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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin-the so-called "pro-
tected classes." To make out a successful civil rights claim under the
current legal structure, a plaintiff must first identify the protected class
under which her claim arises (i.e., race or religion). She must then
identify a subclass of that protected class (i.e., African American race or
Christian religion) and assert that, due to her membership in or relation-
ship to that subclass, she was treated differently in violation of the law.
This Article explores the disconnect between self-identity and perceived
identity in the context of assigning membership in protected classes and
subclasses. Specifically, it analyzes the tension inherent in the protected
class deemed "color."
By tracing the relevant legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the jurisprudence that has developed in the wake of its passage,
this Article provides critical historical context for how identity has been
assigned in civil rights jurisprudence. It finds that the institutional ac-
tors-the legislature and the courts-abdicated their responsibility to
define the color protected class, differentiate color from race, and give
clarity to the relevant subclasses of a color discrimination claim. Recog-
nizing that gap, parties to civil rights actions have stepped into the void.
Most recently, parties have begun inserting the concept of "people of
color," a term adopted by a modem progressive social movement to build
solidarity and power among non-White minorities, into civil rights chal-
lenges. Such a shift in the language of civil rights law brings to the fore-
front the tension between a plaintiffs self-identification and the plain-
tiff's perceived identity that forms the basis of the defendant's discrimi-
natory action.
This Article warns against adapting the people of color concept for
civil rights litigation. It argues that the category people of color, un-
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doubtedly important to developing cultural and political capacity and
power, should not be inserted into civil rights litigation. Because of the
history of conflating the terms color and "colored," joined with the diffi-
culty in disentangling color from race, the existing legal structure for
establishing civil rights claims leaves little room for reimagining identity.
Inserting the people of color construct into civil rights challenges will
undercut the potential of the law to provide broad protection against dis-
crimination and runs counter to the goal of achieving racial equality.
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It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of al-
ways looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring
one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt
and pity. One ever feels his twoness,-an American, a Negro; two
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in




On December 17, 2009, Judge Mary S. Scriven, federal district
court judge in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
1. W.E.B. DU BoIs, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 8 (1903).
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Florida, looked down from the bench and asked counsel for the United
States of America, "Am I black?"2 Counsel responded, "To my naked
eye, you are, Your Honor."3 Judge Scriven's question at the pretrial con-
ference in United States v. Fountain View Apartments, a civil rights case
involving allegations of race or color and familial status discrimination
under the Fair Housing Act,5 illuminates the complicated nature of racial
classification in law. The government's motion to exclude testimony of
Hispanic renters where the complaint alleged discrimination based on
race ("African-American") and color ("black") prompted the court's in-
quiry.6 Defense counsel asserted that defendants should be permitted to
introduce testimony from Hispanic tenants because the complaint alleged
housing discrimination on the basis of "race or color." Defense counsel
posited, "Everything we have researched indicates that the word color
encompasses peoples of color today."7 In other words, she read the asser-
tion of color discrimination under the statute as an assertion of discrimi-
nation against people of color, a term commonly associated with non-
White racial minorities in modem American society.8 Defense counsel
continued, "It's a crucial point in this case, because the complaint alleges
race or color, and it's very important. We have a large population of col-
ored persons historically at Fountain View Apartments. It's a big issue
for us."9 It was clear from context that defense counsel was arguing that,
2. Transcript of Pretrial Hearing at 46, United States v. Fountain View Apartments, Inc.
(Fountain View), No. 6:08-cv-00891 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2014), ECF No. 115.
3. Id.
4. From February 2008 to June 2014, 1 was a trial attorney at the United States Department
of Justice, Civil Rights Division, and acted as lead counsel for the United States in United States v.
Fountain View Apartments. United States v. Fountain View Apartments was originally filed in the
Middle District of Florida on June 4, 2008. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Fountain
View, No. 6:08-cv-00891 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2008). The First Amended Complaint was filed on
August 11, 2009. First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Fountain View, No.
6:08-cv-00891 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009), ECF No. 87.
5. Fountain View, No. 6:08-cv-00891, 2009 WL 1905046, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 2009);
see also Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3631 (2012).
6. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 4, para. 26 ("From at least 2000 through the
present, Defendant James Stevens has been subjecting actual and prospective tenants at Fountain
View Apartments to discrimination on the basis of race or color. Such conduct has included, but is
not limited to: a. Directing Fountain View employees to tell black or African-American prospective
tenants that there are no available apartments, regardless of availability; b. Refusing to negotiate
with black or African-American prospective tenants for rental; c. Misrepresenting the availability of
units to black or African-American potential tenants; d. Threatening to evict one or more tenants
who were known or believed to have black or African-American friends and associates; e. Making
statements with respect to the rental of apartments at Fountain View Apartments indicating a prefer-
ence, a limitation, or discrimination based on race or color; and f. Failing to offer black or African-
American persons the same terms, conditions or privileges regularly offered to white persons.").
7. Transcript of Pretrial Hearing, supra note 2, at 45.
8. See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Any-
more, 47 STAN. L. REv. 957, 962-63 (1995) (noting that the number of groups and subgroups in-
cluded in the people of color construct has grown over time to include an increasing percentage of
non-Blacks); see also Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 53, 55 n.9 (1999) ("The term 'people of color' often refers not only to the possibility of pro-
gressive coalition among subordinated racial groups but also to the changing demographics of the
population of the United States.").
9. Transcript of Pretrial Hearing, supra note 2, at 46.
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if the United States alleged color discrimination, then defendants could
introduce evidence that they rented to some individuals considered peo-
ple of color to rebut the allegation that they refused to rent to other indi-
viduals also considered people of color.10
In civil rights litigation, where discrimination prohibition is based
on identified protected classes-race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin"-the plaintiff identifies the protected class under which her
claim arises. In order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that she was
treated differently because of her membership in a subclass of that pro-
tected class.12 Defense counsel's assertions and Judge Scriven's response
in Fountain View Apartments raise critical questions for civil rights ad-
vocates: As the demographics of the country become more diverse, can
the subcategories that form the basis of a discrimination claim be
reimagined? Who gets to set the boundaries of those subcategories? And
who determines whether the plaintiff falls within or outside of those
boundaries?13 Focusing specifically on the protected class identified as
color, and by tracing the actors who have influenced its definition and
the boundaries of its subclasses, this Article investigates those ques-
tions.14 It concludes that the category people of color, widely used in
society and political advocacy, should not be defined as a subclass of
color within the structure of the civil rights laws. Doing so runs the risk
of swallowing the protections of the color class entirely. Even if the cat-
egory survives, the substantive and evidentiary challenges raised by the
insertion of the people of color construct will restrict development of
10. See id. at 43 ("1 believe there is some question, even as to the claim, Your Honor. The
complaint reads in terms of discrimination in terms of color or race which, in our mind, includes
Hispanic population. Fountain View has traditionally had a significant Spanish population. For
whatever reason, they have not had as many African-Americans there.").
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in certain public and private spheres
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of those pro-
tected classes, along with familial status and disability. Fair Housing Act §§ 804-05, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3604-05 (2012).
12. For example, an African American alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 may allege that she was the victim of discrimination because she is African American, a
particular bounded subclass of race. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -3. She alleges that she was treated
differently because of her membership in the subclass (African American), not the protected class
(race). Similarly, a woman alleging illegal sex discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act
may allege that she faced discrimination because she is female, a particular bounded subclass of sex.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06.
13. There is another critical question related to this analysis-what happens when subclasses
are not or cannot be bounded? In other words, what happens to civil rights legal protections when the
assumptions about boundaries between subclasses cannot be logically maintained? Can the current
civil rights statutory structure survive? Will it have any meaningful impact on addressing entrenched
discrimination and bias? With the exception of a brief analysis of certain courts' discomfort with
color discrimination as an unbounded concept, see infra Section II.B, this Article does not reach
those important questions. For analysis of the broader critique and defense of the rights-based civil
rights model see sources cited infra note 15.
14. The analysis in this Article primarily focuses on the period of time from the debates
preceding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the present. It also focuses exclusively on the American
experience with particular legislation and the interplay with racial labeling and categorization.
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color jurisprudence, which is a critical step to realizing the full potential
of the current civil rights statutes. This will undercut the potential of the
law to provide broad protection against discrimination and runs counter
to the goal of achieving racial equality.'
The legislature, courts, lawyers, plaintiffs, and defendants are all ac-
tors who have a role in asserting and defining protected classes, and the
subcategories within those protected classes, that may form the basis of a
discrimination claim. Part I of this Article tracks the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the categories discussed and assigned
therein. It highlights the tension between the language of racial classifi-
cation (i.e., colored) employed at the time of the debates and the unde-
fined protected class identified as color in the statute itself. It establishes
that Congress refused to define the boundaries of the color protected
class or explicitly identify a distinction between colored and color. Part II
reasons that the legislature's inaction is a primary barrier to the courts'
ability and willingness to (1) recognize colorism (discrimination on the
basis of skin color),16 (2) define the color protected class, and (3) accept
or assign plaintiffs membership in certain subcategories of that protect-
ed class.
Part III begins with a discussion of racial labeling over time, with a
particular emphasis on the changing labels of Blacks in America. It in-
troduces the difference between external categorization and self-
definition, specifically looking at the recent trend of self-categorization
as multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural, and the catchall term
"person (or people) of color." Part III argues that, in the absence of defi-
nition from the legislature and the courts, other actors, including broader
cultural forces, will attempt to define color and its boundaries in civil
15. There is much debate about the utility of the civil rights model as a force of social change
and racial equality. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 8, at 95-96 (arguing that the civil rights model is
based on the experience of Whites, not Blacks, resulting in a structure that ignores the unique needs
of a subordinated group such as social and economic justice and instead focuses on isolated legal
rights); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984) (offering a four-
tier critique on rights-based theory, which includes the ultimate argument that discourse about rights
impedes progressive advances). But see Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Re-
trenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1356-58 (1988) (recognizing both the transformative power of anti-discrimination law and the
dangers of the rights-based approach in legitimizing a structure that has traditionally subordinated
Blacks); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 402-05 (1987) (challenging Critical Legal Studies scholarship in
so much as it wholesale rejects rights-based theory, particularly as the critique is applied "to the
black struggle for civil rights" (footnote omitted)). I find myself and this Article situated in the latter
camp, recognizing both the limits of and the continued need for aggressive enforcement of the cur-
rent anti-discrimination rights-based laws.
16. 1 borrow the definition of "colorism" from Trina Jones's adaptation of Alice Walker's
definition as "the prejudicial treatment of individuals falling within the same racial group on the
basis of skin color in the context of antidiscrimination law." Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law
of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1489 (2000) (quoting ALICE WALKER, If the Present Looks Like
the Past, What Does the Future Look Like?, in IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS 290, 290-
91 (1983) ("Colorism-in my definition, prejudicial or preferential treatment of same-race people
based solely on their color . . .. [I]mpedes us.")).
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rights claims. It also recognizes the powerful impact of self-identification
and agency in detailing one's narrative in the legal arena. Part III con-
cludes by detailing the current trend of pleading discrimination or differ-
ential treatment in civil rights challenges where the complaint invokes
the people of color classification. Finally, Part IV concludes the analysis
by identifying the potential drawbacks of introducing the terms person of
color and people of color into civil rights challenges. Ultimately, this
Article argues that, despite the importance of agency in legal storytelling,
the risk of importing the people of color concept into civil rights chal-
lenges outweighs the benefits.
Racial labels, whether externally defined or self-defined, have pro-
found meaning to those labeling and being labeled.17 While carrying
great meaning, however, labels are mutable and take on different signifi-
cance depending on time, place, and speaker. Today, the people of color
movement may operate to symbolize solidarity and build political and
cultural coalitions among historically disenfranchised groups. Within
the context of the current civil rights legal structure, however, application
of the people of color construction will have the opposite effect. Insertion
of the concept into civil rights jurisprudence may actually retract rights
and inhibit movement toward racial equality.
I. "COLORED" VERSUS "COLOR" - CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
This part provides an in-depth look at the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, paying particular attention to the labels of ra-
cial categorization used therein and comparing those labels with the pro-
tections afforded to individuals based on color. Review of the legislative
history provides three related insights. First, as seen in the debates pre-
ceding the Act's passage, the majority White legislature regularly in-
voked the term colored as a racial label affixed to African Americans,19
17. See infra Section III.B.
18. While use of the term people of color is regularly employed to foster coalition building
among non-Whites in an effort to advance the interests of historically disenfranchised groups, its use
in myriad circumstances also risks essentializing an enormously varied group of individuals and
subgroups. See Caldwell, supra note 8, at 55 (citing Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race
Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICti. L. REV. 821
(1997)) (recognizing that use of the term "people of color" risks "conceal[ing] overlapping and
conflicting theoretical and practical issues"); see also discussion infra Section IlIl.A.
19. It does not escape my attention that use of the term "African American" is a label itself, in
its usage and in its construction (without a hyphen, in this case). Cf Lorraine Bannai & Anne
Enquist, (Un)examined Assumptions and (Un)intended Messages: Teaching Students to Recognize
Bias in Legal Analysis and Language, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 14 n.49 (2003) (noting the recent
trend toward omitting the hyphen for terms that combine races or nationalities); Grant H. Morris,
The Greatest Legal Movie of All Time: Proclaiming the Real Winner, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533,
543 n.25 (2010) (explicitly choosing not to hyphenate African American because it may suggest that
certain Americans are not as worthy as other Americans). The problem of choosing and constructing
labels is replicated in this Article many times, with several different labels. For example, I struggled
with whether to capitalize "Black" and "White." I decided to capitalize both terms, unless they
appeared in a quotation. Cf Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does
"Sound Educational Policy" Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?,
6 [Vol. 93:1
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the group identified by the lawmakers as the primary beneficiary of the
20
legislation. Second, at the time of passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the legislators appeared generally to be operating with a founda-
tional understanding that race is primarily defined as a binary distinction
between Black and White. Therefore, even as some grappled with the
possibility that race and color were different and that color did not mean
colored, a kind of gravitational pull to remain in the binary structure per-
sisted.2 1 Finally, the legislators explicitly refused to define the color pro-
tected class in the statute.22 That refusal has had a lasting impact on the
analysis of civil rights protections today. It stands as an indicator that
racial labels affixed externally define the protections of the Act and also
leaves the courts with little authority to, or guidance on which to, define
protections beyond traditional racial boundaries.
A. "Colored" in 1960s America
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes,
without doubt, that the lawmakers who drafted, amended, and argued
about the landmark statute primarily used the terms "colored" and "Ne-
gro," often interchangeably, to describe Black citizens, the group regular-
ly identified by legislators as the primary beneficiary of the legislation.23
The repeated use of the term colored as a racial label sets the stage for
Congress's refusal to define the color protected class, its boundaries, and
the boundaries of the subcategories under which a color discrimination
claim could arise. It also gives historical context for the current confu-
sion in the courts about the relationship between color and race in civil
rights litigation.
As early as 1962, Senator Kenneth Keating of New York, an advo-
cate of a federal law banning literacy tests in voting, evidenced the ac-
ceptance and institutional use of colored as synonymous with Negro.
Senator Keating quoted the Department of Justice's assessment of the
Fifteenth Amendment on the Senate floor: "[I]t forbids 'onerous proce-
dural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise
by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unre-
stricted as to race,' and it vitiates measures which have the 'inevitable
43 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 n.4 (1994) (noting her choice to capitalize "Black" even though certain reference
guides advise the use of the lowercase because of her assessment of the "need for self-empowerment
and self-definition"); Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1332 n.2 ("When using 'Black,' I shall use an
upper-case 'B' to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute
a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun."); Maritza I. Reyes,
Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital Role ofJudicial Discretion in the Removal ofLaw-
ful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REv. 637, 672 n.268 (2012) ("White and Black are capitalized
in this Article in the same way as Latino and African American.").
20. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 6527-34 (1964) (Senator Humphrey's explanation of the "af-
firmative case" for the civil rights legislation); id. at 6071-79 (Senator Long's explanation of his
opposition to the civil rights legislation).
21. See discussion infra Section I.B.
22. See discussion infra Section I.C.
23. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6527-33 (1964).
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effect' of disenfranchising Negroes."24 Keating and the Department's use
of the terms "the colored race" and "Negroes" shows institutional ac-
ceptance that the terms could be used synonymously to identify a par-
ticular racial group in America. Georgia Senator Herman Talmadge, an
opponent of the same legislation, discussed voter registration statistics
from Georgia in the same way. He noted:
[AIll of the 15 Georgia counties in which Negro registration amounts
to 25 percent or more of the total number of voters are small rural
counties. In one of them-the coastal county of Liberty-the Jour-
nal's tabulation showed 14 more colored persons registered than
white... . And of the six Georgia counties in which no Negroes are
registered, four of them in north Georgia, where few, if any, colored
people reside.25
Opponents of the civil rights bill regularly used the terms Negroes
and colored to describe the same population. For example, in complain-
ing about the request for a trade school for Blacks, Senator Russell Long
of Louisiana noted, "The community did not have such a school for
whites, but they asked to have one for Negroes, because the colored citi-
zens did not have adequate facilities available to them."2 6 And in one of
the most loathsome exchanges in the legislative history, Senator Long
and Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina affixed colored and Ne-
gro labels to the same population of people:
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Would it not be fair to ask what kind of fix
the colored folks would be in if they had not been brought to this
country, but had been allowed to roam the jungles, with tigers chas-
ing them, or being subjected to the other elements they would have to
contend with, compared with the fine conditions they enjoy in Amer-
ica?
Mr. THURMOND. Of course, the Negroes are much better off as a
result of their coming to this country.27
Senators Long and Thurmond, employing colored and Negro in the
most pejorative way, frame the civil rights legislation as inextricably
linked with slavery. It is yet another demonstration that the term colored
cannot be separated from the country's history of racial oppression of
Blacks. And, therefore, it becomes more difficult to separate color dis-
crimination from race discrimination. America's history of racial hierar-
chy, which has been woven into the fabric of our language over time,
creates significant complexity when trying to separate color discrimina-
tion from race discrimination.
24. 108 CONG. REC. 7797 (1962) (quoting Department of Justice brief).
25. Id. at 7217.
26. 110 CONG. REC. 7605 (1964).
27. Id. at 7903.
[Vol. 93:18
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As seen in the Keating quote, it was not just civil rights opponents
who conflated the terms colored and Negro in the debates leading up to
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Senator Dodd, Democrat
from Connecticut, for example, complained of segregation and exclusion
in the craftsman economy.28 He noted that "although there exist two Ne-
gro locals for cement mixers and bricklayers, most colored persons are
employed only as unskilled laborers."29 And in support of Title VI of the
legislation, Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island noted that two hospi-
tals in North Carolina denied medical care "to those whose skin was col-
ored."30 He went on to note that "[t]he Federal funds that helped to build
these hospitals were raised, of course, by taxation-taxes paid by both
white and Negro citizens. But the Negro in need of care could not get it
at these hospitals simply because he was a Negro."3'
The pervasive use of the term colored to describe Blacks in the civil
rights debates and the similarity of the term colored to one of the identi-
fied protected classes-color-is of particular import because it both
exacerbated the association between color and race and quelled any
movement to articulate legitimate differences between the two con-
structs. It ultimately operated to limit the emerging definition of the color
protection. The legislators' foundational approach to race as a binary
distinction between White and Black offers a primary reason why.
B. White Versus Black - A Binary Assessment ofRace
The debates preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
establish that the legislators' primary approach to race was one of a sin-
gular distinction-White or Black. The binary approach to race is im-
portant in this analysis because it sets the stage for Congress's failure to
define the color protected class or explicitly distinguish it from race. That
the color protection was so close to the term for Blacks-colored-
further reinforced the singular division between Black and White, which
became basic to the understanding of both the race and color categories
in the legislation.
Certain opponents of the proposed legislation argued that the civil
rights law would increase the distinction and difference between the two
races-Black and White. In arguing that the legislation was unnecessary,
South Carolina Senator Olin Johnston discussed proposed changes to
voting laws: "Many States have a provision written into the qualifica-
tions for voters that if persons have been tried and convicted of certain
crimes, they cannot vote.. . . That applies to white or colored citizens.
There is no distinction between the two races in that respect.,32 Senator
28. 109 CONG. REC. 4155 (1963).
29. Id.
30. 110 CONG. REc. 7054.
31. Id.
32. 109 CONG. REc. 5101 (1963).
2015] 9
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Russell Long of Louisiana used similar language in protesting legal inte-
gration measures by reasoning that forced integration would further in-
crease tension between the two races. He questioned, "Do Senators real-
ize how much legislation on this subject is already in our
lawbooks? ... More of it-especially the kind of it which was rammed
through the House and which is now before us-will only drive the white
and the colored races further apart ... .33
Many supporters of the legislation shared the binary assessment of
race in America. In affirming his support for Title VI of the legislation,
Senator Philip Hart, Michigan Democrat, identified the legislation as one
equalizing treatment of two races:
I share ... the hope and belief that in the weeks immediately ahead
the kind of record that is being made here today will enable us to
consider the facts intelligently and respond to the several recommen-
dations made in the President's civil rights message, particularly that
section which aims at the use of funds for programs that are worth-
while. In my judgment, such programs will not be killed. Rather, the
purpose is to have applicable in the administration of such programs
rules which are consistent with the kind of nation we preach to the
rest of the world that we are, a Nation that treats all its people with
equal hand and equal justice, and does not have one window marked
"white" and another window marked "colored," in order that taxpay-
ers, white and colored alike, may participate in Federal programs.34
Proponents and opponents of the legislation did contemplate benefi-
ciaries of the legislation outside of the traditional Black/White binary.
Senator Hubert Humphrey, Minnesota Democrat, specifically identified
the fact that the legislators' first instinct was to restrain their analysis to
traditional Black/White racial boundaries.35 In trying to push against that
impulse, he noted, "[C]itizens of America-not colored citizens-and,
by the way, let us stop talking about colored citizens, and let us talk
about citizens, because there are all shades of color."36 Although less
explicitly, in opposing the bill just before its passage, Senator Russell
Long of Louisiana also gave a nod to the possibility that color might
encompass an identity beyond Black and White.37 In asserting that "tip-
ping" is a natural by-product of integration, he noted,
[W]hen our liberal friends went about integrating the school system
in Washington, they found that where 1 percent of the schoolchildren
in a school were colored, no one tended to move out of the area, ex-
cept perhaps one or two families. When the percentage reached 8 or
10 percent, the whites started moving out. By the time it reached 20
33. 109 CONG. REC. 5881 (1963).
34. Id. at 12,102.
35. 110 CONG. REC. 7799.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 7563.
[Vol. 93:110
BRANDING IDENTITY
percent, the whites were moving out even faster. Then when it
reached about 70 or 80 percent, the great liberal integrationists
moved out themselves. So eventually no one was left except one or
two white children in an entire school. In an instance like that if one
were to study the situation, he would probably find that some of
those might have been Puerto Ricans, or might have come from areas
where there is somewhat of a shade between the white and the col-
ored races.38
Even Senator Strom Thurmond, in opposing the legislation by tout-
ing his version of racial progress, gave lip service to the concept that
color may be broader than colored. He noted:
I want to see the people of this country-white or Negro, or of any
other color-have every advantage and every opportunity and all the
rights to do well and make progress. I think we should be proud of
what we have accomplished in the United States, and we should
broadcast hese facts to the world.3 9
It is hard to ignore, however, the power of the foundational
approach, the instinct that race is essentially defined as White versus
Black, a singular and clear differentiation between two specific groups.
In summing up his remarks in favor of the bill, Senator Warren Mag-
nuson, Democrat from Washington, demonstrated that the legislation, at
its core, was designed to equalize treatment of Blacks and Whites.40 So,
even when he explicitly invoked differential treatment on the basis of the
color of one's skin, his starting point was a binary Black/White racial
assessment:
Our assumption is that this is a nation of equals-yet this assumption
falls to the ground as soon as discrimination to the Negro is taken in-
to account.
The hard fact is that the American system of equality has, up to now,
left out men and women whose skins were of another color.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 5802. Senator Thurmond's comment raises two related issues that should be kept in
mind when assessing the usefulness of the language used by the lawmakers opposed to the civil
rights legislation. First, each speaker presumably had an agenda and it is difficult, if not impossible,
to separate the language used in a statement from the underlying agenda. That is not to say, however,
that the language used isn't relevant to the inquiries this Article explores. Rather, as courts struggled
to understand congressional intent, it is important to recognize how the lawmakers' agendas influ-
enced the outcome. See infra Section W.A. Second, Senator Thurmond's statement articulates that
White may be deemed a subclass of color. The implications of that understanding and its effect on
emerging color discrimination claims are discussed later in this Article. Infra Section IV.A.
40. See I10 CONG. REc. 7412.
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The Federal judiciary has been forthright in upholding the proposi-
tion that race has no place in American life or law-that, in the lapi-
dary phrase of the elder Justice Harlan, the American Constitution is
colorblind.41
Congress's binary Black/White assessment of race sets the stage for
the collapse of the color protection into race. It evidences a lack of vision
on the part of the legislation's designers to imagine that there could be
subcategories within the protected class that would deviate from tradi-
tional racial assessment. More specifically, it fails to imagine a scenario
other than a Black complainant seeking recourse from a White defend-
ant. When we place the language of the Civil Rights Act and its legisla-
tive history in the historical context of segregation and Jim Crow, it is
understandable that legislators viewed the debate as a largely binary
Black/White debate. A significant effect of that viewpoint, however, is
Congress's resulting lack of urgency or foresight to define critical terms
in the statute.
C. "Color" is Undefined in the Statute
Throughout the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress
expressly and repeatedly refused to define certain critical words, includ-
ing color. The legislative history shows that the choice to omit defini-
tions was deliberate. Based on the data and reasoning set forth above,
one may hypothesize that is because those same lawmakers did not or
could not articulate the relationship between colored and color or race
and color.
Opponents of the civil rights legislation specifically challenged the
meaning of the term color during the many debates on the legislation.
Senator John Little McClellan, Arkansas Democrat, and Texas Republi-
can Senator John Tower discussed the lack of a definition for the term
color:
Mr. McCLELLAN. What is "color" as defined by the bill?
Mr. TOWER. I am not sure I understand what is it.
Mr. McCLELLAN. The bill does not define it, does it?
Mr. TOWER. It is not defined. The term is ambiguous.
42
Senators McClellan and Tower purposefully draw attention to the
bill's failure to define color in an effort to discredit the constitutionality
and efficacy of the proposed legislation.43 The legislators continue:
41. Id.




Mr. McCLELLAN. Suppose that one of the six people to whom I re-
ferred should be one-tenth Negro. Under the statute would he be con-
sidered colored, or would he be considered more white than black, so
that color would not enter into the question of his possible employ-
ment or rejection?
Mr. TOWER. That is a very interesting question. If he had a multina-
tional background, and there were some sort of obligation imposed
by the commission on the employer, to hire, say, a certain percentage
of people with one particular ethnic background, and another per-
centage of people with another ethnic background, the question
would be difficult enough for anybody to resolve, but it would be left
to the arbitrary will and discretion of the commission.4
The second part of the colloquy establishes that, although there was
no explicit definition of color, Senators McClellan and Tower assumed
that color was rooted in the term colored as they defined it synonymously
with Black. And as the conversation continued, it became clear that the
confusion was not limited to the relationship between color and colored,
but that the confusion extended to other critical terms in the statute, such
as race and national origin:
Mr. McCLELLAN. The pending bill does not undertake to define
what is color and what is not color; does it?
Mr. TOWER. No; and we get into a real problem when we go into
questions of color, religion, sex, or national origin. There can be all
sorts of discussions along those lines.45
The colloquy between Senators McClellan and Tower is interesting
because it not only explicitly challenges the bill's failure to define the
term color but also demonstrates the legislators' failure to disentangle
racial labels (i.e., colored) from protected classes (i.e., color) and pro-
tected classes from one another (i.e., color as compared to race).
In debate the next day, Senator McClellan further demonstrated his
inability to identify any meaningful differences between the terms color,
colored, and Negro, even as he protested the bill's failure to define the
term color:
The bill does not define what color is. What is color?
... The bill defines nothing. It leaves the situation in a hodgepodge.





If he is 55 percent white and 45 percent Negro, what is he, then,
white or Negro, under this bill?
The bill contains no definition.
Proponents of the legislation never answered the call to define
47color. Representatives Abernethy and Celler did, however, engage in a
conversation acknowledging that certain intraracial discrimination could
trigger protection under the color prong of related civil rights legislation:
Mr. ABERNETHY. I will ask another question. If it should be ille-
gal-and I understand it would be under this bill-for an employer
not to hire a person on the ground of race-that is, color-would it
be illegal not to hire because of the shade of color, that is because the
skin of the applicant is too dark?
Mr. CELLER. I suppose shade of color would be color. The whole
embraces all its parts.
Mr. ABERNETHY. ... Would the FEPC have authority to correct an
employment discrimination among our Negro citizens in the District
of Columbia, where light-skinned Negroes refuse to hire Negroes of
dark skin?
Mr. CELLER... . I may say if there is any discrimination against the
Negro regardless of his shade or gradation of pigmentation of his
skin in employment, that discrimination would be a violation of this
act.4 8
Like the exchange between Senators McClellan and Tower above,
the conversation between Representatives Abernethy and Celler shows
that, even in the most expansive reading of color, the confusion between
racial labels and protected categories persisted. The conversation high-
lights the difficulty legislators had both separating color from colored (or
46. Id. at 7875.
47. Congressman Dowdy of Texas offered several amendments to Title VII in February of
1964. One such amendment added certain definitions to the bill, including to "define 'race' to in-
clude the Caucasian race, and [ ] define 'color' to include white, and [ ] define 'religion' to include
the word 'Protestants' and the phrase 'national origin' to include people born in the United States of
America." Id. at 2725. He explained:
From the discussions we have had on the floor here there seems to be some doubt that
these things were covered. This last amendment would at least make the bill applicable to
everybody. And if there is any protection in the bill for anybody, it would give everybody
the same equal protection under the law, if there is any protection in the bill.
Id at 2725-26. Although Representative Celler previously acknowledged that the bill banned dis-
crimination against White people, the amendment was rejected. Id. at 2552, 2727.




Negro) and distinguishing discrimination on the basis of race from dis-
crimination on the basis of color.49
Senator Gale McGee, Wyoming Democrat, a proponent of the civil
rights legislation, recognized the importance of words and definitions but
remained steadfast against pressure to include definitions for all such
terms. He explained:
It is always a fascinating exercise to discuss what words mean. The
meaning of words changes in each generation, in the course of time. .
. . So long as we are dealing with human language, we shall have a
disagreement about the meaning of words....
I submit that so long as there are as many individuals interested in the
specific semantics of the language as there are, we can never reach an
absolute definition.
So, the choice is, Shall we do nothing, or shall we go too slowly and
make certain that we do not make a mistake? Or shall we take a kind
of step forward, with the kind of chance it represents, in order to pro-
duce timely action in the measure or tempo of our times?
A part of the colloquy on the floor of the Senate will make clear the
general order of intent of Congress that will not be ignored down-
town, even though we understand from time to time that there are,
sometimes, misreadings of what a man meant when he said a certain
thing.
But again, we must take chances. Therefore, I would hesitate to see
us worry so much about the meanings of words and the absolute in-
terpretations of where we go from here. I think it is important that we
lay down some broad, general guidelines to move us another step to-
ward the achievement of what we all agree is our dream of human
rights.50
Senator McGee's observations may represent he ultimate reasoning
behind the decision to exclude definitions of color and related terms. He
49. Other proponents of civil rights legislation showed similar confusion. During the course
of the debates for the Fair Employment Practices Act for the District of Columbia, Senator Thomas
Dodd, Democrat from Connecticut, assumed that color discrimination is a problem of the "Negro
population," noting,
I have been told that there are thousands of young people in this city who are no longer in
school, but who cannot obtain employment largely because of their color. And I have
been told time and again that the inability to obtain work is one of the main causes of de-
linquency and crime among young members of the Negro population of this city.
109 CONG. REC. 4154 (1963). And in discussing whether to bar literacy tests in elections, Senator
Jacob Javits, liberal Republican from New York, similarly commented, "certain States have deprived
thousands of Negroes of the right to vote on the ground of color, in violation of the 15th amend-
ment." 108 CONG. REC. 7913 (1962).
50. 110 CONG. REC. 7794.
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acknowledges that language is inherently ambiguous. Senator McGee,
however, assumes that the broad guidelines laid out in the legislation will
suffice to impart its meaning to future interpreters and adjudicators,
which has not proven accurate.5 2 Senator McGee's sentiments are trou-
bling in another way. The changing nature of words and labels may be
"fascinating" in an academic sense, but the legislation was designed to
provide specific legal protection to groups that had been historically dis-
enfranchised and particularly vulnerable to bias and discrimination. As
will be seen in the next part, the failure to define the categories of people
who were afforded protection under the Act has had lasting consequenc-
es in the development of the jurisprudence. Failure on the part of the
legislature to define color, to separate it from race and distinguish it from
colored, left a vacuum that courts have been reluctant to fill. That vacan-
cy has thus limited the protections embedded in the Act from being fully
realized.
II."COLORISM" IN THE COURTS
Congress failed to define color discrimination in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and related statutes. The second most obvious actor to pro-
vide elucidation on the meaning of the statutory language, the judiciary,
has offered minimal guidance and essentially no clarification.
The courts' approach to allegations of color discrimination is unsur-
prising for three primary reasons. First, when viewing language and ra-
cial categorization in the historical context of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Congress offered little guidance to uniformly or consistently define
color and color discrimination or apply legal tests for ferreting out such
discrimination. Further, courts seemingly are similarly influenced by the
impulse to view race as a Black/White binary. Without guidance from
51. He fails to see, however, that words contain both semantic and pragmatic meanings.
Muneer Ahmad explains that the former is "the 'fixed context-free meaning' of words" and the latter
is "the meaning that words assume in a particular context, as understood between particular individ-
uals." Muneer 1. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54
UCLA L. REV. 999, 1032 (2007) (quoting GuY COOK, DISCOURSE 29 (1989)). When it comes to
defining the meaning of the term color as a protected class in civil rights legislation, both the seman-
tic and pragmatic meanings of the word, as set forth in the legislative history, are elusive.
52. See infra Part II.
53. A basic tenet of statutory construction is that "courts should endeavor to give meaning to
every word which Congress used and therefore should avoid an interpretation which renders an
element of the language superfluous." Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citing United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997); United Food & Commercial Workers Union
Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 550 (1996); First Bank Nat'1 Ass'n v. FDIC, 79 F.3d
362, 367 (3d Cir. 1996)). So that is the first principle: every word should be given meaning. But
what happens when the words used in statutes are undefined or ill-defined? At that point, courts,
commentators, and advocates look to the legislative history to give meaning to the words of a statute.
See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 422-26 (1985) (assessing the plain language of the
statute and then assessing congressional intent). And that is the second principle: legislators' dis-
course provides elucidation for statutory language. In the context of defining the meaning and
boundaries of color discrimination and its related subcategories in civil rights legislation, those
principles have been essentially unrealized.
BRANDING IDENTITY
the legislature, and starting from a narrow understanding of racial cate-
gorization, courts have made incongruous and sometimes baffling deci-
sions with respect to defining and delineating color discrimination
claims. Second, courts are uncomfortable categorizing and labeling peo-
ple based on skin color, which runs along a spectrum and cannot be easi-
ly categorized,54 an issue that will be more fully addressed later in this
part. Third, the majority of litigants who plead color discrimination plead
it as part and parcel of a race discrimination claim. It is unsurprising that
courts fail to separate claims based on two protected classes-race and
color-when litigants themselves generally conflate the concepts. Alt-
hough overlapping issues that inform each other, this part addresses each
in turn.
A. Barriers to Moving "Color" Beyond "Colored"
Courts, like the legislators who drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
have been stymied by a binary understanding of race. That binary as-
sessment has influenced the judiciary's willingness to grapple with dif-
ferentiating color discrimination from race discrimination, determining
how to assess color discrimination claims, and deciding who is responsi-
ble for drawing the relevant boundaries.55 Because the civil rights laws
rose from the vestiges of slavery and Jim Crow, it is challenging even
now to move beyond that binary analysis.
When a court begins its analysis of race and color discrimination
with an impulse to consider race and racial categorization under a
Black/White binary analysis, it is difficult to see color discrimination
56separate and apart from race discrimination. Through a Black/White
54. There is certainly a strong argument, however, that race is no more easily categorized than
color. In the simplest analysis, there is almost no such thing as a pure race. Perhaps more complicat-
ed, but no less true, understanding that the concept of race is a social construct, it is difficult to
suggest that race can be definitively ascribed or adopted. See, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, Administer-
ing Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1283-
85 (1994) ("The administration of our extensive corpus of anti-discrimination law and preferential
policy requires that we make 'hard' variables of the very 'soft' concepts of race and ethnicity.").
55. Trina Jones identifies a bias in American civil rights jurisprudence "towards thinking of
discrimination in Black and White and cross-racial (as opposed to intra-racial) terms." Trina Jones,
Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 657, 677 (2010). Jones has also challenged courts and scholars to separate
color discrimination from race discrimination. Jones, supra note 16, at 1532-34. While Jones
acknowledges that race and color are overlapping phenomena, and that both concepts are social
constructions, she makes a concrete distinction between race discrimination and color discrimina-
tion. She explains her views on the overlap in the concepts: "Skin color is one device for assigning
people to a racial category. Race is the social meaning attributed to that category. It is a set of beliefs
or assumptions about individuals falling within a particular racial group." Id. at 1497. Jones goes on
to distinguish colorism from racism: "With colorism, skin color does not serve as an indicator of
race. Rather, it is the social meaning afforded skin color itself that results in differential treatment."
Id
56. That color discrimination is separate and distinct from race discrimination, however, is not
a conclusion accepted universally. Angela Harris argues that "race and color are not two different
[concepts]." Angela P. Harris, Essay, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in the
New Century, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 52, 61 (2008). Drawing on what she has de-
fined as the "performativity school" of critical race theory, Harris identifies color as a trigger for
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lens, it is also difficult to envision the circumstances under which a
member of one racial category may discriminate on the basis of color-
not race-against a member of a different racial category. It is unsurpris-
ing, therefore, that courts have primarily given credence to color discrim-
ination claims when they are pleaded in circumstances of intragroup dis-
crimination-discrimination against one who is a member of the perpe-
trator's same racial group.
In Walker v. Secretary of the Treasury, IRS,57 for example, the
plaintiff alleged color discrimination under Title VII, specifically arguing
that her supervisor, a dark-skinned Black woman, was prejudiced against
light-skinned Blacks, a class into which plaintiff fell. In Walker, the
court rejected defendant's suggestion that the terms race and color in
Title VII are synonymous, pointing to "case law [that] repeatedly and
distinctly refer to race and color." 59 The court then drew the obvious
conclusion:
This court is left with no choice but to conclude, when Congress and
the Supreme Court refer to race and color in the same phrase, that
"race" is to mean "race", [sic] and "color" is to mean "color". [sic]
To hold otherwise would mean that Congress and the Supreme Court
have either mistakenly or purposefully overlooked an obvious redun-
dancy.0
The Walker court also explicitly recognized the physiognomic dif-
ferences between members of the same race, specifically Blacks:
It would take an ethnocentric and naive world view to suggest that
we can divide caucasians into many sub-groups but some how [sic]
all blacks are part of the same sub-group. There are sharp and distinc-
tive contrasts amongst native black African peoples (sub-Saharan)
both in color and in physical characteristics.6 1
Similarly, in Jones v. Jefferson Parish62 the court declined to dis-
miss the plaintiffs color discrimination claims under Title VII, noting
that "[1]ight-skinned blacks sometimes discriminate against dark-skinned
racial discrimination. Id. at 61-62. She ultimately argues that "[tihe shift from categorical racism to
colorism, if that is what the United States is currently experiencing, signals a more complex racial
environment, but not a necessarily less racist one." Id. at 62. Taunya Lovell Banks similarly identi-
fies color discrimination as a form of race-based discrimination, which she labels "[r]ace-related
discrimination." Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705,
1743 (2000) [hereinafter Banks, Colorism]; Taunya Lovell Banks, Multilayered Racism: Courts'
Continued Resistance to Colorism Claims, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATrERS
213, 216 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 2009) [hereinafter Banks, Multilayered].
57. 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
58. Id. at 404.
59. Id. at 406.
60. Id.; see also Barrella v. Village of Freeport, 43 F. Supp. 3d 136, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
61. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 407-08.
62. No. 12-2191, 2013 WL 871539 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2013).
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blacks, and vice versa, and either form of discrimination is literally color
discrimination."63
Similarly, the most likely place to find a color discrimination com-
plaint addressed by courts arises in cases involving a plaintiff of Puerto
Rican descent.M In 1980, for example, the court in Felix v. Marquez65
denied the defendant employer's motion for summary judgment, recog-
nizing that color discrimination was a legitimate claim under Title VII. 6 6
The court noted, "Color may be a rare claim, because color is usually
mixed with or subordinated to claims of race discrimination, but consid-
ering the mixture of races and ancestral national origins in Puerto Rico,
color may be the most practical claim to present."67
The district court in Rodriguez v. Gattuso,68 a case arising under the
Fair Housing Act, echoed Felix.69 After a bench trial, the court found that
the defendant landlords had been willing to rent an apartment to a light-
skinned Latina woman until they saw her dark-skinned Latino husband.
The court discussed color discrimination specifically:
Most often "race" and "color" discrimination are viewed as synony-
mous, just as the term "white citizens" is most often contrasted with
"black citizens"-a racial distinction. But the very inclusion of "col-
or" as a separate term in addition to "race" in Section 3604(b) implies
strongly that someone who is of the same race ("race" as used in the
63. Id. at *5-7 (quoting Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also
Nettle v. Cent. Okla. Am. Indian Health Council, Inc., 334 F. App'x 914, 926 (10th Cir. 2009);
Rodriguez v. Gattuso, 795 F. Supp. 860, 865 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Rougeau v. La. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
No. 3:04-cv-00432-JJB-DLD, 2008 WL 818961, at *8 (M.D. La. Mar. 25, 2008).
64. Banks, Multilayered, supra note 56, at 217-18.
65. No. 78-2314, 1980 WL 242 (D.D.C. Sept. I1, 1980).
66. Id at *1.
67. Id; see also Falero Santiago v. Stryker Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96 (D.P.R. 1998). In
Falero Santiago, the plaintiff filed a Title VII action against his former employer for discrimination
on the basis of national origin and color. Id. at 94. Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting analysis, the defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to meet the "replaced" prong of the
prima facie case because his duties were reassigned to another Puerto Rican. Id. at 96. The court
pointed to the color discrimination claim, noting that "[tihe fact that Cabrera's skin is of a different
color places him outside Falero's protected class, and is enough to satisfy the fourth element of
plaintiffs prima facie case." Id. Citing to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Shaare Tefila Congrega-
tion v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987), the Falero Santiago court noted that plaintiff's case raised "alle-
gations of intertwined national origin and color discrimination under Title VII, and given that Title
VII explicitly affords protection against both national origin and color discrimination, the same
reasoning [as the Court used in Shaare Tefila] would apply here." Falero Santiago, 10 F. Supp. 2d at
97. Although the court found that the plaintiff was ultimately unable to establish that the defendant's
proffered reason for his dismissal was pretextual, Falero Santiago stands as one of the few cases that
recognize both that color discrimination is actionable as an individual claim under Title VII and also
that a color discrimination claim can stand alongside, without being subordinated to, a claim of
discrimination based on another protected class (national origin). See id. at 98-99. The same analysis
could easily be applied to "double discrimination" based both on race and color. The key issue to
acknowledge is that color is not subordinated to race or national origin, but that a victim of discrimi-
nation on the basis of race and color faced adverse employment (or housing) actions both because of
his color and because of his race. That is a distinctly different analysis from one in which courts treat
race and color claims as one and the same.
68. 795 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
69. Id. at 865.
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ethnic sense, not he broader sense announced in St. Francis College
v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-13 (1987) as the 19th century un-
derstanding of the term) but who is treated differently because of his
dark skin has been discriminated against because of his color-
something expressly forbidden by Section 3604(b).70
Because of the impulse to think about race as a Black/White binary,
the Rodriguez analysis has not translated to a broader array of color dis-
crimination cases. In fact, in light of the current jurisprudence, there is a
danger that recognition of color discrimination claims will adhere only to
claims of intraracial discrimination or other circumstances in which tra-
ditional racial boundaries do not appear to apply.7 In Rougeau v. Louisi-
ana Department of Social Services,7 2 for example, the plaintiff, a female
of biracial heritage, alleged iscrimination and retaliation on the bases of
race, color, and gender.73 While the court specifically recognized that
"[t]here is no doubt that plaintiff, who is of bi-racial decent [sic], is a
member of a protected class," the court did not specify under which pro-
tected class it was analyzing Rougeau's claims.74 The majority of the
opinion discusses "racially charged" questioning, "racial harassment,"
and "racial discrimination," suggesting that the court viewed Rougeau's
color claim as subsumed in her race claim. The court only separated out
the color claim in one specific instance. When discussing Rougeau's
disparate treatment allegations, the court discussed allegations against
three of the plaintiffs supervisors, two Caucasian and one African
American.76 The court assessed the former two under a race discrimina-
tion claim and noted, with respect to the African American supervisor,
that "the likely basis for plaintiffs discrimination claim against Ms.
Booker is not racial discrimination, but rather color discrimination,
which is recognized, albeit rarely, under Title VII." 7 7
The Rougeau court's approach may be a symptom of its urge to
view racial categories narrowly drawn as White versus Black. Without a
70. Id. (parallel citations omitted).
71. That is not to say that intraracial discrimination cases are asy to win. Trina Jones identi-
fies the challenges of proving intragroup discrimination, in part because the claims "do not fit the
usual analytical framework for discrimination cases." Jones, supra note 55, at 680. She defines types
of intragroup discrimination claims, identifying particular barriers to those claims and articulating
practical tactics plaintiffs can take to succeed in such claims. Id. at 677-80. Jones identifies specific
challenges for plaintiffs alleging intraracial, intragroup discrimination, which she defines as vertical
intragroup discrimination. Id. at 681-88. Rougeau v. Louisiana Department of Social Services, is an
example of intraracial, intragroup discrimination-a Black supervisor discriminating against a light-
er-skinned Black employee. Rougeau v. La. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3:04-cv-00432-JJB-DLD,
2008 WL 818961, at *8 (M.D. La. Mar. 25, 2008). Jones argues that skepticism, indifference, and
acceptance of such actions create barriers to successful vertical intragroup discrimination claims.
Jones, supra note 55, at 687-88.
72. No. 3:04-cv-00432-JJB-DLD, 2008 WL 818961 (M.D. La. Mar. 25, 2008).
73. See id. at *1-2.
74. Id. at *6.
75. Id. at *6-8.
76. See id. at *7-8.
77. Id. at *8.
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broader understanding of racial categories and racial identity, however,
intraracial discrimination is difficult to assess under a traditional race
discrimination analysis. Therefore, courts turn to the undefined, ambigu-
ous concept of color discrimination to explain intraracial discrimination.
The statute, however, does not delineate race discrimination and color
discrimination in those narrow terms. The protection against race dis-
crimination exists regardless of the perpetrator of the discrimination.
And the same is true of the protected class identified as color.
B. Color on a Spectrum
Courts and commentators have identified several impediments to
successful claims involving color discrimination.7 9 Perhaps the barriers
are a symptom of the legislators' and courts' unwillingness to define and
bound the protections against color discrimination, and perhaps they are
the cause of that unwillingness. Whatever the reason, a major hurdle is a
reluctance to label groups based on skin color, seemingly because skin
color runs along a spectrum and cannot easily be categorized. Although
all of the challenges and possible solutions to litigating a successful color
discrimination case are beyond the scope of this Article, the discomfort
with labeling and categorizing groups based on skin color is central to
this Article's assessment of how color is defined, the subcategories that
arise within the protected class, and who gets to define those categories.
The court in Sere v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois80
explicitly identified the discomfort with categorizing individuals based
on skin color. In dismissing plaintiffs intraracial discrimination claim
under Section 1981, the court stated that it "refuse[d] to create a cause of
action that would place it in the unsavory business of measuring skin
color and determining whether the skin pigmentation of the parties is
sufficiently different to form the basis of a lawsuit."81 Although Al-
Khazraji v. Saint Francis College82 overruled Sere's reasoning with re-
spect to intraracial discrimination,83 it did nothing to change the underly-
ing sentiment with respect to the difficulties in measuring skin color.
78. The Rougeau analysis also poses a problem in that it assumes that intragroup race discrim-
ination may not be actionable. See id.
79. The problems of how to successfully litigate a color discrimination claim are beyond the
scope of this Article. For a discussion about specific challenges litigants might face and practical
advice for attorneys representing plaintiffs in intragroup discrimination cases, see Jones, supra note
55, at 662-63. For a discussion of the tests that might be employed in a color discrimination case and
a proposed "race-plus" solution for color discrimination claims, see Enrique Schaerer, Intragroup
Discrimination in the Workplace: The Case for "Race Plus," 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57, 77-91
(2010).
80. 628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1986), abrogation recognized by Jordan v. Whelan Sec. of
Ill., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 746 (2014).
81. Id at 1546.
82. 784 F.2d 505 (3rd Cir. 1986).
83. Id at 517.
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In fact, the court in Moore v. Dolgencorp, Inc.," identified a similar
discomfort. In Moore, a discrimination action arising under Title VII, the
plaintiff, a dark-skinned African American woman, complained of race
discrimination when she was replaced as a manager of a retail store by a
biracial man.85 The court, in assessing her race discrimination claim un-
der the McDonnell Douglas framework, found that the plaintiff failed to
establish the fourth prong of the analysis because the defendant replaced
her with an individual who was a member of the same protected class
(African American). The plaintiff in Moore argued that her replacement
was not a member of the same protected class because he was a "mixed
race" male. She submitted affidavits in support of her claim, averring
that she is "an African-American woman" whose "skin color is dark,
even within the range of other African-Americans, and especially com-
pared to persons of non-African-American heritage, including persons of
mixed race."87 She further averred that she had seen the "mixed race in-
dividual who replaced [her]" and "[w]ithout question, his skin color is
significantly lighter than [plaintiff s]."88 The court in Moore refused to
permit the plaintiff to convert her claims into color discrimination or sex
discrimination claims and viewed the quoted averments as "a back-door
attempt to amend the complaint to add claims of sex and color discrimi-
nation."89 The court ultimately concluded,
To recognize a legal hierarchy within the protected class of race
based upon differences in the hues of skin color would create or deny
legal remedies based upon sub-categories of this class that Congress
has not chosen to recognize. It could also open the door to nearly in-
surmountable issues of proof in court regarding the actual racial her-
itage of a plaintiff and/or a person replacing a plaintiff, not to men-
tion difficulties for everyone in the daily application of the Civil
Rights Act.
90
84. No. 1:05-cv-107, 2006 WL 2701058 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2006).
85. Id. at *2.
86. Id. at *4. Under the test established in McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff establishes his
prima facie Title VII case by showing "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Courts have found that the final prong may be
satisfied by a showing that plaintiff "was replaced by a person not within the protected class." Falero
Santiago v. Stryker Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 93, 95 (D.P.R. 1998) (citing Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte,
Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 673 (1st Cir. 1996)). Once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to establish that there was a valid and non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant is success-
ful, the burden shifts yet again back to the plaintiff to show that the stated reason is "mere pretext"
for discrimination. Id. at 798.
87. Moore, 2006 WL 2701058, at *4.
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id. at *3.
90. Id. at *4; cf Franceschi v. Hyatt Corp., 782 F. Supp. 712, 723-24 (D.P.R. 1992) (ac-
knowledging the difficulty of "distinguishing among a myriad of color shades, physiognomic and
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The sentiments expressed in Sere and Moore may also have been at
the heart of the Northern District of Illinois court's decision in Oranika
v. City of Chicago.91 In Oranika, the court noted that the plaintiffs alle-
gation of national origin discrimination on the basis of being Nigerian
was reasonably related to a claim of race discrimination and color dis-
crimination because "nothing in the Complaint suggests that the people
of Nigeria are not of meaningfully uniform color and race."92 In fact, the
court went on to note that "this at least may be a case where national
origin, race, and color are all effectively the same thing." 93 Taunya Lov-
ell Banks raises the question as to whether that same analysis would have
been applied if the plaintiff was from a majority White country. Citing to
a string of Title VII case law to illustrate courts' extreme reluctance to
acknowledge color discrimination claims when the plaintiff is Black, she
argues, "The colorism cases demonstrate the extent to which courts rec-
ognize, explicitly or implicitly, the fluidity of race when determining
who is white and who is nonwhite, but not black."94 The courts' reluc-
tance to differentiate on the basis of color, especially within the Black
race, circles back around to the central theme of this Article: Who sets
the boundaries of the protected classes and the distinctions and differ-
ences that define the boundaries of their subcategories?
C. Conflating Race and Color Discrimination Claims
To date, the majority of courts treat allegations of color discrimina-
tion as synonymous with allegations of race discrimination. For example,
in affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to defend-
ants, the Third Circuit in Hartman v. Greenwich Walk Homeowners'
Ass'n9 5 acknowledged that the plaintiff alleged discrimination on the
basis of race or color. The court failed, however, to specifically address
the two protected classes as separate claims of discrimination.96 Courts
around the country have proceeded in a similar manner, subsuming color
discrimination into more widely pleaded claims such as race discrimina-
tion and national origin discrimination.9 7 "The result, [as noted by at least
cultural characteristics" and dealing with that discomfort by finding that Saint Francis, for purposes
of Section 1981, "recogni[zed] that physiognomic characteristics are no longer considered the indis-
pensable magic recipient for a cause of action under the statute"); Walker v. Sec'y of Treasury, IRS,
713 F. Supp. 403, 408 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (acknowledging explicitly the difficulty of categorizing
individuals based on skin pigmentation, but ultimately concluding that the color discrimination claim
should be put to the jury).
91. No. 1:04-cv-08113, 2005 WL 2663562 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2005).
92. Id. at *4.
93. Id. at *4 n.3.
94. Banks, Colorism, supra note 56, at 1738; see also Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and
the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MIcH. L. REV.
1161, 1163 (1997).
95. 71 F. App'x 135 (3rd Cir. 2003).
96. Id. at 136.
97. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 579-81 (1st Cir. 1999),
abrogated by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Porter v. Ill. Dep't of Children &
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one commentator,] is that 'color' is read out of the statute."98 It is tempt-
ing to blame that on the systemic issues identified above. It is also, with-
out doubt, a response to the allegations set forth in the complaints and the
resulting causes of action.9
It is not unusual to find civil rights complaints that plead "race or
color discrimination" as a single claim of discrimination. ' The com-
plaint (and amended complaint) in Fountain View Apartments did just
that. With the exception of those paragraphs alleging discrimination on
the basis of familial status, in each and every paragraph alleging discrim-
ination, the complaint alleged discrimination "on the basis of race or
color."10 The complaint in Sturm v. Davyin Investments, Inc.102 provides
yet another example. In Sturm, the complaint alleges violations of the
Fair Housing Act'03 and other state and federal civil rights statutes.'0 In
addition to asserting discrimination on the basis of disability, the Sturm
complaint alleges race or color discrimination as a single cause of ac-
tion. 105 The complaint specifically alleges: "Defendants ... have engaged
in discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiffs because of Plaintiffs'
disability or on account of Plaintiffs' race and color (Black/African
Americans) . . . ."' Like the complaint in Fountain View Apartments,
the Sturm complaint separates the allegations of "race and color" dis-
crimination from the allegations of discrimination on the basis of another
protected class (in Sturm, disability).07 In other words, the complaints in
Family Servs., No. 98-1152, 1998 WL 847099, at *1-4 (7th Cir. Nov. 23, 1998); Love v. United Air
lines, Inc., No. 98-C-6100, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4069, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1999).
98. Schaerer, supra note 79, at 8 1.
99. See, e.g., Barrella v. Vill. of Freeport, 43 F. Supp. 3d 136, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting
the plaintiffs allegations related to "race/color" and "race and/or color" and recognizing that both
parties and courts regularly conflate the concepts of race discrimination and color discrimination
(quoting Complaint at paras. 90-95, Barrella, 43 F. Supp. 3d 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2014))).
100. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 16, at 1533 n. 195, 1537-38 & nn.210-13; Trina Jones, The
Case for Legal Recognition of Colorism Claims, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR
MATrERS, supra note 56, at 223, 229-32.
101. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 5-6.
102. No. 2:12-CV-07305, 2013 WL 8604662 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013).
103. Although the Fair Housing Act was passed in 1968, four years after the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Fair Housing Act (or Title VIII) has generally been considered an extension of Title VII
in that Title VII's jurisprudence and legislative history are generally considered to inform the mean-
ing and import of Title VIII. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
934 (2d Cir. 1988), affd in part sub nom. Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488
U.S. 15 (1988); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Comment, Apply-
ing the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128, 158-60
(1976). Like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one will find no definition of "color" or "race" in the Fair
Housing Act. See Fair Housing Act § 802,42 U.S.C. § 3602 (2012).
104. Complaint for Damages as a Result of Discriminatory Housing Practices Directed at
Plaintiffs in Violation of Federal and State Fair Housing Laws at paras. 50-57, Sturm, No. CV 12-
07305 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012).
105. Id. at paras. 50-57.
106. Id. at para. 13.
107. See id. at para. 14 (asserting that the defendants discriminated in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of rental of a dwelling "based on race and color, and disability" and that the defendants
"evict[ed] tenants and those associated with the tenants because of the tenants' disability, or race and
color").
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Fountain View Apartments and Sturm exemplify the common practice of
alleging "race or color discrimination" using a structure and citing factu-
al allegations that fail to distinguish or give independent meaning to the
color discrimination claim. 08
Litigants have pleaded race or color discrimination as a single cause
of action even in cases where the evidence is solely differential treatment
based on a Black/White binary, such as where match-pair testing of Afri-
can Americans and Whites provides the basis for the allegations of dis-
crimination.1'" Litigants have even pleaded "race or color discrimina-
tion" when relying on census statistics and Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) data, where there is no possibility of differentiating indi-
viduals of varying skin color within a category of race or national origin,
as evidence of discrimination."0 Such an approach only serves to rein-
force the courts' dual inclinations to view race and racial categories as a
Black/White binary and to conflate race and color protections under the
civil rights statutes.
When one looks at the complicated legislative history set forth in
Part I of this Article, the tension between the language used in the statute
("race, color,.. . or national origin") and the words used to ascribe
meaning to the statutory language is stark. The tension between color and
colored, which has played out as a convergence of the color and race
constructs, is a legacy of the debates preceding the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Courts have been disinclined to fill in definition to the color pro-
tection or more clearly differentiate it from the race protection. So it is
left to another actor-plaintiff, defendant, attorney or other-to fill in the
108. That the strategy of pleading "race or color discrimination" has been widely used is un-
surprising. At first glance, employing such a strategy provides litigants the most flexibility. Flexibil-
ity in pleading has always been important in discrimination cases, especially where the defendant's
suspected internal considerations or biases may form the basis of plaintiffs intentional discrimina-
tion claim. In other words, because a plaintiff does not know conclusively if her skin color or her
race was the basis for unfair treatment, it is safest for her to plead "race or color discrimination" to
cover her bases. And since courts generally treat the terms the same, there has been little risk to the
particular client in maintaining the most flexibility possible. The broader risk, as set forth herein, is
the persistent conflation of the race and color protected classes and the resulting limited jurispru-
dence on color discrimination that constrains civil rights protections to traditional notions of race
discrimination.
109. See, e.g., Complaint at paras. 19-21, 53, Fair Hous. Justice Ctr., Inc. v. Revlyn Apart-
ments, LLC, No. CV12-1336 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012) (alleging "discrimination ... because of
race or color" as evidenced through allegations of differential treatment of African Americans and
Whites at the subject property). The most common kind of match-pair testing generally involves a
series of "secret shopper" testers who pose as prospective tenants and gather evidence about differ-
ential treatment of prospective tenants that may be attributed to the tester's membership in a particu-
lar subclass of a protected class.
110. See, e.g., Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at paras. 46, 51-53, 61, 200, Mt. Holly
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, No. 1:08-cv-02584-NLH-JS (D.N.J. May
27, 2008) (citing to 2000 Census statistics regarding the percentage of Whites, African Americans,
and Hispanics from county and block levels in Mount Holly Gardens to support allegations of "race,
color and national origin" discrimination); Complaint at paras. 125-26, 303, Smith v. Bernard Mort-
gage Corp., No. 1:10-cv-05440 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2010) (citing to HMDA data, among other
sources, to allege individual and class violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act for discrimina-
tion on the bases of race, color, and sex).
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gap left by the legislature and the courts. In the absence of pressure from
one of those actors, the jurisprudence on color discrimination will lan-
guish and will fail to develop to more effectively combat discrimination
in our nation.
III. DEFINING AND DELINEATING "PEOPLE OF COLOR"
In the absence of movement from the legislature or courts to define
color discrimination, distinguish it from race discrimination, or identify
the bounds of its subcategories, advocates and litigators have stepped in
to fill the breach. One significant move is the recent trend to import the
people of color construct into civil rights suits."' In the last decade, there
has been a surge of civil rights complaints that explicitly reference peo-
ple of color. The final section of this part looks at that trend. Before get-
ting there, however, this part sets the stage by tracing the past and current
use of racial labels used for the Black community. It also addresses the
recent adoption of the term people of color to include Blacks and other
non-White minorities. By analyzing the different racial labels applied to
the same community, this part establishes two important and related
themes. First, that labels are mutable and the meaning ascribed to them is
variable based on time, place, and speaker. Second, that labels are mean-
ingful to those being labeled and those doing the labeling. Both because
of, and in spite of, those related themes, litigants must carefully consider
how they identify and label their identity for the specific purpose of mak-
ing out a legal claim under the current anti-discrimination statutes.
A. A BriefHistory of "People of Color"
Although the term "people of color" is used regularly in social and
cultural discourse today, it is not a new term of identification. In The
Color of Words: An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Ethnic Bias in the
United States, cultural anthropologist Philip Herbst begins his definition
of "people of color, People of Color" with an explicit acknowledgement
that the terms have been "long in English usage for any nonwhite catego-
,,112ry.
In fact, a search of early statutory language confirms Herbst's as-
sessment and reveals that the term was originally employed as a divisive
and exclusionary device for oppression of those deemed to be "of color."
111. This analysis is particularly concerned with the dangers inherent in defining people of
color as a bounded subclass of color. For the reasons set forth in Section II.C, supra, however,
discrimination allegations on behalf of or involving people of color are not always explicitly limited
to claims of color discrimination. Rather, the claims arise under anti-discrimination statutes alleging
color discrimination, race discrimination or "race and/or color discrimination." See infra Section
III.C.
112. PHILIP H. HERBST, THE COLOR OF WORDS: AN ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF ETHNIC
BIAS IN THE UNITED STATES 178 (1997). Herbst seeks to provide an "extensive reference collection




For example, in 1803, Congress enacted a federal statute titled "An Act
to Prevent the Importation of Certain Persons into Certain States, Where,
by the Laws Thereof, Their Admission is Prohibited" 13 :
[N]o master or captain of any ship or vessel, or any other person,
shall import or bring, or cause to be imported or brought, any negro,
mulatto, or other person of colour, not being a native, a citizen, or
registered seaman of the United States, or seamen natives of coun-
tries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, into any port or place of the
United States, which port or place shall be situated in any state which
by law has prohibited or shall prohibit the admission or importation
of such negro, mulatto, or other person of colour .... 114
An 1830 Report of the Proceedings of the Pennsylvania Coloniza-
tion Society notes "[o]f all the descriptions of our population, and of
either portion of the African race, the free people of color are, by far, as a
class, the most corrupt, depraved and abandoned.""'5 The Pennsylvania
Colonization Society, an auxiliary of the American Colonization Society,
aimed to "transport to the Western shores of Africa, from the United
States, all such free persons of color as choose voluntarily to go." 116 In
1839, the District of Columbia Circuit Court upheld "'[a]n act concern-
ing free negroes, mulattoes, and slaves,' passed on [May 31], 1827,"
which prohibited any "free black or mulatto person" from freely moving
through Washington after 10:00 pm, excepting any "person of color
passing peaceably through the streets to or from a meeting-house or
place of worship; [or] any person of color sent on an errand by the owner
or employer of such person."1 7 And, in 1927, a Georgia anti-
miscegenation statute punished "[a]ny charge or intimation against a
white female of having sexual intercourse with a person of color"" 8 An-
other Georgia statute provided definition: "All negroes, mulattoes, and
their descendants, having any ascertainable trace of . .. either Negro or
African, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian blood in his or her veins, shall be
known in this State as persons of color."" 9
It is telling that in Dred Scott v. Sandford,120 as support for its find-
ing that the Black plaintiff held no rights or privileges afforded by the
United States Constitution, the Supreme Court identified a series of local
113. AN ACT TO PREVENT THE IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN PERSONS INTO CERTAIN STATES,
WHERE, BY THE LAWS THEREOF, THEIR ADMISSION IS PROHIBITED (Feb. 28, 1803),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/i9th century/sl003.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
114. Id.
115. PENNSYLVANIA COLONIZATION SOCIETY, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA COLONIZATION SOCIETY 35 (1830).
116. Id. at 36.
117. Nichols v. Burch, 18 F. Cas. 187 (C.C. D.C. 1839) (quoting bylaw of the corporation of
Washington of 31st May, 1827, § 6).
118. Legal Map: Accessible Version, LOVINGDAY (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 105-707
(1927)), http://www.lovingday.org/legal-map-accessible (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
119. Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 79-103).
120. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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and federal laws that held the "African race" as a class separate and dis-
tinct from "people" and "citizen[s]." 2 1 For example, the Court pointed to
an 1813 Act of Congress that separately identified citizens of the United
States and persons of color:
That from and after the termination of the war in which the United
States are now engaged with Great Britain, it shall not be lawful to
employ, on board of any public or private vessels of the United
States, any person or persons except citizens of the United States, or
persons of color, natives of the United States.
122
The Court found this example "decisive" of the government's dif-
ferentiation between citizens and persons of color, finding that "[p]ersons
of color, in the judgment of Congress, were not included in the word
citizens, and they are described as another and different class of per-
sons." 23 The Court also relied on Attorney Generals William Wirt and
Caleb Cushing's assessment that free persons of color were not a catego-
ry of people contained within the meaning of citizens of the United
States.124
It appears that, in the late 1800s, the term people of color lost its
traction in official and popular discourse. That is not to say, however,
that labels used to categorize Blacks and other non-White minorities
were not utilized. In fact, the people of color classification is one in a
long line of labels that have been used to define or include Blacks in
America.125 In the mid- to late- nineteenth century, the term colored
dominated the landscape.12 6 As seen in the legislative history cited earli-
er, the colored label competed with the term Negro as a reference to
Blacks, depending on the speaker and intended meaning. The term Negro
gained acceptance in the late nineteenth century, shepherded into popular
121. Id. at 393, 410.
122. Id. at 420 (quoting Act of 1813, 2 Stat. 809).
123. Id. at 420-21.
124. Id at 421.
125. The language of categorizing Blacks in America is one of the most striking examples of
the changing language of group categorization. It is not, however, the only example. In fact, the
concept of shifting terms of categorization does not belong only to the spectrum of racial categoriza-
tion. Those individuals who are members of or are perceived to be members of the LGBTI commu-
nity, for example, have witnessed dramatic shifts in categorization, both external and internal.
What's more, the changing use of the term "queer" from an external classification with offensive
undertones to the language of self-categorization stands as a fascinating example of the way that
language and the language of categorization has powerful meaning beyond the simple act of group-
ing. See Angela Clements, Sexual Orientation, Gender Nonconformity, and Trait-Based Discrimina-
tion: Cautionary Tales from Title VII & an Argument for Inclusion, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. &
JUST. 166, 200 (2009); Nancy J. Knauer, Gender Matters: Making the Case for Trans Inclusion, 6
PIERCE L. REv. 1, 37 (2007).
126. Tom W. Smith, Changing Racial Labels: From "Colored" to "Negro" to "Black" to
"African American," 56 PUB. OPINION Q. 496, 497 (1992). In 1992, at the time the article was
published, Smith was Director of the General Social Survey, a flagship survey of the National Opin-
ion Research Center. Id. at 496. His article traced the changing labels ascribed to and adopted by
Blacks in America. See id at 496-97. For a slightly different take, see Lerone Bennett Jr., What's In
a Name? Negro vs. Afro-American vs. Black, 23 EBONY 46 (1967).
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parlance by Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois.127 Later, as the
1950s and 1960s marshaled in the civil rights movement, a desire to
break from labels and identities placed on the Black community by
Whites caused a shift in racial terminology from Negro to Black.12 8 Tom
W. Smith, former Director of the General Social Survey, explained that
the Black label was applied to those deemed "progressive, forward-
looking, and/or radical," but became largely accepted and lost its radical
connotation by the early 1970s.129 The term Black remained the self-
identification label of choice, and was largely accepted by Whites as
well, until 1988, when "Romana H. Edelin, president of the National
Urban Coalition, proposed [a switch to the label] 'African-American."',
30
Heralded by Jesse Jackson, the term "African-American" sought to "give
Blacks a cultural identification with their heritage and ancestral home-
land."l 3 1 A decade later, in 2005, a study using data drawn from the Na-
tional Survey of Black Workers from 1998-2000 showed that Blacks
nearly equally preferred the labels "black" and "African-American."l 3 2 it
also established that "the popularity that 'African-American' achieved
during the early 1990s did not grow during the ensuing decade and that,
if anything, 'black' has enjoyed a modest resurgence."1 33
The term people of color has also enjoyed a comeback. Once dis-
paraging to its members, the people of color label has been re-
appropriated by many who self-identify as members. In 1963, the Rever-
end Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. resurrected the phrase when he referred
to "citizens of color" in his famous "I Have a Dream" speech.134 Dr.
King asserted: "It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this
promissory note, insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of
honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a
bad check, a check which has come back marked 'insufficient funds.' 135
Dr. King's use of the term "citizens of color" adopted and coopted it as a
term of self-categorization. It was not used in a derogatory sense. Inten-
tionally or not, Dr. King's use of the term collapsed the differentiation of
127. Smith, supra note 126, at 497.
128. Id. at 499.
129. Id. at 499, 502.
130. Id. at 503; see also Bannai & Enquist, supra note 19, at 40 n.49 (explaining that the term
African American has itself undergone transformation, used with and without the hyphen to con-
sciously connote different meanings); Morris, supra note 19, at 543 n.25.
131. Smith, supra note 126, at 507.
132. Lee Sigelman, Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin, What's In a Name? Preference for
"Black" Versus "African-American" Among Americans of African Descent, 69 PUB. OPINION Q.
429, 430, 433-34 (2005). The study showed that neither gender nor level of education changed the
preference of the "black" or "African-American" label, but that age, city size, and region had an
impact; younger residents of large cities outside of the South preferred "African-American" to
"black." Id. at 434.
133. Id at 434.
134. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech at the March on Washington (Aug. 28,




citizen and people of color that formed the basis of the Dred Scott deci-
Sion.
Interestingly, and in tension with the way society generally defines
the term today, Dr. King used the term "citizens of color" term inter-
changeably with "the Negro people." Such an insight is fascinating when
placed in historical context. As set forth above, in 1963, Congress was
hotly engaged in the debate over the law that would become the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The 88th U.S. Congress House of Representatives,
which served from January 3, 1963, to January 3, 1965, had 435 mem-
bers.136 Together with the Senate, there were 535 legislators, yet only a
handful of Black lawmakers.'37 Therefore, the language of racial catego-
rization used by those members of Congress is seemingly representative
of labels placed on one group by another group, rather than the self-
categorization language utilized by Dr. King. The racial categorization
language most regularly used by those members of Congress in the legis-
lative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was colored and Negro.
Such choices represent both an overlap (with the use of the term Negro)
and a contrast (with the use of the term colored) to Dr. King's self-
categorization language of "citizens of color" and "the Negro people."
In the wake of Dr. King's use of the term "citizens of color" as self-
definitional and exclusive of non-Black citizens, the term people of color
has expanded over time to become more inclusive of non-Black commu-
nities generally regarded as ethnic or racial minorities. For example, in
the 2008 Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity and Society, Salvador Vidal-
Ortiz defines the phrases "people of color" and "person of color" as ref-
erence to "racial and ethnic minority groups."'38 Vidal-Ortiz also explic-
itly acknowledges the mutability of the terms over time and location. He
notes that the terms have "a strong association to phenotype, skin color,
and eye/hair/other physiological aspects that often defined Blacks in the
United States," but also observes that the political and coalitional power
of terms permit a person or group to self-identify, not only by their coun-
try of origin or panethnic label, but also by the more inclusive term per-
son of color.13 9 He insightfully notes,
136. U.S. JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, POCKET CONGRESSIONAL DICTIONARY: EIGHTY-
EIGHTH CONGRESS 181 (1963) [hereinafter POCKET CONGRESSIONAL DICTIONARY],
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015073070453;view-lup;seq=1; Black-American Rep-
resentatives and Senators by Congress, 1870-Present, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-
Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senators-by-Congress/
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
137. POCKET CONGRESSIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 136, at 181; Black-American Repre-
sentatives and Senators by Congress, 1870-Present, supra note 136.
138. Salvador Vidal-Ortiz, People of Color, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
SOCIETY 1037 (Richard T. Schaefer ed., 2008).
139. Id. at 1037-38.
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People of color is, however it is viewed, a political term, but it is also
a term that allows for a more complex set of identity for the individu-
al-a relational one that is in constant flux. Immigration, travel, and
racial constructs-in general, people's social world-all have an im-
pact on how changing these identifications may be. It is perhaps be-
cause of the flexibility in identification that the term has become sig-
nificant in biracial and multiracial writings (and for individuals) as a
term that better helps to identify people with multiple national ori-
gins, panethnic backgrounds, or so-called racial makeup.140
However complicated and changing the "of color" terms have been
over the last few decades, they have enjoyed growing acceptance and
popularity in mainstream society. In 1988, William Safire wrote an arti-
cle for the New York Times noting that the phrase "people of color has
never been more in vogue."l41 And, although seemingly still outpaced by
the term "minorities,"1 42 the term people of color is now considered a
primary term of racial categorization.
Legal academic scholarship has embraced the label people of color
and related terms, invoking the "of color" modifier with abandon. More
than 200 law review and journal articles use a related term in their ti-
tle.143 Scholarship abounds about how communities of color, women of
color, faculty of color, and students of color shape, and are shaped by,
every facet of law and policy. And legal scholars of color have united,
formally and informally, to offer support and energy to each other in the
battle against institutional, social, and political forces that have kept the
legal profession and legal academia exclusive and homogeneous. In her
article, From Tokenism to Emancipatory Politics: The Conferences and
Meetings of Law Professors of Color, Linda Greene traces the history of
various "People of Color ... [c]onferences" since 1967, a movement that
led to "The First National Meeting of the regional People of Color Legal
Scholarship Conferences" in 1999.14 Greene identifies the critical nature
of such meetings and conferences to be "catalytic forces in the break-
down of apartheid in American legal education, essential to the survival
and prosperity of minority scholars in a continuing environment of to-
kenism, and central in the development of distinctive legal scholarly
140. Id. at 1038.
141. William Safire, On Language: People ofColor, N. Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1988, at Al 8.
142. Kee Malesky, The Journey from 'Colored' to 'Minorities'to 'People ofColor,' NPR (Mar.
31, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/03/30/295931070/the-journey-
from-colored-to-minorities-to-people-of-color.
143. WESTLAW NExT, http://next.westlaw.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (searching "People
of Color").
144. Linda S. Greene, From Tokenism to Emancipatory Politics: The Conferences and Meet-
ings of Law Professors of Color, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 161, 161, 164-65 (1999) [hereinafter Greene,
Tokenism]; see also Linda S. Greene, From Sea to Shining Sea: The Midwestern Origins of the First
National Meeting of the Regional People of Color Legal Scholarship Conferences, 20 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 29, 29 (2000); Neil G. Williams, Two Men and Twenty Years of Meetings: Norman
Amaker, Derrick Bell, and the Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference from
1990-2010,42 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. i., i, v (2011).
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voices unique to the 'outsider' perspective of minority professors."l4 5 In
the last several years, many legal "People of Color conferences" have
occurred as minority scholars continued to unite under the banner of
people of color and scholars of all races continue to discuss the intersec-
tion of law, race, business, society, and politics.14
The label people of color and related terminology have also infused
the mainstream lexicon, as represented in local and national news.
Newspaper articles from just one week in 2014 (October 5-11) are filled
with references to people of color and other, similarly identified groups.
The Associated Press identified Laurel Richie as "the first woman of
color to lead a professional sports league." 4 7 The Washington Post re-
ported that a conference entitled "Moving Social Justice" is the "first-of-
its-kind conference to be held by atheists of color." 48 And USA Today
ran a story about the New York Times' commitment to diversifying its
staff, after a "firestorm . . . about diversity" followed from a review of
the television show How to Get Away with Murder, which raised ques-
tions "about diversity and how people of color are covered."49 Outreach
and grassroots organizations have adopted the modifier into their names:
"For People of Color, Inc." provides law school admissions consulting
services to prospective law school applicants;150 "The People of Color
Networks" helps adults and children with behavioral health diagnoses;51
"Trans People of Color Coalition" promotes the interests of transgender
persons of color;152 and the "National Organization for People of Color
145. Greene, Tokenism, supra note 144, at 164.
146. See About Us, SESWPOCC, http://www.seswpocc.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015)
(detailing Southeast/Southwest People of Color Legal Scholarship Conferences each year from
2005-2013 and 2015); Northeast People of Color (NEPOC) Legal Scholarship Conference 2008,
B.U. SCH. L., http://www.bu.edullaw/nepoc/ (last visited February 20, 2015) (recognizing Northeast
People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference in 2008 at University of Buffalo Law School); The
20th Mid-Atlantic People of Color (MA4POC) Conference, W. VA. U. C. L.,
http://law.wvu.edulmapoc20l5 (last visited February 20, 2015) (describing the recent 20th Mid-
Atlantic People of Color Conference at West Virginia University School of Law held in January
2015); Third National People of Color Conference, SETON HALL U. S. L.,
http://law.shu.edu/About/NewsEvents/thirdnationalpoc/index.cfm (last visited February 20, 2015)
(discussing the Third National People of Color Conference at Seton Hall Law School in 2010).
147. Report: WNBA Industry Leader for Diverse Hiring, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 8, 2014,
4:45 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/wnba/story/report-wnba-industry-leader-for-diverse-hiring-
100814.
148. Kimberly Winston, Black Atheists Say Their Concerns Have Been Overlooked for Too
Long, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/black-atheists-
say-their-concems-have-been-overlooked-for-too-long/2014/10/09/05 1d9e04-4fc9-1 e4-877c-
335b53ffe736_story.html.
149. Arienne Thompson, 'NYT' Editor: 'I Have an Obligation to Diversfy The Staff' USA
TODAY (Sept. 24,2014, 3:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2014/09/24/nyt-editor-
i-have-an-obligation-to-diversify-the-staff/l6163107/ (citation omitted).
150. See About, FOR PEOPLE OF COLOR, INC., http://forpeopleofcolor.org/about/ (last visited
Nov. 20, 2015).
151. See About Us, PEOPLE OF COLOR NETWORK, http://www.pocn.com/cms/enUS/about-
us.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
152. See TRANS PEOPLE OF COLOR COALITION, http://www.glaad.org/tags/trans-people-color-
coalition (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
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Against Suicide" addresses the issue of suicide prevention and interven-
tion in communities of color.153
The history of the term people of color, set alongside the various
other labels and classifications that have been employed to describe
Blacks and other non-White minorities, is marked by variability. It began
as a derogatory label employed to set apart those considered non-citizens
and less than human. It was replaced by a number of other labels, both
set upon the member group and chosen by the members themselves, over
time. Ultimately, it reemerged, adopted by the most prominent African
American leader of the civil rights movement to describe the impetus
behind the movement-racial inequality assessed in a Black/White bina-
ry. Over time, in an effort to capture capacity and build solidarity, it has
taken on a broader meaning, encompassing a large and shifting number
of individuals who identify as non-White or minority.
As the meaning of the term people of color has varied depending on
time, place, and speaker, the mutability of the term itself requires pause
to consider the utility and benefit of employing such a label. As noted
several times herein, there is a strong argument that the inclusive nature
of such categorization promotes coalition building among historically
disenfranchised groups.154 Paulette Caldwell, for example, notes the
common thread of White supremacy that has dominated American histo-
ry and stands as a critical element of progressive race methodology
across race and ethnicity.155 She also warns, however, of the critical im-
port of simultaneously "uncovering . . . specific group histories" and
accounting for differing stories of White supremacy in each group's
unique history.156 Such an insight touches on the significant danger in
employing the term people of color as a racial or ethnic label-the dan-
ger in essentializing the individuals and subgroups contained in the peo-
ple of color construct.157 That is especially the case here, where the histo-
ry of the term people of color establishes that its meaning is mutable and
the inclusivity of the term shifts and changes over time and depending on
the context of its usage. Further, adoption of the term people of color
does little to dislodge the binary assessment of race in America. Rather,
Caldwell has argued that its use has simply shifted the focus from a
153. See NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR PEOPLE OF COLOR AGAINST SUICIDE,
http://www.ncsp.org/nopcas.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
154. See Caldwell, supra note 8, at 55; Deborah Ramirez & Jana Rumminger, Race, Culture,
and the New Diversity in the New Millennium, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 481, 500 (2001); Vidal-Ortiz,
supra note 138, at 1038.
155. Caldwell, supra note 8, at 77-78.
156. Id.




Black/White binary assessment of race to a non-White/White binary as-
sessment of race.58
B. The Language ofRacial Categorization is Meaningful
While the adoption of the term people of color carries potential ben-
efits to those who identify as or are identified as members of the catego-
rization, the effect of its adoption is not absolutely positive or negative.
Labels have profound effects, both internally and externally. Depending
on whether the label is self-imposed or imposed by those outside of the
member groups, the impact may differ significantly.
The effect of labeling groups may especially be felt when categori-
zation and labeling occurs in formal law and legislation. Spearlt argues:
Among the most influential in the day-to-day American lexicon are
words from constitutions, statutes, and U.S. Census survey question-
naires. This set of laws and institutions, formal and informal, work
together and have a profound influence on the way Americans con-
ceive and speak of one another. Law helps structure routine practices
of life by generating compliance or acts of resistance and by provid-
ing a framework for legitimate discourse and action in the exercise of
159
power.
For minority groups underrepresented in government, racial label-
ing and categorization in formal legal structures, including the language
used in the debates preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, generally invoke labels placed on groups rather than terms of self-
definition.'6
Omi Leissner recognizes that "names and naming reflect, and often
reify relations of dominance and subordination." 6 1 That is not to say,
however, that labels imposed on groups may not, in the end, be empow-
ering to the identified group. Christine Hickman identifies the latent
power in being labeled or defined as a member of a particular group. Her
argument that the so-called "one drop rule" ultimately had profound ben-
efit in creating solidarity and power in the Black community recognizes
158. See id. at 63 (arguing that much of the critique of the Black/White paradigm of racial
assessment "does little more than substitute alternative binary or other constructions for the existing
dominant paradigm without attending to the consequences of these reconstructions for the ultimate
goal of ending racial subordination"); see also Martha Minow, Foreword, Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 13-14, 70-73 (1987) (recognizing that "difference" is a relative comparison and
that the language employed to categorize and define individuals and groups takes on implicit as-
sumptions about "whose point of view matters").
159. Spearlt, Enslaved by Words: Legalities & Limitations of "Post-Racial" Language, 2011
MICH. ST. L. REv. 705, 710; cf Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law,
Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1666-67 (1990) (recognizing and detailing
how words and word choice impact the way that society views family violence).
160. For further discussion, see Hickman, supra note 94, at 1165-67; Spearlt, supra note 159,
at 710; Naomi Zack, American Mixed Race: The U.S. 2000 Census and Related Issues, 17 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 33, 34, 41 (2001).
161. Omi Leissner, Naming the Unheard Of, 15 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 109, 109 (1997-1998).
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the impact of labeling, both positive and negative, even when the label is
externally imposed.16 2 She notes:
So it was with the one drop rule. The Devil fashioned it out of rac-
ism, malice, greed, lust, and ignorance, but in so doing he also ac-
complished good: His rule created the African-American race as we
know it today, and while this race has its origins in the peoples of
three continents and its members can look very different from one
another, over the centuries the Devil's one drop rule united this race
as a people in the fight against slavery, segregation, and racial injus-
tice.163
One may make the same argument about the term people of color.
Originally employed to exclude and dehumanize, over time, individuals
who self-identify as people of color have co-opted the term as a symbol
of broad-based cultural and political power.
It is worth pausing here to discuss the context of the increased use
of the people of color label as it is set alongside the "People First"
movement in the disability rights context. People First describes a self-
advocacy movement of individuals previously labeled and identified as
"retarded" or "mentally retarded."164 Born out of the Swedish Parents
Association for Mentally Retarded Children in the late 1960s, the seem-
ingly simple concept is, at its heart, that people labeled retarded could,
and should, have a role in making choices about their own lives.16 5 The
movement led to the passage of laws that specifically changed the words
used in legislation to reflect a shift in thinking about persons with disa-
bilities. Rosa's Law, for example, passed in 2010, identified specific
statutes relevant to people with disabilities and amended certain words to
explicitly reflect a language shift in labeling individuals with disabili-
ties.166 In Washington D.C., the People First Respectful Language Mod-
ernization Amendment Act, passed in 2012, amended more than twenty-
five specific District of Columbia laws to formally and legally relabel
"the handicapped" and "mentally retarded persons" as "persons with
disabilities" and "persons with intellectual disabilities."'6 ' The ARC, a
national organization that advocates for and serves people with intellec-
tual and developmental disabilities and their families, describes the im-
port of the language change:
162. Hickman, supra note 94, at 1166.
163. Id.
164. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 195 (1993).
165. Id
166. Rosa's Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643, 2643-45 (2010); See Sarah E. Redfield
& Theresa Kraft, What Color is Special Education?, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 129, 148 n.113 (2012).
167. People First Respectful Language Modernization Amendment Act of 2012, D.C. Law 19-
169 (2012), 2011 Bill Text DC B. 169 (LEXIS). The People First Respectful Language Moderniza-
tion Amendment Act of 2012 followed the original legislation, which was passed in 2006. People
First Respectful Language Modernization Act of 2006, D.C. Law 16-169 (2006).
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The language a society uses to refer to persons with disabilities
shapes its beliefs and ideas about hem. Words are powerful; Old, in-
accurate, and inappropriate descriptors perpetuate negative stereo-
types and attitudinal barriers.
Our words and the meanings we attach to them create attitudes, drive
social policies and laws, influence our feelings and decisions, and af-
fect people's daily lives and more. How we use them makes a differ-
ence. People First Language puts the person before the disability, and
describes what a person has, not who a person is. Using a diagnosis
as a defining characteristic reflects prejudice, and also robs the per-
son of the opportunity to define him/herself.168
Like the People First movement in the disability rights context, self-
identification as people of color symbolizes the members' control of their
label and the authority to define the members of their category.'6 9
Unlike the People First movement, however, people of color termi-
nology has not been incorporated into formal law in the same way.1 70 I
fact, although there has been some recent movement to incorporate the
term people of color and related terminology into formal legislation, the
terms and their influence on the law remain generally marginalized. They
168. What is People First Langage?, THE ARC, http://www.thearc.org/who-we-are/media-
center/people-first-language? (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
169. The "People First" movement has some similarities to the people of color movement, but
there exist several differences that are important to an in-depth critical assessment of the two move-
ments. Most importantly, the role of perception plays a different legal role when discussing a person
with disabilities and a person of color in the context of civil rights laws. Both the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act explicitly provide protection for discrimination against
one who is "perceived" as having a disability. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2(a)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2012); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 2(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(4) (2012)
(amended 2014). There is no similar protection in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It may be possible to
argue that perception of protected status (i.e., race or color) should create a cause of action under
civil rights laws. For example, if a Caucasian person submits a resume for a job and is not inter-
viewed for the position because the employer believes that her name is a name commonly associated
with an African American, the applicant may have a cause of action for race discrimination. Some
courts, however, have been reluctant to find that perception of protected status provides protection
under Title VII and related laws. See, e.g., Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn.
2004) (granting summary judgment to employer defendant because: "Title VII protects those persons
that belong to a protected class, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and says nothing about protection of
persons who are perceived to belong to a protected class. . . . Congress has shown, through the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act that it knows how to enact legislation
that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected class. Neither party has cited
any controlling authority which would permit a claim for perceived race or national origin discrimi-
nation and this Court is unaware of any such precedent."); see also Lewis v. N. Gen. Hosp., 502 F.
Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he protections of Title VII do not extend to persons who are
merely 'perceived' to belong to a protected class." (citing Uddin v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp.,
No. 1:05-CV- I 15-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47238, at *14 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006); Butler v.
Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004))). Although additional analysis about he rela-
tionship between the two movements would be of value, it is outside the scope of this Article.
170. 1 make no comment here on whether the incorporation of the "People First" language in
formal law has made any noticeable difference in the treatment of or discrimination against people
with disabilities.
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are located primarily in a statutory context that will not be binding in
law. For example, in the "Findings" section proposed for the Women's
Educational Equity Act of 2001, Congress found that "classroom text-
books and other educational materials do not sufficiently reflect the ex-
periences, achievements, or concerns of women and, in most cases, are
not written by women or persons of color." 71 And, whether a program
would "address the needs of women and girls of color and women and
girls with disabilities" is the first listed criterion for whether the Secre-
tary can issue awards under the program.172 Similarly, in a statute titled
"Equal Access to the Administration's Education Programs," the Admin-
istrator is challenged to "bring more women of color into the field of
space and aeronautics."73 The Obama Administration created an Office
of Minority Health to provide resources to communities of color; devel-
oped an Office of Minority and Women Inclusion to promote women and
people of color in the banking industry; and established a White House
Council on Women and Girls "to ensure that Federal programs and poli-
cies address and take into account the distinctive concerns of women and
girls, including women of color and those with disabilities." 7 4 Policy-
makers today are seemingly walking a fine line-adopting the terminol-
ogy of the of color modifier, but only in locations and ways that will
have little to no influence on the implementation of law. Although there
is value in the language employed in explanatory or aspirational findings
or promotions, there is no legal accountability or remedy for failure to
meet those goals.
While there is much to be said about the power of categorization
and the language used to identify the relevant categories, there is not
universal acceptance or appreciation of the benefit of labeling. In fact,
activists and scholars have warned against giving any label too much
power. In 1928, W.E.B. Du Bois, responded to the call that the term
Negro be abandoned as a label:
Do not . . . make the all too common error of mistaking names for
things. Names are only conventional signs for identifying things.
Things are the reality that counts. If a thing is despised, either be-
cause of ignorance or because it is despicable, you will not alter mat-
ters by changing its name. If men despise Negroes, they will not des-
pise them less if Negroes are called "colored" or "Afro-Americans."
171. Women's Educational Equity Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7283(b)(3)(B) (2012).
172. Id. § 7283d(a).
173. 51 U.S.C. § 40906(c) (2012).
174. See 12 U.S.C. § 4520 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300u-6(a) (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,506, 74
Fed. Reg. 11271 (2009), reprintedas amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
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[A] Negro by any other name would be just as black and just as white
. . . . It is not the name--it's the Thing that counts.175
Nearly a century later, Spearlt catalogues and critiques the terms of
racial categorization of the Black community in America throughout the
decades. 176 He notes, for example, that use of the terms "nigger" and
"Negro" used language to objectify by color.177 And he makes no distinc-
tion with the application of the term "black" as a label of racial categori-
zation, arguing that "the replacement term 'black' had the same import,
since this word was like saying 'nigger' in English."1 78 Ultimately,
Spearlt concludes that the terms "person of color" and "people of color"
fare no better.179 Such terms, he avers, evoke a biased dichotomy of
White (pure, good) versus non-White (impure, bad).80 He argues that
"[1]anguage facilitates the process of objectification as required by slav-
ery and colonialism, and whiteness has been a defining part of culture for
centuries, including the notion that white people are good and people of
color are bad."'8 ' Tom Smith suggests that the importance and anxiety
about racial labels for the American Black community is arguably con-
nected to one or more of the following three theories: (1) enslaved
Blacks were stripped of indigenous and varied identities and cultures and
were long prohibited from developing their own institutions and commu-
nity to advance their group identity; (2) because Blacks remain discrimi-
nated against, any name eventually becomes tainted by racial prejudice;
and (3) some sense of an "inferiority complex."'8 2 If, as Spearlt and
Smith suggest, all racial labels take on a disparaging meaning over time,
is it worth the energy and effort necessary to change the labels? Does
changing the label change the underlying racial bias or tension underly-
ing the categorization?
Certainly, the history of changing labels affixed to and adopted by
the American Black community over time suggests that labels do, in fact,
carry great meaning. In fact, in the legal context, critical lawyering
scholars and those advocating client-centered lawyering recognize the
great importance of a client's agency in defining oneself and one's sto-
175. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Name "Negro, " in THE CRISIS 96, 96-97 (1928). I pause to consid-
er, here, whether Du Bois's sentiment could be applied to the debate about the difference between
race discrimination and color discrimination. What is "the Thing" that counts in assessing the inter-
nal bias of one discriminating on the basis of race discrimination as compared to one discriminating
on the basis of color? Such a query sits at the center of the scholarly debate on the relationship
between racism and colorism. See, e.g., Banks, Colorism, supra note 56, at 1708-13; Harris, supra
note 56, at 62-65; Jones, supra note 55, at 665-68.
176. Spearlt, supra note 159, at 732, 738-39.
177. Id. at 738.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 745-47.
180. See id. at 732.
181. Id.
182. Smith, supra note 126, at 511-12.
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ry. A client's narrative, including her self-identification, sets out some-
thing more than the context for her legal claim; it establishes her place in
the world relative to the other players in her legal story.
The rest of this part identifies a recent trend in adapting the people
of color construct into civil rights challenges, a move in itself that im-
plies the meaningfulness of reimagining one's racial identity. The final
part then argues that inserting people of color into civil rights challenges,
while perhaps meaningful to give the plaintiff agency to self-define her
category and subclass, may actually be counterproductive to the goals of
the civil rights movement.
C. Pleading "People of Color"
There has been a recent trend in civil rights complaints to include
allegations of violations of law against people of color,184 a trend this
Article deems problematic for the advancement of racial equality through
rights-based legal challenges. The great majority of the complaints dis-
covered using such language were filed after 2000. Such allegations arise
in three primary forms. The first iteration involves complaints that in-
voke the term person of color to label the plaintiff. The second contains
complaints labeling the class or group of people impacted by defendant's
allegedly discriminatory actions as people of color. The final category,
which comprises the greatest number of complaints, uses the term person
of color or people of color in factual allegations to provide circumstantial
evidence of race or color discrimination against particular plaintiffs. 85
As will be seen in Part IV, the complaints' invocation of the term people
of color generally is, at best, neutral to the case's resolution and, at
worst, risks contraction of civil rights protections.
Certain civil rights complaints identify the plaintiff as a person of
color. In Green v. Topnotch at Stowe,' 86 for example, plaintiff, an Afri-
183. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2118-22 (1991); Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting
"Unwelcomeness" From the Outside: Using Case Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed
Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 61, 62-63 (2007); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 485-89 (1994).
184. There any many constitutional challenges brought pursuant to Sections 1981 and 1983
that allege discrimination against people of color or persons of color. This particular analysis, how-
ever, focuses on complaints that assert claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Hous-
ing Act of 1968 or their relevant amendments. The explicit color protected class under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act, combined with the unique historical setting underpin-
ning the legislative history of those laws, provides the most apt analysis for this Article.
185. There are also certain complaints that use the people of color term or similar terms in the
factual allegations in reference to a statement made by the defendant as evidence of race or color
discrimination. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, United States v. French, No. 2:12-cv-15583-JCO-MJH
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2012) ("Paula French stated that there were not many 'people of color' in the
area where the subject property was located."); Complaint for Damages at 7, Rivers v. Cty. of Marin,
No. 03-cv-01808 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2003) ("The conduct included but was not limited to ... (3)
comments from supervisors stating that people of color and other disadvantaged 'nerthiwells'
'should be lined up and shot."').
186. No. 1: 06-CV-00096, 2008 WL 345886 (D. Vt. Feb. 7, 2008).
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can American female, asserted violations of Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and her constitutional rights based on claims that she was
unfairly suspected of and arrested for a crime she did not commit based
on her race and color.'8 7 In her complaint, Ms. Green self-identified as a
"person of color" and "of the African-American race. A plaintiffs
self-identification of herself as a person of color is the clearest example
of how a party may, in the absence of guidance from the legislature or
courts, seek to define the meaning of color discrimination and the bound-
aries of the subclass through which she can seek civil rights protection. It
inserts the cultural concept of person of color into civil rights jurispru-
dence.
The second category of complaints using the term people of color
requests relief on behalf of people of color. In other words, the com-
plaints assert violations of federal civil rights laws on behalf of a larger
group of people defined by their inclusion in the group labeled people of
color. Like the first category, it involves a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs
defining an undefined and unbounded group termed people of color as a
subclass of the protected class of race or color. In Darensburg v. Metro-
politan Transportation Commission,189 for example, the plaintiffs alleged
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in the funding of
public transit services in the San Francisco, California Bay Area.'1' Indi-
vidual plaintiffs, along with organizational plaintiffs who are comprised
of "people of color who are riders of the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit
District," aver that the "Defendant MTC has historically engaged, and
continues to engage, in a policy, pattern or practice of actions and omis-
sions that have the purpose and effect of discriminating against poor
transit riders of color in favor of white, suburban transit users, on the
basis of their race and national origin."'9 '
The complaint sought class certification to include "all people of
color who are current and potential patrons of AC Transit."'92 The com-
plaint asserted three separate causes of action, including a cause of action
187. Id. at * 1-2.
188. Complaint with Demand for Jury Trial at para. 4, Green, No. 1:06-CV-00096 (D. Vt. May
11, 2006). The Plaintiff also alleged, in asserting violations under Section 1983, that "it was not a
violation of [law] for Green to be a person of color, to possess maxipads, and/or to possess or use
cornstarch for cosmetic purposes." Id at para. 121; see also Second Amended Complaint for Viola-
tion of Civil Rights with Jury Demand at 7, Walker v. Hoppe, 239 F. App'x 998 (M.D. Tenn. Aug.
17, 2005) (suing for employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex, the plaintiff brought a
Title VII complaint based on her allegedly illegal discharge on the basis of race "merely for offering
the perspective of 'a person of color' with competency/integrity").
189. Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm'n., 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
190. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Pursuant to Fourteenth
Amendment to The United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 at para. 1, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2005) (No. C-05-01597).
191. Id.
192. Id. at para. 24.
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for violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for discrimina-
tion on the basis of race and national origin, but not color.193
The final category of complaints in which people of color is em-
ployed involves factual allegations against a broader category of people
of color to provide support for, or circumstantial evidence of, defendant's
discrimination against the particular plaintiff(s). Those complaints vary
in the asserted causes of action, but many do assert color as a protected
class. In Harris v. Sutton Motor Sales & RV Consignments Corp.,194 for
example, the plaintiff alleged violations of Title VII, Section 1981, and
various state laws arising from differential treatment, hostile work envi-
ronment, and retaliation claims.19 5 The plaintiff, an African American
male, alleged race and color discrimination on the basis of factual allega-
tions that he was treated differently from his Caucasian counterparts and
was subjected to racial slurs and retaliation.96 He also claimed that one
supervisor would make comments about other minority groups, calling
Hispanics, for example, "Joses."l9 7 On the basis of those factual allega-
tions, Mr. Harris alleged that "Defendant's actions created a hostile work
environment toward people of color that Plaintiff was subjected to" and
that "Defendant's hostile work environment toward Plaintiff, because he
is a person of color, constitutes a violation of [Title VII]."l 98 Similarly, in
Martin v. State University of New York,199 the plaintiff, an African Amer-
ican female, alleged violations of Titles VI and VII for discrimination on
the basis of race and color.2oo Her factual allegations were based primari-
193. Id. at paras. 70-78; cf Class Action Complaint at paras. 2-3, Rodriguez v. Nat'l City
Bank, No. 2:08-cv-02059, 2008 WL 2547584 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2008). In Rodriguez, four plaintiffs
brought suit against the defendant bank alleging discriminatory practices in obtaining residential
mortgage loans, which is a violation of the Fair Housing Act, among other federal and state laws. Id.
at para. 1. The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action "on behalf of themselves and a class of all
other similarly situated Minority ... homeowners subjected to Defendants' discriminatory practices
.... ." Id. at para. 2. The complaint defined "Minority" to be "persons who are African-American or
Black, as well as persons who are Hispanic or Latino." Id. at para. 3. The complaint is based, in part,
on various studies related to wealth and the disproportionality of subprime mortgages offered to
borrowers "of color." Id. at paras. 4-18. Unlike the single plaintiff in Green, however, the proposed
class in Rodriguez alleges discrimination on the basis of race but does not specify color as a basis for
legal protection. It begs the question whether use of the term "Minority" (presumably a synonym to
"people of color" under the facts of the complaint) has any particular meaning for establishing dis-
crimination on the basis of a protected class. The complaint defines "Minority" to include a tradi-
tional race subclass (African American or Black) and a traditional national origin subclass (Hispanic
or Latino). See id. at para. 3. Other than the plaintiffs' autonomy of self-defined labeling and the
symbolic power of solidarity between the two protected classes, on the surface, there appears to be
little to no additional meaning or legal weight behind use of the term "Minority."
194. No. 08-6308-HO, 2010 WL 143769 (D. Or. Jan. 9, 2010).
195. Id. at * 1-4.
196. Id at *1 -5.
197. Complaint at 14, Harris, 2010 WL 143769 (D. Or. Oct. 6, 2008).
198. Complaint at paras. 31, 45, Harris, 2010 WL 143769 (D. Or. Oct. 6, 2008); see also
Complaint at para. 38, Arevalo v. Or. Dep't of Transp., No. 08-06359-HO (D. Or. Nov. 5, 2008)
(alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and color in part because "Defend-
ant's actions created a hostile work environment toward women and people of color that Plaintiff
was subjected to").
199. 704 F. Supp. 2d 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
200. Id. at 219.
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ly on the retaliation she suffered for opposing the defendants' discrimina-
tory treatment of a colleague.201 The plaintiff asserted that "[t]he Defend-
ant COLLEGE has maintained a pattern and practice of treating people
of color . . . differently than [sic] it treated its White and/or American
employees, and retaliated against persons who question and oppose the
Defendants' repeated refusals to follow the Tripartite Committee's find-
,,202ings as to discrimination.
Where there has been little guidance to litigants on the relationship
between race and color discrimination or the defining boundaries of color
discrimination and its relevant subcategories, it is unsurprising that par-
ties themselves would fill the void by adopting the social and cultural
term people of color in asserting violation of their civil rights. The way
that a plaintiff pleads his or her case, however, is meaningful. At the very
least, it sets the tone for the way that the court will assess the merits of
the case.2 03 Where the plaintiff self-identifies as a person of color in the
body of the complaint, there is some sense that the label is meaningful
for the assessment of the legal claim of discrimination. The same is true
for plaintiffs who seek relief on a broader class of people of color or base
their factual allegations on broad-based discrimination against people of
color. Where the term acts primarily as shorthand for discrimination
against multiple identifiable groups protected under the relevant stat-
ute(s), this Article questions it utility. Further, as the next part sets out,
the Article ultimately argues that employment of the term may actually
work in opposition to the goals of equality in civil rights.
201. Id. at 215.
202. Amended Complaint at para. 43, Hedge v. State Univ. of N.Y., No. CV-06-05856
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2006); see also Complaint at para. 12, Alex v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 1:12-CV-
01021-GTS-DRH (N.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012) (alleging that "defendant GE ... have [sic] a long
history of discriminating against African Americans and other employees of color"); Complaint at
para. 7, Fenner v. News Corp., No. 09 CV 9832 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2009) (including factual allega-
tions by two self-identified African American plaintiffs asserting widespread discrimination against
"other employees of color" in their civil rights complaint); Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at para.
20, Phillips v. Minn. State Univ. Mankato, No. 09-cv-1659-DSD-FLN (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2009)
(alleging a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and, in support, identifying a supervi-
sor's response as "indicative of an overall racially discriminatory attitude that was hostile and dis-
missive she had towards [PlaintiffJ and others of color at MSU"); Amended Complaint at para. 24,
Kanhoye v. Altana Inc., No. 2:05-CV-04308-LDW-WDW (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2006) (asserting
individual claims of discrimination on the bases of national origin, race, and color alleged that
"[t]here existed at Altanta a 'glass ceiling' for people of color.... and when people of color ...
applied to work in . . . [the Validation] Department or expressed interest in working [in the Valida-
tion] Department, they were passed up for White, American-born individuals from outside the com-
pany"); Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Monetary Relief at paras. 27, 49, Thompson v.
Southwest Airlines Co., No. 04-313-JM (D.N.H. Aug. 17, 2004) (alleging discrimination on the
basis of race and color in violation of Title VI and, in support, asserting that she "observed that [a
Southwest employee] stopped to speak to another person of color requesting to see her ticket"
and"[o]n information and belief a disproportionate number of women and persons of color are sub-
jects of Southwest's policy requiring a passenger to purchase a second ticket"); Complaint for De-
claratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Damages at paras. 2, 4, Hubley v. CIC Corp., No. 3:02-cv-
05566-FDB (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2002) (asserting "a pattern and practice of discrimination against
people of color and families with children, and retaliation against those who have opposed discrimi-
natory practices" and alleging discriminatory treatment on the basis of race and familial status).
203. See supra Section II.C.
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IV. THE CLASH OF "PEOPLE OF COLOR" AND "COLOR"
The flexibility of the term people of color, arguably so useful in so-
cial and political coalition building, 204 is exactly what may limit its use-
fulness in addressing entrenched bias through civil rights challenges.
This Article has traced the history of the terms colored and color in the
debates preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the advent
of colorism claims under that very law, and the movement toward alleg-
ing people of color discrimination as a civil rights claim. The parts, taken
together, establish that the institutional actors' declination to identify the
boundaries of the color protection and its subclasses has created an open-
ing for self-definition. Flowing from that void, there has been a recent
trend of employing the phrase people of color in defining a subclass of
color or race in civil rights challenges. The problem is that the term peo-
ple of color has no bounds. It is flexible and changing; its meaning is
dependent on time, place, and speaker. Therefore, it has little utility in
the legal framework of the Civil Rights Act and related anti-
discrimination laws. In fact, in certain cases, it not only adds little to the
claim but may work at cross-purposes to the goal of addressing discrimi-
nation through the current legal structure.
A. White is a Color
Set alongside the development of the shifting racial lexicon in the
United States, it would seem that the prohibition against color discrimi-
nation would prohibit discrimination against people of color, defined as
non-White minorities. But what if White is a color under the law? There
is a strong argument under the law that White is, indeed, a color. If that is
the case, the term people of color ceases to be a subclass of color; the
subclass swallows the whole protected class category.
The legislative history and jurisprudence of Section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 suggest that White people are protected under
that statute. Section 1981 guarantees the same rights to all persons "to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence . . . and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens"205 The statute
was passed in 1866, in the wake of the Civil War. Its primary purpose
was to protect the civil rights of African Americans, many of whom had
recently been emancipated from slavery. The legislative history of Sec-
tion 1981, however, indicates that the statute's proponents had an expan-
sive concept of the class of people the legislation should protect. For
example, Senator Trumbull described the bill as applying to "every race
and color," and Senator Howard noted that the object of the bill was to
give "to persons who are of different races or colors the same civil
204. Vidal-Ortiz, supra note 138, at 1037-39.
205. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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rights."206 The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 similar-
ly establishes that Congress intended the legislation to protect against
discrimination against Whites. Representative Celler noted, about the
legislation, for example, that "there could be discrimination against
White people and there could be against colored people."207
The courts have adopted the same rationale in civil rights jurispru-
dence. In the 1976 decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transporta-
tion Company,208 the Supreme Court held that the protections afforded by
both Section 1981 and Title VII applied to Whites, as well as non-
Whites. 209 The opinion cites Section 1981 legislative history establishing
that "the bill was routinely viewed, by its opponents and supporters alike,
as applying to the civil rights of whites as well as nonwhites."210 The
McDonald Court, relying on the plain language of the statute and guid-
ance from the EEOC, also determined that Title VII protections extended
to Whites as well as non-Whites. The Court cited legislative history from
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 recording congressional intent that Title VII
was "intended to 'cover white men and white women and all Americans,'
and create an 'obligation not to discriminate against whites."'
211
Circuit court and Supreme Court decisions in Al-Khazraji v. Saint
Francis College come to the same conclusion. In Al-Khazraji, a profes-
sor alleged discrimination by his employer college, claiming violations
of Title VII and Section 1981 because he was denied tenure due to his
212Arab origin and Muslim religion. After dismissing plaintiffs Title VII
claims on statute of limitations grounds, the Third Circuit rejected the
defendant's argument that Section 1981 did not apply to Arabs, who are
,,213th
"taxonomically Caucasians" and therefore "white citizens. Rather, the
Third Circuit, relying on concepts of ethnicity and physiognomy, found
206. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 211, 504 (1866). It is not clear whether the legisla-
tors' statements acknowledge a distinction between race and color. It is clear, however, that they
acknowledge a preference for the protections embedded in the legislation to be read broadly.
207. 110 CONG. REc. 2579 (1964).
208. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
209. Id. at 295-96.
210. Id. at 289; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 211, 504 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Howard, a supporter: "[The bill] simply gives to persons who are of different races or colors the
same civil rights"); id. at 505 (remarks of Sen. Johnson, an opponent: "[T]he white as well as the
black is included in this first section . . . ."); id. at 601 (remarks of Sen. Hendricks, an opponent:
"[The bill] provides, in the first place, that the civil rights of all men, without regard to color, shall
be equal .. . .").
211. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280 (first quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (remarks of Rep.
Celler); then quoting 110 CONG.REc. 2578 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark)). This is one place where
the response of the bill's proponents to their opponents' challenges ostensibly resulted in the adop-
tion of the opponents' agenda. Seemingly, in an effort to gain support for the bill's passage, propo-
nents of the 1964 civil rights legislation answered challenges from opponents that the legislation was
designed exclusively for the benefit of Blacks. In doing so, they promised the bill's opponents that
the legislation was protection for all, explicitly including Whites. See id; see also 110 CONG. REC.
2487 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
212. Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 506 (3rd Cir. 1986).
213. Id. at 514-17.
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that the protections of Section 1981 "extend[] beyond those who are tax-
onomically members of the Negro race."2 14 The majority concluded:
Congress did not intend to limit Section 1981 solely to those who
could demonstrate that they had been discriminated against because
they belonged to a particular group identified and described by an-
thropologists. When Congress referred in the statute to "race," it
plainly did not intend thereby to refer courts to any particular scien-
tific conception of the term.215
The Supreme Court affirmed and, after reviewing various defini-
tions of the term race and the legislative history of Section 1981, found
that Congress intended to protect against discrimination based on "ances-
try or ethnic characteristics."2 16
If White is a color under the law, then what does it mean to use the
term people of color in alleging discrimination? Especially when recog-
nizing the confused jurisprudence on color discrimination, under such an
analysis, an allegation of discrimination against people of color would
have no meaning whatsoever. If all people have a color under the law,
then people of color is synonymous with people and the potential of the
protected class falls away completely.
B. Problems of Proof
Even if people of color is not read to include Whites, its use in civil
rights claims creates problems of proof. United States v. Fountain View
Apartments provides a cautionary tale for pleading discrimination on the
basis of membership in the people of color category.217 Defense counsel
attempted to redefine the government's color subclass to avoid liability.
In doing so, defense counsel not only challenged the plaintiffs right of
self-definition but also used the flexibility of the term people of color to
seek to introduce arguably irrelevant exculpatory evidence. She specifi-
214. Id. at 514-15. The Al-Khazraji court implicitly recognized the difficulties in separating
the concepts of race and color, noting, "We believe that Congress's purpose was to ensure that all
persons be treated equally, without regard to color or race, which we understand to embrace, at the
least, membership in a group that is ethnically and physiognomically distinctive." Id. at 517. The
Third Circuit court continued: "Discrimination based on race seems, at a minimum, to involve dis-
crimination directed against an individual because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and
physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens." Id.
215. Id. at 516.
216. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-13 (1987); see also Jordan v.
Whelan Sec. of Ill., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 746, 752 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The McDonald and Al-Khazraji
courts addressed the claims under theories of race discrimination. The analysis, however, translates
to an assessment of whether White is a color for purposes of assessing color discrimination. McDon-
ald, 427 U.S. at 289; Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 519. In fact, the Jordan court cited Al-Khazraji for the
same proposition in assessment of a color discrimination claim. Jordan, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 752-53.
217. The complaint in Fountain View Apartments did not use the term people of color. Howev-
er, by pleading "race or color discrimination" as a single cause of action, the court applied the term
to the singular cause of action. See supra Section II.C. Therefore, the lessons of Fountain View
Apartments apply both to litigants pleading "race or color discrimination," which is a common way
to plead discrimination, and those who evoke "people of color" membership.
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cally argued that the Fair Housing Act statute does not define color and
that persons of color should be read to include Hispanics as well as "Pa-
kistanis and Indians and southern Italians for that matter."2 18 If people of
color is defined that broadly, it will be exceedingly difficult to prove
exclusion of all members of that class.2 19 And because the term people of
color is mutable and has changed over time and place, the court or fact-
finder's definition of people of color may not comport with plaintiffs
definition. Under a people of color theory, defendants may be allowed to
exploit the flexibility of the category to confuse and prejudice the jury.
Another potential barrier is the legal test that applies to an allegation
of discrimination on the basis of membership in a subclass identified as
people of color. Courts have primarily assessed Title VII employment
discrimination claims under the test established in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green.220 If the protected class is people of color, the plaintiff will strug-
gle to establish that she was replaced by someone outside of her protect-
ed class.221 In other words, she will not only have to establish her mem-
bership in the people of color subclass of color but she will also have to
establish that she was replaced by someone outside of that subclass. Be-
cause of the undefined boundaries of people of color, that may prove to
be remarkably difficult. It would be impossible, in fact, if courts were to
consider Whites as members of the people of color classification.
Finally, if membership in a people of color group imparts legal
rights under civil rights laws, then someone or some entity must define
inclusion. In other words, someone must determine whether plaintiff
rightfully falls within the boundaries of the identified protected subclass.
The law does not define who is responsible for that assessment or set the
burden of proof.2 22 And, as Taunya Lovell Banks argues, there are barri-
218. Transcript of Final Pretrial Conference at 48, United States v. Fountain View Apartments,
Inc. (Fountain View), No. 6:08-CV-891-ORL-22-DAB (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2010), ECF No. 115. The
Fountain View court did not ultimately rule on the government's motion in limine to exclude testi-
mony of Hispanic tenants. Although she did not rule, at the pretrial conference, the judge indicated
her willingness to consider defense counsel's definition of the relevant subclass of the government's
color claim. See id. (requesting that "somebody needs to bring me some legal authority that tells me
whether people who are Hispanic and brown or native American and red and Asian and yellow are
not encompassed as a person of color"). After the court granted summary judgment for the United
States on its familial status pattern or practice claim, the case settled. See United States ofAmerica v.
Fountain View Apartments, Inc. et al Docket, PLAINSITE,
http://www.plainsite.org/dockets/tjssns2e/florida-middle-district-court/united-states-of-america-v-
fountain-view-apartments-inc-et-all (last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
219. The law, of course, does not require wholesale exclusion of a protected class in order to
prevail. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (provision of Fair Housing Act
setting forth criteria of discriminatory action); see also Children's Alliance v. City of Bellevue, 950
F. Supp. 1491, 1496 n.8 (W.D. Wash. 1997). The problems of persuasion and confusion of the fact-
finder, however, persist.
220. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Moore v. Dol-
gencorp, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-00107, 2006 WL 2701058, at *1-2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2006).
221. See, e.g., Moore, 2006 WL 2701058, at *4; see also supra Section I.B.
222. In Barrella v. Village ofFreeport, 43 F. Supp. 3d 136, 177-78 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), the Court
found that the determination of the race of the person promoted in plaintiffs stead was a question
best left to the jury after having heard testimony about the witness's own self-identification, testimo-
[Vol. 93:146
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ers to colorism claims and concerns with both self-identification and
external assignment of skin tone.223 Self-identification will invariably
create confusion for the fact finder and engender distrust from those
fighting the expansion of civil rights protections. External assignments,
by judge or jury, will raise discomfort for the fact finder identified in
Sere and Moore, remove the plaintiffs autonomy to self-designate, and
run the risk of limiting the protection of the laws.
Herbst issues a broader challenge to the use of racial labels that fur-
ther complicates the insertion of culturally relevant racial labels into civil
rights jurisprudence. He argues that the language of group self-definition
is problematic because it forces individuals to choose to be inside or out-
side of the group. He notes:
[A] group will not necessarily agree on what it wishes to be named, if
it wishes to be named-or even grouped-at all. Nor do many indi-
viduals (consider, for example, persons of multiracial background)
identify with any particular ethnic group, or any single group. Nor
does use of a self-descriptive term always mean true identification
with a group; it could simply be a rhetorical choice. Ethnic naming is
often a dicey business.224
Where a plaintiff asserts discrimination on behalf of an unnamed
and undefined group of people of color, itself a vague categorical con-
cept, she runs the risk of essentializing a group of varied individuals who
may not wish to be so categorized.
C. Measuring Progress
Adapting the language of a social movement focused on solidarity
and coalition building into civil rights legal challenges also jeopardizes
the collection of critical data regarding discrimination. Because insertion
of the people of color category into the legal framework raises the sub-
stantive and evidentiary hurdles identified above and further entangles
the categories of race and color, its usage in that capacity is likely to arti-
ficially suppress data about discrimination.
In the 2000 Census, respondents were, for the first time, given the
225option to self-identify as more than one race. The results were nomi-
ny from others on their perception of the witness's race, and the jury's own assessment of the wit-
ness's race.
223. See Banks, Multilayered, supra note 56, at 218.
224. HERBST, supra note 112, at xii-xiii.
225. See Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R. Ramirez, Overview of Race and
Hispanic Origin: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (2011),
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c20l0br-02.pdf. There are five racial categories: White,
Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or
Other Pacific Islander plus Some Other Race. Id. Individuals may also self-identify as Hispanic or
Latino, but such identification is a National Origin identification that is separate and distinct from
the questions on race for purposes of the Census. Id.
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nal; only 2.3% of the population so identified.2 26 But the fight prior to the
introduction of the 2000 Census questionnaire was disproportionate to
the ultimate results.2 2 7 On one side, certain advocacy groups argued for
the right of self-definition and personal expression.228 On the other side,
civil rights advocates warned that allowing such self-categorization
would dilute critical data the government relies on to fund and support
civil rights advocacy.229 Christine Hickman cites to the congressional
testimony from a representative of one of the groups challenging the
changes to the Census:
Our society's ability to discourage . . . discrimination is based in part
on the effective implementation of our civil rights laws. In this re-
spect, the collection of race and ethnic data in the census is funda-
mental. Any changes to the data collection of race and ethnicity must
be strictly scrutinized to ensure that the integrity of our civil rights
laws are [sic] not compromised.
230
Introducing people of color into the civil rights structure, with all of
the problems of proof identified above, may threaten the collection of
accurate data regarding discrimination faced by particular racial and eth-
nic groups in much the same way.
Similar concerns identified by the civil rights advocates hold true in
assessing the effect of people of color claims in race discrimination or
color discrimination causes of action. In 2013, the EEOC reported 3,144
claims of alleged color discrimination, up from 2,662 reported in 2012.231
The government and advocates collect data on claims, settlements, and
legal outcomes for various civil rights claims. Such data collection is
critical in assessing trends in discrimination allegations and charges. Be-
cause of the inherent fluidity of the people of color definition and the
problems of proof in asserting people of color discrimination, invoking
people of color in discrimination lawsuits risks underestimating both race
discrimination and color discrimination. Just as the incorporation of mul-
ti-racial and multi-ethnic choices on the U.S. Census may diminish the
usefulness of the data to advance civil rights support and funding, the
inclusion of the people of color construct in discrimination claims may
226. Id at 6.
227. Hickman, supra note 94, at 1254.
228. Id. at 1254-55.
229. Id at 1254. For further discussion on the debate preceding the 2000 Census, see id at
1254-64.
230. Id at 1254 (alteration in original) (quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Census,
Statistics, and Postal Personnel of the Comm. on the Post Office and Civil Service, 103d Cong. 182
(1993) (statement of Steven Carbo, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund)).
231. See EEOC CHARGE RECEIPTS BY STATE (INCLUDES U.S. TERRITORIES) AND BASIS FOR
2013, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://wwwl.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/state_13.cfm?renderforprint-l; EEOC CHARGE





skew data relied upon to measure the success of, and continued need for,
our civil rights legal tools.
D. A Brief Cost-Benefit Analysis
There is a cost to denying a plaintiffs desire to adapt the cultural
concept of person of color into civil rights litigation. It denies a person
who identifies as part of a group from asserting that identity in a particu-
lar legal context. As Katherine Kruse explains, "Critical lawyering theo-
rists argue that attempting to force clients into existing legal doctrinal
categories may ignore the reality of their lives and reinforce and repro-
duce patterns of oppression that subordinate them."232 It is, therefore, a
complicated analysis to determine the cost of limiting a plaintiffs agency
in defining her identity in a civil rights challenge. One must weigh the
costs of loss of agency against the potential risks, some of which are
identified herein, associated with trying to adapt a cultural concept into a
legal argument.233
This Article recognizes that, as Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome
Bruner so convincingly tell us in Minding the Law, narrative storytelling
is both the way we argue and understand the law, and that story is inex-
tricably linked to and influenced by our cultural experience.234 Amster-
dam and Bruner acknowledge that, as part of culture, we continually
reinterpret the past in response to new requirements.23 5 This Article does
explore a kind of reinterpretation of the past. It notes that the civil rights
legal structure is built on assumptions about the interchangeability of
race and color and a binary Black/White assessment of race. It challenges
lawyers and advocates to think about how protection against color dis-
crimination can stand as distinct from race discrimination to enhance the
protections of the current structure. And yet it cautions that the risks in-
herent in adapting the concept of people of color into civil rights chal-
lenges may ultimately outweigh the benefits under the current legal doc-
232. Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand The Plural Values of Client-Centered Represen-
tation, 12 CLINICAL L. REv. 369, 395 (2006) (citing Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical
Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1,48 (1990)).
233. It may be that engaged client-centered counseling is the appropriate way to assess those
risks and benefits for each particular client. See STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS:
CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 72-98 (2009); Katherine R. Kruse, Engaged
Client-Centered Representation and the Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 39
HOFSTRA L. REV. 577, 587 (2011) ("Engaged client-centered representation recognizes that clients
do not arrive with static and pre-determined objectives to which lawyers can simply defer. Clients'
objectives are tied to their feelings, relationships and experiences; their objectives often change over
the course of representation; and their objectives are shaped in part by the information about the law
and available legal options that their lawyers explain to them."). Regardless, it is worth engaging in
the conversation about how making such a choice impacts patterns of subordination more broadly, a
topic that is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article starts from the premise that, while perhaps
flawed, the current civil rights structure offers some opportunity to challenge bias and discrimination
in particular settings like employment. For further discussion about the utility of the civil rights
model as a force of social change and racial equality, see sources cited supra note 15.
234. See generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000).
235. Id. at 222.
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trine. Despite the recognized value of the people of color concept in cul-
tural and political spheres, this Article finds that there is limited space in
the current civil rights legal structure for reimagining identity.
CONCLUSION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against discrimination on the
basis of particular, generally immutable, characteristics. One such char-
acteristic is color. Yet, neither the statute nor the legislative history pro-
vides guidance on the meaning of color, its relationship to race, or the
bounds of any particular subcategories necessary to establish differential
treatment. And the courts have failed to offer sufficient clarity. There-
fore, it is not surprising that parties are seeking to define color, its rela-
tionship to race, and its subcategories in legal claims. One such effort is
the recent inclusion of people of color as a proposed subclass of color or
race when identifying plaintiffs protected class. Introduction of the term
people of color into the civil rights jurisprudence, however, carries the
risk of constricting protections that remain critical to the advancement of
236
racial equality today.
There is political and cultural coalitional power of bringing a great-
er number of people under one interest group. In fact, the political power
of those who identified as Black in the 1960s was a strong motivator for
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.237 Although people of color
have historically lacked political power, there is arguably more control
238
and sway with larger and united numbers2. So it seems counterintuitive
that utilizing the language of inclusion (i.e., people of color) in civil
rights jurisprudence would be counter to the goal of racial equality. And
yet that is exactly what this Article suggests.23 9 The definitional void in
236. 1 recognize that eliminating the use of the terms person of color and people of color as
means to challenge discrimination against all non-White persons under the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Fair Housing Act may leave a gap in protection. At the very least, it may dampen the effi-
cient use of such complaints to redress discrimination against a wide swath of people, especially in
class action litigation or a complaint akin to the complaint in Darensburg. See supra Section III.C.
Strategies to address the fallout, such as pleading race discrimination and color discrimination as
separate and distinct causes of action, are beyond the scope of this Article.
237. See Edward J. Erler, Equal Protection and Personal Rights: The Regime of the "Discrete
and Insular Minority, " 16 GA. L. REv. 407, 443 (1982) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, whatever altruism they may have displayed as remedies for 'historic'
discrimination, were a large part of the attempt to keep the urban black vote solidly Democratic.");
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness A Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection
Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 11 (2010) (noting that racial minorities had persuaded Congress to
adopt the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965). But cf Crenshaw, supra note
15, at 1383 (noting that a consequence of the civil rights reforms of the 1960s "may be the loss of
collectivity among Blacks" as Blacks moved into different spheres in American society).
238. See Ramirez & Rumminger, supra note 154, at 500 & n.77 (noting that "people of color"
have a significant population and therefore have the potential to "wield their own political power,"
but recognizing that it would require creation of a single coalition).
239. This is certainly not the first time that a seemingly progressive topic has been criticized
for its failure to provide sufficient specificity to provide meaning. See, e.g., Trina Jones, The Diver-
sity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, I STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 171, 176-77 (2005) (criticizing the
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civil rights jurisprudence left by the institutional actors should not be
filled by insertion of the people of color concept. Because of the history
of conflating the terms color and colored, joined with the difficulty in
disentangling color from race, the existing legal structure for establishing
civil rights claims leaves little room for reimagining identity. Inserting
people of color into civil rights challenges will expose the claims to sig-
nificant substantive and evidentiary challenges. Doing so will weaken the
breadth of the law's protection against discrimination by stripping the
potential of color discrimination claims and compromising claims of race
discrimination.







The government's power to seize individuals who are suspected of
crimes-by arresting, stopping, or otherwise detaining them-has ex-
panded significantly in the twenty-first century. The Supreme Court's
gradual redefinition of what constitutes a reasonable Fourth Amendment
seizure has occurred without meaningful evaluation of whether the gov-
ernment needs additional seizure or detention power.
There are key differences between search and seizure doctrine that
make the development of a general and unifying explanatory theory of
modem Fourth Amendment search and seizure trends difficult, if not
impossible. These differences suggest that a focused, independent analy-
sis of Fourth Amendment seizure developments (uncoupled from search-
and privacy-focused analyses) is overdue.
This Article documents the expansion of seizure power across the
spectrum over the last fifteen years. These cases reveal missed opportu-
nities to provide greater protection to individuals, and they identify spac-
es where new technologies might justify revisiting settled rules. In addi-
tion, these decisions reveal how the Court's reluctance to probe govern-
ment motivations and to consider less intrusive alternatives undermines
its efforts to balance individual rights against government interests.
The Article then outlines the individual rights and collective inter-
ests that are implicated in seizure cases. Finally, the Article analyzes the
problems presented by the Court's approach to calculating necessity in
seizure cases. Proposals for reform are focused on four areas: requiring
precise statements of government needs in seizure cases; looking to ex-
isting laws, guidelines, and police norms to support (or refute) necessity
claims; requiring greater proof of a need to seize in cases involving more
minor offenses; and considering alternative approaches, technological
changes, and long-term costs in calculating necessity.
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INTRODUCTION
In its landmark 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio,I the Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of the individual rights that are infringed by
unlawful seizures of people: "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law." 2 Nearly fifty years later, this idea that the Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable seizures is one that the Court has "carefully
guarded" seems woefully out of date.
1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891)).
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Protests across the country during the past eighteen months against
overly aggressive policing provide ready proof that the Court's potential
as a meaningful constraint on the police has not been realized. The 2014
and 2015 protests were sparked by deaths during street encounters, stops,
and arrests of unarmed black men at the hands of police officers, includ-
ing Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri; Eric Garner in Staten Island,
New York; Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio; Walter Scott in North
Charleston, South Carolina; Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Maryland; and
Laquan McDonald in Chicago, Illinois. 3
Brown and Garner were killed within weeks of each other during
the summer of 2014.4 Brown's death caused an immediate "eruption of
protests and violence" in Ferguson;5 those protests were reignited months
later when the Ferguson grand jury announced its decision not to indict
the officer who shot Brown.6 When the Staten Island grand jury an-
nounced that it, too, was not indicting the officer who put Eric Garner in
the chokehold that caused his death, New Yorkers angrily took to the
streets.7 People in cities across the country followed suit. New protests
3. Editorial, The Lessons of Baltimore, and Ferguson, and Too Many Places, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-baltimore-20150429-
story.html (describing protests); Mark Berman, How the Response to Protests over Police Force
Changed Between Ferguson and Baltimore, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/05/01/from-ferguson-to-baltimore-
how-the-response-to-protests-over-police-force-has-changed-nationwide/ (describing protests); Tony
Briscoe, Laquan McDonald Protestors Call for Special Prosecutor, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2015, 5:24
PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/localbreaking/ct-chicago-police-laquan-mcdonald-push-
protest-met-20151206-story.html (describing protests).
4. See Nicole Crowder, The Timeline of Events and Scenes in Ferguson, Mo., Since the
Shooting of Michael Brown, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/08/16/the-timeline-of-events-and-
scenes-in-ferguson-mo-since-the-shooting-of-michael-brown/ (describing Michael Brown's death on
August 9, 2014, and ensuing protests); Staten Island Man Dies After Police Try to Arrest Him, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/nyregion/staten-island-man-dies-after-
police-try-to-arrest-him.html (announcing Eric Garner's death).
5. Elijah Anderson, What Caused the Ferguson Riot Exists in So Many Other Cities, Too,
WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/13/what-
caused-the-ferguson-riot-exists-in-so-many-other-cities-too/; see also Mark Landler, Obama Offers
New Standards on Police Gear in Wake of Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12 /02/us/politics/obama-to-toughen-standards-on-police-use-of-
military-gear.html (describing a "wave of anger at law enforcement officials across the country").
6. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not
Indicted, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-
wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html.
7. J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave ofProtests After Grand Jury Doesn't Indict Officer
in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-
chokehold-death-of-eric-gamer.html. In July 2015, four days before the anniversary of Garner's
death, New York City announced that it had agreed to settle (for $5.9 million) the wrongful death
claim brought by Garner's family. J. David Goodman, Eric Garner Case Is Settled by New York City
for $5.9 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/nyregion/eric-
garer-case-is-settled-by-new-york-city-for-5-9-million.html.
8. Justin Wm. Moyer et al., Protests in Support of Eric Garner Erupt in New York and
Elsewhere, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/moming-
mix/wp/2014/12 /04 /after-grand-jury-doesnt-indict-police-officer-who-choked-eric-gamer-protests-
erupt-in-new-york-and-elsewhere/ (noting that "[a] wave of protests erupted from Manhattan to
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followed the deaths of Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, and Freddie Gray.9
Most recently, in November 2015, protesters in Chicago took to the
streets when officials (after delaying for more than a year) released video
footage of the October 2014 police shooting of 17-year-old Laquan
McDonald.10
These protests-while set in motion by specific incidents-were
fueled by a broader set of concerns about the role and legitimacy of law
enforcement in heavily policed communities." Underlying these protests
is a realization that police are increasingly using their power to stop or
arrest individuals-not to investigate crimes, but as a means of regulat-
ing communities. Indeed, in New York, these protests flowed naturally
from several years of debate and litigation to reform the city's aggressive
stop-and-frisk policing program.12
In December 2014, with the objective of restoring community trust
in the police, President Obama created a Task Force on 21st Century
Policing.'3 FBI Director Jim Comey, in a February 2015 speech de-
Oakland, Calif." including as examples, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Oakland, Washington, D.C., Seattle,
Atlanta, and Baltimore, among many more). The anniversaries of the deaths of Garner and Brown
led to more protests in the summer of 2015. Benjamin Mueller & Nate Schweber, Eric Garner is
Remembered One Year After His Death, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/nyregionleric-gamer-death-anniversary.html; Wesley Lowery
et al., State of Emergency Declared in Ferguson After Police Shoot and Critically Injure Man Dur-
ing Protests, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.cominews/morning-
mix/wp/2015/08/1 0/shots-fired-during-protests-in-ferguson-mo-reports-say/.
9. Peter Hermann et al., After Peaceful Start, Protest of Freddie Gray's Death in Baltimore
Turns Violent, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/baltimore-
readies-for-saturday-protest-of-freddie-grays-death/2015/04/25/8cf990f2-e9f8-l le4 aael-
d642717d8afa story.html; Alan Blinder & Manny Fernandez, North Charleston Prepares for
Mourning and Protest in Walter Scott Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/l /us/north-charleston-prepares-for-weekend-of-mourning-and-
protest-in-walter-scott-shooting.html; Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Says He Shot Tamir Rice After
Fake Gun Was Pulled, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/us/cleveland-officer-says-he-shot-tamir-rice-after-fake-gun-
was-pulled.html (noting that the recent release of information surrounding the shooting has "prompt-
ed protests across the country and raised questions about how the police use force and interact with
African-Americans").
10. Patrick M. O'Connell et al., Laquan McDonald Shooting Protest Groups Plan Friday
March, CHi. TRIB. (Nov. 26, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-cop-
shooting-laquan-mcdonald-protest-1 27-met-20151126-story.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
I1. Anderson, supra note 5 (describing stop-and-frisk policies and the militarization of police
as creating an atmosphere of "authoritarian oversight and normalized police harassment").
12. See infra Section III.A. I.
13. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Fact Sheet: Task Force on
21st Century Policing (Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/12/18/fact-sheet-task-force-21st-century-policing ("Recent events in Ferguson,
Staten Island, Cleveland, and around the country have highlighted the importance of strong, collabo-
rative relationships between local police and the communities they protect."); see also OFFICE OF
CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015) [hereinafter TASK FORCE] (explaining that President Obama formed
the task force to respond to "recent events that have exposed rifts in the relationships between local
police and the communities they protect and serve"). The Task Force issued its final report in May
2015 and many of its recommendations are being implemented in jurisdictions around the country.
Id.; see also President Obama, Weekly Address: Continuing Work to Improve Community Policing
2015] REDEFINING REASONABLE SEIZURES 57
scribed by commentators as unprecedented in its candor,14 echoed the
importance of this mission and directly addressed the "disconnect be-
tween police agencies and many citizens-predominantly in communi-
ties of color."'5
While this executive branch attention to policing is much needed,
the Court's role in authorizing greater police contact with civilians, and
its potential as a source of restraint, requires scrutiny.'6 A close examina-
tion of seizure cases decided by the Court over the last fifteen years re-
veals that the government's power to seize individuals suspected of
crimes-by arresting, stopping, or otherwise detaining them-has ex-
panded significantly.
The Terry Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment's "reason-
ableness" standard required "balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."'7 Over time,
and perhaps particularly in the twenty-first century, that balance has be-
come skewed in the government's favor in seizure cases. Cases about
8 1920arrests,' stops,19 and search warrant seizures, for example, illustrate
that a gradual redefinition of what constitutes a reasonable seizure has
occurred without meaningful evaluation of whether the government actu-
ally needed additional seizure or detention power.
(Aug. 15, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/08/15/weekly-address-continuing-work-improve-community-policing).
14. Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Chief Links Scrutiny of Police with Rise in
Violent Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/us/politics/fbi-
chief-links-scrutiny-of-police-with-rise-in-violent-crime.html?_r-0 (describing it as an "unusually
candid speech" and observing that "[m]ore than his predecessors, Mr. Comey has used his office as
one of the nation's top law enforcement officials to bring attention to issues that state and local
police departments are confronting").
15. James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at Georgetown University
(Feb. 12, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-
enforcement-and-race) ("Serious debates are taking place about how law enforcement personnel
relate to the communities they serve, about the appropriate use of force, and about real and perceived
biases, both within and outside of law enforcement."). More recently, Comey has sparked controver-
sy by expressing concern that "increased attention on the police has made officers less aggressive
and emboldened criminals." James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School (Oct. 23, 2015) (transcript available at
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/law-enforcement-and-the-communities-we-serve-bending-the-
lines-toward-safety-and-justice) (recognizing that some behavior change is to be welcomed, but
emphasizing the importance of "a strong police presence" to detect and deter violent crime); see also
Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra note 14 (noting that Comey's opinions are not shared by top level Justice
Department officials and outlining disagreement among law enforcement officials as to "whether
there is any credence to the so-called Ferguson effect" (referring to the protests following the events
in Ferguson, MO)).
16. See infra Part III for a discussion of the appropriate role of the Court in regulating police
behavior.
17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (alterations in original) (quoting Camara v. Mun.
Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
18. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164
(2008); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
19. See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014); Navarette v. California, 134 S.
Ct. 1683 (2014); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
20. See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
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While other scholars have focused generally on the Court's struggle
to weigh government interests in Fourth Amendment cases, these anal-
yses focus principally on cases and developments regarding searches and
privacy, as opposed to seizures of people.21 In recent years, this focus on
privacy and searches has also been driven by technological changes in
the way information is created, maintained, and retrieved. Corresponding
adjustments in societal privacy expectations shift the doctrine governing
searches, demanding attention from the Court and from scholars attempt-
ing to predict and to reconcile Court decisions.22 These questions of
modern surveillance and information gathering are irresistibly complex
and undeniably urgent.
In outlining his "equilibrium-adjustment theory," for example, Orin
Kerr ambitiously sought to find a unifying theory to make sense of the
"byzantine patchwork" of Fourth Amendment cases.23 In Kerr's view,
the Supreme Court responds to "changing technology or social practice"
by "adjust[ing] the level of Fourth Amendment protection to try to re-
store the prior equilibrium."24 Kerr claims that his theory "explains what
judges do when they apply the Fourth Amendment ... and explains a
great deal of how Fourth Amendment law came to look as it does."25
Kerr's analysis, however, is primarily focused on searches; he spends
little time trying to explain seizure doctrine, and close analysis of the
21. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15-21 (2012) (including some discussion of seizures but principal-
ly focused on privacy, searches, and surveillance); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE
NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 22, 38-39 (2007) (advocating a
more nuanced and precise scale of suspicion to better calibrate and balance Fourth Amendment
interests but acknowledging focus on "regulating physical and transaction surveillance"); Shima
Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 42 (2013) ("Most Fourth Amend-
ment cases balance the need for effective law enforcement against an individual's . .. [right to]
privacy."); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506-
07, 508 n. 16, 528 n. 123 (2007) (explaining that the article analyzes the four dominant models of
defining what a "reasonable expectation of privacy" means in the context of Fourth Amendment
searches and clarifying that seizures are beyond the scope of the article); L. Song Richardson, Arrest
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2040 (2011) ("The [Fourth]
Amendment is primarily concerned with protecting individual privacy against arbitrary government
intrusion."); cf Jed Rubenfeld, The End ofPrivacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104-05 (2008) (advocat-
ing focus on security instead of privacy, focusing on wiretapping and enemy combatant detentions).
22. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014) (warrantless search of cell
phone incident to arrest held unconstitutional); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965-66 (2013)
(DNA swabbing of arrestees held constitutional); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)
(warrantless GPS tracking held unconstitutional); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)
(warrantless use of thermal heat imager held unconstitutional).
23. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 479-80 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr, Equilibrium] (describing the "dynamic" of "equilibrium
adjustment" as means of reconciling conflicting Fourth Amendment cases); see also Orin S. Kerr,
Response, Defending Equilibrium-Adjustment, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 84, 90 (2011) [hereinafter
Kerr, Defending] (explaining that one goal with the equilibrium theory "was to rescue Fourth
Amendment law from this anarchic narrative").
24. Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 480.
25. Kerr, Defending, supra note 23, at 90.
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Court's recent seizure cases does not reveal any pattern of equilibrium.26
The Court's seizure cases over the last fifteen years instead demonstrate
a relatively consistent expansion of government seizure authority.27
So the protection against unreasonable seizures, although clearly
understood by the Court to be a fundamental liberty protection, continues
to be a neglected sibling.28 In this way, little has changed since 1982,
when Richard Williamson described the Court as "preoccupied with the
task of defining the nature and scope of the individual privacy right se-
cured by the amendment."29 Scholars have also given the interests in
liberty, freedom of movement, and autonomy-which are implicated by
unlawful seizures-too little attention."
This emphasis on searches by courts and scholars is only problemat-
ic if searches and seizures are different from each other in meaningful
ways. They are. Seizures always involve restraining the movement of the
person being seized.3 1 Whether briefly at a checkpoint or, at the other
end of the spectrum, as the function of a formal custodial arrest, seizures
implicate fundamental liberty interests in bodily integrity and freedom of
movement.32 The government's corresponding interest in seizure cases
always includes, but is not limited to, the need to restrain the movement
of the person being seized for some period of time.
Part I of this Article documents how Court decisions in the last fif-
teen years have expanded the definition of a "reasonable seizure." This
has occurred for every category of seizures of people: arrests, stops,
26. See Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 481, 521-22 (describing Fourth Amendment
events that can be explained by equilibrium-adjustment, asserting that the law of arrests has not
changed, and asserting how the Court's automobile cases (including traffic stop decisions) reflect
acclimation to automobile as new technology).
27. See infra Part I. Although Kerr views technology as a force driving his perceived equilib-
rium, it operates differently in the seizure context. As outlined below, changes in technology have a
greater potential to weaken government claims of need in the seizure context. See infra Section
III.D.
28. Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Ar-
rest," 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 771, 771 (1982) (describing "the law governing seizures of people" as the
"stepchild of fourth amendment jurisprudence").
29. Id.
30. Williamson's article is a notable exception. See id. Tracey Maclin's work includes others.
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters" - Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1991) [hereinafter
Maclin, Encounters]; Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amend-
ment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1328-30 (1990) [hereinafter Maclin, Locomotion]
(describing the Court's shift away from recognition of fundamental Fourth Amendment "rights of
personal security and locomotion"). There are, of course, other thorough analyses of specific types
of seizures that are discussed throughout this Article and particularly in Part 1. The literature, how-
ever, has too few analyses of seizures collectively.
31. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures'
of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime-
'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Section III.A.
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search warrant seizures, checkpoints, encounters, and police use-of-force
cases.
Part II focuses on the first part of the Fourth Amendment balance:
the individual interests that are implicated by a seizure. This part details
both the nature of the interests that are implicated and the costs (both to
individuals and to the community) of unlawful seizures. This part also
highlights why an analysis of seizures (uncoupled from search doctrine)
is necessary.
The counterweight in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness bal-
ance-the government's need to seize-is the focus of Part III. There, I
analyze four categories of problems with the Court's evaluation and cal-
culation of necessity in seizure cases: (i) the Court's failure to press the
government to articulate the need for a particular seizure; (ii) the Court's
unwillingness to use existing laws, guidelines, or norms to evaluate
claims of necessity; (iii) the Court's silence about the impact of over-
criminalization on the government's seizure power; and (iv) the Court's
reluctance to consider alternative approaches, developing technologies,
and long-term impacts in calculating necessity.
In making this critique-that the Court must play a more assertive
role in evaluating the strength of the government's asserted interests or
needs-I join a chorus of other scholars who have made that point about
the Fourth Amendment generally.34 My contribution to this discussion is
to focus on and isolate the seizure-specific aspects of this problem and to
begin to identify proposals that would ensure a more robust necessity
inquiry in cases involving seizures of people.
I. SEIZURES OF PEOPLE: AN OVERVIEW OF AN EXPANDING POWER
The law governing when and how the government can "seize" indi-
viduals who are suspected of committing crimes is rooted in the Consti-
tution. Stripped of those passages that focus on searches, the Fourth
Amendment provides "the people" with "[t]he right . .. to be secure in
34. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 44 (asserting that-at least in cases "outside the
home"-justices have "abandoned" their Fourth Amendment obligations and, instead, prioritize
"police convenience"); SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 21, 42-43 (advocating more rigorous Fourth
Amendment balancing according to the "proportionality principle"); Baradaran, supra note 21, at 7
(proposing a new Fourth Amendment model of "informed balancing" to address the court's prob-
lematic reliance on "blind balancing"); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth
Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1686-87 (1998) (describing the Court's
approach to reasonableness balancing as "relaxed and deferential"); Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness
with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MiSS. L.J. 1133, 1137
(2012) (advocating for "more stringent" reasonableness balancing in Fourth Amendment cases);
Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the
Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1176 (1988) ("[The Court] regularly
undervalues the fourth amendment interests jeopardized by every search and seizure, while over-
valuing the countervailing law enforcement interests.").
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their persons . . . against unreasonable . .. seizures."35 The word "sei-
zure" in the Amendment includes two very different concepts: the sei-
zure of people, which is the focus of this Article, and the seizure of
"houses, papers, and effects," which is not.36 A broad spectrum of police
conduct-ranging from full-blown custodial arrests to street stops to
brief detentions at checkpoints-will meet the Court's definition of a
* 37seizure of a person.
Although scholars like Orin Kerr describe the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as maintaining a steady balance of
power between the state and the individual,38 the Court's seizure cases-
and, in particular, its twenty-first century seizure cases-do not fit that
model. Decisions issued by the Supreme Court since 2000 have broadly
expanded the government's power to seize people. The Court decided
twenty-eight cases that relate to the seizure of a person during that fif-
teen-year window.39 In twenty-two of those twenty-eight cases, the Court
ruled in favor of the government, solidifying existing seizure authority
and expanding the government's ability to arrest, stop, or otherwise de-
tain individuals.40 The government's overall success is probably under-
stated by these numbers. As explained in more detail below, two of the
decisions against the government, Florida v. J.L.41 and City of Indianap-
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
36. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584-85 (1980) ("The simple language of the
Amendment applies equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property."). This Article will
often refer to "seizures of people" simply as "seizures." References to seizures of property or evi-
dence will be explicitly identified.
37. See infra Sections I.A-I.F.
38. See, e.g., Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 480 (explaining equilibrium-adjustment
theory).
39. This volume of seizure cases is, by itself, remarkable. In the ten years preceding (1990-
99), the Court heard only eight cases involving seizures of people. All of these cases (the cases
decided since 2000 and those decided from 1990-99) were located by running Westlaw searches for
the terms "Fourth Amendment" and "seizure." (Other more targeted searches were also run.) The
cases that were a "hit" for those search terms were reviewed by the author and by two research
assistants before being counted in these numbers.
40. The twenty-two seizure cases decided in the government's favor include: Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014); Plumhoffv. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014); Navarette v. Califor-
nia, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011); Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S.
323 (2009); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008); L.A. Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007);
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005); Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405 (2005); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146
(2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004); Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419 (2004); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194
(2002); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), receded from by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223
(2009); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001); and Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Six seizure cases were decided against the government during this period. They include: Rodriguez
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015); Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013); Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); and Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
41. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
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olis v. Edmond,4 2 were significantly scaled back by later Court decisions
(Navarette v. California43 and Illinois v. Lidster," respectively) during
the same time period. The government's "loss" in Bailey v. United
States4 5 is similarly offset by the Court's earlier decision in Muehler v.
Mena.46
In the search context, by contrast, there are several recent cases
where the Court has notably restrained the government's power. Riley v.
California,47 Florida v. Jardines,48 United States v. Jones,49 and Arizona
v. Gant50 are ready examples.
The following sections provide a brief outline of the law in each of
these seizure categories: arrests, stops, search warrant seizures, check-
points, "consensual" seizures, and police use of force. The focus is, in
particular, on Supreme Court decisions and other developments since the
turn of the century that illustrate this expansion of the government's
power.
A. Police Power to Arrest
1. Background: Endorsing Warrantless Arrests
The Framers clearly understood seizures of persons to include for-
mal, custodial arrests.5' The requirement that police must have probable
cause to arrest criminal suspects is perhaps the hardest and fastest Fourth
42. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
43. 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
44. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
45. 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1042-43 (2013) (holding that Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692
(1981), did not justify the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises
covered by the search warrant). On remand, the Second Circuit upheld Bailey's conviction finding
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Bailey and that statements and evidence obtained
during the initial part of the stop were properly introduced against him at trial. See United States v.
Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 345-46 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding Fourth Amendment violation only when offic-
ers handcuffed Bailey and that introduction of his subsequent statements was improper but resulted
only in harmless error).
46. 544 U.S. 93, 102 (2005) (finding plaintiffs detention in handcuffs during execution of
search warrant for two to three hours was reasonable in light of government interests; plaintiff was
not a suspect and was not the target of the search).
47. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding warrantless search of arrestee's cell phone was
unconstitutional).
48. 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013) (bringing drug dog to suspect's porch to sniff front door
was a Fourth Amendment "search").
49. 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding installation of GPS tracker onto suspect's car was a
Fourth Amendment "search").
50. 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (narrowing circumstances justifying search incident to arrest of
automobile).
51. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 69 (1996) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment (and its sister provision
in the Massachusetts tate constitution) specified seizures of "persons" to highlight the "heightened
sensitivity government should show" when "bodily arrests" were involved and citing Wilkes and
Entick as "paradigm cases" that influenced the framers and noting that both involved "bodily ar-
rests").
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Amendment rule.52 Until relatively recently, it was a rule without any
real exception.53
Arrest warrants, however, are not usually required. The Supreme
Court's 1976 decision in United States v. Watson5 endorsed the "ancient
common-law" rule that a warrant is not required for any felony arrest that
occurs in public and which is supported by probable cause.55 Warrantless
arrests for misdemeanors committed in the officer's presence are also
permitted.56
The Court recognized in Watson and in Gerstein v. Pugh57 "that
maximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a
magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest."5 The
cost of requiring arrest warrants, however, was viewed by both the Wat-
son and Gerstein Courts as "an intolerable handicap for legitimate law
enforcement."59 Although the Watson Court counseled that seeking an
arrest warrant would be, where "practicable," the "wise" course, in prac-
52. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (holding that the probable cause stand-
ard applies to all arrests). As the Court explained in Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003), as of
2003, the Court "[had] never sustained against a Fourth Amendment challenge the involuntary
removal of a suspect from his home ... absent probable cause." (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811, 815 (1985)).
The difficulty of quantifying probable cause, of course, means that even this core compo-
nent of the rule is hardly fixed. Compare Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Be-
yond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 71 (2010) ("We do not
know exactly what the phrase 'probable cause' means, in strict numerical terms."), with Andrew E.
Taslitz, Foreword, The Death ofProbable Cause, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, ii (2010) (explaining
that "for several decades, most judges understood probable cause's quantitative requirement to hover
around a preponderance of the evidence," but asserting that the Court's recent decisions reflected a
lower probability).
53. See discussion of material witness arrests infra Section I.A.3. It is perhaps more accurate
to state that the rule has not had any lawful exception. For details about a long-term, unlawful prac-
tice in Detroit of arresting and detaining for "hours or even days" witnesses to homicides, see Pam
Belluck, Detroit Police Case Wide Net Over Homicide 'Witnesses,' N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/ ll/us/detroit-police-cast-wide-net-over-homicide-
witnesses.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that "[tihe law is clear" that "police cannot arrest"
witnesses, but documenting dozens of reports (and eventual lawsuits) for witnesses detained by
Detroit police).
54. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
55. Id. at 418, 421, 422-23 (observing that the common-law rule had "survived substantially
intact" at both the state and national level). According to Wayne LaFave, by 1965 (a decade before
Watson), it was "routine [for officers] to make arrests without [a] warrant," and even when warrants
were sought, "judicial participation ... [was] infrequent and . . . perfunctory." WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 15-16 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965).
56. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 422-23.
57. 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (preceding United States v. Watson by one year).
58. Watson, 423 U.S. at 417; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975).
59. Watson, 423 U.S. at 417, 423-24 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-14) (stating that
even if the Court might prefer that officers obtain warrants, "we decline to transform this judicial
preference into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long
been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal
prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it
was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like").
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tice this is rarely done.6 0 For arrests inside a suspect's home, however,
the Court has required that he government obtain a warrant.
2. Permitting Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses
In the decades following Watson, the government's power to arrest
criminal suspects otherwise remained relatively stable.62 Since the turn of
the century, however, the Court has decided several important cases-
including Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,63 Virginia v. Moore,6 and Ash-
croft v. al-Kidd 6-that have effectively expanded the power of the po-
lice to arrest criminal suspects.
Twenty-five years after Watson, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
the Supreme Court turned its attention to the question of the reasonable-
ness of arrests for "very minor" offenses.66 In Atwater, the majority held
that a police officer's decision to take the plaintiff into custody for a seat
belt violation (her children were not properly seat belted) was constitu-
tional. This was true even where (i) the violation was punishable only
by a fine and (ii) the record indicated that the officer's subjective inten-
tion was "gratuitous humiliation[]" of the arrestee.68
The Atwater Court purported to weigh the government's interest but
without real scrutiny of the need to take low-level offenders like Atwater
into custody. In fact, the Court ultimately rejected the idea that the gov-
ernment should have to make any specific showing:
[A] responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by
standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of gov-
ernment need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be con-
verted into an occasion for constitutional review.... Courts attempt-
60. Id at 423-24 (noting that officers' "judgments about probable cause [to arrest] may be
more readily accepted where backed by a warrant").
61. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (holding that warrantless arrests in the
home are "presumptively unreasonable").
62. Cf Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 521-22 (following discussion of Watson, Kerr
notes that "[tihe basic facts of an arrest by a government agent for a felony are the same today as
they were at common law," and accordingly "the law of arrests has remained the same"). But cf
Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an "Arrest" Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?,
48 VILL. L. REv. 129, 157-66 (2003) (describing confusion resulting from the Court's shifting
approach to defining the line between a stop and an arrest).
63. 532 U.S. 318, 340, 354-55 (2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
warrantless custodial arrests for minor offenses).
64. 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (establishing "that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in
the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution" even where state law
prohibited arrest for that offense).
65. 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084-85 (2011) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation for the plain-
tiff's arrest and two-week detention under the Material Witness statute).
66. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
67. Id. ("If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender.").
68. Id. at 346-47 ("[T]he physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations
imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.").
64 [Vol. 93:1
REDEFINING REASONABLE SEIZURES
ing to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the
government's side with an essential interest in readily administrable
rules.
69
The Atwater Court was reluctant to impose on officers in the field a
new judicially drawn line between fine-only offenses and those punisha-
ble by any term of imprisonment.70 This suggested a possible exception
to the new Atwater rule. What if the rule forbidding arrests for fine-only
offenses was a legislative directive? Several years later, in Virginia v.
Moore, the Court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation
even when the decision to effect a custodial arrest directly contravened a
state law requiring police to issue a summons for the particular infrac-
71tion.
The Atwater Court expressed doubt that there was any meaningful
proliferation of custodial arrests for minor offenses.72 In fact, however,
misdemeanor arrests and prosecutions around the country were rapidly
climbing.73 Recent data from New York City document high numbers of
arrests and prosecutions for "quality-of-life" offenses (including, e.g.,
gambling, loitering, making graffiti, disorderly conduct, and riding a bike
on the sidewalk).74 Even before Atwater was decided, scholars observed
this phenomenon. In the wake of Eric Garner's 2014 death, critics have
asked why police would use force to subdue a person suspected of selling
untaxed cigarettes.76 Evidence of so much aggressive policing of misde-
69. Id. at 347 (citation omitted) (first citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35
(1973); then citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
70. Id.
71. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
72. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 (acknowledging that there were likely other examples of "com-
parably foolish, warrantless misdemeanor a rests" but expressing confidence that "the country is not
confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests").
73. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 611, 630 (2014) ("Between 1993 and 2010 the number of misdemeanor arrests [in New York
City] almost doubled."); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (2012)
(highlighting a 2009 report from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers "estimating
that approximately 10.5 million nontraffic misdemeanor prosecutions occur nationally per year
based on the extrapolation of caseload statistics collected from twelve states in 2006" compared to
the "1 .1 million persons convicted of a state felony and approximately 58,000 federal felony cases
filed in the nation's largest urban counties" during the same year).
74. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., A REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 2, app. J-1 fig.20 (2013)
[hereinafter OAG ARREST REPORT),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAGREPORTONSQF_PRACTICES NOV 2013.pdf (documenting
high rates of quality-of-life arrests in NYC from January 2009-December 2012).
75. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race,
and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 462, 476 (2000) (documenting an
increase in the number of people arrested for low-level offenses as well as an increase in the num-
bers of those cases that were dismissed (i.e., a decrease in the quality of the arrests)); Debra Living-
ston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 590 (1997) (noting that in New York City, "quality-of-life en-
forcement has been aggressively pursued by police executives invoking the Broken Windows idea"
and predicting eventual community alienation).
76. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text; see also John Marzulli et al., NYPD No. 3's
Order to Crack Down on Selling Loose Cigarettes Led to Chokehold Death of Eric Garner, N.Y.
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meanors and quality-of-life offenses suggests that the Court's assump-
tions in Atwater about the lack of abuses ought to be revisited.
3. Arresting Criminal Suspects as Material Witnesses
The traditional arrests described above require that police have
probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed a crime.77 What
ability do law enforcement officers have to arrest criminal suspects if
their suspicion does not rise to the level of probable cause? The answer
traditionally found in criminal procedure treatises and law school case-
books would have been none. But in most criminal procedure casebooks
now, that black letter proposition is accompanied by an asterisk or quali-
fied by a note about the federal Material Witness Statute 78 : explaining
how it operates, documenting its use to arrest and detain terrorism sus-
pects, and citing the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd.79
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd was the first and only Supreme Court case chal-
lenging the government's post-9/11 use of the Material Witness Statute.80
The statute permits the arrest of individuals who have information that is
"material in a criminal proceeding ... if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure [their] presence . . . by subpoena."8 The statute
has been interpreted broadly, allowing the arrest of witnesses to ongoing
grand jury investigations as well as trial witnesses.8 2 The heart of Abdul-
lah al-Kidd's claim was that former Attorney General John Ashcroft had
instituted a department-wide policy to use the federal Material Witness
Statute pretextually to detain criminal suspects on less than probable
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/wife-
man-filmed-chokehold-arrested-article- 1.1893790; George F. Will, Editorial, Eric Garner, Criminal-
ized to Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2014, at A21 ("Garner died at the dangerous intersection of
something wise, known as 'broken windows' policing, and something worse than foolish: decades of
overcriminalization."). In his editorial, Will quotes Professor Stephen Carter who observed that:
It's unlikely that the New York Legislature, in creating the crime of selling untaxed ciga-
rettes, imagined that anyone would die for violating it. But a wise legislator would give
the matter some thought before creating a crime. Officials who fail to take into account
the obvious fact that the laws they're so eager to pass will be enforced at the point of a
gun cannot fairly be described as public servants.
Will, supra.
77. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012) ("Release or detention of a material witness.").
79. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); see, e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 134 (3d ed. Supp. 2014) (citing al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, and noting the case presented
"an unusual context in which the arrest power may exist even without probable cause to believe the
arrestee has committed an infraction, much less a crime"); YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 352-53 (13th ed. 2012) (citing al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074; United States v.
Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003)).
80. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 ("Release or detention of a material witness").
82. See Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 49-62 (providing detailed analysis of legislative history to
support determination that 18 U.S.C. § 3144 applies to grand jury witnesses); see also Lauryn P.
Gouldin, When Deference is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in Material- Witness Detentions, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1346-47 (2012) (analyzing legislative history and scholarly critiques of appli-
cation of statute to material witnesses).
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cause. 8 Al-Kidd's journey to the Supreme Court focused public attention
on the government's novel and highly controversial use of the Material
Witness Statute as an investigative detention tool.M In the years follow-
ing September 11, scores of material witnesses were detained in maxi-
mum-security facilities for extended periods while their alleged connec-
tions to various terrorist plots were investigated.85 Many were never
called to testify before the grand jury (or in any other criminal proceed-
-86ing).
In media reports and in amicus briefs, government officials empha-
sized that the power to detain suspects as material witnesses was an es-
sential counterterrorism tool.87 This claim of necessity was not tested by
the al-Kidd Court, however. Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court unan-
imously held that Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity because he
had not violated a clearly established law.88 A majority of five Justices
also rejected al-Kidd's claim against Ashcroft on the merits, refusing to
invalidate the warrant solely on al-Kidd's assertion of prosecutorial pre-
text.89 In other words, when provided with an opportunity to prohibit the
government from using the Material Witness Statute to detain criminal
suspects, the Court declined to do so. Although the Court did not explic-
itly authorize the use of the Material Witness Statute as an investigative
detention tool, the decision in al-Kidd implicitly facilitated the continued
83. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.
84. Gouldin, supra note 82, at 1336-37.
85. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS To ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE
MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, at 1-3 (2005),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0605_0.pdf. In a September 2014 Report, the De-
partment of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) suggested that the statute had been used to
detain fewer than 100 material witnesses in international terrorism cases since September 2001. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT'S USE OF THE
MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE WITH A FOCUS ON SELECT NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS 14 (2014)
[hereinafter OIG REPORT], https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2014/sl409r.pdf. OIG noted that this
"represented a tiny fraction of [its] . . . overall use." Id. at v. The statute is used regularly in immigra-
tion and human trafficking cases and, from 2000 to 2012, over 58,000 material witnesses were
arrested by the federal government. Id. at 1, 13.
86. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 85, at 2.
87. Gouldin, supra note 82, at 1335-36, 1345 (collecting statements made by former Attor-
neys General, former White House Counsel and former United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York in support of the use of the statute to detain terrorism suspects).
88. The Court explained that "[q]ualified immunity gives government officials breathing
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions." al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at
2085. Qualified immunity for Ashcroft was appropriate because "[a]t the time of al-Kidd's arrest,
not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest
pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.". Id. at 2083. Justice Ginsburg concurred in
the judgment stating that "no 'clearly established law' renders Ashcroft answerable in damages." Id
at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor also concurred "that Ashcroft did not violate
clearly established law." Id. at 2089 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Kagan recused herself. Id
at 2085 (majority opinion).
89. See id at 2085 ( "[A]n objectively reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness
pursuant to a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of alle-
gations that the arresting authority had an improper motive."). Whether al-Kidd had "concede[d]"
the validity of the warrant for purposes of his suit against Ashcroft (or more broadly) was the subject
of disagreement among the Justices and prompted several concurrences. See id. at 2083 & n.3.
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use of the statute in this way, effectively broadening the government's
90seizure power.
To be fair, the questions presented to the al-Kidd Court were limited
in scope, and as Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence, the
Court's decision left "unresolved whether the Government's use of the
Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful." 91 That issue continued
to be litigated in the district court and at the Ninth Circuit until Decem-
ber of 2014 when an out-of-court settlement of the lawsuit was an-
nounced.92
Material witnesses are a very narrow category of federal arrestees,
and the power to arrest material witnesses may for now be dormant-on
reserve until the next emergency.9 3 Nevertheless, as outlined in Part III, it
is another example of an expansion of seizure power that seems to have
resulted from (or been facilitated by) problems with the Court's evalua-
* * 94tion of necessity in seizure cases.
Although an arrest is the "quintessential[]" Fourth Amendment sei-
zure of a person,95 the definition of a seizure developed by the Supreme
Court over the last five decades includes other less intrusive restraints on
movement that are briefly addressed in the following sections.
B. Stopping Power
Until 1967, if an individual was not actually arrested by police,
courts did not generally find that a Fourth Amendment seizure had oc-
90. See OIG REPORT, supra note 85, at 77 ("Under the [al-Kidd] Court's Fourth Amendment
analysis, if detention can be objectively justified by the need to secure the witness's testimony, it
does not matter if the subjective intent of the relevant officials was something else, such as to detain
the individual pending the development of probable cause to arrest him.").
91. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. In al-Kidd's Bivens action against the FBI agents who effected his arrest, the District
Court of Idaho granted al-Kidd summary judgment, finding that al-Kidd's detention did not comply
with the requirements of the statute. See al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. 1:05-CV-093, 2012 WL 4470782,
at *1, *6 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2012). The government's appeal of that decision was pending before
the Ninth Circuit when the case was settled. See Richard A. Serrano, Muslim American Caught Up
in Post-9/11 Sweep Gets an Apology, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-detainee-apology-20150214-story.html#page=1. Al-Kidd
received $415,000 and an acknowledgment from Wendy J. Olson, the U.S. Attorney for the District
of Idaho, that fell short of an actual apology (despite the Times headline). Id. Olson wrote that "[tihe
government acknowledges that your arrest and detention as a witness was a difficult experience for
you and regrets any hardship or disruption to your life that may have resulted from your arrest and
detention." Id. (quoting Letter from Wendy J. Olson, U.S. Attorney, to Abdullah al-Kidd (Jan. 15,
2015)).
93. OIG found that the use of the statute to detain material witnesses in connection with
terrorism investigations was "concentrated in the 2-year period immediately following the Septem-
ber II attacks" and that no witness had been detained in an international terrorism investigation
since 2004. OIG REPORT, supra note 85, at 65-66.
94. See infra Part Ill.
95. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. Watson, 423




curred. To arrest a criminal suspect, police had to have probable cause
to suspect the person of having committed a crime,97 but no suspicion
was required for lesser police encounters (which included, for example, a
police officer approaching an individual to request information)."
1. Terry and its Recent Progeny
The Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Terry v. Ohio made clear
that street "stops"-ever after deemed Terry stops-were Fourth
Amendment seizures even though the intrusion on individual rights fell
short of a full-blown custodial arrest." Cognizant of the realities facing
street-level law enforcement, the Terry Court declined to require either
probable cause or a warrant for the stop (and frisk) that were the focus of
the case. Although Chief Justice Warren, who authored the majority
opinion, carefully avoided explicitly defining the requirements of a
"stop,"1"3 Justice Harlan, in his oft-quoted concurring opinion, set out the
reasonable suspicion standard for which the case would come to be
known.'0 As Justice Harlan explained, because a stop is a lesser Fourth
Amendment intrusion, less suspicion is required.102 After Terry, a stop is
justified if a police officer has a reasonable or "articulable suspicion"
that "criminal activity may be afoot." 03 Terry is equally well-known for
deeming a "frisk" to be a Fourth Amendment event. A Terry frisk-
which is something less than a "full-blown search"-is justified if an
officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person he or she has stopped is
armed and dangerous.'0" Although stops and frisks, like their search and
96. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (explaining (and rejecting) prior view that "the
Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers
stop short of something called a 'technical arrest"').
97. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (noting that prior to Terry, "the
requirement of probable cause [to make an arrest] . . . was treated as absolute").
98. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
99. Id. ("It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and re-
strains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."); see also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 369-70 n.16 (2011) (clarifying that before Terry these
encounters were not constitutionally protected).
100. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 & n. 16 ("We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitution-
al propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention'
and/or interrogation.").
101. Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and
Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court's Conference, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 749, 793-821
(1998) (documenting the shift from probable cause to reasonableness in the drafting of the Terry
opinions); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law
Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 891, 895-96 (1998).
102. Terry, 392 U.S. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. The concept of reasonable suspicion for which Terry is known is drawn from Justice
Harlan's concurrence. Terry, 392 U.S. at 31, 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the concept of
an "articulable suspicion less than probable cause" and concluding that Officer McFadden's "justifi-
able suspicion afforded a proper constitutional basis for accosting Terry, restraining his liberty of
movement briefly, and addressing questions to him"). The "criminal activity may be afoot" language
is drawn from the majority opinion. Id. at 30 (majority opinion).
104. Id. at 19, 27.
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seizure big siblings, are often conjoined in theory and practice, the focus
of this Article is on the seizure component of the pair: the stop.
In seizure cases decided since Terry that involve something less
than an arrest, the Court has generally evaluated the government's con-
duct using the sort of reasonableness balancing that the Terry Court em-
ployed.105 As the Terry Court explained: "[T]here is 'no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
[or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."'
10 6
In Brown v. Texas,07 decided eleven years after Terry, the Court elabo-
rated further on how to balance reasonableness in seizure cases:
The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a tradition-
al arrest, depends "on a balance between the public interest and the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference
by law officers." Consideration of the constitutionality of such sei-
zures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.'0
8
In the nearly fifty years since Terry, the Court has significantly
broadened the definition of reasonable suspicion and narrowed both
(i) the circumstances that will be deemed a stop (instead of a mere en-
counter) and (ii) the circumstances that will convert a stop into an arrest
(requiring probable cause).' As outlined below, decisions issued by the
Court in the last fifteen years have continued this trend. The cumulative
effect of these decisions-pulling back from the exigency presented in
105. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
106. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (alterations in original) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387
U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
107. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
108. Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975)).
109. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (holding that an individual's con-
sent to search is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have
felt free to refuse to cooperate with the police); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (hold-
ing that "under the totality of the circumstances the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited suffi-
cient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of respondent's car" when police observed
and corroborated some of the innocent behaviors reported in the tip); United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (holding that a 20-minute delay between the initial traffic stop and search
of the vehicle was constitutionally permissible); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)
(holding that the only relevant inquiry as to custody is how a reasonable man in the suspect's posi-
tion would have understood his situation); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding
that a narcotics dog "sniff test" was reasonable in a brief Terry stop situation); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (giving examples of factors, the presence of which may
indicate that exchange with police constitutes a seizure: "the threatening presence of several officers,
the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be com-
pelled"); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (holding incriminating statements made
in custody were fruits of an illegal seizure because the application of the Fourth Amendment's




Terry, lengthening the time span and intrusiveness of Terry stops, and
moving away from requiring specificity about the offense of suspicion-
is readily seen in the dramatic increase in the use of stops and frisks as a
regulatory or deterrent tool to manage crime in urban communities.110
The story of the expansion of Terry in the twenty-first century includes
several important Court decisions. It is also, however, the story of police
exploiting the Court's deferential, laissez faire approach to regulating
police conduct in this context."'
2. Reasonable Suspicion: Lowering the Bar
The Court's 2000 decision in Illinois v. Wardlowll2-finding that an
individual's flight from police in a high-crime neighborhood could justi-
fy a stop-significantly broadened the definition of reasonable suspi-
cion.113 Before Wardlow, the Court had held that if an individual was free
to leave or terminate an encounter with the police, she was not "seized"
under the Fourth Amendment.114 The Court's pre- Wardlow decisions
made clear that if the police did not have reasonable suspicion to subject
a person to a Terry stop, that person had a right to walk away (or other-
wise terminate an encounter with police).115
The Wardlow majority, however, curiously found that the speed
with which a person exercised his right to leave an encounter could trans-
form constitutionally legitimate behavior into articulable suspicion.' In
other words, although prior cases provided a right to walk away, the
Wardlow Court held that when Wardlow ran from police, his flight creat-
ed reasonable suspicion for a stop.117 Wardlow was perhaps as notewor-
thy for what the opinion omitted or downplayed: there was no crime of
suspicion identified, it was unclear whether the officers were in un-
marked cars (which is essential to determining the significance of the
110. See Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y.C.L.U., http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data
(last visited Sep. 19, 2015) (documenting dramatic increase in stops and frisks in New York City);
see also ACLU OF ILLINOIS, STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 3 (2015), http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/ACLUStopandFrisk_6.pdf (providing data on stop-and-frisk practices in
Chicago; claiming that rate of stops in Chicago outpaced New York by 4 to 1).
Ill. Frank Zimring has outlined the "basic methodology" of New York's "aggressive" street
policing: officers conduct stops and frisks "of suspicious-looking persons" and then "mak[e] arrests
for minor offenses as a way to remove perceived risks from the street and to identify persons wanted
for other crimes." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE 118 (2012). See infra
Section IlIl.A. I for a discussion of the issues presented in the New York City stop-and-frisk litiga-
tion.
112. 528 U.S. 119 (2002).
113. Id. at 124-25.
114. See infra Section I.E.
115. See infra Section I.E.
116. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 ("[U]nprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooper-
ate.").
117. Id. at 122-25. The Wardlow Court rejected the approach taken by the Illinois Supreme
Court which had held that flight was an exercise of the Royer right to leave an encounter with police
(and thus could not be a basis for reasonable suspicion). Id. at 122-23. Instead, the Wardlow Court
deemed flight "the opposite" of"going about one's business." Id. at 125.
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flight), and there was no data to support the claim that this was a high-
crime neighborhood."8
In United States v. Arvizu,l19 decided two years later, a unanimous
Court upheld a stop based on a combination of factors that the Court
acknowledged would have been insufficient to establish reasonable sus-
picion independently.12 0 In Arvizu, as in prior decisions, the Court em-
phasized the need to "give[] due weight to the factual inferences drawn
by the law enforcement officer."121
More recently, in April 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Navarette v. California, a case involving two brothers who were ar-
rested and charged with felony drug charges by state authorities.122 The
central issue in the Navarette case was whether an anonymous tip from
another driver, who claimed that the defendants had attempted to drive
her off the road, was sufficient to establish the reasonable suspicion re-
quired for a lawful stop.123
In a split 5-4 decision, the Court held that it was.124 Navarette sig-
nificantly limits the Court's earlier decision in Florida v. J.L., which held
that an anonymous tip with limited description of the suspect and no pre-
dictive elements was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a
stop.125 The tip in JL. was that a young, black male wearing a plaid shirt
standing at a bus stop was carrying a firearm.126 The Court held that the
information in the tip did not establish reasonable suspicion for the stop
and frisk of J.L.1 27
Prior to Navarette, scholars viewed corroboration of an anonymous
tip-and specifically of the criminal conduct alleged in the tip-as essen-
tial to a determination that an anonymous tip could qualify as reasonable
suspicion.128 After Navarette, not much is required to make an anony-
118. Id. at 138-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
120. Id at 275-77 (permitting reasonable suspicion for stop based on officer's observation that
driver was stiff, children waved awkwardly, and car slowed at sight of officer (among other fac-
tors)).
121. Id. at 277.
122. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686-87.
123. Id. at 1688-89.
124. Id. at 1686.
125. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000); see also Katie Barlow & Nina Totenberg, Su-
preme Court Gives Police New Power to Rely on Anonymous Tips, NPR (Apr. 22, 2014, 7:40 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/04/22/305993180/court-gives-police-new-power-to-rely-on-anonymous-
tips; Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Big New Role for Anonymous Tipsters, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr.
22, 2014, 9:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/opinion-analysis-big-new-role-for-
anonymous-tipsters/ (observing "that the Court had added significantly to police authority to con-
clude that they must act because a crime is in progress").
126. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
127. Id. at 274.
128. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62
EMORY L.J. 259, 292 (2012) (explaining that for an anonymous tip to constitute reasonable suspi-
cion, "the predictive tip must be corroborated by police observation, which means corroboration of
[Vol. 93:172
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mous tip reliable enough to justify the stop of a vehicle. The Navarette
majority was satisfied that the anonymous tipster's eyewitness account
seemed to have been made roughly contemporaneously with the incident
alleged by the tipster.129 The Court assumed that most 911 callers have
awareness of "technological and regulatory developments" that "relay
the caller's phone number to 911 dispatchers."l30 As a result, "a reasona-
ble [police] officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice
before using such a system."l31
It is not difficult to imagine the language that will appear in new
editions of police manuals to reflect this expanded power to detain mo-
torists; it can largely quote the majority opinion. An anonymous tip that
alleges any of the following "dangerous behaviors . . . would justify a
traffic stop on suspicion of drunk driving": "weaving all over the road-
way," "'cross[ing] over the center line' . . . and 'almost caus[ing] several
head-on collisions,"' or "driving in the median."l32 Of course, having an
officer observe any of these behaviors would immediately provide rea-
sonable suspicion. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, described the key prob-
lem in the case:
[The officers] followed the truck for five minutes, presumably to see
if it was being operated recklessly. And that was good police
work.... But the pesky little detail left out of the Court's reasonable-
suspicion equation is that, for the five minutes that the truck was be-
ing followed (five minutes is a long time), [the defendant's] driving
was irreproachable.133
Despite the fact that they could not corroborate the anonymous re-
port, the officers stopped the vehicle.' 34
3. Rodriguez v. United States: Stopping Short
In its April 2015 decision in Rodriguez v. United States,135 the Court
ruled in favor of the defendant, strictly limiting the scope of a traffic stop
both the specific individual and the ongoing crime" (emphasis added)); see also Virginia v. Harris,
558 U.S. 978, 979, 981 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have grant-
ed certiorari to the question of whether an officer must visually corroborate an anonymous tip of
drunk driving).
129. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 n.1, 1689 (2014). The majority opinion
notes that the tipper had identified herself but that she was never called to testify. Id. at 1689 n.1. As
a result, the call was treated as an anonymous tip. Id.
130. Id. at 1690.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1690-91 (first and third alterations in original) (first quoting People v. Wells, 136
P.3d 810, 811 (Cal. 2006); then quoting State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 715-16 (Haw. 2004); and
then quoting State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001)).
133. Id. at 1696 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Had the officers witnessed the petitioners violate a
single traffic law, they would have had cause to stop the truck, and this case would not be before us.
And not only was the driving irreproachable, but the State offers no evidence to suggest that the
petitioners even did anything suspicious, such as suddenly slowing down, pulling off to the side of




to those steps that further the officer's "mission." 3 6 As Justice Thomas
emphasized in his dissent, the majority's decision is not readily compati-
ble with the Court's prior Fourth Amendment cases.137
Rodriguez involved a traffic stop: state police officer Morgan Stru-
ble pulled Dennys Rodriguez over after Rodriguez veered onto the
shoulder of the road while driving on a Nebraska highway.3 8 Stops for
traffic violations like the one at issue in Rodriguez are a sort of hybrid
seizure. They involve probable-cause-level suspicion of wrongdoing, but
because the detentions involved are generally "relatively brief," they are
viewed as "more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' . . . than to a for-
mal arrest." 39
The Rodriguez stop really involved two phases. During the first
twenty minutes of the detention, Officer Struble ran a records check on
both Rodriguez and his passenger; he questioned the two men; he wrote a
warning ticket; and eventually, he returned to the men their documenta-
tion. 140 The legality of this first phase of the stop was not disputed by the
parties.
The Rodriguez Court focused on what happened next during the
continued seizure of Rodriguez (in what can be viewed as the second
phase of the stop). Although Officer Struble admitted that he "got all the
reason[s] for the stop out of the way," he declined to let Rodriguez
leave.141 Instead, he asked for "consent"l42 to walk his dog around Rodri-
guez's car.143 When Rodriguez refused, Struble ordered him to get out of
the car, and they waited for backup.'" When the second officer arrived,
five or six minutes after the first phase of the stop ended, the officers led
Officer Struble's dog around the car.145 The dog alerted on the second
135. 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
136. Id. at 1612 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).
137. Id. at 1617 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas emphasized that Illinois v. Caballes
held that "conducting a dog sniff [does] not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its
inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner." Id. at 1617 (alternation in original) (quot-
ing Illinois, 543 U.S. at 408). Also, Justice Thomas cited Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110
(1977), to support his determination that Officer Struble's decision to call for backup (and protect his
safety) was reasonable under the circumstances. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1618.
138. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at 1614 (alteration in original) (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)).
140. Id. at 1613.
141. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting statement by Officer Struble) (clarifying that Struble
"did not consider Rodriguez 'free to leave"' (quoting statement by Officer Struble)).
142. As noted in Section LE, infra, in the text accompanying notes 176-90, if a person does not
have the right to refuse a police request, he cannot truly be found to have "consented" to a search or
seizure. Based on the way that the events transpired in this case, it is clear that Officer Struble did
not believe that Rodriguez had a choice about the dog sniff.





pass around the car.1" 6 During the ensuing search of the interior of the
car, the officers discovered methamphetamines.147
Reversing the Eighth Circuit, the majority held that absent reasona-
ble suspicion the extended detention violated the Fourth Amendment.148
In support of its holding, the Court emphasized that the "mission" or
purpose of the traffic stop was completed at the end of the first phase
(when the ticket issued and the suspect's documents were returned to
him).149 As the Court explained:
Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the
traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's "mission"-to ad-
dress the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related
safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of
the stop, it may "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at]
purpose." Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the
traffic infraction are-or should have been-completed.50
The Court cited its previous decision in Florida v. Royer'' for the
proposition that "[t]he scope of the detention must be carefully tailored
to its underlying justification." 52 The majority's decision is cause for
optimism that the Court may be willing to require the government to
defend more specific and particularized needs for a seizure.'15  This is
true even when that more rigorous scrutiny will create some tension with
the Court's seizure (and search) precedents.
C. Search Warrant Seizures
Police officers are also permitted to detain individuals, without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, when those individuals are inside
or near a place that is being searched pursuant to a validly executed
search warrant.154 This rule, known as the Summers rule, was expanded
significantly by the Court in its 2005 decision in Muehler v. Mena.'5
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1616.
149. Id. at 1614 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).
150. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Illinois, 543 U.S. at 407).
151. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
152. Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
153. Tracey Maclin disagrees, cautioning that Rodriguez "does not expand Fourth Amendment
protections for motorists." Tracey Maclin, Perspectives, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 17) (on file with author). In fact, Maclin argues, the case misses the opportunity to
state clearly that police questioning that is unrelated to the crime that is the basis for the stop is
"unreasonable" and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 24, 28, 33-35.
154. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) ("[A] warrant .. . founded on probable
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a
proper search is conducted." (footnote omitted)); see also Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031,
1034-35 (2013) (explaining the Summers rule).
155. 544 U.S. 93, 98-99 (2005) (noting that the detention in Muehler was "more intrusive than
that which [was] upheld in Summers").
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In Muehler, the Court held that it was reasonable for eighteen offic-
ers conducting a search warrant to detain for two to three hours, in hand-
cuffs, four occupants of the premises being searched.1 6 Those occupants
were not the targets of the officers' investigation, and they were not oth-
erwise suspected of criminal activity.157 The duration of their detention
and the use of handcuffs the entire time set the degree of the intrusion in
Muehler well apart from what the Summers decision had authorized.158
The Court upheld this additional intrusion without meaningful inquiry
into the officers' need for these precautions. The purported safety-based
need to handcuff Mena rested on the fact that the two officers watching
the occupants were "outnumber[ed]."l5 9 This safety-based need, howev-
er, was as much the product of on-site staffing allocations as anything
else: there were sixteen other officers searching the house while Mena
and the others were handcuffed.'6 The Court shied away from second-
guessing the officers' allocation of resources.
In Bailey v. United States, decided in 2013, the government
sought-but the Court rejected-a further spatial expansion of Sum-
mers.162 After obtaining a warrant to search defendant Bailey's residence
for a handgun, police observed someone matching Bailey's description
drive away from the residence with another individual. 163 While one
group of officers executed the search warrant at the residence, two other
officers followed Bailey and pulled him over about one mile away from
the residence.64 The government argued-and both the district court and
the Second Circuit agreed-that Summers "authorizes law enforcement
to detain the occupant of premises subject to a valid search warrant when
that person is seen leaving those premises and the detention is effected as
soon as reasonably practicable."'65 The Supreme Court notably rejected
that extension of the Summers rule, holding instead that Summers does
not authorize "the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity
of the premises covered by a search warrant."'66
156. Id. at 98-100.
157. Id. at 96.
158. Amir Hatem Ali, Note, Following the Bright Line of Michigan v. Summers: A Cause for
Concern for Advocates of Bright-Line Fourth Amendment Rules, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483,
504 (2010) ("Had the [Muehler] Court ... balanced the totality of the circumstances-that is, both
the detention and the handcuffing together-it would have been balancing a detention that was
significantly more intrusive than that in Summers against the aforementioned law enforcement
interests."); see also Muehler, 544 U.S. at 104-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
159. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 103 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 110 (Stevens, J., concurring).
161. See infra Section 111.D (challenging the government's allocation of resources as creating
the "need" in Muehler).
162. Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1040-42 (2013).
163. Id at 1036.
164. Id
165. United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 208 (2d Cir. 2011), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013).




Seizure doctrine has evolved to encompass high volumes of suspi-
cionless stopping as well. In United States v. Martinez-Fuertel67 and in
Delaware v. Prouse,'68 the Court expressly established that checkpoint
stops (whether at permanent checkpoints or at temporary roadblocks) are
"seizures" within the Fourth Amendment.'69 Police officers may briefly
stop individuals at checkpoints without any suspicion of criminal wrong-
doing if the officers' "primary purpose" is something other than tradi-
tional law enforcement.170 The Court has held that "roadway safety" and
"border protection" are valid non-law-enforcement purposes for DWI
stops and immigration checkpoints respectively.171 So long as the gov-
ernment can articulate these sorts of regulatory goals (like highway safe-
ty and border control), the Court has permitted it to reap law enforcement
benefits in the form of drunk driving and immigration arrests when viola-
tors are detected.172
Once the primary-purpose condition is satisfied, the Court balances
the government's need for a particular checkpoint against the individu-
al's liberty interest.17 3 The degree to which the government's checkpoint
procedures advance its interests while also minimizing the intrusion on
liberty is generally the focus of checkpoint cases.' 74 Issues like the length
167. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
168. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
169. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653 ("The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated in this
case because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the
meaning of those Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention quite brief."); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556, 566-67 ("It is agreed that checkpoint
stops are 'seizures' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.") (upholding warrantless stop at
permanent immigration checkpoint); see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450,
455 (1990) ("[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.")
(upholding warrantless stop at temporary sobriety checkpoint).
170. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-41 (2000) (holding that checkpoint to
find narcotics was invalid); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424-28 (2004) (holding that
stopping members of the public to obtain information about a crime they may have observed was
constitutional).
171. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557.
172. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447-48 (holding that Michigan's use of highway sobriety checkpoints did
not violate the Fourth Amendment; thereby upholding drunk driving arrests); Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 566 (holding that "stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints
are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant"; affirming immi-
gration convictions of both defendants as a result). As Ricardo Bascuas has explained, this creates
obvious opportunities for pretextual stops. Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the
Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERs L.J. 719,
759 (2007) ("If criminal charges can be brought with evidence uncovered through
administrative or 'special needs' searches, those searches can provide a convenient pretext for cir-
cumventing any requirement of individualized suspicion.").
173. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427 ("[l]n judging reasonableness, we look to 'the gravity of the
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest,
and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
51 (1979))); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43 ("[I]n determining whether individualized suspicion is
required, we must consider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the particu-
lar law enforcement practices at issue.").
174. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43.
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of the stop, the location of the stop, and the limits on any questions that
are asked are part of this inquiry.175 The linchpin of checkpoint cases,
however, is whether there are meaningful constraints on officer discre-
tion, including randomization.176
In its 2000 decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court
held that a highway checkpoint to discover illegal narcotics was uncon-
stitutional because its "primary purpose" was the general investigation of
"ordinary criminal wrongdoing." 77 Although Edmond signaled to some
that the Court was prepared to draw meaningful limits around the use of
suspicionless checkpoints (and might revisit its prior broad ban on in-
quiries into officer intent),178 the Court's decision in Illinois v. Lidster,
four years later, blurred the Edmond line between regulatory aims and
traditional law enforcement.179 The Lidster Court held that an "infor-
mation-seeking" checkpoint designed to locate possible witnesses to a
vehicular homicide had a valid purpose that set it apart from checkpoints
to stop likely perpetrators (like those at issue in Edmond).80
E. Mere Encounters and Consent
Not every police interaction with a civilian is a Fourth Amendment
event.'81 The Court, in its 1983 decision in Florida v. Royer, made that
clear:
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by
merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by
175. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427-28; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-55.
176. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43; see also Tracey L. Meares, The Distribution of Dignity and
the Fourth Amendment, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES
OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 125-26 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012) (describing the checkpoint
model as the "lodestar for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment" and explaining "that ran-
domization is critical to promote the value of evenhandedness, which is necessary to promote the
goal of discretion control at the heart of Fourth Amendment reasonableness").
177. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40-41, 48 ("Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis check-
point program is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the check-
points violate the Fourth Amendment.").
178. See, e.g., Craig Bradley, The Middle Class Fourth Amendment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
1123, 1135 (2003) ("Edmond called a halt to a series of Burger Court cases that had approved of
roadblocks to apprehend illegal aliens and drunk drivers." (footnote omitted)); George M. Dery, III
& Kevin Meehan, Making the Roadblock a "Routine Part of American Life:" Illinois v. Lidster 's
Extension of Police Checkpoint Power, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 105, 113-14 (2004) (noting that "despite
the govemment's valiant efforts, the Edmond Court remained unconvinced that the narcotics check-
points served any purpose other than the prohibited one of 'general interest in crime control,"' and
that accordingly, the roadblocks at issue "could not be justified under the Fourth Amendment with-
out individualized suspicion" (footnote omitted) (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48)).
179. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427-28.
180. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426-27. Lower courts attempting to police the suspect/witness line
that the Court observed between Edmond and Lidster have struggled. See, e.g., Palacios v. Burge,
589 F.3d 556, 562, 564 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing, as identified in Edmond, that there are only
limited circumstances where individualized suspicion is not necessary and holding that under Lid-
ster, where police need to acquire more information about a recent crime in the vicinity, an identifi-
cation procedure may be "reasonable in context" (quoting Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426)).
181. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983).
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putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offer-
ing in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to
such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself
as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure
requiring some level of objective justification.1
82
The distinction between a Fourth Amendment seizure and other
lesser encounters with police was initially spelled out in Terry:
"[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his free-
dom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."'83
The test eventually developed by the Court established that a person
is seized under the Fourth Amendment when a reasonable person in his
or her shoes would not feel "free to leave"'8 or to "otherwise terminate
the encounter."'85 In addition, unless the suspect is physically restrained
or submits to a "show of authority" by police, the Court will not find that
a seizure has occurred.186
In this way, a "consensual seizure" is an impossibility. For consent
to be meaningful, a person must have the freedom to refuse to consent.
Per the Mendenhall-Royer-Bostick line of cases, however, if a person
has freedom to leave or to terminate the encounter, she is not, in fact,
seized.187 In other words, an individual who remains in an encounter with
police when the law determines that she has the freedom to leave or ter-
minate an encounter cannot claim to have experienced a Fourth Amend-
ment event.'8 For this reason, no affirmative consent is required. This is
distinguishable from the search context where officers routinely obtain
182. Id. (citations omitted); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) ("Given the
diversity of encounters between police officers and citizens, however, the Court has been cautious in
defining the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment on encounters between the police and citi-
zens.").
183. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
184. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("[A] person has been 'seized'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surround-
ing the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."); see also
Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 30, at 1299-1302 (criticizing Mendenhall-Royer free-to-leave test
and asserting that Court's embrace of common law right of inquiry (i.e., police right to stop and ask
questions of individuals on the street) significantly reduces Fourth Amendment protections and
infringes the right of locomotion).
185. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 439-40 (1991) (enlarging Mendenhall test).
186. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 629 (1991).
187. Cf Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality,
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 507, 515-16 (2001) (describing the "assumption that when an individual agrees to police
requests to engage in conversation, she is not submitting to a 'show of authority' of the kind that
would convey the message that she is not free to leave" (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625)).
188. See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (describing the type "of consensual
encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest"); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35 ("We have
stated that even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may general-
ly ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent
to search his or her luggage-as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with
their requests is required." (citations omitted)).
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affirmative consent to search and where the issue then litigated is the
voluntariness of that consent.'89
The Mendenhall-Royer-Bostick line of cases is controversial be-
cause the Court hypothesizes more freedom to terminate encounters with
police than most people actually feel. As Tracey Maclin explained:
"Common sense teaches that most of us do not have the chutzpah or stu-
pidity to tell a police officer to 'get lost' after he has stopped us . . . ." 9
Even those of us who may know, as a legal matter, that we are free to
leave or terminate certain encounters with police, may not actually feel
free to do so.19'
In decisions that attempted to address that concern, and which relied
on language from the Court's earlier decision in Bostick, the Eleventh
Circuit developed a test that arguably required officers conducting bus
sweeps to alert passengers that they were not required to comply with the
officers' requests.19 2 As the Eleventh Circuit explained, "Absent some
positive indication that they were free not to cooperate, it is doubtful a
[bus] passenger would think he or she had the choice to ignore the police
presence."'9 3 In its 2002 decision in United States v. Drayton,' howev-
er, the Supreme Court sharply rejected the idea that officers conducting
bus sweeps should have to advise passengers of their right to terminate
the encounter.'95
189. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1973) (explaining the test for deter-
mining the voluntariness of consent in search cases).
190. Maclin, Encounters, supra note 30 at 249-50.
191. See id; see also Steinbock, supra note 187, at 528 ("Like other constitutional doctrines,
the law of consensual encounters is hard enough for experts to decipher. Its counter-intuitive and
largely inscrutable boundaries create a conundrum for law enforcement personnel and citizens alike.
From the citizen's standpoint, uncertainty will almost surely breed compliance."); Scott E. Sundby,
"Everyman "'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1794 (1994) ("An optimist who reads the Supreme Court's decisions finding
that no seizure had occurred might focus on the inherent courage to stand up to authority that the
Court presupposes in the citizenry. A passenger seated on a bus that is about to depart, for instance,
apparently is sufficiently steeped in constitutional courage that he is capable of telling gun-toting
police who have singled him out for questioning that he wishes to be left alone.").
192. United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1357 (1lth Cir. 1998), abrogated by United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
193. Id. at 1357 ("It seems obvious to us that if police officers genuinely want to ensure that
their encounters with bus passengers remain absolutely voluntary, they can simply say so. Without
such notice in this case, we do not feel a reasonable person would have felt able to decline the
agents' requests."); see also United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2000) (coming to
the same conclusion as United States v. Washington), rev'd, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); United States v.
Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2000) (relying on Washington to hold that bus passenger
should have been advised of right to terminate encounter with officer before being asked for consent
to search).
194. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
195. Id. at 207 ("[T]he Court has repeated that the totality of the circumstances must control,
without giving extra weight to the absence of this type of warning."); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 35, 39-40 (1996) ("We are here presented with the question whether the Fourth Amend-
ment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised that he is 'free to go' before his
consent to search will be recognized as voluntary. We hold that it does not. .. . [l]t [would] be unre-
alistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent
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Drayton was not the only decision in this time period that shifted
the line between an encounter and a stop. As noted above, the Court's
decision in Wardlow-which expanded the definition of reasonable sus-
picion to include flight from police-also served to restrict the manner in
which an individual could exercise his or her freedom to leave an en-
counter with police.196
F. Excessive Force
The final category of Fourth Amendment seizure cases operates dif-
ferently from the preceding categories of seizures. In all of the prior cat-
egories, the focus has been on defining the circumstances in which police
may effect seizures of varying degrees-the when question. But the
Fourth Amendment also governs the how question, regulating the force
that can be used to effect seizures that are permitted. As the Court recent-
ly reiterated in Plumhoff v. Rickard,'9 ' "[a] claim that law-enforcement
officers used excessive force to effect a seizure is governed by the Fourth
Amendment's 'reasonableness' standard." 98
The standard for use of deadly force to apprehend suspects was set
by the Court in Tennessee v. Garner'9 in 1985. The Garner Court held
that where there is no danger or threat to the officer or others, the gov-
ernment's interest in apprehending the individual does not justify the use
of deadly force nor does it outweigh the suspect's interest in his own
life.200 Where there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others, however, the
Court indicated that the use of deadly force would not be unreasona-
ble.20 1
The Court has issued two use-of-force decisions since 2000 that
have expanded on its holding in Garner. In Scott v. Harris, 202 decided in
2007, the Court held that, given the high risk to bystanders, the officer's
decision to ram his vehicle into a fleeing suspect's car to end a dangerous
to search may be deemed voluntary."); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) ("While most
citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they
are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.").
For a thoughtful critique of the Court's conclusion (in the search context) that asking
police officers to advise individuals of their right to refuse to consent to a search would create "prac-
tical difficulties," see Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 869-72 (2014)
(characterizing the Court's conclusion as "highly suspect").
196. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000).
197. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
198. Id. at 2020; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) ("While it is not always
clear just when minimal police interference becomes a seizure, there can be no question that appre-
hension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment." (citation omitted)).
199. 471 U.S. I (1985).
200. Id at I1.
201. Id
202. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
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high-speed chase was reasonable.203 The majority was quick to reject the
dissent's argument that the officers' continued pursuit of the suspect un-
necessarily escalated the situation.204
In Plumhoff v. Rickard, decided in 2014, the Court held that police
firing fifteen gunshots into a vehicle (and killing the two occupants) did
205not violate the Fourth Amendment. 2 The Court explained, relying on
Scott, that this was a reasonable use of force to end the pursuit of a flee-
ing vehicle because the suspect's driving posed a public-safety risk.206
These cases, relying on a case-by-case totality of the circumstances ap-
proach, have been criticized for failing to provide officers (and lower
courts) with clear guidelines about how to resolve use-of-force ques-
tions.
The question of the need for greater de-escalation of police encoun-
ters has come to the forefront in the wake of the series of highly publi-
cized deadly force cases from 2014 and 2015.208 Although police forces
are significantly more professional (and professionalized) than they were
in the past, that has not necessarily meant that they are less aggressive.
Radley Balko argues that "as a matter of policy, police use more force
today than they have in the past. SWAT tactics, for example, are increas-
ingly used for credit card fraud and other low-level offenses, administra-
tive warrants, or even regulatory enforcement."209 He advocates for
greater emphasis in "[u]se-of-force training . .. on conflict resolution and
de-escalation."210
II. DEFINING LIBERTY AND CONTROL
Being precise about the nature and substance of the rights implicat-
ed by an unlawful seizure is essential. As this Article makes clear, the
reasonableness of a particular seizure will ultimately turn on both the
weight of the government's need for the seizure and the possibility of
203. Id. at 386 ("A police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.").
204. Id. at 385.
205. Plumhoffv. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014).
206. Id ("[I]t is beyond serious dispute that Rickard's flight posed a grave public safety risk,
and here, as in Scott, the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.. .. We reject
th[e] argument [that petitioners acted unreasonably in firing fifteen shots]. It stands to reason that, if
police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the
officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended.").
207. Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1l19, 1127
(2008) (asserting that Garner, Graham, and Scott have provided limited guidance to lower courts
sorting out use of force claims).
208. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
209. Radley Balko, Five Myths About America's Police, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-americas-police/2014/12/05/35bl af44-
7bcd-1 I e4-9a27-6fdbc6l2bff8_story.html ("The problem isn't cops breaking the rules-the rules




protecting the government's interest in ways less intrusive than a Fourth
Amendment seizure.
Reasonableness is a relative measure and the government's interest
in effecting a particular seizure will be weighed against the individual
interests that are infringed.211 The important task of defining the individ-
ual interests at stake in seizure cases involves two steps. The Court must
first clearly identify the nature of the rights that are infringed when a
seizure occurs. As outlined below, those individual rights are generally
defined in terms of both liberty (or freedom) and control (or autonomy).
The second step is the calculation: the Court must try to value those
rights by gauging the individual and collective costs of seizures.
A. Individual Rights
The text of the Fourth Amendment itself does not distinguish be-
tween searches and seizures: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .... "2 12 Nor does it differentiate be-
tween seizures of people and seizures of "houses, papers, and effects."2 13
But the rights and liberties at issue in seizure cases differ in important
ways from those implicated by searches.2 14
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures
of persons is, in fact, a bundle of rights and protections. The interests
infringed when a person is seized have been described as rights to "free
movement"2 15 and "locomotion,"2 16 rights to "personal security" and
"bodily integrity,"217 and rights to "personal dignity." 218 Taken together,
211. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (explaining that calculating Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requires balancing the government's "need" against the "invasion" of a particular
search or seizure (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967))).
212. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
213. Id.
214. The needs that the government must assert to justify a seizure are different, too. See infra
Section III.A.
215. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 346 (1998).
216. Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 30, at 1260-61 (describing the Fourth Amendment as
protecting a "right of locomotion" that was grounded both in the right to be free from "government
interference" and the Amendment's protection of "personal security").
217. Clancy, supra note 215, at 346 & nn.263-69 ("In referring to protected personhood inter-
ests, it has been sometimes stated that the Fourth Amendment protects the right to be left alone,
individual freedom, personal dignity, bodily integrity, the 'inviolability of the person,' the 'sanctity
of the person,' and the right of free movement." (footnotes omitted) (quoting first Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); then quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1968))
(collecting Supreme Court cases in the footnotes); see also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-
27 (1969) ("Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant o prevent wholesale
intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or
'investigatory detentions."').
218. Clancy, supra note 215, at 346. The concept of dignity has also been described as the
"inviolability" or "sanctity of the person." Id. at 346 & nn.263-69 (first quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S.
at 484; then quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 66) (collecting Supreme Court cases in the footnotes); see
also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (describing al-
2015] 83
84 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1
these descriptions define both an intrinsic, essential, inalienable liberty or
freedom and a means of restraining the government.219
In the search context, scholars like Stephen Schulhofer, Jed Ruben-
feld, and Thomas Clancy have advocated characterizing the Amendment
as affording a right to control or restrict government access to infor-
mation as opposed to a mere privacy protection. 220 A similar emphasis in
seizure cases on these concepts of security and control is important, but
any suggestion that we should develop a unifying, autonomy-based ex-
planation of the interests implicated in both search and seizure cases may
be problematic.221 In seizure cases, as noted above, the interest that is
implicated-albeit to varying degrees-is the right to control the move-
ment of one's own body.222 Refraining that specific form of control as
some more general autonomy interest that applies similarly or equally to
searches and seizures may seem relatively harmless, but it risks-at least
in seizure cases-making the interests at stake more vague or removed.
Instead, a clearer articulation of the movement, locomotion, and liberty
rights at stake in seizure cases might highlight for the Court (or even for
law enforcement officers) alternative and less restrictive means of ac-
complishing the government's ends.223
With the right to control one's movement at its core, the right to be
free from an unreasonable seizure is readily distinguishable from the
property and privacy rights that are implicated by searches (or by sei-
zures of evidence and property).224 Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to
Kidd's ordeal as a "grim reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for human
dignity, constraints that will control officialdom even in perilous times").
219. See Clancy, supra note 215, at 354 (asserting the Framers' focus on security reflected a
desire "to exclude the government").
220. Stephen Schulhofer, for example, rejects the characterization of Fourth Amendment
privacy as a form of secrecy and advocates replacing it with a view of privacy as a form of infor-
mation control. SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 6-9. As Schulhofer explains, privacy defined only as
secrecy is too easily dismissed as a protection that only the guilty would need. Id. at 6. This is a
subtle shift-from emphasizing a desire to hide information to the desire to control one's infor-
mation. Id. at 6-9 (explaining that Fourth Amendment privacy protection is not about "secrecy," it is
about "personal autonomy," "security," and "control over personal information").
Jed Rubenfeld and Thomas Clancy have similarly argued against a privacy-centered view
of Fourth Amendment search protections and for greater emphasis on "security." Clancy, supra note
215, at 367-68 ("[T]he ability and the right to exclude agents of the government is the essence of the
security afforded by the Fourth Amendment.... It is not privacy which may motivate a person to
assert his or her right. It is the right to prevent intrusions-to exclude-which affords a person
security."); Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 104 ("The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee a right of
privacy. It guarantees-if its actual words mean anything-a right of security.").
221. Thomas Clancy has asserted that "[t]o look beyond the right to exclude and seek positive
attributes to the right to be secure, whether those attributes be called privacy or something else,
serves to limit-and ultimately defeat-that right." Clancy, supra note 215, at 367. Jed Rubenfeld's
desire to jettison privacy and "revitaliz[e] the right to be secure" seems to suggest a similar ap-
proach. Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 104-05.
222. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
223. See infra Section IIl.A.
224. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) ("A search compromises the individu-
al interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or proper-
ty."); see also Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 30, at 1330 (asserting that the "modern constitutional
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insist on a bright line between searches and seizures or between privacy
and personhood or movement. Searches and seizures overlap in many
cases. Indeed, the need to get the seizure analysis correct is heightened
because arrests are generally an automatic trigger for searches incident to
arrest.225 Terry stops, likewise, often lead to Terry frisks.226 And a chal-
lenge to the evidentiary fruits of one of these seizure-triggered searches
is the most frequent means by which the lawfulness of a stop or arrest is
litigated.2 27
Nor is there a case being made here that seizures are always more
intrusive or offensive than searches. Searches of a person-for example,
frisks, pat downs, or other searches of a person's pockets; body cavity
searches; or cheek swabs for DNA-may implicate similar personhood
and dignity interests and, depending on the nature of the search, could be
dramatically more intrusive than, say, a checkpoint stop.22 8
The point is simply that the interests implicated by a seizure of a
person are different in important ways from other Fourth Amendment
events: they always involve at least some restriction on movement that is
not inherent in a search. Precision about the interests and rights implicat-
ed by police conduct is essential to evaluating the lawfulness of the gov-
ernment's conduct in any Fourth Amendment case. As outlined in Part
III, in every seizure case, the Court must address whether the govern-
ment can justify the restraint of a particular suspect's movements.
fascination with the right of privacy [has] obscure[d]" the importance of a "meaningful right of
locomotion"); Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 103 (explaining that "expectations of privacy do not
really speak to arrests or imprisonment-that is, to seizures of the person").
225. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a search incident to
arrest authorizes extensive and thorough search of suspect's person); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1969) (authorizing search of grab area around arrestee as an incident of an arrest), abroga-
tion recognized by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). In many states, arrests also trigger
DNA swabs. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970-71 (2013). Custodial arrests may
also trigger intrusive searches at the jail. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132
S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012).
226. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (finding frisk of a constitutionally stopped
person appropriate when the officer had reason to suspect he individual was armed).
227. Cf Strossen, supra note 34, at 1189-90.
228. Cf Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE L.J. 727, 737-42 (1993) (analyzing results of survey that asked
respondents to rank the intrusiveness of a wide range of search and seizure categories). In a frequent-
ly quoted passage from his concurrence in United States v. Watson, Justice Powell grappled with this
question and highlighted the conflict between logic and law in the Court's approach to regulating
arrests:
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and seizures, and since an
arrest, the taking hold of one's person, is quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that the
constitutional provision should impose the same limitations upon arrests that it does upon
searches. Indeed, as an abstract matter an argument can be made that the restrictions upon
arrest perhaps should be greater.
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
DENVER LAW REVIEW
B. The Cost of an Unreasonable Seizure
Being specific about the nature of the interests at stake in seizure
cases is only part of the process. Scholars have long documented the
Court's struggle to accurately measure or value the cost of a particular
Fourth Amendment intrusion, particularly when the individuals present-
ing the claim to the Court are either accused or convicted criminals. As
Nadine Strossen has explained, the Court's efforts to weigh the "subjec-
tive intrusiveness" of a search or seizure are "particularly dependent up-
on value judgments" that are regularly made without citation to "any
empirical evidence-either specific evidence regarding the reactions of
particular individuals, or more generalized evidence such as expert opin-
ions or public opinion surveys."229
While the Court's harm-estimation problems are common to both
search and seizure cases,230 there are reasons to think they may be ampli-
fied in the seizure context. Particularly in technology cases, Justices
seem to be better able (or at least more willing) to put themselves in the
position of the individual whose home is being surveilled,23 1 whose car is
being followed,232 or whose phone is being searched.233 There are not
similar passages to cite in recent seizure cases. Justices do not seem to
get stopped, to ride the bus, or to live in boardinghouses.
In Atwater, perhaps the seizure case most likely to strike close to
home for the Justices, the Court did acknowledge the "pointless indigni-
ty" of Atwater's arrest and confinement for a mere seat belt violation.234
As noted above, however, Atwater's experience was quickly (and inac-
curately) dismissed as an anomaly.
229. Strossen, supra note 34, at 1188; see also Baradaran, supra note 21, at 35-36.
230. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 228, at 774 (asserting that survey data reflected a
mismatch between "commonly held attitudes about police investigative techniques" and the Court's
perceptions of the intrusiveness of those techniques and recommending further empirical studies);
see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of
Privacy: Testing Lay "Expectations of Privacy," 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 339-42 (2009).
231. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) ("The Agema Thermovision 210 might
disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath-
a detail that many would consider 'intimate' . . . .").
232. At oral argument in United States v. Jones, Chief Justice Roberts famously asked the
government attorney: "You think there would also not be a search if you put a GPS device on all of
[the Justices'] cars, monitored our movements for a month?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 9,
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
233. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489-90 (2014) (describing cell phones as containing
"[t]he sum of an individual's private life"; observing that "it is no exaggeration to say that many of
the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of
nearly every aspect of their lives-from the mundane to the intimate"; and enumerating the types of
apps that are typically found on cell phones: "apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party
news; apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for sharing prayer requests; apps for
tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning your budget; apps for every conceivable hobby or
pastime; apps for improving your romantic life").
234. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
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The Floyd litigation from the Southern District of New York high-
lights that, as scholars like Song Richardson and Shima Baradaran em-
phasize, having concrete data is transformative for parties (criminal de-
fendants or civil plaintiffs) asserting Fourth Amendment claims.235 The
events of the last year may have brought us to a moment where the gov-
ernment is more willing to develop and share that data. As FBI Director
Jim Comey explained in February 2015: "The first step to understanding
what is really going on in our communities and in our country is to gath-
er more and better data related to those we arrest, those we confront for
breaking the law and jeopardizing public safety, and those who confront
,,236
us.
The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing emphasized
the need for more data to support a "culture of transparency and account-
ability." 237 Indeed, in its action items, the Task Force called on law en-
forcement agencies to (i) "collect, maintain, and analyze demographic
data on all detentions (stops, frisks, searches, summons, and arrests)";
and (ii) publish both their department policies and "information about
stops, summonses, arrests, reported crime, and other law enforcement
data aggregated by demographics."238
Even where data sets are hard to come by, detailed and descriptive
ethnographic accounts of the experience of those who reside in heavily
policed communities provide a clear-eyed view of the costs of aggressive
stop-and-arrest policies. In their 2013-2014 analyses of the impacts of
New York's aggressive policing on the community being policed,
Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler, and Bruce G. Link found that
"young men reporting police contact, particularly more intrusive contact,
also display higher levels of anxiety and trauma associated with their
experiences."239
In his study of forty Black and Latino boys in East Oakland, Cali-
fornia, Victor Rios argued that police perpetuated dislocation of boys in
the community by "assuming that all the boys were actively engaged in
235. The "hit rate" data in Floyd was essential to the plaintiffs' success in the District Court.
See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 575-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Baradaran,
supra note 21, at 8 (advocating "informed balancing [which] requires consideration of wider infor-
mation contained in statistical data, clinical evidence, and experience, rather than common sense
alone"); Richardson, supra note 21, at 2040 (having data helps courts "reconsider their behavioral
assumptions about police decisionmaking and judgments of criminality").
236. Comey, supra note 15 ("'Data' seems a dry and boring word but, without it, we cannot
understand our world and make it better.").
237. TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 1.
238. Id. at 13, 24.
239. Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men,
24 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2324 (2014); see also CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND
FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT 1 (2012) ("These interviews provide evidence of how deeply this prac-
tice impacts individuals and they document widespread civil and human rights abuses, including
illegal profiling, improper arrests, inappropriate touching, sexual harassment, humiliation and vio-
lence at the hands of police officers. The effects of these abuses can be devastating and often leave
behind lasting emotional, psychological, social, and economic harm.").
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criminal and violent activity or by providing the boys little choice."24 0
Rios also observed that the experience of boys without criminal records
in his study was disturbingly similar to the experience of those with
criminal records: the boys who had not been arrested "expressed the
same feelings and experiences as the boys who had been stigmatized,
disciplined, and arrested."24 1 Alice Goffman and Elijah Anderson have
similarly illuminated the impacts of aggressive policing on communi-
242ties.
Finally, proposals for the Court to take a broader view of the inter-
ests being asserted are as important in the seizure context as they are in
search and privacy cases.243 Anthony Amsterdam cautioned, in 1974,
against the more narrow conception of the Fourth Amendment as a
"'safeguard' against violation of individuals' isolated spheres of fourth
amendment rights."24 Instead, he advocated a "conception of the
amendment as a general command to government to respect the collec-
tive security."24s The Court's failure to account for security as a collec-
tive community right is particularly problematic in cases like Atwater,
where the Court balanced Atwater's individual complaint against the
246
needs of police across the country. As outlined in Section III.D, com-
240. VICTOR M. RIos, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BoYS 72
(2011).
241. Id. at 148.
242. ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY
191-93 (1990) (describing the experiences and responses of an innocent black man who is stopped
by the police in Philadelphia, PA); see also ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN
AMERICAN CITY, at xii-xiv (2014) (chronicling her experiences with the 6th Street Boys, a group of
men "in a lower-income Black neighborhood" in Philadelphia).
243. Baradaran, supra note 21, at 8 (advocating that courts "consider not just the criminal
defendant before them but also the constitutional rights of a broader swath of society"); Tracey
Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government Perspective: Whose
Amendment is it, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 669-70 (1988) (criticizing Court's failure "to
appreciate the implications of its rulings for persons not immediately involved in the cases before it.
Though many may consider this argument an exhausted civil libertarian protest, whenever the Court
upholds a challenged police practice against an obviously guilty individual, the Court is also licens-
ing similar intrusions against not-so-obviously innocent persons as well."); Strossen, supra note 34,
at 1196 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976)) (using Martinez-
Fuerte as an example where the Court deemed the intrusion "quite limited" and failed to "take into
account the intrusiveness experienced collectively by the thousands of motorists detained at the
checkpoint each day, or the hundreds of thousands detained each week").
244. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
372 (1974); see also Strossen, supra note 34, at 1196 ("The Court's tendency to focus on individual
fourth amendment litigants also causes it to neglect systematic evaluation of the collective harm to
individual rights resulting from searches or seizures that are similar or identical to the one that gave
rise to the case.").
245. Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 372; see also Sundby, supra note 191, at 1777 ("I would
characterize the jeopardized constitutional value underlying the Fourth Amendment as that of 'trust'
between the government and the citizenry.... Government action draws its legitimacy from the trust
that the electorate places in its representatives by choosing them to govern.").
246. Strossen, supra note 34, at 1204 (criticizing "the Court's regular weighing of the privacy
and liberty rights of a single individual against the law enforcement interests of the collective na-
tional community"); see also Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What's "Reasona-
ble": The Protections for Policing (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 16-17) (draft on file with
author) (explaining that the Court's balancing is "illusory" because "[w]hen the Court weighs the
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munity effects and interests must also be considered when weighing the
government's interests. Eventually, the consistent deprivation of individ-
ual liberties will create public-safety costs.24 7
III. DEFINING NECESSITY
The other side of Terry's reasonableness balance-and the focus of
this final part of the Article-is the government's need for the seizure in
question. The sections that follow examine four categories of problems
with the necessity calculus in seizure cases: (i) the Court's failure to
press the government to articulate the need for a particular seizure;
(ii) the Court's unwillingness to use existing laws, guidelines, or norms
to guide its assessment of necessity; (iii) the Court's silence about the
impact of overcriminalization on the government's seizure power; and
(iv) the Court's struggle with its obligation to consider alternative ap-
proaches, developing technologies, and long-term impacts in calculating
necessity.
A. Articulating the Need to Seize
The government's need to seize an individual is often different from
its interest in conducting a search. This is why even searches of a person
(which implicate some of the same individual interests as seizures) must
be analyzed differently. The government's interest in conducting a sei-
zure must always be justified by some need of the government to control
or restrict the movement of a person's body,24 8 while its purpose for a
search is to obtain access to information, evidence, or weapons.249 Of
course, both of these specific, immediate interests may be in service of
general investigative, crime prevention, or other public safety aims that
are common to both searches and seizures.250
government's and individual's competing interests, it almost always compares the overarching goal
of the search scheme against a single individual's privacy interest"). This apples-to-oranges problem
was starkly presented in Atwater, where the Court acknowledged that Atwater's individual interest
"clearly outweigh[ed] anything the City [could] raise against it specific to her case." Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (emphasis added). The Atwater Court proceeded, however,
to balance her interests against the government's universal need for readily-administrable rules
across the full spectrum of factual scenarios. Id. at 347-49.
247. See infra Section III.D.2.
248. See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347, 354; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417
(1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1968).
249. Cf WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 5.4(c) (5th ed. 2013) (explaining that "one primary purpose" of searches of individu-
als "is to find evidence of the crime" under investigation); Baradaran, supra note 21, at 17 (finding
that in search cases, the government's interests "include officer safety ... public safety . . . and
judicial economy" (footnotes omitted)).
250. See LAFAVE, supra note 249, at § 5.4(c); Williamson, supra note 28, at 774 ("A seizure of
a suspected criminal, in other words, may not only serve the utilitarian function of making criminal
prosecution possible by providing a body in court against whom to prosecute the case; it also may
enhance investigatory goals by providing the opportunity to obtain evidence."); see also Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981) (describing officer (and occupant) safety as a significant law
enforcement interest driving detentions of occupants during execution of search warrants).
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At the outset of any reasonableness analysis, the Court must clearly
define the need for a particular seizure; vague assertions that a particular
arrest or stop is "necessary for effective law enforcement" are insuffi-
cient. In too many Fourth Amendment cases, involving both searches and
seizures, the Court has been imprecise about the government need at
stake. In her 2013 article, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, Shima
Baradaran explained that "effective law enforcement" was the govern-
ment need or interest most often cited in Fourth Amendment search and
seizure cases.251 Baradaran and others, including Christopher Slobogin,
argue persuasively that the Court's acceptance of these overly general
and vague justifications for searches and seizures undermines the indi-
vidual liberties protected by the Amendment.252
Courts cannot defer to the sort of intuitive, gut-level calculations
that are pervasive in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.2 53 The Court's
approach seems particularly problematic in light of social science re-
search revealing the impact of cognitive biases on police decision-
254making. Specificity and precision are particularly important when the
government interest at issue is a combination of investigative, regulatory
(deterrent), and preventive needs.25 5
Requiring more clear statements of necessity to justify Fourth
Amendment seizures does not mean that every seizure must be adjudi-
cated on a case-by-case, need-by-need basis. Throughout the cases re-
251. Baradaran, supra note 21, at 16-17. This interest was identified in over fifty percent of the
cases that she analyzed. Id.
252. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 31 (noting that the Court's efforts to make an "assess-
ment of the invasiveness of the police action in question ... have been abysmal"); Baradaran, supra
note 21, at 20-25; see also Lee, supra note 34, at 1157; Strossen, supra note 34, at 1201 ("The
Court's tendency to inflate the governmental stake in any search or seizure is augmented by its
corresponding tendency to assume that the search or seizure will be uniquely successful in promot-
ing law enforcement goals. This entails two separate assumptions, neither of which is supported by
judicial analysis or evidence. The first is that the challenged law enforcement method will in fact
effectively promote the law enforcement goal at issue. The second is that it will do so to a substan-
tially greater degree than alternative law enforcement methods." (footnote omitted)).
253. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 2052-56 (focusing on problems with police intuition);
Stoughton, supra note 195, at 849, 857 (noting that it is "common practice [for the Court] to make a
statement without citation or support" regarding "its factual assertions about policing" and describ-
ing problems with Court's intuitions). But see Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 481 (defending
"existing [Fourth Amendment] doctrine [as] complex and fact-specific" but not a "mess":
"[E]xisting [Fourth Amendment] doctrine . . . . is the product of hundreds of equilibrium-
adjustments made over time. Those adjustments were usually made intuitively in response to felt
necessities, but in rare cases were made out of a conscious recognition of the need for changes to
keep the law in balance in the face of new practices and technological change." (emphasis added)).
254. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 984-87 (1999) (evaluating the role that cognitive biases play in driv-
ing law enforcement decisions). See generally Richardson, supra note 21, at 2035-36 (discussing
cognitive biases).
255. See Friedman & Stein, supra note 246 (manuscript at 6-7) (explaining that "the very
nature of policing has shifted - from a reactive crime-solving model towards intelligence gathering,
regulation and deterrence," and emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between these catego-
ries of police behavior); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 418-20 (1988) (distinguishing between po-
lice-initiated searches and "responsive" searches).
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viewed in Part I, the Court missed opportunities to narrow entire catego-
ries of seizures and rejected litigants' proposals to draw more liberty-
protective, bright-line rules. Recent decisions in Floyd, Navarette, and
Moore provide useful examples of the importance of requiring the gov-
ernment to articulate its need for a particular seizure.
1. The Need to Deter
The benefit of pressing the government to articulate the need for a
seizure was recently made plain in the New York City stop-and-frisk
litigation. On August 12, 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern
District of New York issued a decision in Floyd v. City of New York,256
holding that the New York City Police Department's (NYPD) stop-and-
frisk practices (i) violated the Fourth Amendment because they were not
based on the requisite reasonable suspicion and (ii) displayed a pattern
and practice of racial profiling in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.257 Although Floyd is not a Supreme Court case, the developments
in that litigation highlight the importance of interrogating the govern-
ment's purported need for expanded seizure power.
Judge Scheindlin's decision relied heavily on data about stops that
had been gathered by the NYPD for more than a decade.2 58 This data
showed a more than 600% increase in the number of stops over the span
of ten years: from 97,296 stops reported in 2002259 to 685,724 stops in
2011, the year the program peaked.2 60 The data also included the number
of stops that resulted in an arrest or summons (the hit rate).261
The class action plaintiffs relied heavily on the hit rate data to argue
that they had been stopped without reasonable suspicion.262 The dearth of
guns found during NYC frisks revealed that early, decades-old predic-
tions about the potential for abuse of Terry had been realized.263 In de-
256. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 540, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
257. Id. at 562-65.
258. Id. at 582; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN NEW YORK CITY, at ch. 5 (2000), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/nypolice/main.htm; N.Y.
STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES 65 (1999),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil-rights/stpfrsk.pdf
259. Stop-and-Frisk Data, supra note 110.
260. Second Supplemental Report of Jeffery Fagan, Ph.D. at 10, Floyd v. City of New York,
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034). In 2012, the number of stops dropped to
532,911 and the 2013 figure was 191,558. Stop-and-Frisk Data, supra note 110. 2014 data (46,235
stops) shows that the downward trend has continued. Id; see also Mike Bostock & Ford Fessenden,
'Stop-and-Frisk' Is All But Gone From New York, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/19/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-is-all-but-gone-from-new-
york.html?_r-0 (explaining downward trends in stop-and-frisks).
261. See Complaint at 10, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 08 Civ. 01034).
262. Id. at 13.
263. See Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 438 ("The pressures upon policemen to use the stop-
and-frisk power as a device for exploratory evidence searches in these areas are intense. Police can
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fense of the stop-and-frisk program, the City's expert argued that the low
hit rate actually demonstrated the program's effectiveness:
With the critical shift to a mission of finding crime patterns, deploy-
ing police where and when crime is occurring before it occurs, and
reducing crime by proactive efforts to stop crime before it happens,
i.e., preventing crime, the measure of success has changed. In con-
trast to the definition of success used in the Fagan Report, a down-
ward trend in the number of weapons found, and even of arrests, by
prevention standards, are evidence of success.264
In public statements defending the City's aggressive stop-and-frisk
program, former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg also empha-
sized deterrence as one of the driving forces behind the program:
Critics say the fact that we're 'only' finding 800 guns a year through
stops of people who fit a description or are engaged in suspicious ac-
tivity means that we should end stop and frisk.
Wrong. That's the reason we need it-to deter people from carrying
guns. We are the First Preventers.265
In other words, when pressed to justify the need for this dramatic,
exponential increase in Terry stops, and when faced with highly prob-
lematic data about racial bias in the execution of the program, the City
argued that the success of the stop-and-frisk program rested on a deter-
rence theory (and not on the traditional Terry justification for a stop-the
investigation, interruption, or prevention of a crime in progress).
The City's deterrence arguments have intuitive appeal (even if they
266lack empirical support). More aggressive policing creates a greater risk
of detection that is generally expected to deter crime.267 These arguments
justify virtually any exercise of the power because these are 'high-crime' areas where all young
males, at least, are suspect." (footnotes omitted)).
264. Report of Dennis C. Smith, Ph.D. at 20, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034).
265. Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor of N.Y.C., Address on Public Safety to NYPD Leadership
(Apr. 30, 2013) (transcript available at http://wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/151-
13/mayor-bloomberg-delivers-address-public-safety-nypd-leadership); see also OAG ARREST
REPORT, supra note 74, at 2 ("The NYPD identifies stop and frisk as a tool to combat violent and
gun-related crime and deter future criminal conduct." (footnote omitted)).
266. ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 145 (concluding that, despite the beliefs of police (officials
and patrol officers) "these aggressive tactics add significant value to patrol efforts" there is, at best,
"mixed evidence of effectiveness"); see also id. at 149 ("Of all the undocumented elements of New
York City's policing changes, the marginal value to crime reduction of a variety of aggressive tac-
tics-stops, searches, misdemeanor arrests-should be at the very top of the priority for rigorous
evaluation efforts but it isn't.").
267. The proposition that increasing the risk of apprehension increases deterrent benefits finds
support as a general matter. See VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 1 (2010),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf ("Research to date generally
indicates that increases in the certainty of punishment, as opposed to the severity of punishment, are
more likely to produce deterrent benefits.").
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are also unconstitutional. The Court has never permitted officers (or en-
tire departments) to justify stops as a form of general deterrence except at
checkpoints where a brief detention is "carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual of-
ficers."26 8 In the street-stop context, officers are required to have individ-
ualized suspicion of criminal activity that "must be measured by what the
officers knew before they conducted their search."26 9 The Floyd case
demonstrates that, when pressed to articulate the necessity for a particu-
lar category of seizures, the government may reveal policy motives or
purposes that directly contravene the governing constitutional stand-
ard. 2 70
2. Needs Versus Interests
The Court's vagueness may, in part, be attributable to the fact that,
in some cases, the Court has described the Fourth Amendment as con-
cerned with government interests as opposed to needs. The use of the
term "interests" seems best intended as a contrast with the inalienable
individual right it is being balanced against, not as some watered-down
version of a government need.271 The government's power to seize-in
other words, its authority to infringe individual rights-is contingent on
identifying its need for the seizure.27 2 Relatedly, any power given to po-
lice must be limited according to the government's clearly defined
need.273 Justice Scalia zeroed in on this distinction in the Bailey decision
268. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). Other statements made by Mayor Bloomberg
reflected some awareness of this problem with the City's argument. In a press conference held
immediately after Judge Scheindlin issued her ruling against the City, Bloomberg described the
"vital deterrent" benefit of stop and frisk as a "critically important byproduct" of the program. Mi-
chael R. Bloomberg, Mayor of N.Y.C., Press Conference on Floyd Decision (Aug. 12, 2013) (tran-
script available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/bloomberg-vows-appeal-federal-
judge-ruling-stop-stop-and-frisk-policy-article-1.1424630); cf Friedman & Stein, supra note 246
(manuscript at 59) (describing the New York City program as "arbitrary" and unconstitutional be-
cause it lacked "the safeguards of deterrent policing").
269. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000).
270. See Friedman & Stein, supra note 246 (manuscript at 59) (explaining that the New York
City stop-and-frisk program was "not investigative policing; it [was] in terrorem deterrence").
271. See Maclin, supra note 243, at 670 ("[T]he fourth amendment was designed not to facili-
tate governmental investigations, but rather to protect citizens from unjustified and arbitrary gov-
ernment invasions.").
272. The original reasonableness cases consistently referred to the government's "need" for a
particular search or seizure. Quoting from Camara, which had been decided only a year before, the
Terry Court described the Court's task as "balancing the need to search (or seize) against the inva-
sion which the search (or seizure) entails." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (alterations in
original) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)). The Terry Court also
referred to the "government interest" but made clear that the interest must "justif[y] official intru-
sion." Id. at 21. Later cases have similarly employed this sort ofnecessity language. See, e.g., Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (upholding search-warrant seizure where the government
articulated a "specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need" for the seizure and where "the
restraint at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time and scope"); Maryland v. Buie, 494
U.S. 325, 333-34 (1990) (explaining that the Terry Court permitted the frisk "which was no more
than necessary to protect the officer from harm" (emphasis added)).
273. Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 437 ("[Tihe fourth amendment is thought to tolerate [stop
and frisk] power only as the result of a fine balance between its recognized intrusion upon personal
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when he emphasized that "[c]onducting a Summers seizure incident to
the execution of a warrant 'is not the Government's right; it is an excep-
tion-justified by necessity-to a rule that would otherwise render the
[seizure] unlawful."'
274
The prospect of seizing a suspect in order to search her provides an
example. In justifying a custodial arrest, the Court should not rely on an
officer's interest in conducting incidental searches or frisks as part of the
evaluation of the necessity for custody. In the course of upholding a cus-
275todial arrest in Virginia v. Moore, however, the Court explained that
"[a]rrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and does not
continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to con-
duct an in-custody investigation."27 6 The Court was vague about the kind
of "in-custody investigation" being referenced, but it reiterated shortly
afterward that custodial arrests "enable officers to investigate [an] inci-
dent more thoroughly."277 The Court cited Wayne LaFave's thorough
treatise on arrests as support for this proposition.278
The LaFave citation does not support the idea that the desire to con-
duct a search incident to arrest (the search that ultimately revealed nar-
cotics in Moore's case) could justify an arrest. Instead, in that section,
LaFave describes, but does not endorse, the practical incentives that lead
officers, who have "adequate grounds" for an arrest, to prefer to take a
suspect into custody: "[A]n arrest is commonly made when a search is
desired. Consequently, the suspect may be taken into custody under cir-
cumstances in which the risk of nonappearance would not be great."279
Indeed, earlier in the book, LaFave notes that "neither courts nor legisla-
tures have given sustained attention to ... whether the initial taking into
custody is necessary."280
Of course, stops and arrests give the government easy access to in-
formation (through the various warrantless frisks and searches that can
accompany those seizures).28' It is not entirely clear whether the Moore
Court was including the power of police to conduct a protective search
privacy and security and its justification by a specific police need. Exercised in excess of that need,
the power makes the intrusion without the justification and destroys the balance." (footnote omit-
ted)).
274. Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1044 (2013) (second alteration in original) (em-
phasis added) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
275. 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
276. Id. at 173.
277. Id. at 173-74.
278. Id. at 173 (citing LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 177-202.)
279. LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 186-87 ("An officer who has adequate grounds may arrest a
suspect to make it possible to conduct a lawful search of his person.").
280. Id. at 168.
281. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that the majority's holding empowered officers faced with a traffic violation to "stop the
car, arrest the driver, search the driver, search the entire passenger compartment of the car including
any purse or package inside, and impound the car and inventory all of its contents" (citations omit-
ted)).
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incident to arrest of Moore as a constitutional justification for the ar-
282rest. Although a protective frisk or search may frequently operate as a
practical incentive for a police officer to conduct a stop or an arrest, these
corollary searches should not be used by the Court as a constitutionally
legitimate justification for the triggering Fourth Amendment seizure.283
3. Tying Necessity to a Specific Crime
Precedents that discourage consideration of law enforcement pur-
poses or motives have complicated the inquiry into the need for a par-
284ticular seizure. After Whren, the Court has been excessively cautious
about probing the government's actual motivations for a particular sei-
zure. 285 The Court's pretext decisions effectively write the Court out of
aiding in the solution of significant profiling problems. And they have
the potential to undermine the Court's ability to calculate government
needs: if police are not required to disclose their purposes, the Court will
be unable to tailor seizure power to the government's actual needs.
In more recent cases, the Court has relaxed the requirement that an
officer conducting a stop or an arrest must identify the crime of suspi-
cion. That requirement was clearly articulated in the Court's 1979 deci-
sion in Brown v. Texas, where the Court emphasized that a Terry stop
should be based on reasonable suspicion that an individual is involved
with "specific misconduct."286 Nevertheless, more recent decisions in
cases like Illinois v. Wardlow have upheld Terry stops even where offic-
ers have been silent about the crime of suspicion.287
282. Moore, 553 U.S. at 174.
283. As Anthony Amsterdam explained in 1974: "When a frisk power allowed exclusively
upon the predicate that the officer needs it to protect himself from deadly assaults by a person he has
stopped for questioning becomes a motive to stop and question persons whom the officer would not
stop at all except for the opportunity to use a frisk as an evidence-gathering device, surely fourth
amendment values are seriously infringed." Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 437. The Court's deci-
sion in Whren v. United States, which permits pretextual stops, does not demand a different result
because the pretext for the search was an independently legitimate basis for the stop. 517 U.S. 806,
813 (1996) (refusing to invalidate a pretextual traffic stop that was motivated by the officers' desire
to search the car and its occupants for narcotics).
284. Compare Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) ("[W]hether the officers had
an implied license to enter the porch [which was integral to whether there was a "search"] depends
upon the purpose for which they entered."), and City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48
(2000) (holding that the programmatic purpose of the checkpoint-traditional narcotics enforce-
ment-was the basis for Court's finding that it was unconstitutional), with Whren, 517 U.S. at 813
("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").
285. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 2082 (2011) (explaining that the
Court generally "eschew[s] inquiries into intent" because "the Fourth Amendment regulates conduct
rather than thoughts"); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (holding that an "officer's
subjective motivation is irrelevant"); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813-14.
286. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49, 51 (1979); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)
(explaining that reasonable suspicion required proof of something more than an "inchoate and unpar-
ticularized suspicion or 'hunch"'); Friedman & Stein, supra note 246 (manuscript at 61) ("In Terry,
the stop was predicated on the perceived imminence ofa specific crime.").
287. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-25 (2000) (holding that a Terry stop was justified
where the individual who was stopped was in a neighborhood known for heavy narcotics trafficking
and ran away from police). The Wardlow Court noted that "the determination of reasonable suspi-
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The shift from the Court's 1968 decision in Terry-where the exi-
gency of the situation was what prompted the Court to uphold the stop
and frisk288 -to the regulatory and deterrent rationales driving current
stop-and-frisk programs also highlights this problem.2 89 The record pre-
sented in Floyd suggested that Terry stops on this sort of general suspi-
cion of criminality had become increasingly routine: "Between 2004 and
2009, the percentage of stops where the officer failed to state a specific
suspected crime rose from 1% to 36%."290
The Court's 2014 decision in Navarette provides another variation
on this problem. In Navarette, the anonymous tip clearly described a past
episode of reckless driving, but the caller did not allege ongoing drunk
driving.291 Under Terry, this subtle distinction carries weight. An investi-
gative Terry stop is clearly justified when an officer has reasonable sus-
picion of ongoing criminal activity.2 9 2 An officer's power to stop an indi-
vidual on reasonable suspicion that they committed a past, completed
crime is less clear.293 The Navarette majority avoided resolving this
question by finding that the anonymous tip of past conduct could have
provided sufficient reasonable suspicion for ongoing criminal activity.294
By basing that claim of reasonable suspicion on an anonymous tip that
the officers could not confirm, the majority significantly broadened the
295
definition of reasonable suspicion.
cion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior" and that the
officer was "justified in suspecting that [defendant] was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore,
in investigating further." Id. at 125 (noting that no crime of suspicion was identified).
288. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Officer McFadden suspected that Terry and his two associates
were "casing" a store for a potential burglary or robbery. Id. at 6; see also United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that a Terry stop must be investigation of
"ongoing or imminent criminal activity"); LAFAVE, supra note 249, § 9.2(c) (explaining that the
Terry decision "stressed that he officer acted 'to protect himself and others from possible danger,
and took limited steps to do so' and advocating that Terry stops "should be expressly limited to
investigation of serious offenses" (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28)).
289. See Nick Pinto, The Point of Order, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2015, at MMI3 ("Most people
now think of the police primarily in their role of crime fighting. But it is at least as much their other
original mandate, the prevention of disorder, that perpetuates the suspicion many hold for them.
Order is a subjective thing, and the people who define it are not often the people who experience its
imposition.").
290. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (these facts
were not contested by the parties).
291. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2014).
292. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Some argue that Terry stops should be limited to investigations
of serious crimes. E.g., Colb, supra note 34, at 1692.
293. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, explained that the Court was left to evaluate
"whether the 911 caller's report of being run off the roadway created reasonable suspicion of an
ongoing crime such as drunk driving as opposed to an isolated episode of past recklessness."
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690; see also id. at 1695 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The circumstances
that may justify a stop under [Terry] to investigate past criminal activity are far from clear and have
not been discussed in this litigation." (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
221, 229 (1985)). But see Colb, supra note 34, at 1692-93.
294. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690.
295. See id. at 1695 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I fail to see how reasonable suspicion of a discrete
instance of irregular or hazardous driving generates a reasonable suspicion of ongoing intoxicated
driving.").
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B. The Role of Guidelines, Statutes, and Norms
This Article is intentionally Court focused in its diagnoses and pre-
scriptions. That focus reflects enduring optimism about the role that the
judiciary can play and must play in repairing a criminal justice system
that is desperately failing in many urban communities. While other
scholars have ably suggested promising complementary legislative, pros-
ecutorial, and departmental reforms,296 the Court still has a fundamental
role to play in restraining aggressive police power.297 Our system is con-
structed on the premise that the Court can and will perform this func-
tion.298 Furthermore, the Court's missteps in some of the cases docu-
mented in this Article are partly to blame for the categorical enlargement
of seizure power.
This is not to say that state legislation and departmental guidelines
are not important mechanisms for restraining police behavior. They
clearly are, and they should play a more central role in guiding the
Court's assessment of the necessity for and the reasonableness of a par-
ticular seizure. As Anthony Amsterdam observed four decades ago, the
Court could require searches and seizures to comply with clearly articu-
lated departmental guidelines or state laws in order to survive reasona-
bleness challenges.29 Scholars like John Rappaport, Rachel Harmon,
296. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 99, at 294 (explaining that "urban police forces are more
attentive to local preferences than a generation ago" but this requires investment in personnel; "Bet-
ter styles of policing and less cash-strapped urban police forces are mutually reinforcing."); Russell
M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor's Role, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1591, 1594-95 (2014) (arguing that prosecutors "as executive officers should refrain from introduc-
ing evidence that they conclude was unconstitutionally obtained without regard to judicial admissi-
bility-a duty of administrative suppression"); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, I10
MICH. L. REV. 761, 768-81 (2012) [hereinafter Harmon, Policing] (describing shortcomings of
Court-focused and constitution-based solutions; advocating regulatory reforms and rigorous cost-
benefit evaluations of police policy); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2009) (arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which allows
"the Justice Department to bring suits for equitable remedies against police departments that" show a
pattern of police misconduct is underutilized, and if departments were compelled and induced to
reform, by way of this statute, departments would be motivated to proactively reform); Barry Fried-
man & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 106-09 (2015) ("Rather
than attempting to regulate policing primarily post hoc through episodic exclusion motions or the
occasional action for money damages, policing policies and practices should be governed through
transparent democratic processes such as legislative authorization and public rulemaking.") (collect-
ing sources calling for more statutory or administrative rulemaking for police).
297. Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 439 ("In an age where our shrinking privacy and liberty
would otherwise be enjoyable only at the sufferance of expanding, militaristically organized bodies
of professional police, the fourth amendment demands that an independent judiciary play a direct,
strong role in their regulation."). The two avenues of reform are complementary. The judiciary might
more effectively regulate the police by, for example, only giving deference to police when their
conduct comports with democratically authorized policing rules or giving clearer direction to legisla-
tures about how to craft rules for police. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 296, at 179-83.
298. Even with greater reliance on administrative regulations or legislative action to constrain
police, "courts still will need to adjudicate the constitutionality of whatever that process comes up
with." Friedman & Stein, supra note 246 (manuscript at 26).
299. Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 416-29 (explaining that administrative rulemaking by
police would supply "a needed check against arbitrariness," add clarity to the process of evaluating
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Barry Friedman, and Maria Ponomarenko persuasively advocate using
"legislators and law enforcement administrators" to "write the conduct
rules" for street-level law enforcement.3 0 The Court, however, in seizure
cases like Atwater, Whren, Muehler, and Moore has explicitly rejected
the option of using police norms, departmental regulations, or even state
law to provide backbone to the constitutional concept of reasonable-
ness.301 This is so despite the fact that in numerous other Fourth
Amendment contexts, the Court explicitly relies upon community norms
and objective expectations to define what is reasonable.30 2
C. More Crimes, More Seizing
The Court is, regrettably, generally silent in seizure cases about the
well-documented problem of overcriminalization in this country.30 3 But
the connection between the substantive criminal law and the power of
police to seize criminal suspects is direct. As legislators write more crim-
inal laws, they empower police to effect more seizures.
Given the growth in criminal codes, the seriousness of the underly-
ing offense ought to be a relevant consideration when the need for a par-
ticular stop or arrest is being evaluated. In other words, an assumption
that probable cause works as a reasonable proxy for the government's
need for a particular seizure does not hold up as criminal codes become
bloated. Justice Marshall articulated a version of this concern in his dis-
police conduct, support "local autonomy," increase visibility of individual officer practices, and
develop clearly articulated categories of standard police practice).
300. John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CAL. L. REV. 205,
208 (2015) (asserting, at least in some contexts, "law enforcement conduct will hew closer to consti-
tutional norms if the Court gets political policy makers to write the conduct rules than if it writes the
rules itself'); see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 296, at 106-09; Harmon, Policing,
supra note 296, at 764.
301. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (rejecting the argument that an arrest was
unreasonable because it contravened state law); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 103 (2005) (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring) (rejecting the argument that the use of handcuffs for a two to three hour detention
was unreasonable because it "deviated from standard police procedure"); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326, 354 (2001) (rejecting the argument that a custodial arrest for a seat belt
violation was unreasonable because it contravened department norms); Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 816-17, 819 (1996) (rejecting argument that traffic stop was unreasonable because de-
partment regulations directed that narcotics officers should not make traffic stops).
302. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that in addition to manifesting an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," a person
must establish that "the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable"
(emphasis added)).
303. Douglas Husak's seminal book outlined the broad expansion of potentially criminal con-
duct and developed "a normative framework to distinguish those criminal laws that are justified from
those that are not." DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
3, 58 (2008) ("Too much criminal law will continue to produce too much punishment until we have a
principled means to limit the scope of the criminal sanction."); see also Daniel Richman, Overcrimi-
nalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of Bill Stuntz, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 64, 71 (describing the "inex-
haustible supply of criminal law in the United States"); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phe-
nomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 712-19 (2005) (defining and documenting overcriminalization).
But see Mila Sohoni, The Idea of "Too Much Law," 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1622 (2012) (cau-
tioning against quick adoption of hyperlexis critiques).
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sent in Watson.30 The Watson majority-holding that police did not
need to obtain warrants for public arrests-defended the decision as pre-
serving "[t]he balance struck by the common law." 305 That characteriza-
tion, however, glossed over an exponential increase (since the drafting of
the Fourth Amendment) in the number of crimes that qualify as felo-
nies.306 This taxonomy shift meant that the arrest power authorized by
Watson in 1976 was magnitudes greater than the arrest power that exist-
ed when the Fourth Amendment was drafted.307
In his dissent, Justice Marshall explained that the seriousness of the
crimes defined as felonies at the founding ensured that the government
was only afforded warrantless arrest power in cases where it most needed
that authority. In Marshall's words:
Applied in its original context, the common-law rule would allow the
warrantless arrest of some, but not all, of those we call felons to-
day.... As a matter of substance, the balance struck by the common
law in accommodating the public need for the most certain and im-
mediate arrest of criminal suspects with the requirement of magiste-
rial oversight to protect against mistaken insults to privacy decreed
that only in the most serious of cases could the warrant be dispensed
with. This balance is not recognized when the common-law rule is
unthinkingly transposed to our present classifications of criminal of-
fenses.308
The majority rejected this view and did not elaborate on the gov-
emnment's need for greater warrantless arrest power other than to empha-
309size the general burdens of obtaining an arrest warrant.
Watson, as an abiding precedent, continues to broaden police power
every time a new crime is defined. The significant increase in the number
304. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 441-42 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 418, 421 (majority opinion); see also Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 522 (echo-
ing the Watson majority; noting that "[wihile there have been changes to what counts as a felony,
and certainly to what happens after the arrest, the basic balance between liberty and public safety
raised by taking a suspect into custody is the same today as it was at common law").
306. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 441-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
307. The fact that the Court was, in its view, simply sanctioning what the vast majority of state
and federal jurisdictions had been doing does not alter this balancing question. Although Watson did
not result in a transformation of the government's de facto seizure power, its cementing of federal
and state practices set a new dejure baseline.
308. Id. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 439-41 (Marshal, J., dissenting) ("Only
the most serious crimes were felonies at common law, and many crimes now classified as felonies
under federal or state law were treated as misdemeanors. . . . Applied in its original context, the
common-law rule would allow the warrantless arrest of some, but not all, of those we call felons
today. Accordingly, the Court is simply historically wrong when it tells us that '(t)he balance struck
by the common law in generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without warrant,
has survived substantially intact."' (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 421 (majority opinion)));
SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 51 (noting that the warrantless arrest rule, while "clear enough in the
eighteenth century, has no straightforward meaning in modem circumstances"). Schulhofer explains
that in 1792, "a roughly comparable crime" to the credit card theft and fraud committed by Watson
"would have been a misdemeanor." SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 51-52.
309. Watson, 423 U.S. at 417.
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of felony and misdemeanor arrests since Watson can be attributed both to
the continued growth in the criminal code and to the continued profes-
sionalization of the police force (where arrests are tracked, counted, and
used as performance measures).3 10
The Court's determination in Atwater that a custodial arrest was
reasonable, even for a traffic violation punishable only by a fine, seems
to foreclose the possibility of using the Fourth Amendment to help ad-
dress what has since been described as a misdemeanor crisis.311 Indeed,
in 2001, the Court seemed unaware of the rising rates of arrests for minor
offenses.3 12 The idea that these low-level offenses might pose the greatest
potential for discriminatory enforcement and abuse, however, was clearly
articulated long before Atwater was decided.313
The Court's December 2014 decision in Heien v. North Carolina3 14
was similarly silent about questions of overcriminalization. In Heien, the
issue presented to the Court was whether an officer's mistake of law
would invalidate a traffic stop.3 15 Under the mistaken belief that driving
with one broken taillight violated state law, the officer stopped Heien's
310. See JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME: MANAGEMENT
BY MANIPULATION 8-9 (2012) (detailing the "story of police reform that has lost its way, gone
astray, and succumbed to short-term numbers games" by departments that have "adopted the statisti-
cal performance crime model of police effectiveness"). The President's Task Force on 2 1V Century
Policing expressed concern about the extent to which these kinds of performance incentives (and not
real public safety needs) were driving tickets, summons, and arrests. TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at
26.
311. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 73, at 630; Natapoff, supra note 73, at 1320; see also
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1080 (2015) (ex-
plaining that Atwater complicates decriminalization efforts because despite "popular perception ...
legally speaking, the reclassification of an offense into a summons-only infraction does not neces-
sarily take arrest and its concomitant burdens off the table").
312. Compare Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351-52 (2001) ("The very fact that
the law has never jelled the way Atwater would have it leads one to wonder whether warrantless
misdemeanor arrests need constitutional attention, and there is cause to think the answer is no."),
with Natapoff, supra note 73, at 1320; see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 73, at 630. New York
City's recent experience with marijuana arrests demonstrates the problem. From 1994 to 2010, the
City witnessed an exponential increase in marijuana arrests (from approximately 8,000 to over
56,000 per year). Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119
AM. J. Soc. 351, 367 (2013). This phenomenon has been a curiosity because it does not reflect
public enforcement priorities. As Frank Zimring has observed, marijuana clearly did not become a
law enforcement priority at this very late stage of the drug war. ZIMRING, supra note Ill, at 122.
Those arrests, instead, were a tool used to regulate other criminal activity. Id ("These arrests are
police on patrol concentrating effort in high-crime areas and with persons whom police regard as
potential offenders for more senous crimes. But the threshold offense of marijuana provides the
patrolman a method of obtaining fingerprints and removing the suspect from the street. Fundamen-
tally, these arrests are attempts not of drug control but of crime control.").
313. See Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 415 ("A police officer will always arrest a murderer or
an armed robber if he sees one, but whether he will arrest and search a brawler or a drunk or a loiter-
er, or make an investigative stop or a frisk or a street interrogation, or order people to 'move
on,' . . . depends upon his mood and inclinations."); see also Fagan & Davies, supra note 75, at 462,
476 (describing increases in low-level arrests); Livingston, supra note 75, at 590 (describing aggres-
sive "quality-of-life enforcement").
314. 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
315. Id. at 534.
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car. 316 The Court held that the stop was lawful-even though the defend-
ant was not, in fact, violating any traffic provision at the time of the
stop-"[b]ecause the officer's mistake about the brake-light law was
reasonable."3 17
The Heien decision does not seem particularly controversial or sig-
nificant except perhaps in one respect. Drawing on strands from both
Atwater and Moore-where the Court also sought to avoid imposing on
officers in the field the burden of knowing the consequences of a particu-
lar violation-the Heien decision implicitly accepts as a premise the
massive volume of criminal proscriptions. Although the Court asserted
that its decision "does not discourage officers from learning the law,"3 18
it said nothing about the burden the government arguably should bear for
creating such a vast scheme of criminal laws and penalties.
Justice Sotomayor alluded to these concerns in her dissent in Heien,
noting that "permitting mistakes of law to justify seizures has the per-
verse effect of preventing or delaying the clarification of the law."3 19
None of the Justices acknowledged that the decision effectively rewarded
the government for creating a complex and admittedly unknowable crim-
inal code. In other words, if so much is criminalized that is not clearly
morally wrong-for example, regulatory offenses like seat belting and
broken taillights-we should not permit the government to rely on the
bulk of the law to justify enhanced contact with citizens.320
D. Calculating Necessity: Alternatives, Technology, and Myopia
Calculating the need for a particular seizure also requires meaning-
ful consideration of alternatives.321 Court decisions that insist that the
Court will never require the police to employ the least intrusive or re-
strictive alternative to a proposed seizure have been too readily applied
to foreclose any consideration of alternatives, even when the Court
316. The traffic code required only one operational taillight, so the officer was, in fact, mistak-
en about the law. Id. at 535 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(g) (2007)). The North Carolina Su-
preme Court cited a nearby conflicting provision to support its conclusion that the mistake was
reasonable. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(d) (2007)).
317. Id. at 534.
318. Id. at 539.
319. Id at 543-44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Giving officers license to effect seizures so
long as they can attach to their reasonable view of the facts some reasonable legal interpretation (or
misinterpretation) that suggests a law has been violated significantly expands this authority.").
320. It is worth distinguishing here between this concept of overcriminalization (which refers
to the growth of the criminal codes) and the different concept of "hypercriminalization" which
sociologist Victor Rios uses to describe a particular form of overaggressive police profiling. Hyper-
criminalization, according to Rios, is "the process by which an individual's everyday behaviors and
styles become ubiquitously treated as deviant, risky, threatening, or criminal, across social contexts."
RIOS, supra note 240, at xiv.
321. Nadine Strossen's 1988 critique of the Court's failures in this regard still rings true.
Strossen, supra note 34, at 176. As Strossen explained, "the Court's fourth amendment balancing
analyses have neither systematically evaluated the marginal law enforcement benefits of challenged
searches and seizures, nor regularly incorporated the 'least intrusive alternative' requirement, which
is an integral component of other balancing tests . . . ." Id.
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adopts categorical changes to the rules governing seizures.32 2 While the
Court may not want police to have to calculate in absolute terms the least
restrictive alternative in any particular situation, the availability of less
restrictive alternatives is always relevant to reasonableness balancing and
to the calculation of necessity.3 23
The Court has also been reluctant, in cases like Muehler v. Mena, to
second-guess the government's allocation of available resources in sei-
zure cases. As noted above, Mena was detained when officers investigat-
ing one of her tenants came to her home with a search warrant.324 The
officers' need to detain her in handcuffs (and in her nightclothes) for the
two to three hours that it took them to search the residence was never
adequately explained.325 In fact, details supplied in the concurrence made
clear that any purported need was principally the product of the officers'
decision to assign only two of the eighteen officers on the scene to moni-
tor four detainees.326 The Court upheld the detention as reasonable even
after accepting the plaintiffs assertions that (i) she and the other detain-
ees were not the targets of the search, (ii) they "posed no readily apparent
danger," and (iii) "keeping them handcuffed deviated from standard po-
lice procedure."327
1. The Effect of Technology on Necessity
Because a search is about acquiring information, changes in tech-
nology (and behavior) about the collection, storage, maintenance, search-
ing, and dissemination of information have had a significant impact on
the definition and perceived intrusiveness of a search. In plain terms,
developing technologies enable better hiding of information and more
322. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 349-50 (2001) (rejecting defendant's
request for a rule forbidding custodial arrest for minor, fine-only offenses and holding that requiring
police to not arrest when they are unsure about severity of offense "would boil down to something
akin to a least-restrictive-alternative limitation, which is itself one of those 'ifs, ands, and buts' rules,
generally thought inappropriate in working out Fourth Amendment protection" (citation omitted));
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) ("The reasonableness of the officer's decision to
stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques."); United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) ("A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of
police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the
police might have been accomplished.").
323. Strossen, supra note 34, at 1238 ("If the benefits which flow from one measure could be
substantially achieved through a second measure ntailing lesser costs, the latter should surely be
deemed more reasonable, on balance, than the former.").
324. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-99 (2005).
325. See id. at 98-100.
326. Id. at 103-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
327. Id. ("Where the detainees outnumber those supervising them, and this situation could not
be remedied without diverting officers from an extensive, complex, and time-consuming search, the
continued use of handcuffs after the initial sweep may be justified, subject to adjustments or tempo-
rary release under supervision to avoid pain or excessive physical discomfort.").
102 [Vol. 93:1
REDEFINING REASONABLE SEIZURES
sophisticated seeking.328 The Court's recent search jurisprudence reflects
its efforts to adapt to both sorts of changes.32 9
There are, however, no recent (or projected) technological changes
in the seizure context that have impacted the individual's experience of a
seizure. Indeed, his observation that the law of arrest is an example of a
"law enforcement tool or fact pattern [that is] essentially impervious to
change" is what prompted Orin Kerr to conclude that "the basic balance
between liberty and public safety raised by taking a suspect into custody
is the same today as it was at common law." 330 Kerr's conclusion, how-
ever, ignores an important variable: while the physical nature of a seizure
may not vary with technology, the government's purported need for the
intrusion might.
There are a number of available and evolving technologies that
might affect the need for a seizure. For example, if the need to ensure an
individual's appearance in court is driving the government need to take
low-level offenders 33  and material witnesses332 into custody, then so-
phisticated GPS tracking technologies can reduce that necessity. The
increasing availability of body-scanning devices may make claims of
urban police departments that regular street stops are necessary to detect
and deter gun possession less compelling.333 Use of cameras and other
technology to detect traffic offenses (or development of other mecha-
nisms for issuing citations for traffic offenses) makes car stops less nec-
essary.334 More extensive camera surveillance in high-crime neighbor-
hoods ought to reduce the need for aggressive stop-and-frisk policing
strategies. Indeed, significant advances in (and employment of) technol-
ogy enabling physical surveillance and transaction surveillance335 ought
328. See Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 480. Of course, another key part of the equation,
particularly, in the last fifteen years, is the heightened security environment and the government's
aggressive deployment of novel technologies to detect and manage potential security threats.
SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 3-4 ("A second difference between the surveillance of yesteryear and
today is the strength of the government's resolve to use it. Especially since September 11, 2001, the
United States government has been obsessed, as perhaps it should be, with ferreting out national
security threats, and modem surveillance techniques . .. have played a major role in this pursuit.").
329. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484-85 (2014) (warrantless search of cell
phone incident to arrest held unconstitutional); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013)
(DNA swabbing of arrestees constitutional); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)
(warrantless GPS tracking unconstitutional); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (war-
rantless use of thermal heat imager unconstitutional).
330. Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 517, 522.
331. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S.
164, 176 (2008).
332. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).
333. But cf Erin Murphy, Paradigms ofRestraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1372 (2008) (cautioning
against the assumption that "technological restraints are always preferable to physical ones").
334. Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 199, 221 (2007) ("By remotely and automatically enforcing the laws normally used
by police to conduct traffic stops, DSRC [dedicated short-range communication] systems could
eliminate or drastically reduce the number of police-conducted traffic stops.").
335. SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 7-9 (describing five categories of physical surveillance,
including "cameras, tracking devices, telescopic devices, illumination devices, and detection devices
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to reduce or delay the need for seizures in criminal investigations. One
simple way to improve a frequently used calculation of necessity is to
require more data for establishing claims like "high-crime area."336
Other technologies might reduce the likelihood that a police en-
counter might result in excessive or deadly force. The President's Task
Force on 21st Century Policing cited studies that found that the use of
body-worn cameras seemed to act as a sort of deterrent for the officers
who wore them: they "reduce[d] . . . officer[s'] use of force" in stops and
arrests.337 The same Task Force report described advances in "less than
lethal" technology that are being developed to reduce the number of cas-
es where police resort to deadly force.33 8
In general, the Court is more effective at articulating the burdens
that technology imposes on law enforcement than it is at identifying
those burdens that technology alleviates.33 9 Sometimes, as in the warrant
context, technology evolves in ways that could justify less intrusion than
had been necessary to satisfy the needs of earlier police departments.
The Court's holding in Watson, discussed in Section L.A above, was
premised, in part, on the perceived "encumbrance" that an arrest warrant
requirement would impose on police.34 Technology has changed, how-
ever, in ways that call into question the reasonableness balancing that
yielded the Watson result. The possibility of obtaining, from the field,
near-immediate telephonic warrants makes the consideration of the ques-
tion presented in Watson a much different proposition today than it was
in 1976 (and worlds apart from the situation in 1789).341 As Oren Bar-
Gill and Barry Friedman have recently observed:
Feasibility and exigency are both functions of technology, which op-
erates in today's world to favor warrants.. . . For too long we have
lived with a caricature of the warrant process: a detective pounding
out a warrant request in triplicate on a battered Smith Corona, assur-
edly a time-consuming task almost impossible to meet in the fast-
paced arena of police work. We do not live in that world, however,
(i.e., devices capable of detecting concealed items)"); see also id. at 51-70 (discussing the limita-
tions of current Fourth Amendment protections in these contexts); id. at 9-12, 168-91 (discussing
"target-driven transaction surveillance" much of which can be obtained without either a warrant or
even a third-party subpoena; this includes collection of decades of general financial and public
records information from commercial data brokers, more specific financial transaction information,
phone records, click-stream data, and email records, among other types of data).
336. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The "High-Crime Area" Question:
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Anal-
ysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1642-43 (2008).
337. TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 32.
338. Id. at 37-38.
339. The role that technology should play in reducing the need for Fourth Amendment intru-
sions is the subject of a separate work in progress.
340. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).




and have not for some time.... If a magistrate is not on hand, tech-
nology can often fill the gap; telephonic warrants are increasingly
commonplace.... In short, today's technology makes obtaining
permission from an official remote from the heat of the decision fast
and easy.342
In the search context, the Court has begun to adjust the definition of
reasonableness to reflect technological advances. The Court's recent
decisions in Missouri v. McNeely343 and Riley v. California 3  both
acknowledged technological developments (and corresponding rule
changes) that have increased the ability of officers to obtain warrants
remotely.345 As the McNeely Court explained: "[T]echnological devel-
opments that enable police officers to secure warrants more quickly, and
do so without undermining the neutral magistrate judge's essential role
as a check on police discretion, are relevant to an assessment of exigen-
cy.,,
34 6
Although there is no suggestion (yet) that the Court is inclined to
revisit the question of requiring more arrest warrants, any modem de-
fense of (and reliance on) the Watson holding should acknowledge the
Court's response to changing technologies in other Fourth Amendment
contexts.
Similarly, one of the prevailing arguments in Atwater was that it
would be too cumbersome to require officers to know which misde-
meanor offenses were fine only.347 The Atwater majority did not consider
whether it was difficult for any officer to obtain that information through
existing mechanisms-nor did it consider the possibility that a readily
accessible police database could be easily developed. If not then, certain-
342. Id (footnote omitted).
343. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
344. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
345. In McNeely, the Court noted the changes over time of advancements in technology as they
relate to obtaining warrants by looking at the amendments of the federal rules (a magistrate judge
could once issue a warrant via a telephone conversation; the rules now permit issuance of a warrant
via telephone or other electronic communication). McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562 (allowing a magis-
trate judge to "consider 'information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic
means'" (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1)). The McNeely Court also recognized that in some jurisdic-
tions, prosecutors may apply for warrants via radio, telephone, email, and video conferencing and in
some cases can receive a signed warrant in less than fifteen minutes. Id. at 1562; see also id. at 1573
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing warrants received via email to
iPads). In Riley, while acknowledging that a warrant requirement may hinder police, the Court
described the ease with which warrants can be obtained because of the advances of technology in
recent years. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 ("Recent technological advances similar to those discussed
here have, in addition, made the process of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient.").
346. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562-63 (acknowledging, however, the delays built into any
warrant process).
347. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 348 (2001) ("It is not merely that we
cannot expect every police officer to know the details of frequently complex penalty schemes but
that penalties for ostensibly identical conduct can vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossi-
ble) to know at the scene of an arrest." (citation omitted)).
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ly now. Indeed, as Chief Justice Roberts recently observed in the Riley
case: "[T]here's an app for that."348
2. Necessity and Myopia
As the 2014 protests have made clear, aggressive stop-and-arrest
practices also inflict broad, long-term damage by undermining the per-
ceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system.34 9 These approaches
may actually backfire in the long run by alienating communities and by
possibly increasing the delinquency rates among community members.350
The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing emphasized this
need for "legitimacy" in its May 2015 report: "[P]eople are more likely
to obey the law" when those who enforce it are perceived to be "acting in
procedurally just ways."35' In support of the goal of "build[ing] public
trust and legitimacy," the Task Force emphasized the need for a shift in
law enforcement culture from a more aggressive and confrontational
"warrior-mindset" to a more protective "guardian" approach.3 52
Fourth Amendment questions are too often presented as zero-sum
choices between competing (and never coextensive) public-safety and
liberty interests.353 The obvious liberty costs of expanding seizure author-
ity are viewed by the Court as being offset by the asserted law enforce-
ment interests. But what if the government is not particularly good at
calculating its security interests-either because its community focus is
too narrow or its time horizon is too short? Increasing executive branch
awareness of this issue is reassuring. As the President's Task Force ex-
plained: "Crime reduction is not self-justifying. Overly aggressive law
348. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
349. See FACT SHEET, supra note 13 ("As the nation has observed, trust between law enforce-
ment agencies and the people they protect and serve is essential to the stability of our communities,
the integrity of our criminal justice system, and the safe and effective delivery of policing ser-
vices."); see also Anderson, supra note 5 (explaining that racial biases that are evident from stop and
frisk data "extend to other forms of aggressive policing, causing black people to associate police
officers with humiliation and injustice, and stirring distrust for police in black communities around
the country"); cf Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable
Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 348 (2011)
("The research on cooperation finds that willingness to assist the police-for example, by reporting
suspicious behavior or by participating in crime prevention programs-is strongly linked to a per-
son's belief that police authority is legitimate. And that belief is strong only when officials exercise
their authority fairly.").
350. JENNIFER FRATELLO ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COMING OF AGE WITH STOP AND
FRISK: EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 6 (2013) ("[I]ntensive
policing can actually 'backfire' and weaken conventional norms among residents and their willing-
ness to cooperate with police, eventually leading to higher levels of crime." (footnotes omitted));
Stephanie A. Wiley & Finn-Aage Esbensen, The Effect ofPolice Contact: Does Official Intervention
Result in DevianceAmplification?, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 16-19 (2013).
351. TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 1.
352. Id. at 1, I1-12.
353. See Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1483 (criticizing "the Court's insistence in Fourth Amendment cases that




enforcement strategies can potentially harm communities and do lasting
damage to public trust."354
This is a message that is too often missing in Court analyses of the
government's power to seize individuals under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court, too, has a more active role to play to ensure that longer term
public-safety costs of broadened seizure authority are weighed in the
balance.
CONCLUSION
Over the last fifteen years, the Court's reasonableness balancing in
cases involving seizures of people has yielded greater authority to the
government and significantly narrowed the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. Police make more arrests for minor offenses. They employ
stop-and-frisk policies in ways that far exceed the "carefully guarded"
approach initially envisioned by the Terry Court. The Court has largely
withdrawn from regulation of "consensual" encounters. Lines previously
drawn in checkpoint cases, in search warrant-seizure cases, and in cases
involving police use of force have shifted and blurred.
These trends are based, in some measure, on the Court's underesti-
mation of the individual rights and community interests at stake in these
cases. Close examination of the cases reveals that this expansion has
been driven, in large part, by the Court's reluctance to scrutinize the oth-
er side of the balance: the government's need to detain a particular crim-
inal suspect (or category of potential suspects). This must change. The
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures is meaning-
less if the Court does not play an active role in restraining aggressive
police power.
354. TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 16; see also id. at 42 ("It must also be stressed that the
absence of crime is not the final goal of law enforcement. Rather, it is the promotion and protection
of public safety while respecting the dignity and rights of all.").
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EXCEPTIONS MEET ABSOLUTISM: OUTLAWING
GOVERNMENTAL UNDERREACH IN HEALTH LAW
CHRISTINA S. Hot
ABSTRACT
Health measures are sometimes struck, not for "overbreadth," but
for "underbreadth." Short of an equal protection problem, a guaranteed
right, an unconstitutional condition, or other constitutional problem, how
does the effort to moderate a law by carving out exceptions to accommo-
date important concerns necessarily doom the underlying legal provision
itself? Is there any pattern to the courts' use of relatively malleable ad-
ministrative law review doctrines to strike down health rules, not just
because of what they do, but ostensibly because of what they leave un-
done?
This Article tackles the underappreciated vulnerability of excep-
tions-based rules in health law. I look at three examples: New York
City's notorious Soda Portion Cap Rule that exempted refills; the FDA's
decision to allow age-restricted, over-the-counter (OTC) emergency con-
traception; and Pennsylvania's Medicaid rules providing eyeglasses, an
optional benefit, to beneficiaries with eye disease but not to those with
refraction error. Each case exhibits three common elements that charac-
terize how a rule's exceptions, deliberately tailored to prevent overreach,
can turn out to be the rule's Achilles' heel. The courts in each of these
cases insist upon an extra-legal policy absolutism that challenges not
only our assumptions of a default judicial posture favoring cost-benefit
analysis but also deeper assumptions about the rule-based nature of law.
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INTRODUCTION
Health law perches at an intersection where disciplines and values
collide. A longtime observer, in an article entitled Can Health Law Be-
come a Coherent Field ofLaw?, opens with the following declaration: "I
want to concede at the outset that health law, today, is not yet a coherent
EXCEPTIONS MEET ABSOLUTISM
field of law. It is, rather, a disjointed set of statutes and doctrines
based on different principles and paradigms ....
Major health laws, from Medicare to the recent Affordable Care
Act, are products of intense normative struggle.2 The results are often
highly detailed statutory and regulatory regimes memorializing each
round of combat over enactment and implementation. These regimes are
inevitably littered with rules containing built-in exceptions.
In this Article, I will show that this design, employed extensively
throughout the health law field, is vulnerable in court. This Article iden-
tifies a phenomenon of judicial antagonism towards rules with built-in
exceptions. This phenomenon exhibits a pattern, which spans the politi-
cal spectrum, whereby judges intervene to strike such health-related rules
precisely because the exceptions signal value conflict. Next under the
pattern, judges divert the underlying disputes to extra-legal arenas of
decision-making, such as politics, science, or medicine. Finally, they
justify their intervention using distinctly rule-averse forms of reasoning
derived from the self-same, extra-legal arenas that they anointed as the
appropriate normative fora. The existence of this three-part judicial sub-
routine challenges some of our assumptions about the judicial default
posture favoring cost-benefit analysis, as well as deeper assumptions
about the rule-based nature of law.4
My thesis starts from the feature of exceptions built into a rule be-
5fore the time of application. I acknowledge that the parameters of a
rule's applicability are sometimes framed linguistically as an exception
and sometimes as one of the rule's conditions, requirements, or "ele-
ments."6 I will refer to both as exceptions, stipulating that the phenome-
non I am describing is a rule's "underinclusion," regardless of how it
appears as an artifact of language.
I. Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 365, 365 (2006).
2. For the ACA's accommodation of multiple different goals and ideas, see, for example,
Paul Krugman, The Big Kludge, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 2013, at A27 (describing the ACA as "a clum-
sy, ugly structure that more or less deals with a problem"); see also Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing,
NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/12/14/testing-testing-2
(comparing the strategy of the ACA on health cost rationalization to agricultural policy at the turn of
the twentieth century, not "a grand solution[,]" but "a hodgepodge").
3. The Supreme Court has declared ERISA "a 'comprehensive and reticulated statute[.]"'
Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993)). For the proposition that Medicare is filled with detailed, highly
specified provisions, see Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn't
Worked, 101 GEo. L.J. 519, 524 (2013).
4. For the default posture of cost-benefit analysis, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default
Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1667-68 (2001). For the rule-based nature of law according to
legal positivism, see infra notes 7, 19 & 23.
5. This is in contrast to those exceptions that result from rule defeasibility.
6. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 872-73 (1991). But see
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 533-36 (1983) (differentiating
between jurisdictional parameters that define a statute's applicability and proscriptive parameters
that define the conduct to be prohibited).
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Why should judges invalidate rules narrowly drawn to fit diverse
considerations?7 What account can we give for why judges limit law-
makers to a seemingly all-or-nothing range of action with no ability to
trim a measure to accommodate different factors? My discussion of three
illustrative health law cases will show that doctrine alone cannot answer
these questions.
In seeking the unstated fit norms that rein in exceptions, I examine
these cases and find that these judges disfavor rules in the face of the
value conflict that is inevitable given the normative pluralism character-
8izing health law. Exceptions are often indicators of a highly salient val-
ue conflict,9 and the examples show that judges are hesitant to depend
7. Throughout this Article, I will use "rule" in the thin, abstract sense, as a norm character-
ized by a certain degree of detailed specificity, and which applies pressure to conform where the
reason for conforming is the fact of the rule itself. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 21, 55-57
(1961). T will refer to such a norm as a "rule" whether it is in fact an agency "regulation," technically
an "order" under the Administrative Procedure Act, a statutory or constitutional provision, or judge-
made doctrine. This Article focuses on "rules" made at the agency level, but we observe such pat-
terns in regimes that impose substantive review on legislation as well. See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (declaring the ACA's individ-
ual mandate outside Congress's authority in part because of the exceptions carved out of the man-
date), af'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001) (invalidating ban on
indoor tobacco advertising near schools if placed less than five feet from the ground, citing failure to
protect children taller than five feet); Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 411, 416-17 (Idaho
1976) (explaining that a state malpractice damages cap might be constitutional under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but that the cap violated the state constitution in part
because it did not cap liability for other types of defendants). But see Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (declaring that "the reform may take one step at a time, ad-
dressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute . . . . The legislature may select
one phase of one field and apply a remedy there"). For articles that document similar "exceptions" or
all-or-nothing phenomena in non-health constitutional law fields, see Mitchell N. Berman, Commer-
cial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes
the Lesser," 55 VAND. L. REv. 693 (2002); John Fee, Greater-or-Nothing Constitutional Rules, 64
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 101 (2013); Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument hat the
Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227 (1994); Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of
First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based
Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 32.
8. These cases are not meant to be representative, but they are also not isolated examples of
this phenomenon of invalidation for underinclusion. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobac-
co Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133-36 (2000) (ruling that the regulation of cigarettes as a drug-delivery
device is outside the statutory authorization because FDA only banned marketing to minors when
such an unsafe product should have been banned entirely); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779-82 (2014) (striking HHS regulation mandating for employer provision of
contraceptive coverage as part of the ACA requirement that employers provide preventative care as
contrary to the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act in part because carve outs from that mandate
for grandfathered plans and for non-profits suggested a less restrictive alternative); Am. Trucking
Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating the 0.08 ppm ozone standard
because the underlying statutory delegation, by prohibiting cost-benefit analysis with respect to
public health, provided "no intelligible principle" for standard setting short of complete elimination),
af'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
9. Many scholars discuss this feature of exceptions, limitations, balancing, and under-
inclusion. See, e.g., Claire Oakes Finkelstein, When the Rule Swallows the Exception, in Rules and
Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer 147-49 (Linda Meyer ed., 1999), reprinted in 19
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 505, 505-08 (2000); see also John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013
Term-Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4 (2014) (stating of
the Court's fidelity to accommodations in Congressional text that "[b]y adhering, instead, to the
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upon "rules" in these contexts-whether the rules are regulatory or
judge-made, substantive or "jurisdictional." The reasons they give fit a
pattern, suggesting that courts are eliding rules with their underlying
justifications.'o This phenomenon amounts to a policy-absolutist counter-
strand to the implicit cost-benefit default principles that Cass Sunstein
has identified, which purport to give agencies latitude to weigh compet-
11
ing concerns.
A. Conventional Wisdom: Courts Employ Cost-Benefit Defaults
Sunstein has argued for an emerging "federal common law of regu-
latory policy" consisting of presumptions that federal courts, particularly
the D.C. Circuit, employ to construe statutes in such a way as to allow
agencies to accommodate countervailing costs and benefits.12 Sunstein
examines the case law to show that, absent clear congressional prohibi-
tion, agencies are by default permitted under a variety of statutory au-
thorizations to make de minimis exceptions; to consider health-health
tradeoffs; to weigh costs as well as benefits; and to reject nonfeasible
regulation.13 Indeed, he argues that at least some of these cost-benefit
defaults, by placing a clear-statement burden on Congress when it pre-
scribes "policy absolutism" to the exclusion of offsetting concerns, are
part of an arsenal of nondelegation canons that limit unconfined agency
action and thereby protect the values of Article I, Section I of the Consti-
tution.14 Thus, Sunstein's cost-benefit default principles reflect the judi-
cial stance that rules are less arbitrary and more legitimate when they do
acknowledge competing considerations.5
While Sunstein restricts his gaze to federal courts reviewing federal
agency action, cost-benefit analysis is also prevalent, potentially even
words of the statute as written, today's Court enables Congress more predictably to express its
preference for outcomes that may not be so coherent - that include rough accommodations, take
only baby steps toward some broader purpose, or adopt crisp rules that favor certainty over achiev-
ing a perfect means-ends fit"); Linda Ross Meyer, Unruly Rights, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 1-9
(2000) (discussing the significance of balancing and limitation in the context of "interest" based
theories of rights); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing
Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 773-75 (1995).
10. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 3-6 (1977) (discussing the
perennial jurisprudential question of whether law consists of rules or whether law consists in part of
the underlying moral principles behind those rules).
11. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1667-68. 1 am not proposing these exceptions are precisely
contoured for nor governed by utilitarian welfare calculations, but they do exhibit a kind of balanc-
ing, or trade-off orientation. And Sunstein's orientation toward trade-offs or accommodations re-
flects this broader perspective rather than a narrower utilitarianism. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1733, 1739-41 (1995).
12. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1654-56.
13. Id at 1668-70.
14. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 323, 334-35
nn.93-94 (2000).
15. See Sunstein, supra note II (advancing a view that law allows people in a society to
proceed without forcing convergence or coherence on larger abstract values and principles).
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normatively privileged, in states as well.1 6 Yet in the three health law
cases I examine, instead of following a common law that favors account-
ing for offsetting values, courts seem to be striking those rules that
acknowledge competing considerations.'7 Such a view, if extended,
would render rules unsuited to the management of plural values.
B. Contrasting Pattern
My approach in this project is to look at three cases, spanning both
time and the political spectrum. These cases involve New York City's
Soda Portion Cap Rule, the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's)
decision to allow age-restricted, over-the-counter status for emergency
contraception, and Pennsylvania's Medicaid rule that provided eyeglass-
es to those with eye disease but not refraction error. In each case, the rule
is struck because it contains a built-in exception. I identify the common-
alities that underlie the decisions across three doctrinal areas, namely, the
New York State separation of powers doctrine, the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, and
statutory interpretation of the federal Medicaid statute's "reasonable-
ness" standard for state programs.
Three common elements emerge from the three examples:
1) First, the court in each instance identifies the exception-laden
provision's ambition to confront value conflict as the crucial misstep that
dooms the measure. The design of the soda portion cap balanced health
against "economic" as well as political turf or even liberty considera-
tions. The Plan B age-restricted switch decision balanced legitimate
"safety and efficacy" considerations against sexual morality. Pennsylva-
nia balanced health needs against cost considerations.
2) Next, each judge, having decided that the rule improperly han-
dled value conflicts, assigned the decision to some extra-legal arena-
politics in the soda portion cap, science in the Plan B OTC switch, and
clinical medicine in the Pennsylvania eyeglasses benefits. The judge dis-
abled positive law in each of these cases, preferring the governance of
other, arguably more robust social institutions instead.
16. Indeed in the New York state case I examine here, Judge Pigott declares, "[C]ost-benefit
analysis is the essence of reasonable regulation; if an agency adopted a particular rule without first
considering whether its benefits justify its societal costs, it would be acting irrationally." N.Y.
Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene,
16 N.E.3d 538, 546 (N.Y. 2014). And the dissent states, "Cost-benefit analysis has long been a
staple of state and federal regulatory processes (see e.g.[,] State Administrative Procedure Act
§ 202-a [1] ['In developing a rule, an agency shall, to the extent consistent with the objectives of
applicable statutes, consider utilizing approaches which are designed to avoid undue deleterious
economic effects or overly burdensome impacts of the rule upon persons']." Id at 559 n.3 (Read, J.,
dissenting) (second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 202-a(l)
(McKinney 2015)).
17. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the
Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 753, 755-58 (2013) (arguing that canons of statutory
interpretation are a form federal common law).
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3) Third, despite the ostensible deference of the judge to these other
justificatory arenas, the judge in each case determines the outcome her-
self in the guise of a decision to divert jurisdiction over the matter away
from the agency to her favored arena.'8 However, the judge never articu-
lates a jurisdictional rule. Instead, the judge decides the jurisdictional
question by applying her own conception of the methodology borrowed
from the non-legal institution she has predetermined. The dispositive
analysis was balancing in the soda portion cap case, extrapolation to an
undersampled population in the emergency contraception OTC case, and
reference to ophthalmologist affidavits in the Medicaid eyeglasses case.
This three-step maneuver is profoundly rule averse. Steps one and
two are common enough insofar as legal institutions often sidestep the
declaration of substantive rules and use jurisdictional rules instead to
assign the substantive decision to another actor. However, step three in
these cases shows that the jurisdictional decision is also decided by re-
course to rule-averse reasoning.
I begin by examining the scholarship on the nature of rules and their
justifications to discover what in our expectations surrounding rules
might prompt resistance to exceptions.
I. RULES, COMPOUND JUSTIFICATIONS, AND EXTERNAL EXCEPTIONS
A. Legal Scholarship and Definitional Matters
Much has been written of exceptions, but mostly to identify the cir-
cumstances under which exceptions should be, or are likely to be, craft-
ed.19 The exceptions literature does not speak to the question of why,
once a rule has been agreed upon through a process granted social au-
thority, it should then be struck, especially when one of positive law's
uses is held to be "the authoritative settlement of moral and political is-
sues."20
B. Exceptions as a Superficial Category or as Underinclusion?
Above, I note that when I speak of exceptions, I am referring to ex
ante exceptions written into the rule at its inception. Of course, as Freder-
ick Schauer points out, an exception is hard to distinguish from any other
18. 1 use the term "jurisdiction" here not in the technical sense, but to refer to the substantive
arena governing decision-making.
19. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Admin-
istrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 280 (1982); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision ofAdminis-
trative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 74-75 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 588-90 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the
Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process,
1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 167 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 957-
58 (1995).
20. Scott J. Shapiro, The "Hart-Dworkin" Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in
RONALD DWORKIN 22,24 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
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qualifying parameter set forth in the rule.21 Thus, condemnation of a rule
for having an exception is hard to distinguish from condemnation of any
other aspect of the rule's scope or content. However, Claire Oakes
Finkelstein shows that some exceptions or carve-outs can be identified
with significance beyond linguistic fortuity or stylistic choice.22 She sug-
gests that certain exceptions are usefully thought of as external to the rule
that they condition23 : "An exception is a qualification of a rule that
stands in a certain relation to it, namely it stands outside the rule it quali-
fies."24 In her account, an exception's "outsider" status obtains if the
exception can be said to have a different "justification" from that which
underlies the rule.2 5 She even ascribes this view to Schauer himself6:
"The logic of exceptions . . . is more correctly understood in terms of
what Schauer calls 'external' failure, namely conflict between a rule and
something other than the rule's own background justification." 27
C. Rules as Distinct from Justifications
Schauer also supplies the notions of underinclusion and compound
justifications to help us specify the relationship of rules to exceptions. In
his rigorously considered account of "rule-ness," Schauer tells us that a
rule, by definition, diverges from its justification, and he explores the
phenomena of underinclusion and overinclusion of rules relative to their
justifications.28 With these resources in hand, I contend that the type of
ex ante exceptions I examine here can be understood as underinclusions
relative to some justification.
Schauer tells us that for a rule to be a rule, it must apply some pres-
sure distinct from what the justification would suggest if one were to rely
directly on the justification to make decisions:
If a rule applies even when its application would not serve the rule's
justification, and if a rule does not apply even when application
21. Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 152-53 (describing Schauer's position on this point).
22. Id. at 149.
23. Id. at 149, 155 (conceding that Schauer recognizes external exceptions too).
24. Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted).
25. Id. at 155.
26. Id. (distinguishing internal and external exceptions).
27. Id.; see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 117-18 (1991) ("By compari-
son, rules with some resistance to internal failure . .. might still be subject to being overridden by
particularly exigent factors external both to the rule and its justification. When rules are inapplicable
(or, more accurately, non-controlling) on the basis of such factors not themselves a function of what
this rule itself is designed to accomplish, we can say that such rules are externally defeasible, subject
to being defeated or rendered non-controlling by factors external to the rule itself."). Of course,
under a single-valued justificatory system, like utilitarianism, this distinction collapses, as he points
out. Schauer goes on to explain that rules should exert some resistance to external defeasibility:
"[F]or a rule to be a reason for action" it must have "weight." SCHAUER, supra, at 118.
28. See SCHAUER, supra note 27, at 61-62; see also id. at 76 ("A rule exists ... insofar as an
instantiation of a justification is treated . . . as entrenched, having the power to provide a reason for
decision even when that instantiation does not serve its generating justification. The form of deci-
sion-making that we can call rule-based, therefore, exists insofar as instantiations resist efforts to
penetrate them in the service of their justifications.").
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would serve that justification, is it a bad rule? Or have we just misap-
plied the rule? Or is this just part of what rules are all about?29
Rules and justifications will inevitably diverge due in large part to
the unavoidable generality of the rule. However, if one could anticipate
the particular cases where the rule would prove overinclusive, or more to
our purposes, underinclusive, one could then articulate and build in ex-
ceptions in advance.30
One reason that a rule's fit might be predictably bad is based on "in-
ternal" reasons, namely, where the rule does not fit the justification be-
cause the justification itself is undermined by the rule. An example
would be what Sunstein calls "health-health trade-off~s]" when one of
the justifications for the rule is health promotion, yet the health-
promoting measure may itself have adverse side effects for health, justi-
fying limitation of the rule based on "health" concerns as well.' Sunstein
gives a hypothetical example where "the regulation of one risk, like ...
asbestos, may give rise to further risks as a result of the substituted prod-
ucts[,]" which may be just as harmful.32 An "external" failure of the rule,
by contrast, would arise where a different countervailing justification,
e.g., a non-health reason such as economic cost, could be known in ad-
vance to exceed what we would consider justified by the health gains
from regulating asbestos.33 For example, we might find the countervail-
ing cost justification convincing for some subset of instances, such as in
small businesses with ten or fewer employees.
D. Plural Justifications
Thus, characterizing a failure of fit as "internal" or "external" to a
rule, indeed framing the notion of fit at all, or even understanding wheth-
er a rule is even a rule, all depend on each rule having an identifiable
"justification." Yet justifications are often plural. The phenomenon of
compound justifications for any one rule has been noted in other con-
texts, including statutory interpretation, and with respect to rationality
review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.34 "If legis-
lation is often a rough-hewn compromise, then testing its validity against
'actual' legislative purpose risks attributing unwarranted coherence to the
legislative process, which may entail logrolling or other strategic voting,
29. Id. at 34. For a thorough consideration of the role of rules in various health-related deci-
sions, using Schauer's account of rules, see DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH:
MAKING MORAL THEORY WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 11-15 (2001).
30. SCHAUER, supra note 27, at 36-37.
31. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE 124 (2002).
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123,
132 (1972) (criticizing the handling of cases under the rational review doctrine for formulating the
purpose against which the statutory means would be measured for rationality as "a unit rather than as
a mix of policies").
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making concessions to strongly felt but outlying interests, or papering
over disagreements to ensure the legislation's passage."35
In sum, justifications associated with a particular rule can be multi-
farious. Often, the limiting boundary narrowing the scope of the rule is
justified by "external" values, or concerns that differ from the value or
policy underlying the rule. To the extent he rule contains such narrowing
parameters, one could say that the parameters render the rule "underin-
clusive" relative to that particular animating justification. In other words,
even if the narrower rule better fits the constellation of justifications that
might impinge in particular situations, it does not realize the single pre-
sumed animating value to the fullest extent possible because of a limiting
parameter or "carve-out."
Schauer tells us that the nature of rule-based practice is to recognize
that a rule presumptively governs, even when the rule-generated outcome
is not congruent with the resolution of the situation were it to be decided
by resort to the animating justification.36 Thus, if such a narrowed rule
(or exception) is applied, even when the animating justification might
argue for fuller application, that is because in our system of law, we rec-
ognize the normative force of rules, rather than reverting in every in-
stance to decision by justification. 37
Yet as we will see, exceptions, if they arise from competing values
limiting a rule, are sometimes not given effect. These are the examples
we turn to next.
35. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2387, 2450 (2003) (foot-
note omitted). See also Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 540-41 ("Almost all statutes are compromises .
. . . What matters to the balancers is reducing the chance that their work will be invoked subsequent-
ly to achieve more, or less, than they intended, thereby upsetting the balance of the package....
Legislators seeking only to further the public interest may conclude that the provision of public rules
should reach so far and no farther.. .. No matter how good the end in view, achievement of the end
will have some cost, and at some point the cost will begin to exceed the benefits."); Note, supra note
34, at 131-32 (citing John Hart Ely's suggestion that courts must be "restrict[ing] the range of ac-
ceptable goals"). The Note author then goes on to state that to strike a rule for underinclusion denies
multiple justifications. If multiple justifications define the rules' contours, many rules may be "'tau-
tologically' rational," unless the court privileges some of the justifications. Id.
36. SCHAUER, supra note 27, at 93-100.
37. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMs (1990) (providing an ac-
count of rules as norms that substitute for the underlying justification). The project of this Article is
to probe that assumption that our system of law is rule-based, rather than infused with what exclu-
sive positivists would deem "extra-legal" elements. C.f, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699
(2001) (demonstrating that natural law elements enter into judicial decisionmaking, where the court
cites the maxim "[c]essante ratione legis cessat ipse lex" meaning that where a law's rationale ceases
to apply, so does the law itself (quoting I EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 70b (1628))). In Zavydas, the
Supreme Court granted habeas relief even though the statute set no limit on the length of time for
detention beyond removal and "the applicability of due process to aliens subject to removal is at
least questionable." Michael W. McConnell, The Ninth Amendment in Light of Text and History,




A. NY Statewide Coalition v. NYC Health Department: Soda Portion
Cap Rule
1. Description
In May of 2012, then-mayor of New York City, Michael Bloom-
berg, publicly proposed to cap the containers that Food Service Estab-
lishments (FSEs) use to sell sugary drinks at sixteen ounces.38 The provi-
sion defined a "sugary drink" as a nonalcoholic beverage sweetened with
sugar or another caloric sweetener, with more than twenty-five calories
per eight fluid ounces of beverage, and with milk or milk-substitute in-
gredients constituting fifty percent or less of the beverage by volume.39
On June 9, the City published a notice of public hearing to be held
by the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
(DOHMH) in late July. 40 Afterwards, DOHMH sent a memo to its rule-
making arm, the City's Board of Health (BOH), summarizing the hear-
41
ing.
Shortly thereafter, on September 13, the BOH, composed of eleven
members appointed by the mayor, passed New York City Health Code
§ 81.53 establishing the Soda Portion Cap Rule.42
Under the City Charter, the DOHMH has jurisdiction to regulate all
"matters affecting health in the City, including conditions hazardous to
life and health, by, among other things, regulating the food and drug
supply of the City, and enforcing provisions of the New York City
Health Code."4 3 The BOH is charged with establishing the code of health
with respect to anything within the DOHMH's jurisdiction."
The soda portion cap measure met opposition throughout the pro-
cess. Two days after it was announced, a group of city council members
wrote to the mayor, objecting and demanding a council vote.45 One
month after it was adopted, a coalition of plaintiffs sued the DOHMH in
state court over the rule." The county court, in an opinion by Judge Tin-
gling, invalidated the rule as both "arbitrary and capricious" and as im-
proper "legislation" by an administrative entity in violation of the state
38. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide II), 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
39. N.Y.C., N. Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53 (2012) (repealed 2013).
40. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
41. Id.
42. Id at 204-05.
43. Id. at 204.
44. N.Y.C. CHARTER §§ 553, 558 (2009).
45. New York Statewide ll, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
46. Id. at 206.
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constitutional separation of powers test laid out in a prior case,47 Boreali
v. Axelrod.4 8 This outcome was upheld on appeal by Judge Renwick,
relying upon the separation of powers' grounds for invalidation and,
therefore, declining to reach the issue of the rule's arbitrariness.49 The
highest court in New York then affirmed the intermediate appellate court
decision 4-3 on June 26, 2014, with a majority opinion by Judge Pigott
and dissent by Judge Read.o
2. Exceptions
The Soda Portion Cap Rule was characterized as riddled with ex-
ceptions. These exceptions were then blamed as the telltale sign that the
health department improperly balanced political considerations, thus
violating one of the four prongs of the Boreali test for forbidden legisla-
tion by an executive agency.
Judge Renwick describes the rule as follows: "The rule thus target-
ed non-diet soft drinks . . . but contained carve-outs for alcoholic bever-
ages, milkshakes, fruit smoothies and mixed coffee drinks, mochas, lat-
tes, and 100% fruit juices."
These exclusions arose from the definition of "sugary drink."52 The
definition stipulates that a sugary drink is "non-alcoholic."53 It also de-
fines "sugary drinks" as "sweetened by the manufacturer or establish-
ment," thus excluding 100% fruit juices.54 The caloric threshold and
stipulation of "caloric sweetener" presumably exclude diet soft drinks.
Finally, the definition excludes drinks that are constituted by more than
fifty percent milk or milk substitute.56 This parameter thus exempts some
lattes, smoothies, mixed coffee drinks, and milkshakes.
Furthermore, because the Soda Portion Cap Rule stated that it ap-
plies to "food service establishments," whose scope is elsewhere de-
fined,57 the petitioners challenging the rule complained that the rule
47. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide l), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *7-8, *19-20 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
48. Boreali v. Axelrod, 518 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443-45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (striking the New
York Public Health Commission's indoor smoking ban as improper legislation by a state agency).
49. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
50. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide III), 16 N.E.3d 538, 540, 549-50 (N.Y. 2014).
51. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
52. N.Y.C., N. Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2012) (repealed 2013).
53. Id. § 81.53(a)(1)(A).
54. Id. § 81.53(a)(1)(B).
55. Id
56. Id. § 81.53(a)(1)(D).
57. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide II), 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (quoting
the code's definition of a "food service establishment" (FSE) as "a place where food is provided for
individual portion service directly to the consumer whether such food is provided free of charge or
sold, whether consumption occurs on or off the premises or is provided from a pushcart, stand or
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"would appear to exempt grocery stores, convenience stores, bodegas
and markets from having to comply with the Rule. . . . [Such exempt
establishments would] includ[e] the 7-11 market chains and their famous,
or infamous, Big Gulp containers ... ."58
Finally, because the rule regulates size, but not number, of portions,
the petitioners could characterize refills as an exception and persuade
New York's highest court that the entire approach of capping portion
size was underinclusive. 5
3. Boreali Test
The principal complaint that emerges in the suit is that the health
department, as an executive agency, has engaged in an act of impermis-
sible "legislation." Petitioners contend that under the New York State
Constitution, agencies like the BOH "may not bypass the legislature,
under the guise of public health, and make fundamental policy choices
and establish far-reaching new policy programs all by themselves, no
matter how well-intentioned they may be."a How does the presence of
exceptions pertain to whether the Soda Portion Cap Rule constitutes im-
proper "legislation," violating state separation of powers doctrine? The
answer is that Boreali, the seminal case defining the test for such a doc-
trine, contains a prong designating exceptions as a sign of such improper
legislating.6 1
The Boreali test identifies four prongs, the first of which speaks
most directly to the issue of exceptions. The first prong looks at "whether
the challenged regulation is based upon concerns not related to the stated
purpose of the regulation, i.e., is the regulation based on other factors
such as economic, political or social concerns?"62 In other words, "The
first factor in Boreali probes whether the challenged regulation carves
out exemptions based on economic, political and social considerations."63
vehicle" (quoting N.Y.C., N.Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.03(s))). The definition of FSEs also
"excludes food processing establishments, retail food stores, private homes ... and food service
operations where a distinct group mutually provides .. . and consumes the food." N.Y. Statewide
Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene (New York
Statewide I), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013). According "to
[the] 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) . .. [with] the State's Department of Agriculture
and Markets, an FSE is subject to inspection by a local health department only if it generates 50% or
more of its total annual dollar receipts from the sale of food for consumption on the premises or
ready-to-eat for off-premises consumption." New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
58. New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8.
59. See id; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C.
Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide il), 16 N.E.3d 538, 547 (N.Y. 2014).
60. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 206 (quoting Petition, New York Statewide I, No.
653584/12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 11, 2012), 2013 WL 1343607).
61. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1355 (N.Y. 1987).
62. New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8.
63. Id (emphasis added).
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The second prong asks whether the agency filled in the "interstitial"
details of "legislation describing the over-all policies to be implemented"
or if it "wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of
rules without [the] benefit of legislative guidance."6" The third prong
inquires, "[D]id the regulation intrude upon ongoing legislative debate?
In other words, did the regulation address a matter the legislature has
discussed, debated or tried to address prior to this regulation?"65 And
finally, the fourth prong weighs whether "the regulation require[d] the
exercise of expertise or technical competence on behalf of the body pass-
ing the legislation."6
Thus, if an agency engages in line drawing to pursue public health
without excessive economic cost, the first Boreali prong would tend to
characterize the agency's action as legislative because such a measure
aims "to resolve difficult social problems by making choices among
competing ends."67
The Boreali court, in striking a state public health regulation on in-
door smoking, noted:
The exemptions . . . carved out for bars, convention cen-
ters, small restaurants . . . as well as the . . . 'waivers'
based on financial hardship, have no foundation in con-
siderations of public health. Rather, they demonstrate
the agency's own effort to weigh the goal of promoting
health against its social cost and to reach a suitable com-
*68promise.
Boreali declares that exemptions are a sign that this compromise is
occurring because, precisely as Finkelstein argued, exemptions typically
"run counter to such goals and, consequently, cannot be justified as sim-
ple implementations of legislative values."69
Even as the Boreali framework assumes that exceptions are "exter-
nal," presupposing a justificatory value apart from and competing with
the value embodied in the rule, the city health organs tried to argue that
the soda portion cap's exceptions were "internal" and "based solely on
health-related concerns."70 While this argument does not account for all
the exemptions,' the health agencies explained that the exceptions for
milk or juice were justified insofar as each of these items have some nu-
64. Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1356.
65. New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8.
66. Id.
67. Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1356.
68. Id. at 1355.
69. Id.
70. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
71. For instance, alcohol or convenience store Big Gulp drinks were exempted because other
executive agencies had claims of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Katherine Pratt, The Limits ofAnti-Obesity
Public Health Paternalism: Another View, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1903, 1921, 1928 (2014).
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tritional value.72 However, Judge Renwick remained unconvinced be-
cause she regarded the entire design of the provision as underinclusive:
the rule, she observed, in manipulating portion size, does not ban sugary
drinks entirely.73 She said it instead "relies upon the behavioral econom-
ics concept that consumers are pushed into better behavior when certain
choices are made less convenient."74
Remarkably, for Renwick and Pigott, it is this regulatory modesty
which proves that the agency was balancing, not just considering health:
"By restricting portions, the Board necessarily chose between ends, in-
cluding public health, the economic consequences associated with re-
stricting profits by beverage companies and vendors . . . and personal
,,75autonomy ....
The courts also found it damning that the health department framed
the obesity toll in economic terms. The health department had observed
that "[o]besity related health care expenditures in New York City now
exceed $4.7 billion annually . .. Medicare and Medicaid programs fund-
ed by tax dollars, pay approximately 60 per cent [sic] of those costs."76
This economic quantification spurred the court to say that the city was
inappropriately considering economic counterweights to health con-
77cerns.
The health agency also accommodated the jurisdiction of the New
York State Department of Agriculture and Markets by avoiding direct
regulation of grocery stores, which are otherwise under their sister agen-
cy's inspection purview. To Tingling, though, "[t]his could be construed
as evidencing political considerations outside of the Statement of Basis
and Purpose."78 The vision that the judges furnish for proper agency be-
havior is quite puzzling. If agencies were to disregard jurisdiction, politi-
cal considerations, economic costs, and all other ends, that tunnel vision
would seem itself to pose threats in the form of agency overreach.79
4. Value Conflict
The Soda Portion Cap exceptions thus signify the resolution of con-
flicting purposes and prompt judicial invalidation of the rule.
72. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide III), 16 N.E.3d 538, 547 (N.Y. 2014); see also New York
Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
76. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide 1), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. I1, 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y.C. Health Commissioner Farley).
77. Id. at *9.
78. Id. at *8; see also New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
79. See Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of
Woodrow Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1898-99 (2013).
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The formulation of the Boreali prong illustrates that the way the
rule confronts value conflict is one, if not the decisive issue in the case.
But we also find support in the fact that the battle was joined precisely at
the issue of whether the exception was "internal," serving other health
needs, rather than a reflection of some external purpose.80 With an inter-
nal justification, the value conflict dissolves to a mere question of which
means one should use to pursue the unitary value of health. That judges
in each of these cases refuse to recognize the exceptions as "internal"
signals there is something more going on in these cases apart from the
means-ends analysis associated with the ordinary fit tests of substantive
review for rationality.
Instead, the courts seem wedded to showing that the exceptions are
external and that each rule, despite its alignment with the constellation of
ends that it is navigating, is "unfit." The courts are therefore positing a
single, unalloyed justification for the rule. They then proceed to vigor-
ously interrogate "fit" relative to the rule's posited justification. In this
case, the court derived the requirement that health serves as the sole jus-
tification for BOH action from the state's constitutional separation of
powers doctrine. What is curious about he unitary justification approach
is that if it prevails, any standard setting is doomed, not just the delinea-
tion of a standard's scope through exceptions.8 1 It simply fails the plausi-
bility test to pretend that standard setting can avoid settling among com-
peting ends.
Furthermore, the courts' insistence upon rationalization of every as-
pect of the rule to its one recognized justification seems to run counter to
the very function of a rule. As Schauer clarifies, the nature of a rule is
applicability even at the point where the justification would not fit.82
Thus, the rule applied in some instances will not match the rule's justifi-
cation. Even Ronald Dworkin, who includes background justifications
along with rules as part of the corpus of law, distinguishes "rules," which
have all-or-nothing force, from their supporting principles and policies,
which merely exert "weight."83 Of principles, he says, "When principles
intersect . . . one who must resolve the conflict has to take into account
,,84the relative weight of each. However, "[i]f the facts a rule stipulates
are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it sup-
plies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to
80. See supra text accompanying note 71.
81. See, e.g., Rick Hills, Why Did Bloomberg's Soda Portion Ban Bite the Dust? Was it
Mayoral Imperialism, Judicial Activism, or Both?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 11, 2013, 8:23 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/03/bloombergs-soda-portion-ban-bites-the-dust-
defeat-for-an-imperial-mayor-or-victory-for-activist-judg.html ("Is Justice Tingling really demand-
ing that agencies jettison consideration of cost, administrative feasibility, personal privacy, or finan-
cial feasibility when they pursue their primary mandate?").
82. SCHAUER, supra note 27, at 75-76.
83. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 22-28, 71-80.
84. Id. at 26.
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the decision."8  Thus Dworkin, like Schauer, believes that rules apply
even when an underlying principle runs out, or conversely, that the rule
may stop short of an underlying principle, including in those situations
when the rule accommodates a competing principle.
That the soda portion cap's fatal flaw was its attempt to perform this
very function of resolving value conflict by fiat is also paradoxically
evident in that the argument against the rule was framed as a lack of lim-
iting principle. On June 4, 2013, when the appellate court heard oral ar-
guments, the judge repeatedly queried the scope of the Board's jurisdic-
tion and asked whether there was any principle limiting the Board's ju-
risdiction.87 This argument is ironic because, in fact, the health agency
was trying to limit its jurisdiction and promote health while not over-
reaching. It was steering clear of other social and cultural practices while
respecting the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that divided in-
spection and oversight between health and agriculture agencies. Why
was the soda portion rule's limitation, ostensibly condemned as underin-
clusive relative to its health objectives, then viewed as an indication that
its scope of purpose was too broad and lacking a "limiting principle?"
Perhaps the key word is "principle." The judiciary demands that jurisdic-
tion should not be limited or designated ad hoc, or even by ex ante deci-
sion rule, but by background principle.
Here, the argument of underinclusion is turned on its head. And we
see the germ of the court's conception of rules, namely, its elision of
rules and principles, which leads it to reject these particular measures.
5. Assign to Non-Legal Sphere
Having invalidated rule-based line drawing, the courts' next ma-
neuver is to assign the decision to another decision-making sphere. In the
85. Id. at 24.
86. Id. at 26-27; see also id. at 77 ("[T]hese rules have a different shape than they would have
had if the principle [that no man may profit from his wrongs] had not been given any weight in the
decision at all. The long length of time generally required for acquiring title by adverse possession
might have been much shorter, for example, had this not been thought to conflict with the principle.
Indeed, one of my reasons for drawing the distinction between rules and principles was just to show
how rules often represent a kind of compromise amongst competing principles in this way . . . .");
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 180-84 (1986) (expressing Dworkin's views on compromise).
Thus, Dworkin would recognize exceptions as binding even if they embodied a principle competing
with the one underlying other parts of the rule; it would be binding because the exception would be
part of the rule itself.
87. See Glenn Blain, New York City's Soda Ban Bubbles Up to the State's Highest Court -
Updated, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jun. 4, 2014, 5:04 PM),
www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/new-york-city-soda-ban-bubbles-state-highest-court-
blog-entry- 1. 1817197.
88. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 73 (responding to Joseph Raz, of occasions for such
elision "[b]ut I did not deny, in my original article, that conflicts in rules might exist. I said that in
our legal system such conflicts would be occasions of emergency, occasions requiring a decision that
would alter the set of standards in some dramatic way. . . . [H]e may amend one or both of them to




opinions striking the Soda Portion Cap Rule, the courts' eagerness to
offload this decision to another decision-making mode is not matched by
clarity about what that mode might be.89 The judges assume, rather than
argue, that because the agency was improperly legislating, the politically
accountable legislature should have been the appropriate arena. Howev-
er, this assumption is perhaps too hasty on their part.
The prongs of the Boreali separation of powers test presuppose
"politics" or the legislature as the mode of decision-making illegitimately
displaced by the agency rule, and by extension, the default arena to
which this decision would revert. After all, the court introduces the test
as the means to judge whether the agency has "impermissibly trespassed
on legislative jurisdiction."" Moreover, the test's second prong probing
for "interstitial" gap filling or writing on "a clean slate" elevates the
guiding instructions of the legislature as dispositive.9 1 The third prong
further asks whether the legislature has otherwise proposed or taken ac-
tion such that the regulation at issue intrudes upon this ongoing debate.92
The assumption is that the legislative sphere is proper.
Yet while the first prong, with which we are most concerned, desig-
nates economic, political, and social concerns as competing considera-
tions, it does not necessarily command the political, rather than economic
or social sphere, as the arena through which one should negotiate the
resolution of those concerns. In this particular case, the courts do em-
brace political contest as the appropriate alternate mode; however, that
choice is underdetermined, even by the very terms of the Boreali test.
Indeed, the judges in this case sporadically advert to what hey con-
ceive of as the alternate decisional mode of science.93 Judge Renwick, in
examining the fourth Boreali prong, which counts agency expertise as a
factor favoring validity, chastises the BOH for failing to employ its pub-
lic health expertise, rather than its political judgment.94 Thus, "scientific
expertise" could have been an alternate domain for resolving conflicting
values. However, the judges choose not to assign the decision there, but
rather to politics, without much in the way of explanation for their
choice. The nostrum that "science" and "scientific reasoning" can objec-
tively and conclusively recommend a course of action has been so thor-
89. For an explanation of why and how that offloading occurs in health law, see Christina S.
Ho, In Defense of Circular Reasoning: The Affordable Care Act and the Resilience of Law and Self-
Reference, 5 WM. & MARY POL'Y REV. 1 (2013).
90. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide 1), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2013)
91. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1356 (N.Y. 1987).
92. Id.
93. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health
& Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide II), 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 212-13 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
94. Id. (complaining that "the Board did not bring any scientific or health expertise to bear in
creating the Portion Cap Rule").
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oughly debunked that I need not do so here.95 My argument depends not
upon the truth but rather on the court's implicit use of that misconcep-
tion, i.e., its lingering reliance upon the illusory notion of an objective
and determinate realm of scientific decision-making.96
While the courts proffer "politics" and "science" as the two chief
social decision-making institutions ostensibly distinct from and prefera-
ble to decision by legally promulgated rules, it is worth mentioning a
distant third. Judges Pigott and Renwick also suggest that perhaps the
appropriate decision-making arena should be private ordering. By this
mode, the decision of portion size would fall not to health regulation but
to individual choice. Renwick suggests this approach when she rebuts the
health department's internal justification argument by insisting that the
board must have balanced health concerns and concluded that they "out-
weigh the cost of infringing on individual rights to purchase a product
that the Board has never categorized as inherently dangerous."97 Pigott
echoes the sentiment: "This preference for an indirect means of achiev-
ing compliance with goals of healthier intake of sugary beverages was
itself a policy choice, relating to the degree of autonomy a government
permits its citizens to exercise . . . ."98
The court never fully develops the argument that such background
"rights" exist, but one can imagine a decision where the court defended
the principle of open individual choice and that arena as the proper mode
for prioritizing among health and other considerations. Had it done so,
then the court would have had to deny the legislatively enacted instruc-
tion to the agency to protect health, which inevitably limits open individ-
ual choice, and has even recently been understood to include near-
complete bans of substances like artificial trans fats.99 The judges here
opted for the other extreme instead, which is to maintain, rather remark-
ably, that health should have been protected without balancing and with-
95. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shilfling Sands: The Limits of Science in
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2004).
96. Here my use of the category "science" or "scientific expertise" follows CHRISTOPHER F.
EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 7-10
(1990) (describing "the trichotomy of decision making paradigms-adjudicatory fairness, scientific
expertise, and politics" which anchor the distinctions that judges implicitly and expressly draw upon
in administrative law disputes). Edley fully recognizes that science cannot operate without the exer-
cise of some judgment which is inevitably "political," acknowledging that "virtually all sciences,
involve[] uncertainties of prediction and measurement. Science alone, to the extent one can conceive
of it, cannot determine what to do with those uncertainties." Id. at 75. Instead he argues that despite
the conceptual instability of "science" as a distinct paradigm, it is this confused notion that courts
rely upon time and time again to discharge their duties in deciding administrative law cases. Id. at
72-77.
97. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (emphasis added).
98. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide III), 16 N.E.3d 538, 547 (N.Y. 2014) (emphasis added).
99. N.Y.C., N.Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.08 (2012); see also Lindsay F. Wiley, Com-
mentary, Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social Norms, and the Law: The Normative Impact of Prod-
uct Configuration Bans, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1877, 1881 n.9 (2014) (discussing the lack of principled
distinction between trans fat ban and soda portion cap).
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out regard to other concerns, including such "individual [background]
rights to purchase a product.""t Judge Pigott is accused by the dissent of
the same but disclaims support for an absolute ban by invoking a rights-
inflected argument that prohibition of sugary beverages altogether would
also amount to "policy-making, not rule-making" because it "interferes
with commonplace daily activities preferred by large numbers of peo-
ple."'0
What if the court had claimed squarely that this decision belonged
to individual choice? Would such a presumptive "right" or principle
come from the state separation of powers doctrine? Would it come from
some extreme theory of due process? Meanwhile, we need hardly re-
hearse the arguments that just as "pure" objective scientific decision-
making is a myth, no such unstructured realm of free individual choice
exists either. Market dynamics constrain individual choice, and the mar-
ket itself is already shaped by regulatory choices.102 Indeed this market-
norming argument underlies the soda portion cap measure itself. The
notes accompanying the BOH proposal stated that "People t nd to con-
sume more calories at meals that include large beverage sizes. [This
measure's] intent is to address the super-size trend and reacquaint New
Yorkers with smaller portion sizes, leading to a reduction in consumption
of sugary drinks among New York City residents.,0 3
Thus, the availability of individual choice as an arena apart from
law depends, among other things, on whether one believes that the indi-
vidual can exercise her private preferences or whether market ordering
permits exploitation of cognitive biases to manipulate individual choice.
Indeed, the above-mentioned justification that the health department cites
in its memo is the argument that an individual's true preferences are dis-
torted by the super-sizing trend and that the rule is designed to give the
individual the opportunity to choose consciously whether he or she wants
additional amounts of beverage.'0
100. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209; see also New York Statewide III, 16 N.E.3d
at 558 (Read, J., dissenting) ("The Appellate Division ... appears to conclude that the Board would
have acted properly if only it had completely banned all sugary drinks within the City's borders.").
101. New York Statewide III, 16 N.E.3d at 548.
102. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (1997) ("Whether
people have a preference for a commodity, a right, or anything else is in part a function of whether
the government has allocated it to them in the first instance. There is no way to avoid the task of
initially allocating an entitlement (short of anarchy)." (footnote omitted)); see also Mark Kelman,
Legal Economists and Normative Social Theory (1987), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAw 326, 330-32 (Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998); Robert L. Hale, Coer-
cion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470,479-81 (1923).
103. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide 1), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2013) (quoting notes accompanying N.Y.C., N.Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53 (2012)
(repealed 2013)).
104. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 205 (providing the DOHMH's summary of the
debate regarding the Soda Portion Cap Rule after the public hearing and quoting the DOHMH's
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These alternate arenas of science or private ordering are never ex-
pressly analyzed by the courts, and the courts seem to designate the polit-
ical arena as its favored arena by virtual acclamation.
6. Judge Arrogates the Decision and Simulates a Non-Legal
Method
The court's adoption of politics as the preferred forum for this mat-
ter poses its own puzzles. When should the presence of value conflict
require a diversion to "politics," much less some alternate decision-
making arena for resolution? The mere presence of value balancing can-
not be the answer because, if so, then all law would be legislative and the
distinction that the Boreali factors attempt to draw would collapse. If the
case is stripped of distracting and inconclusive doctrinal garb, we are left
with merely a judge, deciding that a particular balance or configuration
of competing values is unacceptable.'05 And perhaps to avoid the chagrin
of nakedly substituting her own conception of balance, the judge then
confers that task upon a different organ, in this case the legislature.
To consider this explanation, we look at what the court claims to be
doing to identify the instances of "improper" balancing that prompt di-
version of the matter away from legal rule setting. The court uses the
Boreali test, but the approach that test employs is one of balancing,
which hardly allays our suspicions that the judge comes close to nakedly
substituting her own preferred resolution of competing values. 107 Indeed,
the Boreali test is particularly indeterminate because, as the court re-
conclusion that "[i]f the proposal is adopted, customers intent upon consuming more than 16 ounces
would have to make conscious decisions to do so").
105. The Court of Appeals dissent says as much: "With all due respect to my colleagues, their
proposed ends-means test . .. harks back to long discredited formalistic approaches to administrative
law, which were seemingly objective but instead served as camouflage for enforcement of judicial
preferences." New York Statewide III, 16 N.E.3d at 560 (Read, J., dissenting).
106. See Jeremy Waldron, Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?, in EXPLORING LAW'S
EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 155, 173-76 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006)
(discussing how the judge, in confronting the materials before him, each side with its own conflict-
ing account of how to balance different competing values, is in the end choosing simply by conduct-
ing and insisting on his own balance, and imposing it as the tiebreaker). But see Ronald Dworkin,
Response, in EXPLORING LAW'S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 291, 304
(Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006) (responding that it is not Hercules' own balance but what he believes to
be the balance dictated by the principle that best fits the rest of the law, assuming that there is such a
fit to be found or constructed while maintaining political integrity).
107. T. Alexander Aleinikoff might characterize this "totality of the circumstances" test as less
strictly a "balancing" method, but rather a factor checklist or "analogical" type of reasoning, where
"one starts with [a] conception of what constitutes voluntariness and involuntariness and then asks
whether the particular situation shares more of . . . [those] elements." T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987). But Aleinikoff also
classifies Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor as a "balancing" case, Aleinikoff,
supra, at 947, even though in Schor, O'Connor weighs factors to determine whether "the 'essential
attributes of judicial power' are reserved to Article III courts" when the agency adjudicates. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). If O'Connor's approach there
constitutes balancing, rather than analogy, in a similar assessment under separation-of-powers doc-
trine of whether agency action too closely resembles that of a coordinate branch, then the distinction
is much less meaningful than Aleinikoff assumes.
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minds us, in this test no one factor is dispositive, and the test instead
"must be viewed in combination and in totality."'08
Admittedly, balancing factors in a legal test is not identical to first-
order balancing of competing values.'0 There is a large and vigorous
literature on proportionality and balancing, which I do not, for my pur-
poses, need to enter here."0 My argument merely depends upon the court
engaging in its own version, if slightly deflected, of the analysis it de-
nounces. It is enough that most would agree that it remains an open ques-
tion whether such judicial balancing is conclusively distinct from politi-
cal balancing.
Such judicial substitution for political balancing could not, of
course, proceed too baldly. Indeed, the courts engage in a sleight of hand
to disguise who decides. This imperative may explain why a profusion of
non-legal realms is implicated. Ostensibly, the doctrine says the legisla-
ture should decide, yet the judge is deciding when the legislature decides.
And what of the other realms we considered?
In deciding that science does not support the agency's decisions, in-
sofar as the agency's clear authority to take strong public health
measures either in the event of epidemic or to ban health hazards was not
triggered, the judges employed their lay version of scientific reasoning to
suggest that obesity is not an epidemic."' Judge Tingling attempted to
ground his decision in "scientific" distinctions-that the obesity threat
could not technically constitute an epidemic if the nature of the hazard
was chronic rather than infectious disease.12 This claim is fairly risible,
as epidemic has been used to refer to noninfectious disease since the se-
cond half of the twentieth century." 3
Renwick also treads on science when she argues that for the rule to
be valid, sugary soda itself would have to be declared a health hazard
without qualification.1 4 Otherwise, the health department has long been
understood as authorized to simply ban hazardous foods to protect
health, well within the "interstices" of the power delegated to the agency.
Indeed, the department exercised this authority in banning artificial trans
108. New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *7.
109. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 37, at 35-40, 46-47 (discussing the problems of balancing first-
order concerns against second-order concerns).
110. See, e.g., Mark Antaki, The Rationalism of Proportionality's Culture of Justification, in
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 284, 284 & n.l
(Grant Huscroft et al. eds., 2014); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role ofExclusionary
Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994).
111. See, e.g., New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *16.
112. See id.
113. Paul M.V. Martin & Estelle Martin-Granel, 2,500-Year Evolution of the Term Epidemic,
12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 976, 979 (2006).
114. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health
& Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide II), 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
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fats."' Renwick dismisses such authority as inapplicable to the current
case, finding that soda cannot be a health hazard by virtue merely of con-
sumption in "excess quantity."'16 What reasoning skill does she bring to
bear in identifying hazards to health and the appropriate conditions under
which they pose a hazard? And why should an exposure fail to constitute
a health hazard if its effects require a threshold quantity? Some hazards
have zero-threshold dose-response curves, and some have U-shaped
curves.17 Numerous substances like fluorine, selenium, and other nutri-
ents are healthy at low doses and do not become hazards until they cross
a certain threshold. Renwick must make these dubious technical claims
to find that the rule fails prong two, namely, that it is not interstitial
rulemaking within the authority clearly delegated to the agency over
health hazards.'18 Scientific identification of a hazard and legal determi-
nation defining the statutory meaning of "health hazard" resemble dis-
torted mirror doubles.
Renwick's approach to hazard identification is by no means a fore-
gone conclusion, but instead a methodological choice. Other jurisdictions
have chosen differently. As Sunstein has noted, federal administrative
law takes a different approach to the question of hazard identification in
the face of qualifying considerations."'9 In his account, federal courts
grant federal agencies default permission to craft de minimis excep-
tions,120 whereas Renwick requires a per se ban of even insignificant
levels of risk from sugary soda.
Finally, while the court briefly mentions markets, i.e., private
choice or ordering, as another regime, it did not pursue its own sugges-
tion of private ordering as the proper mode. Had it chosen to do so, how-
ever, there is a ready-made form of judicial discourse, law and econom-
ics, which also involves the judicial performance of an ersatz methodol-
ogy to approximate the efficient results that might emerge from market
121processes.
In the soda portion cap case, the Boreali test itself is indeterminate,
but the underinclusiveness of the rule, by exposing the unavoidable bal-
ancing of health against other ends, provokes the court to act upon its
anxiety about the highly reticulated agency-crafted rule as the social tool
115. N.Y.C., N.Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE §81.08(a) (2006); see, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Why do
Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219,
1238 (2014).
116. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
117. See J.M. Davis & D.J. Svendsgaard, U-Shaped Dose-Response Curves: Their Occurrence
and Implications for Risk Assessment, 30 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENvTL. HEALTH 71 (1990).
118. See New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 210-11.
119. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed.
2011); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).
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governing and accommodating value conflict. Politics, or even science or
markets, would be preferable. Is distinction between portion size and
number of portions somehow particularly irrational?1 22 Are judges rec-
ognizing some presumptive "right" to health protection, or presumptive
"right" to autonomy that ought not be easily outweighed by other consid-
erations? But where would such a right come from? These cannot plausi-
bly inhere in the separation of powers doctrine alone. Is it implicit in the
delegation to the City Council? But the analysis used to identify when
agencies ought not compromise was hardly a statutory analysis.
When we examine what judges use to determine when the matter
should be deflected away from the domain of rules, we find, notably, a
pidgin science, and a "balancing" test where no one or more prongs can
be said to be dispositive and where no particular threshold has been ar-
ticulated for satisfaction of the test. Rather than applying a clear rule, or
even a consistent principle, the courts engage in an elaborate disguise of
where rule-ness runs out.
B. Tummino v. Hamburg: Plan B OTC Switchl23
Plan B is a drug approved by the FDA in 1999 for use as an emer-
gency contraceptive.124 The active ingredient in the drug, a synthetic pro-
gesterone called levonorgestrel, was approved decades ago for uses other
than emergency contraception.125 Levonorgestrel is a component of many
daily oral contraceptives and intrauterine devices (IUDs).1 26 These long-
approved indications refer to the use of levonorgestrel prior to and during
intercourse.127 However, within a certain window of time post-
intercourse, levonorgestrel is also effective in reducing the risk of un-
wanted pregnancy.128 Thus, in 1997, the FDA solicited and approved
applications to market prescription-only levonorgestrel in specific doses
for this new post-intercourse, or "emergency contraception," use.129 The
approved product was called Plan B.
The chapter of this history that concerns us now arose in the mid-
2000s. At that time, the FDA came under public pressure to make a
product that was well-documented to be non-toxic available over-the-
counter (OTC). Eventually, the FDA did approve a switch to OTC status
for Plan B levonorgestrel as an emergency contraceptive, but only after
122. Cf Pac. Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
123. 1 am indebted to Bernard Bell for suggesting this case.
124. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
125. See Emergency Contraception Fact Sheet, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 2012),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs244/en/. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA 's
Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927, 931-33 (2014).
126. See id. at 931.
127. Id. at 931-33.
128. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
129. Id at 525.
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much delay, and crucially, only for women 18 and older.130 This decision
for age-restricted OTC availability was immediately challenged and re-
sulted in extensive judicial action, memorialized in a series of opinions
by Judge Korman of the Eastern District of New York, who was the pre-
siding judge in the lawsuit over this matter.'3 '
1. FDA Background: Narrow Indications and Scope of Regulatory
Action
I pause to describe the drug approval regime in brief as it explains
how the contours of FDA regulatory action, including regulatory "carve-
outs," are generally defined with respect to particular drugs. Since 1962,
drugs for humans have been subject to the modem pre-market approval
regime in the United States.132 Section 505(a) of the Food Drug & Cos-
metic Act (FDCA) prohibits the introduction of an unapproved "new
drug" into interstate commerce.133 To obtain the approval of the FDA, a
"new drug" must be demonstrated by substantial evidence to be safe and
effective "for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the proposed labeling thereof." 34
This "use" is the key parameter. Some may also refer to it as the
"claim," as "the effect [the product] purports or is represented to have,"
or the "indicated use."'35 Because the pre-approval requirements are only
triggered for "a new drug," the definition of "new drug" is crucial. The
FDCA defines a "new drug" as a drug "not generally recognized ... as
safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed."'36 Thus, the
"use" is the matter whose newness triggers regulatory requirements, not
the chemical entity itself.
Moreover, the safety and efficacy required for approval are judged
relative to that "use" or "indication." 3 7 Certainly a drug that is effective
against headaches might not be effective against brain tumors. Moreover,
a highly toxic drug that might be deemed "safe" for use in treating an
otherwise life-threatening brain tumor could be too dangerous for mere
headaches.
130. This age range was subsequently expanded to women 17 and older. See Diana R. H.
Winters, Intractable Delay and the Need to Amend the Petition Provisions of the FDCA, 90 IND. L.J.
1047, 1066 & 1067 n.148 (2015). On delay, see id. at 1067 & n.148.
131. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Tummino I,
603 F. Supp. 2d at 519; Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino Ill), No. 12-CV-763, 2013 WL 2631163
(E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013).
132. Drug Amendments of 1962 (Kefauver-Harris Amendment), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat.
780, 784 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
133. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
134. Id. § 355(d), (e).
135. Id. § 355(d)(5).
136. Id § 321(p)(1) (emphasis added).
137. See id. § 355(d) ("If the Secretary finds . . . there is a lack of substantial evidence that the
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof . .. he shall issue an order refusing to
approve. . .. ").
2015] 133
DENVER LAW REVIEW
If the indication is the all-important reference for the approval re-
gime, who then determines the indication? In practice, the drug manufac-
turers themselves, often called the "sponsors," define the indications.1 3 8
The sponsor is held to the indication in the sense that they must prove
safety and efficacy against that indication, must label adequately for that
indication, and cannot, at least in theory, actively market their products
for other indications.'3 9 However, the sponsor's ability to stipulate the
indication has gone largely unchallenged with a few exceptions I de-
scribe below.140
The malleability of indication engenders regulatory difficulties.
Clinical trial data is needed to supply evidence of drug's safety and effi-
cacy for any given indication, so the clinical trial's parameters are usual-
ly narrowed to the indication's parameters.141 However, those controlled
parameters often fail to reflect circumstances of actual use in the general
population. The FDA must engage in a particular type of inference, gen-
eralizing the results obtained in the enrolled clinical trial population to
predict the results in the actual population. The threat that the clinical
trial population might skew compared to the actual users of the drug once
it is marketed always lurks in the background.142 For this and many other
reasons, drug approval requires judgment, rather than mechanical calcu-
lation of scientifically determinate outcomes. To inform and exercise this
judgment, the FDA has a number of tools, including in-house experts in
various offices within the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER).14 3 They also have the authority to convene advisory committees
to weigh in on the decision.14
138. Ass'n of Am., Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 206, 216
(D.D.C. 2002); see id. at 218 (contending that it is "Congress' will ... [that] the 'manufacturer ...
through his representations in connection with its sale . .. determine the use to which the article is to
be put"' (quoting S. REP. No. 73-493, at 3 (1934))).
139. However, they often approach promotion of the off-label use through various indirect
means, and indeed are arguably protected by the First Amendment in engaging in at least as much.
See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 160-62 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Wash. Legal Found. v.
Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 337 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ( "In disposing of the case in this manner, we cer-
tainly do not criticize the reasoning or conclusions of the district court."), vacating in part 56 F.
Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999); Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60-61, 74 (D.D.C.
1998), injunction amended by, 36 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.D.C. 1999).
140. See, e.g., Michael J. Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills-A System Popping Under
Too Much Physician Discretion? A Law-Policy Prescription to Make Drug Approval More Mean-
ingful in the Delivery of Health Care, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1085, 1102 (2012) ("Industry sponsors
hold broad discretion to tailor clinical research and to apply (or not) for approval of specific uses in
applications for market access, which provides an incentive to limit the scope of applications for
market access, get approval, and then exploit physician off-label use through sponsorship of research
and conferences and the distribution of medical journal publications.").
141. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
142. See, e.g., Michelle N. Meyer, Regulating the Production of Knowledge: Research Risk-
Benefit Analysis and the Heterogeneity Problem, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 237, 241-42 (2013).
143. See CDER Offices and Divisions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucmO
7
5128.htm (last updated June 26, 2015).
144. 21 U.S.C. § 355(n).
[Vol. 93:1134
EXCEPTIONS MEET ABSOLUTISM
Because the indication is often defined by the drug sponsor, it
comes as no surprise that the indication's scope serves the sponsor's in-
terests. For instance, if a drug is possibly effective in a broad, and thus
high-revenue indication (such as depression or anxiety), but it is easier
and cheaper to run trials and get approval for a narrow indication (such
as schizophrenia), the sponsors may design a study for a narrow indica-
tion to get the drug to market.145 Because the FDA approvals regulate
labeling and how drugs are marketed, but do not limit the "practice of
medicine" by physicians,1'" the drug sponsor may still reap profits if doc-
tors happen to prescribe the drug "off-label" to patients with other condi-
tions.147
Furthermore, indications, like rules, can be narrowed along a num-
ber of different dimensions, not merely along the lines of disease diagno-
sis. Indications are frequently narrowed to subpopulations to minimize
the sponsor's cost and risk as well. Drug manufacturers maintain that
they can define their chosen indication to exclude individuals with heart
conditions or compromised immune systems from the use indicated in
the labeling if they did not enroll those groups in the clinical trial.1 4 8 It is
risky and expensive to enroll pregnant women, for instance, in clinical
trials, so drug manufacturers may often simply stipulate in the labeling
that such product is not approved for use in pregnant women.149
Some of the same risks and difficulties in obtaining effective con-
sent for pediatric patients led drug sponsors to decline to enroll children
145. There were a number of drugs, like gabapentin originally approved for narrow indications
like schizophrenia or seizures, then sold more broadly in the 1990's for conditions like depression or
anxiety. See, e.g., Duff Wilson, Side Effects May Include Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at
BUI. Such drugs have been the subject of recent litigation. See, e.g., Neurontin Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig. v. Pfizer, Inc., 712 F.3d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom., Pfizer, Inc. v.
Kaiser Found., 134 S. Ct. 786 (2013).
146. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public
Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 225 (2011).
147. Much has been written on this subject of off-label use. See id at 225-26; see also Ryan
Abbott & Ian Ayres, Can Bayesian Extrapolation Improve FDA Regulation of Off-Label Uses of
Drugs and Devices?, 4 FOOD & DRUG POL'Y FORUM 1, 1-2 (2014); Aaron S. Kesselheim &
Michelle M. Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion in an Era of Expanding
Commercial Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1539, 1539 (2014); Malinowski, supra note 140, at
1085-86.
148. See Ass'n of Am., Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 217-18
(D.D.C. 2002) ("1 need to acknowledge the limits of FDA's authority. It is our job to review drug
applications for the indications suggested by the manufacturer. We do not have the authority to
require manufacturers to seek approval for indications which they have not studied. Thus, as a matter
of law, if an application contains indications only for adults, we're stuck." (quoting a speech by FDA
Commissioner, David Kessler)); David Loughnot, Note & Comment, Potential Interactions of the
Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J. L. &
MED. 365, 370-71 (2005) (calling this practice of testing treatments for medically differentiable
subgroups of a disease "salami slicing"); see also Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of
Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. PRODUCTS & TOXICS LIABILITY 139, 144-45 (1994).
149. Barbara A. Noah, The Inclusion of Pregnant Women in Clinical Research, 7 ST. LOUIS U.
J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 353, 355-57 (2014).
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in their clinical trials.50 Meanwhile, because of physiological and other
differences distinguishing children from adults, including developing
organ systems or higher metabolism rates, drug sponsors and regulators
were reluctant to generalize adult trial results to the pediatric popula-
tion. 151 Often, they would simply narrow the indication to, for example,
the treatment of depression in patients over the age of eighteen, making
no claim as to the drug's safety or efficacy in children.152
These examples, however, suggest the limits of the prevailing para-
digm that allows manufacturers by and large to control how the drug is
presented for use and, therefore, the standards to which the manufactur-
ers are subjecting themselves.53 Should entire populations be denied
information on safety, efficacy, and dosing simply because manufactur-
ers can restrict indications at will? Does our food and drug law take no
account of the social expectations of that drug's use? Are boundaries
drawn along the lines of age, pregnancy, or immune function equivalent
to line drawing based on other population parameters? As it turns out, the
paradigm that defers to the manufacturers' stated claims in defining the
indication has been checked to some extent by Congress and the FDA.
Now, manufacturers must report certain demographics of their clinical
trial enrollment.154 Drug sponsors are prohibited from excluding men and
women of reproductive age from their trials.'55 The FDA also tried to
issue a regulation mandating pediatric testing and labeling for drugs that
it deemed therapeutically meaningful, needed by substantial numbers of
children, and feasible for study in the pediatric subpopulation.15 6 The
regulation was struck as ultra vires by a federal district court, but subse-
quently codified by Congress, which also authorized six-month addition-
150. See, e.g., Kurt R. Karst, Comment, Pediatric Testing of Prescription Drugs: The Food
and Drug Administration's Carrot and Stick for the Pharmaceutical Industry, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
739, 748 n.44 (2000).
151. See id. at 748 & n.44.
152. See id. at 747.
153. Malinowski, supra note 140, at 1119 ("Similarly, using the regulatory process to attempt
to impose commercial uses on new drug candidates or specific types of human clinical trials on drug
developers would invite allegations of undue impediment on the commercial freedom that is the
touchstone of our private market system and introduce susceptibility to legal challenges.").
154. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(b)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) ("The
Secretary shall, in consultation with the Director of the National Institutes of Health and with repre-
sentatives of the drug manufacturing industry, review and develop guidance, as appropriate, on the
inclusion of women and minorities in clinical trials required by clause (A)."); see also U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: COLLECTION OF RACE AND ETHNICITY DATA IN
CLINICAL TRIALS 1-2 (2005). For a more recent example, see Food and Drug Administration Safety
and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 907, 126 Stat. 993, 1092-93 (2012).
155. PETER BARTON HUT-r ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 699 (4th ed.
2014).
156. See Karst, supra note 150, at 753-55. The FDA may waive the requirement if studies are
impossible or highly impracticable, if the product is not likely to be used in substantial numbers of
pediatric patients, or if it provides no meaningful therapeutic benefit over existing therapies, among




al exclusivity to reward such pediatric studies.157 These measures now
give drug sponsors some duty and incentive to generate pediatric safety,
efficacy, and dosing information.'58
2. Plan B Background
When levonorgestrel was finally expressly approved for emergency
contraception in 1999, this indication proved controversial-especially
among abortion opponents and others who raised concerns about the
incentives for sexual promiscuity. 159
Progestin compounds, of which levonorgestrel is one, are similar to
hormones naturally present in the body, especially during pregnancy.iso
Progestin has a number of effects, including "reduc[ing] the number of
sperm cells in the uterine cavity, immobili[zing] sperm, and . . . de-
lay[ing] or prevent[ing] ovulation."16 1 While some of these effects occur
prefertilization, some have contended that progesterone-like hormones
could also change the uterine lining, possibly rendering it less hospitable
to the implantation of a fertilized egg, an effect that could constitute a
postfertilization event, though this has never been shown.162 This implan-
tation blockage is particularly controversial among those who consider
human life to begin at fertilization, as they construe the postintercourse
interference with implantation of a fertilized egg to be the termination of
human life. 63
However, it has been impossible to verify that levonorgestrel blocks
postfertilization implantation. Judge Korman notes that "it would be 'un-
ethical and logistically difficult to conduct the necessary research' to
157. See Karst, supra note 150, at 762-63.
158. Draft Guidance for Industry on the Pediatric Research Equity Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,233,
53,234 (Sept. 7, 2005); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1)(D). The author helped to draft this Act as a
legislative assistant to then-Senator Hillary Clinton.
159. See, e.g., Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 7, 2006, at 48.
160. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
161. MARCIA CROSSE, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-109, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION: DECISION PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER
MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 12 (2005) [herein-
after GAO REPORT].
162. As would other contraceptives, including progesterone-containing daily oral contracep-
tives, as well as intrauterine devices, whether hormonal or copper. But see Tummino v. Hamburg
(Tummino ll), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (explaining how Plan B labeling mentions
the possibility of interference with implantation "without affirmative evidence" that the drug oper-
ates in this way); Pam Belluck, No Abortion Role Seen for Morning-After Pill, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
2012, at Al (citing experts explaining that it takes a long time to change the endometrium lining, and
emergency contraception is a one-shot treatment).
163. See The Human Life Bill Appendix, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 286 (1982) (statement of John D. Biggers,




conclusively establish that levonorgestrel-based contraceptives do not
interfere with implantation."'6
In 1999, when the new drug application (NDA) for levonorgestrol
used for the emergency contraception indication (Plan B) was first ap-
proved, it was initially approved for prescription use only.'65 Pharmaceu-
ticals are often introduced in this way and later strategically switched to
OTC status by drug sponsors to maximize the revenue generated by the
drug,'66 especially since a switch involving a new clinical study can gar-
ner the sponsor an additional three-year exclusivity "after the exclusivity
and patent periods for the prescription products have expired."67
3. Tummino v. Hamburg: The Case Description
In 2001, after Plan B had been on the market as an FDA-approved
prescription drug for two years, outside citizens petitioned for an OTC
switch.'68 Indeed, in 2003, the Plan B drug sponsors themselves also re-
quested such a switch.16 9 If initiated by someone other than the drug
sponsor, such as citizens or the FDA, a switch can be conducted by
means of a rulemaking.170 If the plan sponsor initiates the switch, they
generally do so through a process similar to a new drug approval applica-
tion called a supplemental new drug application (SNDA).' 7 1 Under either
scenario, the standard governing such a switch is set forth in FDCA §
503B and its accompanying regulation.17 2
i. The Statutory Standard for OTC Switch
Under FDCA §503(b)(1)(a), prescription dispensation is required
for a drug if "because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful ef-
fect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its
use, [it] is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner
164. Tummino 11, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (quoting GAO REPORT, supra note 161, at 13). Any
such post-implantation effect could also be the result of pre-conception use of birth control pills or
an IUD. See generally, Judy Peres & Jeremy Manier, "Morning-After Pill" Not Abortion, Scientists
Say, CHI. TRIB., June 20,2005, at CNl.
165. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
166. See, e.g., Laura Mahecha, Rx-to-OTC Switches: Trends and Factors Underlying Success,
5 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 380, 380 (2006).
167. RICHARD M. COOPER ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 465 (David Ad-
ams et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter FDLI] (referring to the regulatory exclusivities available
under 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)-(iv)).
168. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 526. FDA had always recognized the prescription/OTC
distinction under regulations promulgated in 1938 implementing FDCA § 502(f), requiring that
labeling bear "adequate directions for use." HUTT ET AL., supra note 155, at 802. "Prescription"
drugs were exempt from the requirement of adequate directions for use, but only if the product bore
a label directing that the product be used only by or on the prescription of a physician. Id Subse-
quently Congress, in the Durham-Humphrey Amendments of 1951, passed FDCA § 503B. Id
169. The first SNDA submitted, unrestricted by age, was denied by FDA. Tummino 1, 603 F.
Supp. 2d at 523. The second SNDA was for women 16 and older. Id. The third submitted was for
women 17 and older. Id. FDA then approved for 18 and older. Id.
170. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 503(e)(2)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 353(e)(2)(B) (2012).
171. See Tumnino1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
172. Prescription-Exemption Procedure, 21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b) (2015).
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licensed by law to administer such drug." 73 Section 503(b)(3) continues:
"The Secretary may by regulation remove drugs . . . from the [prescrip-
tion requirements in] paragraph (1) of this subsection when such re-
quirements are not necessary for the protection of the public health."74
Judge Korman proceeds to quote the FDA regulation specifying that
it will implement this language in such a way that:
Any drug limited to prescription use . . . shall be exempted from pre-
scription-dispensing requirements when the Commissioner finds such
requirements are not necessary for the protection of the public health
... and he finds that the drug is safe and effective for use in self-
medication as directed in proposed labeling.175
Thus, public health, constituted by safety and efficacy, is under-
stood to be the chief consideration justifying OTC switch.
ii. More Case Background
Here, the sponsor's switch request was accompanied by significant
amounts of safety data; however, the FDA repeatedly hesitated to grant
OTC status for Plan B.1 76 The original citizen petition was filed in 2001,
and the FDA did not issue a final response for over five years.77
In the meantime, however, the FDA was far from idle; multiple
struggles played out behind the scenes. Despite the FDA's decision not
to require pediatric pharmacokinetic studies for the SNDA, the FDA
early in the process flagged the question of whether the OTC switch
might present different risk-behavior concerns for patients of different
ages. The FDA thus considered the option that the switch might be
undertaken only for those women above a certain age threshold. After
five years of maneuvering and negotiation, including Senate obstruction
of the confirmation of two successive FDA Commissioners pending pro-
gress on this issue, the FDA finally approved the switch for women
eighteen and older shortly before the confirmation of Bush-appointed
Commissioner Andrew Von Eschenbach.179
173. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
174. Id. § 353(b)(3) (emphasis added).
175. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 524-25 (emphasis added) (quoting Prescription-Exemption
Procedure, 21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b) (2015)).
176. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
177. Id. at 536.
178. See id at 529. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §505B(a)(4), as discussed supra note
154, allows FDA to waive pediatric studies for reasons like lack of feasibility. Manufacturers may
still voluntarily conduct such studies. In this case, pharmacokinetic, toxicity or dosing studies would
not have answered the concerns raised, which asked for actual use data.




This age delimitation is the feature that renders the FDA's decision
an example of the phenomenon of an ex ante exception ultimately judged
invalid. OTC status for Plan B was effectively approved for all women
except those under eighteen.180
A women's health coalition sued in January 2005 to contest the re-
jection of their petition for full OTC availability.' 1 Despite the ban on
underage purchase of smoking cessation products, plaintiffs claimed that
OTC status had never been conditioned upon an age threshold before. 8 2
Even if this were true, it is worth noting that OTC status had been condi-
tioned upon other characteristics before, including different diagnosis,
strength, route of administration, dosage form, or even sex of the pa-
tient.183 Moreover, other types of approval, such as new drug approvals,
routinely contain age exclusions, as discussed above.
Judge Korman found for the plaintiffs and declared the restricted
OTC switch with the age-eighteen cutoff to be "arbitrary and capri-
cious."185 Korman remanded to the FDA, but in the period following
remand, the Obama Administration succeeded the Bush Administration,
ushering in new FDA and health department leadership with ostensibly
different views on sexual morality.'86
Yet the new Administration, on December 7, 2011, once again an-
nounced a decision to age restrict the OTC availability of emergency
contraception, which had by now been reformulated by the manufacturer
as a one-pill version.'8 7 The drug would be available OTC only to wom-
180. In a practical sense, this exception was quite difficult to implement and entailed a number
of other restrictions. The FDA maintained that in order to implement the age-related exception
rigorously, all Plan B products had to be carried behind the pharmacist counter, rather than on the
pharmacy shelves. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino l), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
This unusual arrangement was dubbed the "BTC" or "behind-the-counter," regime in contrast to
rather than OTC, (over-the-counter). See id.
181. Id. at 165-66.
182. The FDA has created age-based restrictions when enacting an Rx-to-OTC switch for only
one other class of drugs, nicotine products (such as Nicorette gum), for which only persons 18 years
and older may obtain the products OTC. See GAO REPORT, supra note 161, at 7. Nicorette gum,
incidentally, was given OTC status in 1996, long before the separate tobacco product regime r cog-
nizing age distinctions was passed by Congress. See Information for Consumers (Drugs): Now
Available Without Prescription, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucml43547.htm (last updated Aug. 12,
2011).
183. FDLI, supra note 167, at 466 (citing examples including meclizine, which is available
only by prescription for vertigo but OTC for nausea with motion sickness, clotrimoxazole in pre-
scription form for certain types of candidiasis while OTC for "athlete's foot, ring worm, and jock
itch," and loperamide which is prescription for chronic diarrhea, but OTC for acute diarrhea).
184. See HuTr ET AL., supra note 155, at 807 (identifying conditions on OTC availability,
including gender).
185. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino I), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
186. See id at 549.
187. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino ll), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (referring
to Plan B One-Step).
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en age seventeen and above showing age verification. Among the re-
markable aspects of this second OTC grant was that it was rendered not
by the FDA, whose Commissioner, Margaret Hamburg, adjudged there
to be "adequate and reasonable, well-supported, and science-based evi-
dence that Plan B . . . is safe and effective and should be approved for
nonprescription use for all females of child-bearing potential."188 Instead,
the decision to age restrict the OTC access was made by the supervening
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, overriding
the Commissioner and "invoking her authority under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act to execute its provisions."'89
Judge Korman once again ruled the age-restricted grant to be "arbi-
trary" and "capricious,"' 9 and instructed the FDA to grant the citizen
petition "mak[ing] levonorgestrel-based emergency contraceptives avail-
able without a prescription and without point-of-sale or age restrictions
within thirty days."'91
In this case, the age-exception feature rendered the FDA's decision
vulnerable as compared to blunter, less-contoured measures. Other emer-
gency contraceptives, like ella, are prescription-only products.'92 Even
the levonorgestrel birth control pill (the "mini pill") remains prescrip-
tion-only, even though it is exactly the same chemical entity as Plan B. 93
The FDA is thus allowed to draw lines between one emergency contra-
ceptive product and another, and may even distinguish preintercourse
levonorgestrel from postintercourse levonorgestrel despite scant scien-
tific support for the mini-pill's prescription status.194 However, balancing
access needs along the lines of adult and pediatric indications seemed to
trigger doubt. The court seems to envision the FDA's range of action for
postintercourse levonorgestrel as restricted to fully OTC or fully pre-
scription but no ability to offer OTC access with an exception. Indeed,
the judge ruled that the FDA's decision to exclude women under 18 from
188. Id (quoting Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D., on Plan B
One-Step (Dec. 7, 2011)).
189. Id (quoting Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D., on Plan B
One-Step (Dec. 7, 2011)).
190. Id at 197.
191. Id
192. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves ellarm Tablets for Prescription
Emergency Contraception (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm222428.htm.
193. See Olga Khazan, Birth Control Without a Prescription, ATLANTIC, Sept. 19, 2014,
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/toward-a-prescription-free-birth-control-
pill/380464/ (citing the vice chair of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
Committee on Gynecologic Practice Bulletins saying that the mini-pill should be the first to be
offered over-the-counter because of its safety profile); see also Scout Richters, Note & Comment,
The Moral Interception of Oral Contraception: Potential Constitutional Claims Against the FDA 'S
Prescription Requirement for a Progestin-Only Birth Control Pill, 22 J.L. & POL'Y 393, 408 (2013)
(saying that levonorgestrel is the substance in many progestin-only mini-pills).
194. See id. Indeed, the AMA has passed a resolution calling for the OTC availability of the
mini-pill. See AM. MED. Ass'N, 2013 ANNUAL MEETING MEMORIAL RESOLUTIONS 464 (2013),
http://www.ama-assn.org/assets/meeting/2013ala13-resolutions.pdf.
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OTC availability was what rendered the decision "arbitrary and capri-
cious" as it involved improper factors. 9
5. Value Conflict
i. No Clear Statutory Foreclosure of Offsetting Values
Korman pointed to FDCA § 503B as stating that switches had to be
determined by health standards such as "protection of public health" and
"safety and effectiveness."l9 6 But the statutory text itself does not fore-
close expansive interpretations of the factors relevant to public health or
safety. If the statute is open to these other interpretations, then FDA's
inclusion of behavioral risk compensation effects should enjoy Chevron
deference.197 Indeed, if we accept Sunstein's default canons, the courts
should favor readings that allow consideration of harms that might offset
the health benefits of drug availability. The statute requires the Secretary
to consider whether prescription status is "necessary for public health"
and suggests that broader social factors should be considered as part of
the assessment of safety and effectiveness.198 Section 503B instructs con-
sideration of factors beyond toxicity, including "other potentiality for
harmful effect" and any safety problems arising because of "collateral
measures necessary to [the drug's] use." 99 This language has long in-
cluded consideration of harms that arise not from the drug itself but from
the changes in patient behavior, such as delayed health-seeking behavior,
due to the drug's availability.200
195. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 542, 544, 547-48 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(reviewing the State Farm articulation of the standard).
196. Id. at 525, 548; see also Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 169
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[T]he standard for determining whether contraceptives or any other drug should
be available over-the-counter turns solely on the ability of the consumer to understand how to use
the particular drug 'safely and effectively.' . . . I decide this case based only on my understanding of
the applicable standard." (citation omitted)).
197. See Chevron, U.S., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
198. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 503B(b)(3), 505(d), 21 U.S.C.§§ 353(b)(3),
355(d) (2012).
199. Id. § 353(b)(1)(A).
200. See United States v. Article of Drug, Labeled Decholin, 264 F. Supp. 473, 482-84 (E.D.
Mich. 1967) (refusing to grant summary judgment allowing OTC distribution, even if the drug itself
is pharmacologically safe, because FDA may consider the risk behavior the drug's availability might
induce, i.e., causing the patient to delay seeking professional diagnosis to discover an underlying
condition that requires alternate treatment). The FDA's consideration of "risk substitution" or "risk
compensation" behavior is also evident insofar as the approval of Truvada (a product for the prophy-
lactic use of antiretrovirals among those at-risk of HIV infection) is conditioned upon postmarketing
studies of whether Truvada affects behavior that might increase the chances of HIV transmission.
See Kristen Underhill, Risk-Taking and Rulemaking: Addressing Risk Compensation Behavior
Through FDA Regulation of Prescription Drugs, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 377, 382, 417-19 (2013).
Similarly, the FDA's longstanding pre-2009 stance to apply the NDA paradigm to nicotine products
that make therapeutic claims, like cessation products, but not to treat modified-risk cigarettes (like
low-tar products) as therapeutic products, involves recognition that risk substitution (smoking more
cigarettes, or taking longer drags to compensate) might nullify any therapeutic effects of the product.
Id. at 395. This stance is echoed in the FDCA § 911(g) requirement that risk be measured by "actual
use." 21 U.S.C.§ 387k(g).
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Longtime food and drug law observers, including Peter Barton Hutt,
have argued persuasively that that the statutory language thus accommo-
dates broader societal concerns.201 The FDA often requires "actual use
studies" for OTC switches precisely to test for these broader concerns
such as "compliance issues, including off-label usage . . . [and] overdose
or abuse potential."202 If the use of one drug, itself safe in vivo, would
restrict patients' food or other medications, those considerations would
203be relevant. None of these factors concern merely the physiological
effects of the drug. They involve reasoning about value-laden human and
social behavior, the dynamics of which may be more difficult to capture
in a clinical study and may complicate the extrapolation of such study to
a broader population.
Korman also points to the "purpose" of § 503B as proscribing the
use of political values beyond public health narrowly construed to justify
agency practice. But the Senate report he cites does not contemplate pure
health justifications, unalloyed by other values.20 Congress declared that
its intent was "to 'relieve retail pharmacists and the public from burden-
some and unnecessary restrictions on the dispensing of drugs that are
safe for use without the supervision of a physician."' 205 This statement
acknowledges "burden" and a degree of "necessity" as broad factors
apart from health that the FDA should consider when deciding whether
to make an otherwise safe drug available OTC. None of this is to suggest
that Judge Korman's requirement that the FDA extrapolate the data justi-
fying OTC status for older women to younger age ranges is incorrect, but
simply that deciding to extrapolate is a matter of judgment, indeed dis-
cretion, the scope of which, under statutory text and purpose, one can
reasonably construe to encompass more than consistent technical appli-
cation of health science standards.
201. Peter Barton Hutt, A Legal Framework for Future Decisions on Transferring Drugs from
Prescription to Nonprescription Status, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 427, 436 (1982). He identifies
more than one statutory factor that must be considered, not just toxicity, but other potentiality for
harmful effect, specifically, the "method of use or collateral measures necessary to use." Id. at 433.
Of the last, he says, "Congress intended this factor to have the broadest possible scope. It encom-
passes all aspects of the circumstances under which a drug is used, including broad questions of
social policy. There is perhaps no issue involving drug use that cannot properly be brought into
consideration under this factor." Id. at 436.
202. FDLI, supra note 167, at 473.
203. Lars Noah, Treat Yourself Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails American
Health Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 366 (2006) ("Although the statute and regulations pro-
vide some general criteria for differentiating between prescription and OTC products, ultimately that
determination must be made on an ad hoc basis and without clear guidance... Other harmful effects
may include the risk of interactions with food or other drug products and the potential for abuse."
(footnote omitted)).
204. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
205. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-946, at 1 (1951)).
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ii. Arbitrary and Capricious or Explained by Permissible Rea-
sons?
Korman, in excluding these other social considerations, must rely
less on text, and instead on doctrine that subjective "bad faith" will not
only overcome the record rule but also support a finding of arbitrary and
-206capricious action.
What then does Korman classify as bad faith? It is not clear, and in-
deed other scholars have written of how this case highlights the muddled
state of administrative law doctrine in this area.207 Bad faith might be
thought to consist of dissembling or duress, but what turns out to be bad
faith in Korman's view is the consideration of additional "political" fac-
tors, which he defines as norms, policies, or preferences other than those
of health science.208 In other words, he manages to frame his opinion
such that mere value conflict, rather than lying, is what renders an ex-
emption "bad faith."
Whether the consideration of more than one norm is sufficient to
relegate a decision to the "political" sphere is one that this Article seeks
to probe more deeply, so Korman's decision to assume it here bears re-
mark, especially when he could have based his decision on other grounds
instead. Is it indeed a foregone conclusion that the agency must consider
nothing other than health concerns? Surely agencies can also consider
209
matters like priorities when it comes to enforcement. Moreover, as
health standards do not mechanically apply themselves, the FDA is ex-
pected to use judgment or "discretion," and one control upon discretion
is political accountability.21 0 The subjection of the FDA to the political
processes of nomination and confirmation would suggest intention to
employ this control.
Once one proves the existence of other considerations, political or
otherwise, there is still some distance to go before the presence of non-
health considerations constitutes decision by unreasoned and arbitrary
caprice. What in Korman's decision carries us that extra distance? What
administrative law doctrines do the work? Neither deceit nor falsehood
206. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that
the finding of subjective bad faith will weigh in favor of finding arbitrary and capricious action
(citing Latecoere Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 19 F.3d 1342, 1356 (11th Cir. 1994); James
Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1996))).
207. Heinzerling, supra note 125, at 958-59.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 259-66.
209. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
210. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J.
729, 732-36, 740-45, 750 (1979); see also David F. Cavers, The Legal Control of the Clinical
Investigation of Drugs: Some Political, Economic, and Social Questions, 98 DAEDALUS 427, 430
(1969) ("[T]his evaluation does not call for simply a 'yes' or 'no' judgment. One dosage level may
be safe, another questionable, but the safer dosage level may be of doubtful efficacy. A satisfactory
answer may lie in between. Negotiation follows.").
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was relied upon as the touchstone of bad faith.2 1' Instead, Korman points
to a series of arbitrary "departures" from prior agency practice.2 12
a) Substantive Transgression or Political Cooptation?
In condemning the first decision to age restrict, made by the Bush
Administration FDA, Korman does marshal suggestions of "improper
political influence . . . showing that the political pressure was intended to
and did cause the agency's action to be influenced by factors not relevant
under the controlling statute."213 It is noteworthy that Korman does not
go so far as to claim that any of the instances of political pressure rose to
the level of procedural violations; he simply considers them as evidence
that other substantive factors entered into the decision-making. Take for
instance the first sign of political consideration that Korman cites, the
involvement of the White House. On the day that the Plan B sponsor first
submitted its SNDA requesting OTC status, then-FDA Commissioner
Mark McClellan conversed with a White House domestic policy advisor
about the matter and provided several status updates thereafter.2 14 Kor-
man declined to rule that these were ex parte communications: "Whether
or not it was permissible for the FDA to discuss such questions with the
White House, these discussions were not the norm for the FDA with re-
spect to this type of decision."2 15 In other words, the process was not the
problem; the possible entry of a non-public health factor was measured,
not only by the existence of a channel of external communication, but
also by any departure from previous FDA practice which Korman pre-
sumes to then require justification in terms of public health to satisfy
State Farm requirements for reasoned decision-making.216
The category of facts showing bad faith includes those instances
throughout the process when the FDA personnel were answerable to po-
litical officers. Again, Korman slightly overstates the situation in a way
that implausibly exiles conflicting values pressed by the public: the FDA
leadership, subject to presidential appointment and congressional con-
211. The magistrate judge allowed discovery beyond the record to look for just such evidence.
See Heinzerling, supra note 125, at 953-54.
212. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
213. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting
Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus, 740 F.2d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 1984)).
214. Id. at 527. "Status reports" are excluded from barred ex parte communications under
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (2012).
215. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 547. Korman was presumably referring to 5 U.S.C. §§
554(d), 557(d).
216. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 56-57
(1983) (explaining the arbitrary and capricious standard and requiring under such standard that
NHTSA "supply a reasoned analysis" for revoking the passive restraints rules and not considering
airbags or nondetachable passive belts (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 548 ("While it may have been rational
for the FDA to consider adolescent cognitive development in its evaluation of Plan B as an OTC
drug, plaintiffs have presented unrebutted evidence that the FDA's focus on these behavioral con-
cems stemmed from political pressure rather than permissible health and safety concerns.").
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firmation, is expected to be politically accountable.217 What is the politi-
cal appointment and confirmation process for if not to inject a political
dimension into the FDA's exercise of its discretion and interpretation of
its governing law? Yet Korman disparages the role that the appointment
and confirmation process played.
In the first confirmation battle over the elevation of Acting Com-
missioner Lester Crawford in 2005, Senators Hillary Clinton and Patty
Murray put holds on his confirmation until receiving a commitment that
the FDA would decide the Plan B OTC petition by a certain date.2 18
However, once confirmed, Crawford backed out of the promise and
missed the deadline.2 19
When the Senate next considered a nominee for Commissioner, the
Senators again took a stand, demanding FDA action.220 One day before
the confirmation hearing, the FDA at long last announced the grant of
OTC status, albeit restricted to women eighteen and over.221
Korman is unquestionably correct that politics and social considera-
tions entered the FDA's decision-making in this case, and he hinges his
decision upon the presence of those "political" considerations. What is
harder to tell is if they entered in a way allowed by statute, process re-
quirements, and permissible reasoning or not.
b) Departures Justified by the Limits of Inference from
Sample?
For Korman, the chief facts showing lack of good faith reasoned
decision-making lie in what he calls FDA's "[d]epartures from [i]ts
[o]wn [p]olicies."222
The first departure he questions is the FDA's decision not to adopt
the Advisory Committee's recommendations.2 23 The Advisory Commit-
tee had voted unanimously that Plan B was safe for OTC use and voted
27-1 that the data from an "actual use study" (AUS) could be general-
224
ized or extrapolated to the overall population.22 Finally, the committee
voted 23-4 "to approve Plan B for over-the-counter status without age or
point-of-sale restrictions."225
217. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J.
257, 262-63 & n.24 (noting the FDA's lack of independence and the periodic proposal that it should
be made so); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163,
1207-09 (2013) (discussing the agencies direct accountability to HHS).
218. Tummino I, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
219. Id
220. Id at 523, 546.
221. Id at 546.
222. See id. at 547-49.
223. Id. at 547.
224. Id. at 529, 547-48.
225. Id. at 529.
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The FDA is not required to convene advisory committees.226 Advi-
sory committee decisions are therefore hardly expected to be conclusive,
which Korman himself concedes: "While the Advisory Committee does
not have the final say regarding the OTC switch applications, the FDA
has followed advisory committee recommendations in every OTC switch
application in the last decade . . . ."227 Actually, in 2001, the FDA first
ignored its advisory committees on the health-insurer led petitions to
228switch antihistamines, such as Claritin, to OTC status. Meanwhile, it is
not clear that ten years worth of decisions is the right subset from which
to judge FDA's practices. Nor is it clear that the OTC switch decisions
are the correct category of decision from which the FDA's policy toward
advisory committees should be inferred. Certainly, if one looks at the
FDA's drug decisions, including NDA approvals and revocations, there
are numerous instances where the FDA has acted contrary to its advisory
committees.229 Again, the portrait of the FDA's past practice as deferring
consistently to advisory committee decisions is overstated by Korman-
not an unreasonable stance but also not a foregone conclusion. Despite
my agreement with him on the outcome in this case, my point in this
Article is to show that the outcome, and the grounds recited in the opin-
ion, were choices Korman made, leading us to ask what motivates these
choices. Here, we hypothesize that his choices are guided by dependence
upon the notion that the FDA, or the author of such a drug availability
decision, should pursue a simple unitary value and not resolve competing
norms.
Another departure Korman cites was the FDA's selection of mem-
bers for the Advisory Committee. Rather than leaving it to frontline staff,
the Commissioner's staff directly circulated names, allegedly to achieve
226. HUTT ET AL., supra note 155, at 1013 ("FDA's use of advisory committees in the review
of NDAs, BLAs, and food additive petitions is entirely discretionary . . . ." (quoting Peter Barton
Hutt, The Regulation ofDrug Products by the United States Food and Drug Administration, in THE
TEXTBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE (John P. Griffin & John O'Grady eds., 5th ed. 2006))).
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 918,
121 Stat. 823, 960-61, recently added FDCA § 505(s), which only requires advisory committees for
new chemical entities, and even then, the FDA can waive the requirement in action letter explaining
why it did not do so. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(s), 21 U.S.C. § 355(s) (2012);




227. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
228. Noah, supra note 203, at 360-61.
229. Cathryn Jakobson Ramin, Why Did the F.D.A. Approve a New Pain Drug?, NEW YORKER
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-did-the-f-d-a-approve-a-new-
pain-drug (discussing Zohydro ER, approved despite the advisory committee's opposition due to a
lack of substance abuse deterrence); see also DIANA M. ZUCKERMAN, NATIONAL RESEARCH
CENTER FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEES: DOES APPROVAL MEAN SAFETY?
(2006), http://center4research.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/FDA-Report-v7.pdf ("The
FDA also approved four (36%) of the 11 drugs that the drug advisory committees voted against,
including products that were opposed by almost all the committee members. . . . [C]lose to half
(43%) of the devices that were not recommended for approval obtained FDA approval anyway.").
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"balance of opinion."230 Though this procedural anomaly did not ulti-
mately affect the decision of the advisory committee, the clash between
health science criteria and other considerations is what Korman high-
lights as the problematic "departure."231 Yet, balance is a statutorily in-
scribed consideration. The FDCA requires drug and device advisory
committees to contain diverse perspectives.232
The level of decision-making, not just for the advisory committee
selection, but also the OTC decision itself, troubled Korman. The line
staff, such as the office directors within CDER, were "normally" the
ones to make the decisions, but in this instance, Korman noted the in-
volvement of the CDER Director, the Commissioner's participation,
even the role of the White House, which served as a channel for the in-
troduction of these external considerations.23 3 However, the level of deci-
sion-maker was nowhere prescribed as the Office Director level, and key
"Decisional Meeting[s]" have often included the CDER Director.234 It is
only since then that the statute has been modified by Congress to specify
the "Division Director and Office Director's decision document" and
command that "scientific review of an application is considered the work
of the reviewer and shall not be altered by management or the reviewer
once final."235 Prior to 2007, the statute designated the decision to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), while the Secretary had
in writing delegated to the Commissioner.23 6 And because this was a li-
censing decision, the Administrative Procedure Act imposes fewer re-
strictions on the agency's choice of decision-maker.2 37
Evidence that these external considerations affected the timing of
the decision was a third departure. There was deposition testimony that
on January 15, 2004, the Commissioner expressed the view that the FDA
would issue a non-approvable letter because of the insufficiency of data
for those under sixteen, an insufficiency that was not likely to be ad-
dressed soon.2 38 However, the formal office-level reviews would not be
230. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
231. Id. at 527-28.
232. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 505(n)(3)(B)-{C), 513(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. §§
355(n)(3)(B)-(C), 360c(b)(2) (2012) (requiring "diversified expertise" and consumer viewpoints);
see also id. § 360e(g)(2)(B) (requiring "diversified professional backgrounds").
233. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 546-47.
234. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY:
IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA'S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 32
(2006).
235. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(l)(2)(C)(v), (D), 21 U.S.C. §
355(l)(2)(C)(v), (D) (2012), amended by Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 916 (3), 121 Stat. 823, 958-59.
236. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino ll), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing 21
U.S.C. § 393(d)(2) (2006), amended by Tobacco Regulation, Federal Retirement Reform, Pub. L.
No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009); Delegations ofAuthority to the Commissioner Food and Drugs,
in FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDE § 1410.10 (2005).
237. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 557(b), 554(d)(2)(A). Alternatively, it was a
petition for rulemaking, with no particular APA-defined decision maker.
238. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
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completed until April of that year, after which a non-approvable letter
was accordingly issued in May.239 Thus, the U.S. Government Accounta-
bility Office (GAO) and others never found conclusive evidence that
earlier statements by agency superiors constituted premature decision,
240rather than an exchange of provisional views.
And the most crucial departure-the one at the crux of whether an
internal health reason could justify the other departures, or whether the
decision was motivated by "bad faith" external reasons-was the FDA's
reluctance to extrapolate adult clinical data to the adolescent population
despite previous instances of extrapolation to pediatric subpopulations.
The outcomes of the actual use study (AUS) in particular showed that at
least for the population enrolled in the AUS, the "frequency of unpro-
tected sex did not increase, condom use did not decrease, and the overall
use of effective contraception did not decrease [with use of plan B]." 241
The AUS results formed the fulcrum of the case because the design
of the AUS study producing these results lacked significant inclusion of
younger girls in the adolescent age range. Twenty-nine of the 585 re-
cruited subjects were aged fourteen to sixteen, and none were younger
than fourteen, giving the FDA Commissioner oom to declare that he was
"not convinced the studies had enough power to determine if there were
behavioral differences between adults and adolescents."242 The sponsor
supplemented its own study with existing literature that also looked at
243the behavioral effects of emergency contraception. Yet, the numbers
were still low, particularly for those in the younger adolescent range.
Therefore, the CDER Acting Director concluded that the failure for any
differences to show up with such low numbers did not conclusively
counter the worry that it is generally "'very difficult to extrapolate data
on behavior from older ages to younger ages' because of the diminished
capacity of adolescents to make rational decisions and the 'large devel-
opmental differences,' between [younger and older adolescents]."244 He
signed the non-approvable letter and maintained that "although he 'con-
sulted with the Office of the Commissioner,' he himself 'made the deci-
sion,' on the basis of the scientific data."245
239. Id at 531-32.
240. See Heinzerling, supra note 125, at 951 (discussing how the GAO REPORT, supra note
161, at 21-22, found conflicting evidence on this matter).
241. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (alteration in original) (quoting FDA Commissioner
McClellan).
242. Id at 528, 531, 547 (quoting FDA Commissioner McClellan).
243. Id at 528.
244. Id at 533 (quoting Dr. Galson, Acting Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research).
245. Robert Steinbrook, Waiting for Plan B-The FDA and Nonprescription Use of Emergency
Contraception, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2327, 2327 (2004) (quoting Dr. Galson, Acting Director of
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research).
2015] 149
DENVER LAWREVIEW
Korman pointed to the underlying refusal to extrapolate as an unjus-
tified departure from a "long history" of generalizing data from older
women to younger women for other contraceptives.24
But even Korman concedes that non-extrapolation is the shakiest
ground upon which to stake a claim that the FDA's departure from past
practice rendered its decision improper. Understandably, a judge would
have qualms deciding that biomedical science requires inference to an
under-sampled subpopulation. He allows that "[w]hile it may have been
rational for the FDA to consider adolescent cognitive development i  its
evaluation of Plan B as an OTC drug, plaintiffs have presented unrebut-
ted evidence that the FDA's focus on these behavioral concerns stemmed
from political . . . rather than permissible health and safety concerns."24 7
Korman chooses to use this deviations analysis in a way that high-
lights his doctrinal focus on the agency's consideration of competing
values as the central ground for rebuffing the FDA's explanation. It is
notable that he does not invoke something like the Accardi doctrine,
which holds agencies to the rules or principles they set forth themselves,
even if those policies are not statutorily required.248 Perhaps none of the
"policies or practices" he cites rise to the threshold of clarity and con-
sistency needed to bite with the force of law, though they are still back-
ground conditions that are relevant for substantive review for reasona-
bleness and non-arbitrariness. But if they had risen to such a threshold,
then the departures would be improper in and of themselves, rather than
because they signal an improper consideration.
Instead, the purpose for Korman of tallying these departures is that
any deviation from past practice suggests that something potentially "ar-
bitrary" and unreasonable has entered unless uch outlier action is justi-
fied by internal or statutorily permissible reasons, "supply[ing] a rea-
soned analysis" required by Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association
of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Compa-
ny.249 The defendants do in fact try to justify the deviations on that
ground, saying that the key substantive considerations are the distinctive
health concerns and the lack of data on those health concerns as affected
by emergency contraception use in younger girls and women. As the lack
of such data cannot be conclusively overcome by extrapolating the sci-
ence from the older adults, the appropriateness of extrapolation becomes
the decisive issue for whether deviations can be justified or not.
246. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
247. Id. at 548.
248. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1954).




Thus, as with the soda ban, the line of scrimmage was whether the
exception had an internal or external justification. Suggesting that the
decision and its unique features were a response to the product's particu-
lar public health implications, an internal concern, would have then al-
lowed the agency decision to stand. Such a position would have elimi-
nated value clash.
How were these behavioral concerns for the adolescent population
styled as internal justifications? At the outset of the FDA's process in
April 2001, during review of the citizen petition, the Office of Drug
Evaluation in CDER first reviewed and identified the concerns relating to
younger women as follows:
* Whether availability of Plan B would crowd-out use of "more ef-
fective forms of birth control"250
* adolescents' comprehension of Plan B 251
* the effect on adolescent girls' willingness to use condoms, testing,
and other means of protecting against sexually transmitted diseases
(STD's)252
Under this rubric, the concerns which arguably justified the carve-
out for young women were not "pro-life" concerns or sexual morality
concerns. The FDA framed these concerns as motivated by the underly-
ing health concern over safety and contraceptive effectiveness and
whether those policies should be differentially weighed for younger
women and girls. These are paradigmatic "substitute risks" or "health-
health tradeoffs," which Sunstein claims agencies are permitted to bal-
ance unless Congress has clearly said otherwise.253 Cast this way, the
defeasibility of the underlying health protection purpose of Plan B avail-
ability would be based not upon a competing norm but a judgment inter-
nal to the justification underlying prescription requirements for drugs.
However, the judge rejected this framing and described the con-
cerns about the potentially different behavioral effects on younger wom-
en and girls, not strictly speaking as health concerns, but as concerns
about promiscuity.254
250. Tummino I, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 526, 533.
253. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1668, 1672-73.
254. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 533-34 (quoting an office-level director saying these
concerns "are 'more applicable to the ability of adolescents to make reasoned decisions about engag-
ing in sexual intercourse, not their ability to understand how to use Plan B safely and effectively as
an emergency contraceptive should they engage in unprotected sexual intercourse"' (quoting Dr.
Jenkins, Director of the Office of New Drugs)).
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To dismiss the FDA's protests that their concerns were indeed
health and safety-related, Korman again cited the AUS study results
showing no change in unprotected sex or use of effective contracep-
255tion. Yet this response amounts to a non sequitur, as the low numbers
of young adolescent subjects in the AUS study arguably offered no evi-
dence either way for behavioral effects in that group.256
Thus, Korman concludes that the age-related line drawing was not
justified by health reasons, but orthogonal aims, the consideration of
which the judge deemed extraneous, political, and presumptively "bad
faith," rendering the government's action arbitrary.
6. Assigns to Non-Legal Sphere
In contrast to the court's preference regarding NYC's soda portion
cap, deferring to political decision-making is not Korman's favored an-
swer. Indeed, Korman says the decision was illegitimate because the
confirmation process politically influenced it.
Korman deplores the pressure that confirmation imposes on the
FDA's Plan B actions. Is the FDA's decision therefore too political?
Why isn't the erection of guidelines for the exercise of agency discretion
by means of the confrontation of the President's politics with Congress's
politics just exactly the degree of political that we intended?257 Indeed,
had confirmation not provided a channel for Senate pressure, the FDA
might have withheld even a partial OTC grant, and the morality consid-
erations would have prevailed utterly over health interests.
Two confirmation fights and a new Administration later, the FDA
was still offering only an incrementally modified age-restricted OTC
grant. With these extended battles achieving hard-won accommodations,
and both political parties arriving at the same age-restricted approach, it
seems quite plausible that the result represented some sort of political
equipoise. The outcome was politically validated, even if not fully satis-
fying to any one side. Yet Korman would banish political accountability
for agency decision-making.
What alternate arena does he imagine? Would he prefer that such
decisions reflect private ordering, namely, the market? But market order-
ing entails the pure positivism of allowing the "indicated use" to be de-
fined by the sponsor. Allowing sponsors to draw those lines is consistent
with allowing the valuation of health versus other interests to be deter-
mined by the market. Thus, the age limitation would have prevailed had
the sponsor decided to frame its SNDA application for OTC switch for
255. Id. at 532.
256. See id.
257. The courts recognize that agencies exist in a matrix of political accountability. See, e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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an "age-restricted indication." Throughout the litigation, the government
elected, sometimes to the limit of credulity, to present the age limitations
not as conditions required by the government but as a request by the
sponsor in their SNDA. 258 Even in the government's final hail-Mary at-
tempt to stay the second invalidation granting the citizen petition, it did
so by trying to grant an alternative approval to the drug sponsor's new
SNDA on One-Step, limited to women and girls age fifteen and older.259
Korman, however, scorns the market logic of coping with the value
clash in this way, at least insofar as it would implicate the FDA as a
handmaiden.260 If market incentives determined the availability of the
drug, then the sponsor, through its age-restricted proposal, would earn
market exclusivity for its research.261 Korman denies any obligation to
honor this incentive, calling this arrangement "a sweetheart agreement
with the FDA." 262
Instead, Korman's favored alternate arena is science. His discussion
of the advisory board assumes scientific expertise, not diverse perspec-
263tives, as the requirement. 2 When he identifies the gravamen of the
complaint against the FDA, he cites departure from scientifically-based
review.264 Korman approvingly cites the Pendergast Declaration, an ami-
cus brief of sorts from a former FDA employee that stipulates the charac-
ter of the FDA as "an expert scientific agency charged with making sci-
entific and medical decisions within the boundaries set by the FDCA.
Nothing in that statute suggests that scientific decisions may bend to
political winds."265 These assertions about the "character" of the FDA are
presumed, rather than argued, from specific statutory text.266
258. See Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
259. See Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino III), No. 12-CV-763, 2013 WL 2631163, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013).
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 198, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). The coda to this tussle
is that in the end, the FDA complied with the order by making Plan B One-Step, Teva's product,
available OTC, unrestricted by age, but continuing to age restrict OTC access to all other forms of
emergency contraception. Deborah Kotz, Teva Gets Exclusivity on Plan B Contraceptive, BOS.
GLOBE (July 24, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/07/23/fda-
grants-exclusivity-plan-one-step-emergency-contraceptive-for-three-
years/5ShlBCNplsJTGYzmkkr6MI/story.html. This exclusive arrangement was to last 3 years. Id.
263. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 527-28.
264. See id. at 523.
265. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting
Declaration of Mary K. Pendergast, J.D., LL.M. in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Summary Judgment at 1 33, Tummino II, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No.
12-CV-763)).
266. Dworkin says of the referee in a chess game where Tal deploys a disconcerting smile:
The referee must select one or another of these conceptions, not to supplement the con-
vention but to enforce it. He must construct the game's character by putting to himself
different sets of questions. Given that chess is an intellectual game, is it, like poker, intel-
lectual in some sense that includes ability at psychological intimidation? Or is it, like
mathematics, intellectual in some sense that does not include that ability?
DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 103.
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7. Judge Arrogates the Decision and Methodology
Yet many layers conceal Korman's answer for who should decide
emergency contraception access. On the one hand, in making the drug
available OTC, the result of the case stands for the proposition that the
patient, not the doctor, should decide. At the same time, Korman declares
that the judgment of whether health concerns should accommodate reli-
gious and sexual morality is "political," which might imply that political
processes should decide the question. Yet he deplores the use of political
negotiation to decide these matters. By his lights, scientific experts
should control the outcome, but he is in a bind because by inserting him-
self, he necessarily conveys that judges, in reviewing administrative de-
cisions, should decide.2 67
Should Korman himself apply the scientific standards, or should he
enable the scientific decision-makers to do it? His choice of relief, reject-
ing remand, and ordering grant brings this vexed question to the fore.
And what governs the judge's application of scientific standards? Kor-
man attempts to sidestep these difficulties by proceeding as if he is en-
gaged in methodologically familiar rule-based decision-making to con-
clude that science precluded the agency's decision.268
But to determine that the agency's decision was incompatible with
science, he must define what science would require and in some sense
perform his own scientific analysis.2 69 Indeed, one plaintiffs lawyer not-
ed that the judge "d[id] his own research . . . on scientific details in the
case."270 The pretense that rules are enough to decide is unconvincing.
Each "prior policy or practice" that he attempts to extend to this
case turns out to fall short of a rule that would decide the case without
doubling back to check the agency's work in performing the underlying
"scientific" decision-making process. Rules, as we discussed before,
distinctively apply pressure independently of their own justification.
Something short of a rule will thus be inconclusive on the application of
such prior treatment to this particular case with its particular circum-
stances, leaving Korman no choice but to take some position on the un-
derlying scientific support for inference from adult to adolescent popula-
tions.
267. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 12,
Tummino I, 2013 WL 2631163 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013) (No. 12-CV-763) (voicing this very
concern about the relief of granting the petition, in Korman's April 5, 2013, order invalidating the
Obama Administration's age-restriction, the government argued that the public and the brand of
FDA will be irreparably harmed "if a drug product that purported to be 'FDA approved' were ap-
proved instead at the direction of a court.").
268. See Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
269. See Pam Belluck, Behind Scolding of the F.D.A., a Complex and Gentle Judge, N.Y.





The FDA is not bound to the recommendation of advisory commit-
tees.271 The selection of advisory committee members to represent differ-
ent perspectives was not foreclosed by rule.272 The timing of the decision
was not conclusively prior to the scientific review, and the level of deci-
sion-maker was hardly clearly and irrevocably prescribed.
Fidelity to "rule-based" decision-making should lead courts to en-
courage and honor rules of high formal realizability, precisely the kind
that contain articulated ex ante exceptions.2 73 This approach is at odds
with how Korman rules. The outcome he reaches instead represents a
view that the rule is sufficient to decide only when backed by health sci-
ence, when congruent with what Korman has constructed as the underly-
ing purpose. The naked rule is too vulnerable.
The reasoning that he employs is less an analysis of rules, but rather
a simulation of scientific analysis instead. In the central deviations analy-
sis, it turns out he spends much of his time arguing about whether statis-
tical findings can be extrapolated from one population to another and
why inferences about a younger population can justifiably be drawn from
data describing an older population.27 4 The defendants point out devel-
opmental differences in younger adolescents and present information
showing that they do not always extrapolate drug efficacy to pediatric
populations from adult data ("in 82.5% of the drug products" 275). 2 76 The
factors that affect the appropriateness of extrapolation are manifold. Just
in this action alone, the FDA mentions the number of younger patients
enrolled;27 7 other sampling features, such as whether the study enrolled
subjects in a setting or manner "that would be expected to capture a rep-
resentative population of women who [are potential users];"278 the num-
ber of potential individuals to be expected in the younger age group;279
271. See discussion supra Section III.B.5.ii.b.
272. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
273. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1687-88 (1976) (identifying this feature of certain rules which makes them specific and de-
terminate as compared to standards). The portrait I paint here departs in ascribing valences to rules
as opposed to standards. Adhering to rules here can be "pro-health." More open-textured, policy-
inflected Dworkinian decision making can turn out to be "individualistic," in the case of the soda
portion cap case, or result in less "mutual support," as in the eyeglasses benefits.
274. Korman states that the defendants' position "centers on the argument that the FDA has no
set policy of extrapolating data from adults to pediatric populations." Tummino v. Hamburg (Tum-
mino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Later, he states, "The FDA's failure to extrapo-
late involves ... perhaps the most significant unexplained deviation from FDA practice ordered by
the Secretary." Id. at 175.
275. Id. at 176.
276. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
277. Id. at 531 (explaining that FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan said he was "not con-
vinced the studies had enough power to determine if there were behavioral differences between
adults and adolescents").
278. Tummino II, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dr. John K. Jenkins,
Director of the Office of New Drugs).
279. Id (explaining that the Acting Director of the Division of Pediatric Drug Development
stated that the minimal number of individuals of pediatric age potentially using a drug could justify
2015] 155
DENVERLAWREVIEW
the particular physiological or other differences implicated by the drug
mechanism; differing metabolism; different surface-to-mass ratio; devel-
oping organs; different growth or nutritional requirements;28 0 and differ-
ent cognitive development.28 1
Should the norms governing justifiable inference given the data
sampling constraints operate like legal norms, which may require more
presumptive consistency? Is Korman, in appealing to past extrapolation
and inference, piggybacking on scientific practice norms, or adhering to
a legal rule requiring generalization? 282
Korman argues that none of the FDA's past refusals to extrapolate
to the pediatric population involved safety data, only efficacy findings.2 83
He reasons that because the determination of OTC status for Plan B for
adolescents involved consideration of whether the safety, as well as effi-
cacy, of Plan B for adults could be assumed to obtain in children, the past
history of extrapolating safety data justifies extrapolation here.284 In per-
forming his extrapolation analysis by looking to whether the FDA has
deviated from its historical practices in extrapolation, he does a fair
amount of violence to scientific reasoning. The FDA's protests capture
this well when it says, "Notwithstanding all of these departures, the FDA
argues that here is no customary agency practice and '[e]very drug pre-
sents a unique collection of issues, and no two reviews will be identi-
cal."'
285
Levonorgestrel is remarkably well-tolerated, has been in long-
standing use, and adverse reactions have been minor and few.2 86 Thus,
the findings of Plan B studies may well be generalizable, even to popula-
tions that are not well-sampled. However, it is hard to imagine that judg-
es who do not know much about the differences in physiology and drug
action among different populations are the ones to best correctly identify
the data and study features that would justify extrapolation. Why would
Korman know whether information about a drug's safety rather than
findings about its efficacy were more likely to be similar between adult
and pediatric subpopulations? Why should we trust his judgment that
extrapolation to adolescent populations for previous products, without
waiving the requirement of an additional pharmacokinetic or safety study in a pediatric population,
consistent with the criteria outlined in the Pediatric Research Equity Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(4)).
280. Id. at 173 (citing the FDA's prior decision to label an OTC diet drug, Alli, as "not ... for
use by the pediatric population" because of nutritional concerns).
281. See Memorandum from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. to Margaret
Hamburg, Comm'r of Food & Drugs (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file with author).
282. See Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 532-33 (asserting FDA's long history of extrapolating
from adults).
283. Tummino II, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76.
284. Id.
285. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plantiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion to Strike at 32, Turn-
mino v. Eschenbach, No. 05-CV-366 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 2007)).
286. Id at 166-68.
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regard to behavioral implications, should entail such extrapolation to
adolescents for oral postintercourse levonorgestrel? Surely different is-
sues can arise in different products.
C. White v. Beal: Medicaid Eyeglasses Coverage Restrictions
Pennsylvania, under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (SSA),
administers a Medicaid program, jointly funded by the federal and state
governments to provide health benefits for certain populations in need of
287a medical safety net. Title XIX requires any Medicaid program quali-
fying for federal matching funds to provide certain mandatory benefits,
such as inpatient hospital care, or nursing, but then allows states-at the
same federal match rate-to add certain optional benefits, including eye-
glasses.288 Pennsylvania decided to furnish glasses, but not for patients
with refractive error, such as near-sightedness or far-sightedness.289 The
eligible patients were those whose need for glasses stemmed from an eye
disease.290 The state's failure to provide the optional benefit to those with
refractive error, when they had no obligation to provide the benefit at all,
was deemed to violate the Medicaid statute's requirement of reasonable-
291ness.
1. Medicaid Coverage Background
Medicaid is a joint state and federal program to cover specified
populations considered in need of a safety net.292 States are not required
to establish a program following federal standards for Medicaid, but if
they do so, the federal government will provide them with matching
funds for such expenditures.293 Federal standards include the coverage of
certain mandatory beneficiary categories and certain mandatory benefits,
as well as some crosscutting general standards.29 4 Medicaid features an
approach whereby federal guidelines set a baseline for what a state pro-
gram must cover to qualify as a Medicaid program.295 Failure to reach
the minimum standards will cause the state to lose matching funds, but
states have considerable freedom in the other direction. They are permit-
ted to go beyond the minimum required and layer more generous eligibil-
ity or benefits on top of the federally required floor. The provision of this
287. Social Security Act (SSA) § 1901, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012).
288. See discussion infra Section Ill.C.ii.
289. White v. Beal, 555 F.2d 1146, 1148 (3rd Cir. 1977).
290. Id.
291. Id at 1151-52.
292. ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK 4 (2002),
http://kff.org/medicaid/report/the-medicaid-resource-book/.
293. Social Security Act § 1903, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2012).
294. See discussion infra Section Ill.C.ii-iii.
295. Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medi-
caid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 419-20 (2008).
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optional assistance garners federal matching funds if it falls within the
parameters of general Medicaid requirements.296
i. Eligibility
Eligibility for Medicaid had historically been tethered to the old Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) categories of the "deserving poor."2 97 Under this paradigm,
mere poverty was insufficient to qualify; the program was targeted to
298beneficiaries who had "reason" to be poor. In addition to meeting cer-
tain means-tests, one also had to fall into one of the eligibility "catego-
ries," such as single mothers (now single parents) and their dependent
children, pregnant women, the aged, blind, and disabled.2 99 For states to
receive federal funds, they were required to cover specified low-income
individuals in these categories.
Beyond these mandatory groups, states had the option to cover cer-
tain additional individuals, including those who were somewhat less in-
digent, but because of high medical expenses, still lacked resources for
adequate medical care.3o1
ii. Benefits
The statutory benefits standards were also structured as a mandatory
baseline with a state option to provide more.30 2 Mandatory benefits in-
cluded family planning services, inpatient hospital care, outpatient hospi-
tal services, laboratory and x-ray services, and physician and nurse prac-
303
titioner services.
Other items and services, such as vision, dental, and prescription
drugs, were designated as optional.m
Just as drug indications are not susceptible to unidimensional defini-
tion, benefits can be configured along various parameters. A number of
296. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 292, at 95.
297. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC
HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 73 (2003); David A. Super, Laborato-
ries of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure ofAntipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 541, 585-86 (2008).
298. See Super, supra note 297, at 585.
299. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431,438-39 (2011).
300. Social Security Act § 1902, 42 U.S.C. §l396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2012).
301. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f)(2)(B).
302. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) ("A State plan for medical assistance must ... provide. . .
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17), (21), (28).
303. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17), (21), (28); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A).
304. See 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a) (excluding those services itemized in § 1396d(a)(10)(A) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a))). A number of developments have modified this framework. Now, Medicaid
is delivered largely by managed care companies, and Congress has also reduced benefit requirements
to benchmark or benchmark-equivalent coverage for children, working parents, and pregnant women
above 133% of the federal poverty line. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171,
§ 6044 , 120 Stat. 4, 88-93 (2006) (codified as amended at Social Security Act § 1937, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396u-7 (2012) (defining benchmark coverage based on certain commercial plans in the state)).
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options exist for reducing benefits. Benefits could come with large co-
305
pays. 3 Availability could be restricted to only a limited number of pro-
viders.3 06 Home and community-based care could be made available for
only those patients meeting certain diagnostic criteria for need.307 Hospi-
tal days might be capped.30 s Prescription drugs might be restricted to
those on a formulary.30
iii. Crosscutting Standards
Federal statute also imposes a few general crosscutting require-
ments upon state programs.3 Title XIX contains a so-called equal ac-
cess standard that stipulates that states must provide resources "sufficient
to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under
the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to
the general population in the geographic area." I The so-called compa-
rability standard derives from language that requires the provision of an
equal "amount, duration, or scope" of medical assistance to any other
individual in that category.3 12
The statute contains a number of other such standards,3 " but at is-
sue in White v. Beal3 14 was the "reasonable[ness]" requirement imposed
by the statutory language that "[a] State plan for medical assistance must
... include reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and
the extent of medical assistance under the plan which . . . are consistent
with the objectives of this [Act]." 315
The zone of state flexibility has been described thus: "[T]his court
recognized the state's broad discretion to define the medical conditions
for which treatment is 'necessary' within the meaning of the Act," but
this broad discretion is not unbridled.3 16 Indeed, it is bounded by the fair-
305. See, e.g., Claus v. Smith, 519 F. Supp. 829, 831 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(1).
307. See generally Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community
Care: Lessons From Medicaid's History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 961, 963-65 (2010) (providing
background into availability of community-based care under Medicaid).
308. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 306 (1985).
309. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4)(C).
310. For general discussion, see Huberfeld, supra note 295, at 418-24.
311. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)-(C)(i).
313. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1) (requiring state medical assistance plans to be offered
statewide).
314. 555 F.2d 1146 (3rd Cir. 1977).
315. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). For managed care, 42 U.S.C. §1396b(i)(26) requires necessary,
reasonable limits. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19). Note that advocates sometimes wam against
sourcing these standards for reasonableness in amount, duration, and scope to particular statutory
provisions rather than to more diffuse federal common law. See Stan Dom et al., Marimizing Cover-
age for Medicaid Clients ("Bridges over Troubled Waters"), 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 411, 412 &
n.11 (1986) (regarding case law that "relied on 42 U.S.C. §[ ] ... 1396a(10)(C)(i), and 45 C.F.R.
§ 249.10(a)(5)(i), now 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d)").
316. White v. Beal (White II), 555 F.2d 1146, 1150 (3d Cir. 1977). 1 am grateful to Nan Hunter
for pointing me to this case.
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ly open-textured, non-specific norms articulated above, such as "reason-
ableness," "equal access," and "comparability."3 17
What we explore in White is the curious and arguably "extra-legal"
way by which courts choose to give content to those norms.
2. Exception
The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare added eyeglasses,
clearly an optional benefit, to its Medicaid program. 3 But state law re-
stricted the extent of coverage provided: if the need for eyeglasses
stemmed from an eye disease, Medicaid would cover it, but not if the
need stemmed from refraction error, such as myopia.319
The court declared this exception unreasonable under the Medicaid
statute, which it read to prohibit the restriction of service based on mat-
ters other than "medical need."320 The court opined that the benefit of
federal matching funds comes with a corresponding constraint to scale
the benefit in accordance with the federal purpose of addressing "need":
We conclude that when a state decides to distribute a service as part
of its participation in Title XIX, its discretion to decide how the ser-
vice shall be distributed, while broad, is not unfettered: the service
must be distributed in a manner which bears a rational relationship to
the underlying federal purpose of providing the service to those in
greatest need of it. 321
Leaving aside whether the concept of "need," even "medical need,"
is sufficiently well-specified to settle concrete disputes over plan design,
the court seems to understand the single purpose that governs the pro-
gram as no mere social policy goal to be fulfilled to the extent possible
but without requirement of consistency.322 Instead, the court applies
"need fulfillment" as a Dworkinian social principle, which furnishes an
individualized claim: "By permitting the state plans to provide only part
of the cost, the statute must be construed to envision an evenhanded shar-
ing of benefits and burdens among those having the same needs."3 23 Even
if this principle of evenhandedness for those with the "same needs" were
self-evident from the Medicaid statute, the identification of the relevant
dimension in which needs would be considered "same" or "different" is
317. See Huberfeld, supra note 299, at 446.
318. White II, 555 F.2d at 1148. Eyeglasses, however, would not be optional for children who
enjoy mandatory Early Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSDT) benefits under 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(A).
319. White II, 555 F.2d at 1148 & n.I.
320. Id.atll51.
321. Id.
322. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 91 (describing such a goal as a "nonindividuated political
aim").
323. White II, 555 F.2d at 1151.
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so underdetermined as to be empty.324 "This is so because any set of hu-
man beings will resemble each other in some respects and differ from
each other in others and, until it is established what resemblance and
differences are relevant," the principle of equal treatment for sameness
cannot be determinate.325 In fact, the parameter of the relevant medical
condition along which states are obliged to provide "necessary" treat-
ment evenhandedly proved highly manipulable: "[T]he state argues that
it chose to treat the 'condition of eye disease' and not refractive
error" while the court, agreeing with the beneficiary plaintiff "on the
other hand contends the 'condition' is visual impairment."326
Does the Medicaid statute tell us, by virtue of the availability of
federal financing, that exclusions, or distinctions, can only take a certain
shape? Is it inherent in the legal requirement of "reasonableness" that a
determination should be based on need as determined "medically" rather
than "politically"? Where do these ideas come from?
Ironically, the rejection of political need for "principled" medical
need was delinked from any corresponding requirement that the state
actually meet patients' medical needs. Indeed, the coda was not a happy
one for the plaintiff. The result of the court ruling requiring Pennsylvania
to provide eyeglasses more broadly was that Pennsylvania found eye-
glasses would therefore be unaffordable and withdrew the benefit alto-
gether.327
This case forced the state into an all-or-nothing choice. This case
would not expose the exceptions problem in such stark relief were eye-
glasses a mandatory benefit. But the state is not required to provide them
at all, so how can it be required to provide them to both those with eye
disease and those with refractive error? For the court to read the word
"reasonable" to block a state's politically accountable determination of
the extent to which it wishes to provide "extra" assistance to their Medi-
caid population is striking.32 8 What then is at work?
324. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 560 (1982).
325. HART, supra note 7, at 155.
326. White II, 555 F.2d at 1150-51.
327. White v. Beal (White ill), 447 F. Supp. 788, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
328. This case is not entirely idiosyncratic, but part of a line of precedent where medical need
is privileged and used by courts to invalidate state attempts to cut back Medicaid benefits. See, e.g.,
Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 511-12 (8th Cir. 2006) (invalidating state's decision to provide
partial DME, an optional benefit, to only certain categorical populations); Weaver v. Reagen, 886
F.2d 194, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding state's decision to limit HIV drugs violates Medicaid);
Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 548-49 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding Iowa's exclusion of sex reas-
signment surgery was unreasonable when it was the only available medical treatment for relief of
patient's condition); Phila. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1979)
(finding mandatory EPSTD benefits include orthodontia if medically necessary); Preterm, Inc. v.
Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 126-27 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding it inconsistent with Medicaid statute for a
state to limit physician's medical judgment by prohibiting medically necessary abortions except
those required to save pregnant woman's life, though superseded by Congress's action in adopting




As with the soda portion cap and the Plan B OTC switch, what
seems to be at work is an invalidation of rules when they have, through
their exceptions, accommodated conflicting values.32 9 The court here
forbids the tailoring of a benefit rule to strike a balance between cost and
health need.330
Cost was behind the state's rationale for the exclusion of patients
with refractive error.331 Cost limits forced prioritization, and the state
prioritized according to a social norm constructing the "normal" as op-
posed to "pathological," a norm that, as we will see, runs somewhat
aslant to the "medical necessity" norm. The state claimed that it was
simply trying to allocate limited resources and, therefore, "restrict pay-
ment for eyeglasses to those individuals it considers most in need of aid,
those having pathology or disease of the eye."332 The state articulated its
criterion of need thus: "[R]ecipients whose eye pathology could be treat-
ed or cured by providing glasses were the most immediately needy group
of recipients."
But the court rejects this type of underinclusion: "[W]e do not be-
lieve that the state has applied a permissible method of obtaining econo-
mies in its administration of the medical assistance program."334 Through
this particular benefit rule configuration, the state has improperly as-
sumed the prioritization of competing values.
4. Assigns to a Non-Legal Sphere: Medical Necessity
The court proposes a different prioritization instead-by the norms
of medical practice. "Assuming that medical need is a valid measurement
of eligibility, the state's factual premise [that they have served the needi-
limits on hospital stays consistent with the Rehabilitation Act declaring, "Medicaid programs do not
guarantee that each recipient will receive that level of health care precisely tailored to his or her
particular needs"). But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (holding that Connecticut can
define the procedural hurdles for first trimester abortions to be determined "medically necessary");
Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Arizona can choose to
cover only autologous, and not allogeneic bone marrow transplants given lack of facilities); Smith v.
Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 760-61 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding Iowa's exclusion of gender reassignment
surgery not arbitrary if done by rulemaking and if professionals disagree on the necessity); Curtis v.
Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 648 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding
caps on physician visits per month); Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97, 108 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (find-
ing the state can consider cost in imposing drug formularies, as long as prior authorization process is
adequate).
329. See supra Sections III.A.4, III.B.5.
330. White 11, 555 F.2d at 1150.
331. Id. (describing the state's explanation: "First, the Commonwealth was not and is not ready
to provide the large amounts of money necessary to provide glasses to every recipient needing them
'to aid or improve vision."' (quoting White v. Beal (White 1), 413 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (E.D. Pa.
1976))).
332. Id. at 1149.
333. White v. Beal (White 1), 413 F. Supp. 1141, 1149-50 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
334. White II, 555 F.2d at 1149.
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est of the group], is not supported by the record."33 5 The court goes on to
cite affidavits from two ophthalmologists declaring that sometimes peo-
ple with refractive error may be "more visually handicapped than those
who have a disease of the eye."336
Rather than relying on state law, the court apparently prefers the
concept of "medical need," citing the authority of individual clinicians to
determine the degree of "medical necessity."337
We must therefore examine the concept of medical necessity and,
once it enters into the picture, how it functions as a standard for the
scope of benefits.
"Medically necessary care" is the "almost-universal contractual
standard for [health insurance] coverage."338 According to Mark Hall's
empirical findings, the specificity of the insurance contract has no signif-
icant effect on whether a patient can obtain coverage in legal disputes,
leaving this placeholder term, "medical necessity" to do most of the work
of demarcating what is covered under the plan.339 When interpreting
medical necessity, courts and legislatures do not rest determination of the
standard solely with the agency or insurer providing coverage.34 0 They
preserve enormous latitude for physicians to determine its application.
This latitude does not mean determination by the treating physician, but
rather determination by professional clinical standards,341 a second-order
analysis of what treating physicians ought to do.
The term "medical necessity" is not explicit in the Medicaid statute,
but has become judicially accepted as implicit to the legislative scheme
and is apparently endorsed by the Supreme Court.342 Indeed, White repre-
sents a crucial early step in that process.
The courts are not alone in reading "reasonable" to imply "medical-
ly necessary." HHS states that benefits: "[M]ust be sufficient in amount,
duration, and scope to reasonably achieve [their] purpose." With respect
to the required services for the "categorically needy" and the "medically
needy" the State "may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, dura-
335. Id. at 1150.
336. Id.
337. Id at 1150-51 ("The plaintiffs submitted the affidavits of two qualified ophthalmologists
stating that some persons with refractive error, but without eye pathology, may be far more visually
handicapped than those who have a disease of the eye. Moreover, the physicians maintain that, while
eyeglasses will correct a refractive error, they are not helpful in many cases of eye disease. The state
has not controverted these affidavits." (footnote omitted)).
338. M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 389, 413
(2009).
339. Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study
ofInsurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1055, 1062-63 (1996).
340. See id at 1063.
341. Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical Necessity" Determinations: A Continuing Healthcare
Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599, 619-20 (2004).
342. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444-45 & n.9 (1977).
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tion, or scope of' such services to an otherwise eligible individual "sole-
ly because of the diagnosis, type of illness or condition. . . .
[A]ppropriate limits [may be placed on] a service based on such criteria
as medical necessity or [those contained in] utilization [or medical re-
view procedures]."34 3
What does medically necessary mean, and how is the medical ne-
cessity determination made? In short, it involves significant deferral to
other decision-makers, namely, to the social and institutional practice of
clinical medicine. Under "medical necessity," coverage determinations
depend on more than the policy terms in the contract or statute; they also
involve a second query.344 This second step asks: "[E]ven if the contem-
plated care is a type generally covered, is its use medically reasonable
and necessary in this particular case and thus warranted?"345 The answer
to that question is determined by clinical standards, which in turn emerge
from the practice of medicine. Thus, the courts' turn toward medical
necessity to resolve the question of what to cover amid competing con-
cerns is a diversion of the question away from governance by rule to
another arena.
However, the concept of "medical necessity" does not determine its
own domain and by no means precludes rule-governance in its entirety.
The extent of coverage under public or private insurance has always in-
cluded two analytical steps, the first of which identifies which categories
of services are even eligible to be covered.34 6 Initially, one must ascertain
whether the plan covers surgically implanted artificial lenses, for in-
stance. Only then does the "medical necessity" step determine the cir-
cumstances and patient conditions for which those services are justi-
fied.347 For instance, just because lens implantation surgery is listed
among the benefits does not mean that insurance will cover such a sur-
gery if a patient simply wishes to correct her nearsightedness with an
intraocular lens, or if her cataract is so mild that it does not yet affect the
patient's vision and therefore does not yet justify the risks of surgery.
The Medicaid statute, like other health coverage schemes, lists
broad categories of services to be included in or expressly excluded from
benefits packages, while courts, through cases like White, have tasked
the specification of those benefits to determination by any individual
patient's clinician in accordance with her professional judgment.34 8 CoV-
erage decisions begin as a threshold matter by determining whether the
type of item or service is within the policy. If physical therapy services
343. Sufficiency of Amount, Duration, and Scope, 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2012).
344. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care is Medically Nec-




348. White v. Beal (White II), 555 F.2d 1146, 1150 (3d Cir. 1977).
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are not within the policy, then the inquiry would end there.3 49 But the
White court glosses over the two-step character of any coverage determi-
nation and thereby represents the clinical practice step of the medical
necessity inquiry as the only relevant inquiry.
The distinction between the listing of benefits and the determination
of medical necessity is unquestionably fuzzy. Jessica Mantel, in consid-
ering Medicaid's sister program Medicare, observes that "[flor example,
HHS may provide that a plan's prescription drug benefits must include
all drugs approved by the FDA . . . but not . . . drugs prescribed for the
treatment of erectile dysfunction or infertility." 3 50 While such a regula-
tion would not substitute for an individualized analysis of whether the
patient's condition warrants use of a drug, it could begin to impinge upon
such a determination, as the above example shows by allowing prescrip-
tion drugs for some conditions but not others. A similar inclusion of
therapies for some conditions and not others is arguably what Pennsylva-
nia proposed here.
Thus, medical necessity cannot determine its own governing juris-
diction. It admits of some boundaries set by positive law. But the court
aggressively redrew those boundaries.
5. Judge Arrogates Decision and Method
When the judge decides that medical necessity should govern, he is
displacing another decision-maker's choice.
So how does he decide when to substitute for another's choice? Is
there some legal rule distinguishing the first and second steps of the med-
ical necessity determination? Judge Weis shows no signs of declaring
such a rule. Instead, he appeals to medical norms and applies them in his
own fashion.351 Judge Weis, as we recall, "[a]ssum[es] that medical need
is a valid measurement of eligibility," 352 and he goes on to assess that
need based on two ophthalmologists' affidavits. The ophthalmologists
say that refractive error can be more visually handicapping and that
"[eyeglasses] are not helpful in many cases of eye disease."5 3 Yet Penn-
sylvania provides a long list of those eye diseases where glasses are help-
ful, such as with certain strabismuses, or asymmetries of vision, or condi-
tions associated with lens dysfunction.3 54 Is the judge really qualified to
sift through medical information, especially when provided in the form
349. See, e.g., DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1998) ("No matter how medically
necessary a thing may be to a particular person .. . the state need not (and in fact cannot) provide it
unless it falls within a covered medical service.").
350. Jessica Mantel, Setting National Coverage Standards for Health Plans Under Healthcare
Reform, 58 UCLA L. REV. 221, 229-30 (2010).
351. See White II, 555 F.2d at 1150; see also Hall et al., supra note 339.
352. White II, 555 F.2d at 1150.




of individual clinician affidavits, to aver that patients with divergent
squint or faulty lenses have less medical need?
In this case, neither the legally instantiated rule, nor the underlying
political prioritization, prevail; state legislatures and Medicaid agencies
are thus restricted in how they can weigh economic and other considera-
tions. Judges seem to harbor some underlying view that prompts them to
deflect situations where rules alone, unsupported by what they view as
the proper extralegal norms, claim to resolve value conflict.
One might respond that this case result needs no such cloak-and-
dagger account. In this case, the federal statute simply prohibits such a
benefit limitation. But is this conclusion unambiguously commanded by
the statute?355 An examination of the actual language reveals that the
most locally controlling statutory text concerning eyeglasses as a benefit,
does not prohibit the qualification of the benefit for economic considera-
tions.356 The court even concedes that "[s]ignificantly, the only statutory
restriction on furnishing eyeglasses is that they be prescribed by a physi-
cian or an optometrist."3 57 Unable to rest on the statutory language con-
cerning eyeglasses to impose its more stringent restriction, the court
points instead to the more distant crosscutting language that the state's
definition of benefits must be "reasonable."3 58 With such capacious terms
as "reasonable" defining the restriction on state legislatures, the argu-
ment that this result was compelled, rather than chosen by the court, fal-
ters.
Why can't the state prioritize what benefits to provide rather than
acceding to judge's preferences, clad in the fig leaf of medicine? Medi-
cine, the court seems to say, is the social institution robust enough to
manage this value conflict. Thus, it reroutes the matter away from set-
tlement by pedigreed legal rule, indeed away from the political process
of legitimating rules, and engages in its own ventriloquy of medical
norms to do so.
CONCLUSION
So far, I have identified a pattern-courts striking down exceptions
in health rules when those exceptions seek to accommodate value con-
flict and then assigning the matter to an extralegal, non-rule-governed
arena, all the while invoking non-rule like reasoning from that extralegal
realm to do so.
355. This case predates Chevron, US.A. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
356. Social Security Act § 1905(a)(xvii)(12), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xvii)(12) (2012)
("[P]rescribed drugs, dentures, and prosthetic devices; and eyeglasses prescribed by a physician
skilled in disease of the eye or by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select.").
357. White II, 555 F.2d at I150.
358. See id. at ll50-51.
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This pattern bespeaks a tendency in judicial reasoning to obscure
value conflict, even at the expense of a most potent tool in the legal sys-
tem's arsenal: rules. To strip rules of their ability to bind when even un-
derlying reasons run out is a major sacrifice, and is it worthwhile or nec-
essary to prop up an image of law as a realm of coherent, unitary princi-
ples? The premise of liberalism is the inevitability of disagreement.3 59
People will have different policy preferences. We can agree to disagree,
but we all agree to follow the rules. Why when we need clear dispositive
rules the most, as the instruments of equipoise amid disagreement, are
the judges loathe to allow them? Ex ante exceptions are a way to ac-
commodate and grease social change, reducing the costs of the new rule,
honoring the provisional, the plural, the incremental, acknowledging
competing values, and resisting a winner-take-all form of hubris. But
perhaps this tool is less available than we think.
Is the best we can hope for that law will offload these difficult set-
tlements onto other social institutions, even as jurists engage in shadow-
boxing versions of those alternate normative practices to manage the
jurisdictional decisions that are necessary to maintain these arrange-
ments?360
The courts in each of these cases insisted upon false unitary justifi-
cations, as though each rule should embody one principle. But justifica-
tion for any rule is compound. Health care is provided to the poor to the
extent financially sustainable. We allow patients direct market access to
a drug if the burden of prescription control is "unnecessary." We seek to
moderate unhealthful sugary drinks to the extent compatible with other
aspects of our lifestyle, including some measure of choice or hedonism.
Are health ends more fully respected by health policy absolutism, or by a
willingness to pursue those ends despite acknowledgment of the some-
times wrenching tradeoffs?
Perhaps these judges, facing too many disparate values, yearn for
absolutes that would help them maintain their self-understood role as
"integrating" the law. It is true that health care exists at the intersection
of a number of practices-medical, scientific, actuarial, caregiving-all
of which are tangent to an otherwise closed, internal, and pedigreed set
of legal rules. Does health law alone exhibit this normative overload?
This pluralism and interplay of norms and practices surely characterizes
other topical areas as well.
As a future line of inquiry, we might look for this phenomenon in
non-health cases and test our expectation that adjudication would simi-
larly buckle under the strain of handling the concurrency of norms. We
359. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 450-51 (1971).
360. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 79.
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would hypothesize the same desperate anxiety to restore the unitary, co-
herent "principle" that integrates the entire field.
One reading of these cases, or one candidate for a unifying princi-
ple, ignoring for the moment all the contrary case law, might be that
health has a privileged justificatory weight. What if the implicit view that
judges harbor is that health needs should prevail, that health values exert
some resistance before they yield to another competing policy? What if
the coherent principle that banishes the non-health values from the scene
is an incipient canon privileging health, establishing what we can fairly
call a "right to health?"61
What if a critical mass of courts is compelled by the internal logic
of fairness specific to health, which I stipulate as follows: a principle that
if calamity befalls a member of our community, threatening life and
limb, or other existential preconditions (like pregnancy), and it is within
the human arts to help, we resist limitations.362 Perhaps we do not accept
that health care needs can be weighed like any other policy. Perhaps they
are in Dworkin's language, matters of principle, because the extension of
health care in the face of mortality and suffering acknowledges of the
individual dignity and worth of each individual.
Health interests in this regard should not differ with age, nor cede
lightly to assertions of sexual morality. They obtain for those who buy
their sugary drinks regardless of who vends or inspects the vendors of
those drinks. They do not cleave along adventitious diagnostic distinc-
tions, such as strabismus versus myopia. In White, the judge said as
much: "In our view, the statute does not grant such discretion to the state.
Rather, it requires an equitable distribution of the total funds available
among all in need of the service, with a consequent sharing of benefit
and hardship."3 63
The logic of fairness in law shies away from substantive standards
of reasonableness and looks at whether the decision has authority, re-
gardless of the content.36 But perhaps substantive reasonability can be
361. Such as Sunstein's non-delegation canons. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1668, 1683-84.
Here, I am borrowing heavily from other scholars who have discussed such a canon, but primarily
insofar as they lament the absence of one. See, e.g., WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC
HEALTH, AND THE LAW 267-68 (2009) (presenting a comprehensive argument for why there should
be such a health norm throughout law-"salus populi suprema lex"-and what it might look like);
see also Richard A. Daynard, Regulating Tobacco: The Need for a Public Health Judicial Decision-
Making Canon, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 281, 282 (2002).
362. As Mark Hall says, "the existential stakes" of death, disability, and one's personhood
hang in the balance. Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist
View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 347, 358 (2006).
363. White II, 555 F.2d at 1150.
364. Waldron says this is key to Raz' positivism. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT 37 (1999) ("Authority cannot exist, according to Raz, and legal authority (in what-
ever shape or form) cannot do its work, unless there is a basis for recognizing pronouncements as
authoritative which stands apart from the content and merits of the issues that the authority address-
es." (citing JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 203 (1994))).
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supplied by health norms-norms of what we are owed and owe one
another in the face of suffering, vulnerability, and mortality.365 Health
care holds out a promise of acknowledgement under those circumstances,
in the form of help and care, at the level of what arts and sciences our
society has accumulated by its best efforts.
The more familiar logic of substantive rationality review prohibits
judges from picking and choosing among competing norms, ranking and
balancing them as the judges see fit. Instead, courts claim to engage in a
means-ends fit analysis. But when multiple purposes are present, other
observers have argued trenchantly and persuasively that a judge actually
reach his or her result by manipulating the purpose, restricting permissi-
ble ends to the unitary one that the judge has selected.3 66 Thus, the courts
in performing the subconstitutional forms of substantive review we have
examined here are also engaged in presumptively privileging certain
purposes and declaring others less weighty as against their favored val-
ues. To the extent that judges are doing so here, they may be implicitly
asserting a background health right-a privileged purpose, heretofore
unacknowledged.367
Consistent with Dworkin:
[W]e might, for simplicity, stipulate not to call any political aim a
right unless it has a certain threshold weight against collective goals
in general; unless, for example, it cannot be defeated by appeal to any
of the ordinary routine goals of political administration, but only by a
goal of special urgency.
And indeed, these cases might be understood to illustrate exactly
such an attitude toward health, an attitude recognizing health as a pre-
sumptive right. Of course, Dworkin does not claim that rights inhering in
background principles would override legal rules, but the courts could be
viewed as acting as though these hypothesized health rights inhere in the
separation of powers rules, and the arbitrary and capricious standard, and
the crosscutting statutory requirement of "reasonableness." While none
of these cases strike a federal statute compromising health values,36 9 we
365. This conception is broad enough that it is conceivably consistent with any one of the
Health Promotion, Financial Security or Brute Luck conceptions of the purposes of health insurance
articulated in Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models ofHealth Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (2011).
366. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 127.
367. 1 draw from Dworkin to show the work that judges are performing to construct purpose,
but this maneuver is also manifestly rooted in the Legal Process school, an important antecedent for
Dworkin. Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart &
Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 470-71 (1987) (drawing the connections between legal process theory
and Dworkin's law as integrity).
368. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 92.
369. Though the Eleventh Circuit, in the case that was appealed and would later become Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2011), did seek to declare
Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause invalid with respect to the mandate pre-
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might still understand this privileged weight as a canon, much like Sun-
stein's nondelegation canons protecting special values such as federal-
ism, or the common-law substantive canons Abbe Gluck has identified,
privileging policies from taxation to international law norms.37 But ra-
ther than default canons allowing cost-benefit analysis, we might posit
instead a default canon resisting cost-benefit balancing in health care
cases.371
I would be remiss if I implied by this view that recognizing a right
to health would quell normative conflict over substance. First, the ques-
tion of how much weight such a privilege exerts would move to the fore-
ground.372 Second, it is ironic that this health absolutist tendency is often
used, as it was in the NYC soda portion cap case, to strike innovative,
incremental measures to improve health.
Finally, under a "right to health," normative contest would relocate
to the question of what belongs in the bundle that constitutes the "right."
One final commonality these three cases all share is a demonstration that
there is no underlying a priori concept called health, whose boundaries
are self-evident. Health is what we construct, and it lies on a continuum.
All of these cases founder on their attempts to represent health as some
static identifiable principle. Judge Renwick hews to the notion that expo-
sures are either a health hazard or not, but in the realm of food, nutrition,
and obesity the questions are ones of extent. Dose-response curves need
not be disjoint; some are U-shaped, and some are continuous without
inflection points.373 Meanwhile, what Judge Korman glosses over is that
drug indications can be broader or narrower, and the prevailing paradigm
denies that there should be any underlying "natural" category constrain-
ing what the drug sponsor posits.3 74 And Judge Weis in White runs up
against the malleability of the definition of benefits and the case law
permitting states to trim benefits in myriad other ways.375
But that is a topic for another day. Even bracketing such complica-
tions, the task of evaluating my alternate explanation, that a right or priv-
cisely because the mandate contained exceptions for low-income individuals. Florida ex rel. Att'y.
Gen. v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1310-11 (2011).
370. Gluck, supra note 17, at 765-66.
371. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1692-94 (describing nondelegation canons requiring Congress
to state unambiguously if it wishes a statute to be interpreted to apply extraterritorially, or to raise
constitutional questions, or to implicate certain federalism concerns, etc.).
372. John F. Manning, Lessons From a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1541,
1562-65 (2008).
373. See Lawrence Alexander, Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments 7-9 (Univ. of San Diego
Law Sch., Research Paper No. 07-19, 2005) (discussing how many matter subject o legal determina-
tion have this aspect of scaling according to degree, while legal determination may require the draw-
ing of a binary line along the scale).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 138-59, 181-84.
375. See, e.g., Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992); Curtis v. Taylor, 625
F.2d 645, 653 (5th Cir. 1980); Charleston Mem'1 Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 332-33 (4th Cir.
1982); Va. Hosp. Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781, 786 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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ilege for health might drive these cases, is somewhat outside the bounds
of this piece. Perhaps one could compare this exceptions phenomenon in
health-related cases to exceptions-based invalidations in other topical
areas, and measure, if one could, whether the invalidations were more
idiosyncratic in fields constituted by "interests" rather than "rights."
If one were to find the phenomenon sounding in other non-rights
arenas, one might conclude that the condemnation of underreach in these
cases has less to do with judicial concern for health and instead justifies a
generalization of my proposed explanation: that this exceptions phenom-
enon is a late-mannerist expression of the style of adjudication along the
model of Hercules, an elision of rule and principle that emerges as a
function of regarding background policies as part of the law and as a
direct consequence of the imperative to impose coherence over plural-
ism.
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ABSTRACT
Recently, students of color and their supporters have raised consid-
erable attention surrounding the racial inequalities that exist on college
campuses across the country. Students are protesting against hostile ra-
cial climates and demanding colleges to respond to racial discrimination.
This campaign for improved racial dynamics comes at the same time that
the Supreme Court is considering its latest case on affirmative action.
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin could potentially end race-
conscious admissions and dramatically decrease the number of students
of color admitted to public universities.
Prominent opponents of affirmative action in higher education have
focused on the supposed detriments to students of color who attend uni-
versities with race-conscious admissions policies. Allegedly, students of
color will be stigmatized as "affirmative action admits" and "mis-
matched" by matriculating at a school where they are unprepared to suc-
ceed. Justice Scalia most recently articulated this view during oral argu-
ments this term in Fisher:
[T]here are those who contend that it does not benefit African Amer-
icans to . .. get them into the University of Texas where they do not
do well, as opposed to having them go to a less-advanced school, . . .
a slower-track school where they do well. One of . . . the briefs
pointed out that . . . most of the . . . black scientists in this country
don't come from schools like the University of Texas.
They come from lesser schools where they do not feel that
they're . . . being pushed ahead in . . . classes that are too . . . fast for
them.1
Affirmative action opponents contend that these costs are so serious that
students of color benefit from bans on affirmative action, such as those
f Adriane Peralta holds a J.D. from UCLA School of Law and an Ed.D. from Loyola
Marymount University School of Education. While in law school, Adriane specialized in Critical
Race Studies and Public Interest Law and Policy, and was a Senior Editor for the UCLA Law Re-
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York. I am tremendously grateful to Professor Nancy Leong for her generous support and for believ-
ing in this Article. I would also like to thank my parents, Greg and Janis Peralta, for always believ-
ing in me.
I. Transcript of Oral Argument at 67, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., No. 14-981 (Dec. 9, 2015).
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recently upheld by the Supreme Court in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action.
These arguments, however, ignore the significant harms associated
with race-neutral environments. Such harms for students of color include
racial isolation, stereotype threat, racial microaggressions, identity per-
formance, and forced racial labor. Although these detriments arguably
occur at almost all predominately white institutions, race-neutral envi-
ronments greatly exacerbate these injuries because there are so few peo-
ple of color on campus. These costs are not only intrinsic but also have
economic consequences.
This Article is the first-ever cost-benefit analysis of affirmative ac-
tion in higher education for students of color. It argues that the economic
and intrinsic benefits of attending race-conscious universities greatly
outweigh the costs for students of color.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the affirmative action in higher education debate, much
attention has focused on the possible harms students of color incur when
they attend a university that practices affirmative action (race-conscious
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colleges).2 Opponents contend that race-conscious colleges stigmatize
students of color as "affirmative action admits" and, as a result, impair
future employment opportunities.3 Additionally, prominent opponents
argue that students of color admitted through affirmative action are
"mismatched" because they are not prepared for the rigors of selective
universities. In contrast, the harms associated with attending colleges
that ban affirmative action (race-neutral colleges)5 practically go unno-
ticed.
I first noticed that there was something different about race-neutral
universities when I enrolled at UCLA School of Law.6 My initial impres-
sion as a first-year student was distress and disappointment that there
were so few students of color in my classes; in fact, my large section of
eighty students had just one black student, and I was the only Japanese-
American student. As my first year commenced, I observed little things
that really bothered me. In Constitutional Law, students stared at me
when we came to a case about Japanese Internment, and I felt pressured
to speak on behalf of all Japanese-Americans. One student asked where I
was from, and when I told him Los Angeles, he responded with, "No,
where are you really from?" I often found myself in groups of all white
students or in rooms where I counted the number of students of color on
one hand. I was consistently uncomfortable and anxious by the lack of
diversity.
In 2012, during my first year, the UCLA School of Law Diversity
Action Committee conducted a survey in which 76% of students of color
agreed that "[n]on-white students face challenges at UCLA Law that
white students do not face."7 Only 49% of students of color agreed with
the statement, "The classroom environment at UCLA Law is welcoming
to students regardless of race," compared to 74% of white students who
agreed.8 These survey results made me think about the experiences of
students of color attending race-neutral schools and the added pressures
2. For the remainder of this Article, I will refer to these colleges as "race-conscious colleg-
es."
3. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Cracking the Egg: Which Came First-Stigma
or Affirmative Action?, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1301-02 (2008).
4. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of
Neither Party at 3-10, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
5. For the remainder of this Article, I will refer to these colleges as "race-neutral colleges."
6. Proposition 209 banned universities within the UC System from practicing affirmative
action. See infra Section I.A.
7. Jonathan Feingold & Doug Souza, Measuring the Racial Unevenness of Law School, 15
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 71, 105 (2013); see also Gina Kass, The Personal Take of "Stu-
dent Speak Out" Effectively Addresses Antagonism, DAILY BRUIN (Apr. 12, 2012),
http://dailybruin.com/2012/04/12/_the personal take-of student speakout effectivelyaddresses
antagonism_/.
8. Feingold & Souza, supra note 7.
2015] 175
DENVER LAW REVIEW
and burdens that students of color face.9 I reflected on all the times when
I was too distracted and anxious by the racial dynamics of the environ-
ment to focus on studying, and I wondered if I had made the right deci-
sion to attend a race-neutral law school.
In educational settings, students of color experience racial isolation,
stereotype threat, racial microaggressions, identity performance, and
racial labor. Admittedly, students of color will face these issues at any
predominately white college or university. Race-neutral colleges, how-
ever, exacerbate these harms because there are so few students of color.
Moreover, these harms translate into economic costs because they dis-
tract from and interfere with academic performance. In commoditized
terms, a degree from a race-conscious college is worth more than a de-
gree from a race-neutral college because there are exacerbated costs to
attending a race-neutral school.
This Article is unique in that it discusses affirmative action from the
perspective of students of color. Unfortunately, much of the affirmative
action debate, especially the diversity rationale,'o discusses what is best
for white students." White students are the primary beneficiaries of di-
versity because they profit the most from being around students of color
in higher educational setting. Much of this has to do with the intense
levels of K-12 school segregation in which most white students rarely
have the opportunity to interact with classmates of color before college.'2
9. Throughout this Article, I refer to both undergraduate degrees and law degrees. The rea-
son is that most of the affirmative action debate has surrounded around both undergraduate and law
school admissions.
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-30 (2003) ("[S]tudent body diversity is a compel-
ling state interest . . . . [T]hese [educational] benefits [that diversity is designed to produce] are
substantial .... [T]he Law School's admissions policy promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps
to break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races.' These benefits are 'important and laudable,' because 'classroom discussion is livelier, more
spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting' when the students have 'the greatest possible
variety of backgrounds' ..... [N]umerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning
outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepares them as professionals."' (sixth alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Ap-
pendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); then quoting Brief of
the American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No.
02-241))). For more on the constitutionality of the diversity rationale, see generally Goodwin Liu,
Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test,
33 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 381 (1998).
11. See Tara J. Yosso et al., From Jim Crow to Affirmative Action and Back Again: A Critical
Race Discussion of Racialized Rationales and Access to Higher Education, 28 REV. RES. EDUC. 1, 8
(2004) ("Because of the resistance to enrolling students of color in historically White institutions, the
diversity rationale articulates these benefits in relation to White students. The unquestioned majori-
tarian story within this rationale is that students of color are admitted so that they can help White
students become more racially tolerant, liven up class dialogue, and prepare White students for
getting a job in a multicultural, global economy. How this scenario enriches the education of stu-
dents of color remains unclear.").
12. See GARY ORFIELD ET AL., E PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE





College students of color, on the other hand, typically have had much
more exposure to people of other races before coming to college.1 3 Thus,
college students of color are more likely to have already acquired the
skills derived from diversity before entering college. Therefore, the di-
versity rationale in affirmative action is really about using students of
color to teach and provide diversity skills to white students. This Article,
however, is about what is in the best interest for students of color. It
places students of color at the center of the analysis in hopes of develop-
ing legal solutions that benefit students of color, as opposed to only con-
sidering what is best for white students.
Part I provides a background on state bans against race-conscious
college admissions and explores the recent issues before the Supreme
Court. Part I also challenges and disagrees with the notion that race-
neutral or colorblindness equates to equal opportunity. Race-neutral is
not neutral at all, and in fact, race-neutral policies benefit whites and
disadvantage students of color. Part II discusses stigma and mismatch
arguments, and how those arguments lead to economic claims relating to
the diminished value of race-conscious college degrees. Part III reports
on the effects of race-neutral college admissions in the market for stu-
dents of color and shows that students of color prefer to attend race-
conscious colleges. Part III also looks at comparative studies regarding
stigma at race-neutral and race-conscious colleges. Part IV investigates
why students of color are choosing race-conscious colleges over race-
neutral colleges by exploring the hidden costs of attending race-neutral
schools. Part V argues that stigma and mismatch theorists are incorrect;
affirmative action actually increases both the intrinsic and economic val-
ue of a college degree for students of color.14
13. Research has shown that students of color "who attend diverse K-12 schools have a higher
college attendance rate than those who do not." Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Educa-
tion and 20 Other Higher Education Organizations in Support of Respondents at 14, Parents In-
volved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (Parents), 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-
915). In California, the "racial composition of public schools is strongly associated with the likeli-
hood of gaining access to [the] UC [System]." Brief of 19 Former Chancellors of the University of
California as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 21, Parents, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-
908, 05-915). More specifically, studies prove that a negative correlation exists "between concen-
trated black and Latino enrollment and UC eligibility." Id. at 22.
14. Some may argue that I have approached stigma and mismatch theorists all wrong, by
engaging in a conversation that commodifies college degrees. Perhaps some make a corruption
argument that by commodifying higher education degrees, I have cheapened what it means to earn a
college or professional degree. Conceivably, college degrees should be more about receiving a well-
rounded education and growing into a thoughtful citizen, and not about the worth of a piece of paper
and its signaling effect to future employers. Although I am very sympathetic to this argument, I also
understand higher education to already be a commodified system that people often discuss in market
terms. Attempting to change the way that we frame higher education would only distract from my
central thesis.
In addition, affirmative action jurisprudence also considers higher education as part of the




I. RACE-NEUTRAL VS. RACE-CONscIous ADMISSIONS
Considering race in college admissions is a hotly contested political
and legal debate. For the most part, the debate is exclusive to public uni-
versities because they are subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'5 As it stands today, public universities can-
but are not required to-consider race as a factor among many in college
admissions, so long as the admissions policy does not amount to a quota
system.16 Although public universities can consider race, eight states
have completely banned the practice through voter propositions, execu-
tive order by the state governor, or statute.17 Arguments for state bans on
affirmative action include the following: claims of reverse discrimination
against whites; the desire to be a colorblind society; preferential treat-
ment is unfair; and stigma and mismatch are detrimental to students of
color. This part begins with a background on state bans on affirmative
action and a discussion of the debate recently held before the Supreme
Court. Additionally, this part challenges race-neutrality and explores how
race-neutrality is actually a preference for whites.
A. State Bans on Race-Conscious Admissions
Currently, eight states ban race-based affirmative action in admis-
sion to public universities.18 In 1996, California was the first state to ban
race-conscious admissions through voter initiative, which appeared on
the ballot as Proposition 209 (Prop 209).19 Prop 209 was an amendment
to the state constitution, which proposed, "The state shall not discrimi-
nate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group
on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the opera-
[Niumerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and
"better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepares them as professionals."
These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear
that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citations omitted) (quoting Brief of the American Educational Research
Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-
241)). Thus, people situate the affirmative action debate as part of the larger labor economy. By
discussing college degrees in commodified terms, I have merely contributed to the debate in the
language in which people traditionally discuss affirmative action.
15. Private universities, however, are not subject to the Equal Protection Clause, and thus, are
able to practice various forms of race-conscious admissions free from the Supreme Court's scrutiny.
16. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-23. There are other narrow tailoring requirements to meet
the demands of strict scrutiny, but that discussion is outside the scope of this paper.
17. These states include: California, Florida, Washington, Arizona, Oklahoma, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, and Michigan. Drew Desilver, Supreme Court Says States Can Ban Affirmative
Action; 8 Already Have, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/04/22/supreme-court-says-states-can-ban-affirmative-action-8-already-have/.
18. Id.
19. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson (Econ. Equity II), 122 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1997).
Proposition 209 was called the California Civil Rights Initiative. "Proposition 209 passed by a mar-
gin of 54 to 46 percent; of nearly 9 million Californians casting ballots. . . ." Id.
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tion of public employment, public education, or public contracting."20
Although the amendment itself does not mention affirmative action, the
California Ballot Pamphlet explained Prop 209 to voters as an initiative
that would eliminate race-based affirmative action programs.21 Various
progressive organizations22 challenged the constitutionality of Prop 209
in federal court.23 The case made its way up to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in which the court upheld the proposition.24
In 2006, a similar proposition appeared on the Michigan statewide
ballot. The initiative, commonly known as Proposal 2 (Prop 2), proposed
to amend the Michigan constitution to read that any "public college or
university, community college, or school district shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education or public contracting."2 5 Although
the initiative passed,26 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals eventually
struck down the initiative as unconstitutional27 and created a circuit split
between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. In April 2014, the Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit opinion and upheld the ban.28
In both the California and Michigan cases, proponents of the bans
created a narrative in which race-neutrality, or colorblindness, results in
fairness and equality.2 9 Ward Connerly, one of the major political advo-
20. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3 1(a).
21. Econ. Equity H1, 122 F.3d at 696. The California Ballot Pamphlet, produced by the Cali-
fornia Legislative Analyst's Office, explained:
A YES vote on [Proposition 209] means: The elimination of those affirmative action
programs for women and minorities run by the state or local governments in the areas of
public employment, contracting, and education that give "preferential treatment" on the
basis of sex, race, color, ethnicity, or national origin.
A NO vote on this measure means State and local government affirmative action program
would remain in effect to the extent they are permitted under the United States Constitu-
tion.
Id. (alteration in original).
22. These progressive organizations included: The Coalition for Economic Equity; California
NAACP; Northern California NAACCP; California Labor Federation; AFL-CIO; Council for Asian
American Business Associations, California; Chinese American Citizens' Alliance; Women Con-
struction Business Owners and Executives, California Chapter; United Minority Business Entrepre-
neurs; Chinese for Affirmative Action; Black Advocates in State Service; Asian Pacific American
Labor Alliance; La Voz Chicana; and Black Chamber of Commerce of California. See Econ. Equity
II, 122 F.3d at 692.
23. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson (Econ. Equity 1), 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (N.D. Cal.
1996), vacated sub nom. Econ Equity II, 122 F.3d 692.
24. See Econ. Equity II, 122 F.3d at 710-11 (finding no likelihood of success on equal protec-
tion or preemption challenges to Proposition 209).
25. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
26. "Michigan voters [passed Proposition 2] by a margin of 58% to 42%." Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2012), revd sub
nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
27. Id. at 491 (holding the proposed amendment unconstitutional).
28. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638.
29. See, e.g., Pete Williams & Daniel Arkin, Supreme Court Takes on Affirmative Action in
Michigan Ban Case, NBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2013, 5:13 PM),
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cates for both propositions, responded to a federal court upholding Cali-
fornia's affirmative action ban, "'I'm pleased, but not surprised' . . . .
'The country is clearly going to have to move in the direction of treating
everybody fairly."' 30 Michigan's attorney general, Bill Schuette, whose
office defended Prop 2 before the Supreme Court, commented on the
case, "It's wrong to treat people differently based on your ace or the
color of your skin."
Importantly, many contest whether bans on affirmative action actu-
ally promote equality. Mark Rossenbaum, a prominent civil rights attor-
ney who argued to strike down Prop 2 before the Supreme Court, pointed
out that other groups (for example, legacy students32 ) could seek prefer-
ential treatment by the university, but Prop 2 prevents students of color
from doing the same.33 He contends, "I want the same rule book. I want
the same playing field. The problem with Proposal 2 is that it creates two
playing fields."34 Rossenbaum's comments shed light on an important
way in which state bans on affirmative action, or colorblind policies,
provide a preference to whites: White students are more likely to benefit
from legacy policies since historically there have been more white col-
lege graduates, and during segregation, many colleges did not admit stu-
dents of color. Rarely does anyone question these policies as an unfair
preference.3 5 Considering that here is sizeable debate regarding the fair-
ness of race-neutrality, this narrative deserves further attention.
http://usnews.nbenews.com/_news/2013/10/15/20975390-supreme-court-takes-on-affirmative-
action-in-michigan-ban-case; Anthony York, State Affirmative Action Ban Upheld by Federal Court,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012, 3:16 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/califomia-
politics/2012/04/state-affirmative-action-ban-upheld-by-federal-court.html; see also Karthick Rama-
krishnan, Opinion Editorial, Affirmative Action at California Colleges: A Debate Based on Fear,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/07/opinion/la-oe-0307-
ramakrishnan-prop209-affirmative-action-20140307 ("[Affirmative action] [o]pponents argue for
equal treatment in how rules are applied across racial groups.").
30. York, supra note 29 (quoting statement by Ward Connerly).
31. Williams & Arkin, supra note 29 (quoting statement by Bill Schuette, Mich. Att'y Gen.).
32. Legacy students are the sons or daughters of alumni. It is well known throughout higher
education that legacy students receive some degree of preferential treatment in the admissions pro-
cess to most schools. In fact, most college applications include a section in which prospective stu-
dents can indicate whether a parent or relative is an alumnus of the college. Interestingly, stigma
theorists are not concerned with the stigmatization of legacy students. Perhaps this is because legacy
students do not have clear markers, such as skin color. Interestingly, stigma theorists seem to only
focus on students of color in their attack on "preferential treatment." Student-athletes are another
category of students in which one can claim preferential treatment; however, those students do not
concern stigma theorists either.
33. Williams & Arkin, supra note 29.
34. Id. (quoting statement attributed to Mark Rosenbaum by the Associated Press).
35. See Edmund Zagorin, Race-Blind Admissions are Affirmative Action for Whites, AM.
PROSPECT (Apr. 21, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/race-blind-admissions-are-affirmative-action-
whites ("[N]o group experiences more affirmative action than white people. Michigan's formal pro-
white affirmative action policy, colloquially known as 'legacy preference,' puts the children of
alumni ahead of other applicants. It unquestionably favors the white and the wealthy, at the expense
of the poor and the black."); see also Evan J. Mandery, Opinion, End College Legacy Preferences,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/opinion/end-college-legacy-
preferences.html; see generally AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN
180 [Vol. 93:1
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B. Race-Neutral = A Preference for Whites
Certain conservative members of the Supreme Court throughout af-
firmative action jurisprudence have produced colorblind rhetoric,36 and
this rhetoric has traveled into other areas of the law,37 including K-12
38 40school desegregation, voting, and antidiscrimination law." In Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,41 a case
concerning race-conscious school assignments in K-12 public schools,
Chief Justice Roberts famously said, "The way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."42 His im-
plication here is that any amount of race-consciousness is discrimination
in the form of reverse discrimination against whites and, thus, we should
prefer a colorblind approach. This move toward colorblindness has al-
lowed conservative justices to apply the Equal Protection Clause to pro-
tect whites. The underlying assumption is that colorblindness, or the non-
recognition of race, is always nondiscriminatory.43 In the affirmative
action context, proponents of colorblindness contend that a race-neutral
admissions process will be purely meritorious because it does not con-
sider race.4
Although race-conscious admissions have survived for roughly fifty
45years, 4 the Court has largely scaled back on affirmative action programs
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) (discussing legacy preference in college
admissions and its impact on immigrant and minority groups).
36. 1 use the terms "colorblind" and "race-neutral" interchangeably to reference the nonrec-
ognition of race.
37. Civil rights activists and social justice minded citizens should be very troubled by argu-
ments of colorblindness and preference in the context of affirmative action. These arguments are not
contained within the realm of just affirmative action, but rather, they challenge "ethnic and women's
studies programs, identity-based student organizations, ethnic alumni associations, outreach and
noticing requirements, and even breast cancer screenings and domestic violence shelters as forms of
preference." Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, "Framing Affirmative Action," 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 123, 126 (2006). Thus, affirmative action jurisprudence has much greater consequences
for not only people of color, but also women, the LGBT community, the disabled, and the poor.
38. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (Parents Involved), 551
U.S. 701, 762-63 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
39. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628-29 (2013).
40. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976).
41. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
42. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
43. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. I,
17 (1991) ("Decisions that use color-blind nonrecognition are often regarded as superior to race-
conscious decisions. Proponents of nonrecognition argue that it facilitates meritocratic decisionmak-
ing by preventing the corrupting consideration of race. They regard race as a 'political' or 'special
interest' consideration, detrimental to fair decisionmaking.").
44. See sources cited supra note 29.
45. Interestingly, the origins of affirmative action stem back to President Lyndon B. Johnson
and his social programs of the 1960s that targeted the advancement of people of color. See Mario L.
Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Judging Opportunity Loss: Assessing the
Viability of Race-Based Affirmative Action After Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA LAW REV.
272, 278-79 (2015). In 1965, during the height of the Civil Rights Movement, President Johnson
had this to say in a speech at Howard University:
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with the use of colorblind ideals. Justice Thomas, perhaps the strongest
colorblind opponent to affirmative action, writes, "The Constitution ab-
hors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications
can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also
because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and
makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us
all."" Justice Thomas prefers that the government never consider race or
even acknowledge that different races exist. To disregard race, however,
is to ignore the systemic and historic discrimination that people of color
have faced in this country.
When the Supreme Court employs a colorblind doctrine, the justices
are essentially maintaining the status quo, including the existing racial
hierarchy. Colorblind jurists contend that race-conscious policies dis-
criminate against white students because the consideration of race pro-
vides a preference for students of color.4 7 This conclusion fails to recog-
nize the systemic inequalities that permeate society, especially in educa-
tion,48 and assumes that institutional racism is nonexistent. In order for
one to think that race-conscious admissions policies are a preference for
students of color, then one would have to believe that white students and
students of color are competing on equal footing and that systemic rac-
ism does not exist in education. In reality, by the time students apply to
college, most white students have gained a systemic educational ad-
vantage over students of color.4 9 Thus, considering race is not a prefer-
ence for students of color, it is an attempt to compensate for systemic
inequality.
This is precisely the problem with the diversity rationale in affirma-
tive action jurisprudence. The diversity rationale presumes an equal start-
But freedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now
you are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and choose the leaders you
please.
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him,
bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, "you are free to compete with all
the others," and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.
Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the
ability to walk through those gates.
Lyndon B. Johnson, President, United States, Commencement Address at Howard University: "To
Fulfill These Rights" (June 4, 1965),
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp. It is important to note
that the original purpose of affirmative action programs was to account for past harms and systemic
discrimination against people of color.
46. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part), superseded on other grounds by constitutional amendment, MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
47. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
48. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1991) [hereinafter KOZOL, INEQUALITIES]; JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE
NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (2005) [hereinafter KOZOL,
SHAME].
49. See KOZOL, INEQUALITIES, supra note 48, at 75-77; KOZOL, SHAME, supra note 48, at
280-82.
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ing point and ignores social inequalities, which allows colorblind oppo-
nents to make claims of reverse discrimination and preferential treat-
ment. The purpose of such race-conscious policies should be to address
social inequalities. Nevertheless, colorblind advocates refuse to recog-
nize systemic racism, and thus, they interpret policies that attempt to
ameliorate racism as an unfair preference for students of color.o
In their article The New Racial Preferences, Professors Devon Car-
bado and Cheryl Harris point out how state bans on affirmative action
provide a preference to white students in writing personal statements.
Carbado and Harris explain how strict adherence to colorblind ideals in
college admissions prevents students of color from discussing their racial
52identity in personal statements. This proves to be a real disadvantage
for students of color because they are unable to tell their entire stories;
students of color are not be able to explain how race has affected their
lives or even reference what their cultural background means to them.53
On the other hand, such a strict colorblind policy does not burden white
students in the same way. For many white students, race is not an im-
portant factor of their identity, at least not in the same way as it is for
students of color.54 One of the most significant privileges of being white
is that white students can choose when and whether to think about race.s
In contrast, students of color consider race on an almost daily basis.56
There is no question that colorblind ideals of preventing students from
discussing race disproportionately burdens students of color and results
in a preference for white students.57
Education reform policies that hope to achieve educational equity
must be race-conscious.58 Professor Michelle Alexander writes, "Alt-
hough colorblind approaches to addressing the problems of poor people
of color often seem pragmatic in the short run, in the long run they are
counterproductive. Colorblindness, though widely touted as the solution,
50. See Crenshaw, supra note 37, at 126-28.
51. See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 1139, 1147-48 (2008).
52. Id. at 1148.
53. Notably, this could also hurt white students interested in racial justice issues as well
because they would also likely want to discuss race in their personal statements.
54. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1124-25
(2008).
55. Cf Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, CIRTL
NETWORK,
http://www.cirtl.net/files/PartlCreatingAwareness WhitePrivilegeUnpackingthelnvisibleKnapsack.
pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
56. See Robinson, supra note 54. Of course there are exceptions; for instance, a white student
who goes to a predominately black school. These types of students, however, are very few consider-
ing the very low numbers of white students attending schools with majority students of color. See
ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 12, at 10.
57. See Carbado & Harris, supra note 51, at 1147.
58. See Khiara M. Bridges, Class-Based Affirmative Action, or the Lies That We Tell About
the Insignificance ofRace, 95 BOSTON U. L.R. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
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is actually the problem."59 If education policies remain within the con-
fines of colorblindness, they will never be far-reaching enough to attack
the underlying problem in public education: institutional racism.6 In-
stead, policies will try to close the achievement gap and integrate schools
through other mechanisms, such as socioeconomic status, but these poli-
cies are ineffective because they do not address the root of the problem.61
Professor Neil Gotanda contends, "[M]odern color-blind constitutional-
ism supports the supremacy of white interests and must therefore be re-
garded as racist. There is no legitimate rationale for the automatic rejec-
tion of all governmental consideration of race."62
II. THE SUPPOSED COSTS OF RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS
Opponents to affirmative action claim that there are costs or harms
to students of color who attend race-conscious colleges. The two most
widely discussed costs are stigma and mismatch, both of which this part
explores.
A. Stigma
For over thirty-five years, opponents to affirmative action programs
have relied heavily on the claim of stigma to argue against race-
conscious admissions in higher education. The stigma argument is quite
simple: Affirmative action programs harm all students of color because
(1) they create an environment in which others will assume that they are
not deserving of admission,6 3 and (2) admitted students of color will also
doubt their own abilities and merit." In market terms, stigma theorists
contend that students of color will prefer race-neutral colleges, instead of
race-conscious colleges, because their degree will be free from stigma
and, thus, worth more. These conservative voices make claims of both
internal stigma (the stigma that students of color place on themselves)
and external stigma (the stigma that others place on students of color).
No one is more famous for the stigma claim as an argument against
affirmative action than Justice Thomas. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
59. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 240 (rev. ed. 2012).
60. See Bridges, supra note 58.
61. See id
62. Gotanda, supra note 43, at 62-63.
63. There are many assumptions embedded in this argument regarding the relationship be-
tween merit and test scores that are and are worth challenging, but outside the scope of this Article.
See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Kimberly West-Faulcon in Support of Respondents, Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
64. For an article examining the strength of this argument, see Onwuachi-Willig et al., supra
note 3 (finding via surveys comparing law students at schools practicing and not practicing affirma-
tive action that "l), minimal, if any, intemal stigma felt by minority law students, regardless of
whether their schools practiced race-based affirmative action; 2) no statistically significant differ-
ence in internal stigma between minority students at affirmative action law schools and non-
affirmative action law schools; and 3) no significant impact from external stigma").
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Pena,6 5 Justice Thomas condemns such race-conscious policies on
grounds of internal stigma:
[T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended
consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form
of discrimination. So-called "benign" discrimination teaches many
that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minori-
ties cannot compete . . . . These programs stamp minorities with a
badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or
to adopt an attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences. 66
Additionally, Justice Thomas strongly contends that external stigma
is a worthy argument for the abolishment of affirmative action. In Grut-
ter v. Bollinger,67 a case upholding the consideration of race as a factor
among many in college admissions, Justice Thomas dissents:
It is uncontested that each year, the Law School admits a handful of
blacks who would be admitted in the absence of racial discrimina-
tion. Who can differentiate between those who belong and those who
do not? The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School be-
cause of discrimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as
undeserving. This problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy
as to whether those stigmatized are actually the "beneficiaries" of ra-
cial discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places
of government, industry, or academia, it is an open question today
whether their skin color played a part in their advancement. The
question itself is the stigma-because ither racial discrimination did
play a role, in which case the person may be deemed "otherwise un-
qualified," or it did not, in which case asking the question itself un-
fairly marks those blacks who would succeed without discrimina-
tion.6 8
Justice Thomas repeats this sentiment in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin,69 a more recent affirmative action case decided by the
Supreme Court. He opines briefly, "Although cloaked in good intentions,
the University's racial tinkering harms the very people it claims to be
helping."7 o
Justice Thomas's consistent reliance on the stigma argument in af-
firmative action cases makes the stigma claim worthy of consideration
65. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
66. Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Pena Court required the use of heightened scruti-
ny in determining whether the consideration of disadvantaged groups, including women and em-
ployees of color, in the awarding of government contracts was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 237-39 (majority opinion).
67. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
68. Id. at 373 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
69. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
70. Id. at 2432 (Thomas, J., concurring) The Court remanded the case to the lower court so
that a proper analysis of the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny can be applied. Id. at
2415 (majority opinion).
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and analysis. Moreover, he is not alone in his disdain for race-conscious
policies due to the supposed harm of stigma. Another black conservative
to argue the stigma claim is political activist, and former member of the
University of California Board of Regents, Ward Connerly.7 1 In his ami-
cus brief in Grutter, Connerly contends that race-conscious admissions
policies "treat black and Hispanic students differently," and thus, "they
will be marginalized and presumed to be inadequate."72 Notice that the
blame is always on the race-conscious policy and not on the people mak-
ing accusations regarding qualifications. The stigma claim lets the accus-
ers go unchecked, as if they have every right to make such an accusation.
The underlying assumption that considering race means candidates of
color are unqualified is simply not true.73 Considering race in college
admissions, as one factor among many, does not mean that admits of
color are unqualified.
In deciding between a higher ranked college that practices affirma-
tive action and a less reputable race-neutral college, stigma theorists
would advocate that a student of color select the race-neutral college so
that they avoid any hint of stigmatization.4 This assertion, however, has
very little faith in the intelligence of students of color, whom stigma the-
orists purport to be so concerned. By arguing that stigma should be the
reason to end all affirmative action programs, stigma theorists assume
that students of color are incapable of properly weighing their options
and making an informed decision. It is as if stigma theorists think stu-
71. Connerly is the founder and chairman of the American Civil Rights Institute. About Mr.
Ward Connerly, AM. C.R. INST., http://acri.org/about-ward-connerly/ (last visited Sept. 20 2015).
72. Brief Amicus Curiae of Ward Connerly in Support of Petitioners at 13-14, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (quoting prior statement of Ward Connerly). Connerly states:
Although the intentions of universities and professional schools may be benign, is there
nonetheless a resulting stigma of inferiority on every black and Hispanic student, even
those who don't need preferences? This is clearly a message that perpetuates, as opposed
to eliminates, the most intractable source of racial inequality in America today, which is
the small number of preferred minorities who sufficiently excel academically in order to
apply and be admitted to the nation's universities and professional schools without the use
of preferences.
Id. at 13; see also Brief Amici Curiae of the Center for Equal Opportunity et al. in Support of Peti-
tioner at 17-18, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) ("[T]he liabilities attendant to
the use of racial and ethnic preferences are substantial . . . they stigmatize the so-called beneficiaries
in the eyes of their classmates, teachers, and themselves . . . ." (footnote omitted)); Brief Amicus
Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner at 20, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2012) (No. 11-345) ("Racial preferences stigmatize recipient groups by implying that the recipients
are inferior and need special protection, thus generating the 'politics of racial hostility."' (quoting
PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 173-74 (2003)).
73. See Dennis 0. Ojogho, Affirmative Reaction, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/3/13/ojogho-harvard-affirmative-action/ ("The fundamental
problem with . . . [affirmative action critics] is that [they are] tragically misinformed about how
affirmative action works. [They] assume[] that unqualified people of color are being admitted to this
university in droves to meet some kind of quota. The implication is that there are not enough bril-
liant, young black and Latino minds in this country-that Harvard is forced to admit the first appli-
cation it receives that has the correct ethnicity box checked. This is simply untrue.").
74. See Kate L. Antonovics & Richard H. Sander, Affirmative Action Bans and the "Chilling
Effect, " 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 252,259 (2013).
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dents of color are too naive to know what is best for them in deciding
whether to risk stigmatization or go to a less reputable school.75
Stigma is not a convincing argument to end all affirmative action in
higher education because students of color are well aware of the problem
and are fully capable of determining for themselves what is in their best
interest.76 It is ridiculous to take away one of the options (of attending a
higher ranked affirmative action school) because stigma theorists do not
think that students of color are capable of making informed decisions.
B. Mismatch
A related claim to the stigma argument that has gained traction in
the last decade is mismatch theory-primarily advanced by Richard
Sander, law professor, and Stuart Taylor, journalist.77 Sander and Taylor
assert that students of color suffer academically in two ways when they
attend race-conscious law schools. First, they argue that affirmative ac-
tion at highly selective law schools admits students of color who are un-
qualified, and thus, these students suffer academically because they can-
not compete against their more qualified classmates-they get worse
grades and, thus, worse employment outcomes.78 Sander and Taylor also
argue that students of color learn less because they are unable to keep up
with rest of the class and, therefore, underperform post-graduation on the
bar exam and in career advancement.79
An extension of the mismatch argument is that admitted students of
color face both external and internal stigma because of their inability to
compete academically. Sander and Taylor explain:
75. See JOHN K. WILSON, THE MYTH OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS: THE CONSERVATIVE
ATTACK ON HIGHER EDUCATION 151 (1995) ("Conservatives' attacks on affirmative action often
adopt a paternalistic tone. Critics say they are helping minorities escape the stigma that (they claim)
is the inevitable result of affirmative action.").
76. See infra Part III for more on student enrollment choices and comparative stigma.
77. See Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of Neither
Party, supra note 4, at 3-10; RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT'S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON'T
ADMIT IT 4-5 (2012); Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American
Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 449-54 (2004).
78. See sources cited supra note 77. It is important to note, there is a lot of published research
and scholarship that refutes and disagrees with Sander and Taylor's claim of mismatch. See, e.g., Ian
Ayres and Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1808-09 (2005); Cheryl I. Harris and William C. Kidder, The Black Student
Mismatch Myth in Legal Education: The Systemic Flaws in Richard Sander's Affirmative Action
Study, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., http://www.jbhe.com/features/46 blackstudentmismatch.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2015); Daniel E. Ho, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students to
Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005); William C. Kidder & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Still Hazy
After All These Years: The Data and Theory Behind "Mismatch," 92 TEX. L. REV. 895 (2014).
Although I find the mismatch theory unconvincing, I am assuming its validity for the purposes of
this Article.
79. See Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of Neither
Party, supra note 4, at 8-9.
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Large preferences often place students in environments where they
can neither learn nor compete effectively-even though these same
students would thrive had they gone to less competitive but still quite
good schools. We refer to this problem as "mismatch," a word that
largely explains why, even though blacks are more likely to enter col-
lege than are whites with similar backgrounds, they will usually get
much lower grades, rank toward the bottom of the class, and far more
often drop out. Because of mismatch, racial preference policies often
stigmatize minorities, reinforce pernicious stereotypes, and under-
mine the self-confidence of beneficiaries, rather than creating the di-
verse racial utopias so often advertised in college campus bro-
chures.8 0
Moreover, Sander and Taylor argue that students of color would be
better off going to less competitive race-neutral colleges and universities
(even if a race-neutral college is not as prestigious as a race-conscious
college).8 ' They advocate for affirmative action bans, not only because
they believe students of color will do better academically, but they will
also avoid the stigmatizing effects of underperformance at a race-
- 82conscious colleges.
Interestingly, mismatch and stigma theorists are not as concerned
about unqualified legacy students. One could also regard the students
who are the sons and daughters of alumni, and receive additional consid-
eration by way of a preference, unqualified.84 Mismatch and stigma theo-
rists conveniently do not discuss this group of students and are not con-
cerned at all with their performance.85 One could argue that by neglect-
ing to discuss legacy students, mismatch and stigma theorists are not
well-intentioned and are in fact making bad faith arguments about stu-
dents of color. Mismatch and stigma theorists like to argue that they are
just looking out for the best interests of students of color. Though, if
mismatch and stigma theorists really cared about the best interests of
students, then they would also show concern for legacy students or even
athletes.87
80. Richard Sander & Stuart Taylor Jr., The Painful Truth About Affinnative Action,




83. Id ("The mismatch effect happens when a school extends to a student such a large admis-
sions preference -- sometimes because of a student's athletic prowess or legacy connection to the
school, but usually because of the student's race. . . ." (emphasis added)).
84. See Kidder & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 78, at 936.
85. See Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of Neither
Party, supra note 4, at 5.
86. See Kidder & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 78, at 936 (pointing out how Sander and
Taylor are only concerned with black student underperformance and not mismatched white stu-
dents).
87. See id. at 936 n. 178 ("In their brief supporting Supreme Court review of the Fisher case,
Sander and Taylor begin a discussion of mismatch by briefly noting that 'admissions preferences-
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Further, mismatch and stigma arguments extend into an economic
analysis. In financial terms, mismatch and stigma theorists contend that
race-neutral colleges provide for better economic opportunity for stu-
dents of color.8 8 First, students of color will earn better grades at race-
neutral colleges, which will lead to better job opportunities. Second, their
degree will be free from stigma and thus translate into enhanced job op-
portunities.
Put together, stigma and mismatch theorists' claims lead to a re-
markable economic assertion that a degree from a race-neutral college is
worth more than a race-conscious college degree.89 Considering these
anti-affirmative action arguments of stigma and mismatch, it is worth
investigating whether students of color would be better off, economically
speaking, going to a race-neutral college.
III. THE MARKET SAYS RACE-NEUTRAL COLLEGES ARE STRUGGLING
One of the arguments invoked by stigma scholars is that students of
color will avoid race-conscious colleges and instead prefer to attend race-
neutral colleges. The argument is that students of color at public univer-
sities under affirmative action bans are free from stigma and will not
have to face questions of whether they deserve to be there. In other
words, affirmative action bans ensure that all students gained admission
based on merit alone, and thus, stigma does not exist on race-neutral
campuses. Kate Antonovics and Richard Sander write:
A black candidate deciding between Berkeley and Stanford, for ex-
ample, might conclude after Proposition 209 that the signaling value
of a degree from Berkeley, where there is little or no suspicion of ra-
cial preferences in admission, is greater than the signaling value of a
degree from Stanford, where the suspicion of racial preferences in
admissions is substantially higher.90
Studies suggest, however, that this hypothesis is incorrect. Affirma-
tive action bans have caused students of color to increasingly prefer race-
conscious colleges to race-neutral ones.91 In addition, studies show that
regardless of whether these are based on race, 'legacy' considerations, or other factors' cause lower
grades, but this is a rhetorical pivot and the thrust of their book and Supreme Court briefs focus on
race/ethnicity." (citation omitted) (quoting Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor,
Jr. in Support of Neither Party, supra note 4, at 5)).
88. See id at 897-98.
89. See Antonovics & Sander, supra note 74.
90. Id
91. See William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher
Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 70 (2013) ("Contrary to recent claims by groups opposing affirmative
action, Proposition 209 triggered a series of educationally harmful 'chilling effects' [for underrepre-
sented students of color]. Data on UC's freshman admit pools spanning a dozen years show that
underrepresented minorities (more so for those with the strongest credentials, and especially for
African Americans) are more likely to spurn an offer from UC than they were before Prop 209, and
the difference compared to whites and Asian Americans has gradually widened under Prop 209.");
Symposium, From Proposition 209 to Proposal 2: Examining the Effects ofAnti-Affirmative Action
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students of color face less racism, stigma, and hostility at race-conscious
colleges because these colleges are more likely to have a critical mass of
students of color.92
A. Students of Color Prefer Race-Conscious Colleges
In an article, William Kidder took several data points from various
studies and disproved stigma theorists' argument that banning affirma-
tive action in California would encourage students of color to attend pub-
lic universities (race-neutral colleges). In fact, Kidder shows that in the
years after Prop 209, black and Latino students increasingly preferred
private colleges that had affirmative action admissions policies (race-
conscious colleges).94 When examining the enrollment percentages of
admitted students of color, black and Latino students "were less likely to
choose to enroll at the University of California in the years after Prop.
209."95 Kidder notes that the "most pronounced case [was] African
Americans at UCLA, where the yield rate in the top third of UCLA's
admit pool dropped from 24% to 8%, a decline of two-thirds," after Prop
209.96 To provide some context, "for White/Asian American/Other ad-
mits in the top third of the pool [for all UCs] the yield rate was essential-
ly flat before and after Prop. 209 (57% versus 58%)."97 Thus, Prop 209
had the opposite effects of what stigma theorists predicted. After Prop
209, black and Latino students increasingly spurned offers from UC
schools and chose private universities with race-conscious admissions
instead.
Not only are students of color increasingly choosing race-conscious
colleges over race-neutral colleges, but the number of applicants of color
has also decreased at race-neutral schools since Prop 209. In 1995, be-
fore the implementation of Prop 209, 21.5% of applicants to the UC sys-
Voter Initiatives, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 461, 478-79 (2008) [hereinafter Symposium] (transcription
of welcome and introductory remarks).
92. See Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment
Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1199 (2010) ("Underrepresented minority students in
states that permit affirmative action encounter far less hostility and internal and external stigma than
students in anti-affirmative action states. . . . One of the key arguments in support of affirmative
action is that it can create a critical mass of minority students who are viewed not as a token aesthet-
ic, but first and foremost as legitimate citizens of the classroom to be engaged with on their own
terms. This research suggests that critical mass is more likely to occur in university settings that use
race-based admissions and those students are the ones least likely to report stigma or overt racism.
Conversely, those underrepresented minority students who are racially isolated bear the greatest
burden of overt racism and external and internal stigma. Furthermore, they are most likely to be
found in states that have adopted anti-affirmative action policies." (emphasis added) (footnote omit-
ted)).
93. Kidder, supra note 91, at 70-85.
94. See id. at 78 ("[A]mong those in the top third of the UC admit pool African Americans are
typically twice as likely as UC admits overall (39% average versus 18% overall) to attend a private
selective college or university, and Latinos (25%) are also more likely to enroll at private selective
institutions.").
95. Id. at 74-75.




tem were underrepresented students of color.98 In 1998, after Prop 209,
this percentage dropped to 17.5%.9 In addition, "the evidence is unam-
biguous and consistent that affirmative action bans led to substantial
drops in African American applications at the most selective law
schools," including UC Berkeley, UCLA, and UC Davis law schools.1
Unfortunately, bans on affirmative action have significantly de-
creased the number of black and Latino students enrolling at race-neutral
colleges. Kidder reports, "More than a decade after Prop. 209 took effect
African Americans remained 3.7% of new freshman enrolling in the UC
system, and the figures are lower at UC Berkeley (2.9%), UC Santa Cruz
(2.6%), UC Irvine (2.1%), and UC San Diego (1.2%)."'1 UC system-
wide, black enrollment dropped from 7.8% to 3.9%.102 To provide a
broader context, race-neutral colleges ranked last in the percentage of
black freshman among the nation's top twenty-nine colleges in 2011-
(27) University of Michigan (4.6%); (28) UCLA (3.9%); (29) UC Berke-
ley (2.7%).103 As for Latinos, in 1990 (before Prop 209), Latinos were
22% of the incoming class at UC Berkeley.'1 After Prop 209, Latinos
have maintained around 12% to 13% of the freshman class at UC Berke-
ley.105 UC system-wide, Latino enrollment dropped from 14.6% to
10.8%.106 These numbers are even more depressing considering that in
1990, Latinos were only 23% of graduating public high school students
in California, but in 2010, Latinos were 44% of public high school grad-
uates in California.0 7
Black student enrollment at UCLA particularly suffered after the
implementation of Prop 209. In 2006, UCLA admitted just 210 black
students (2%) out of 10,487 total admitted applicants.0 8 That year, black
student enrollment at UCLA dropped 57% from pre-Prop 209 average
enrollment numbers.' In fact, in 2006, UCLA had the lowest percentage
of black students, only 96 out of 4,852 entering freshman, since 1973.110
98. Symposium, supra note 91, at 474.
99. Id.
100. Kidder, supra note 91, at 86. Studies show that black applicants to UC Berkley and UCLA
law schools dropped two-fifths after Prop 209 went into effect. Id.
101. Id. at 88.
102. Symposium, supra note 91, at 475.
103. See JBHE Annual Survey: Black First-Year Students at the Nation's Leading Research
Universities, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.jbhe.com/2011/12/jbhe-annual-
survey-black-first-year-students-at-the-nations-leading-research-universities/. The top schools with
the most black students were: (1) Columbia (12.5%); (2) Duke (11.1%); (3) North Carolina (10.7%);
and (4) Stanford (10.7%). Id.
104. Kidder, supra note 91, at 89.
105. Id.
106. Symposium, supra note 91, at 475.
107. Kidder, supra note 91, at 89.
108. See Elaine Korry, Black Student Enrollment at UCLA Plunges, NPR (July 24, 2006, 12:01
AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5563891.
109. See id.




Today, UCLA still struggles to enroll black students (in fall 2015, 4.3%
of freshman) and has never fully recovered from Prop 209.' With so
few black students, it is easy to see how these students will have classes
in which they are the only black student, or just one of two. It is im-
portant to keep this perspective in mind when considering the hidden
costs of attending race-neutral colleges (discussed infra Part IV).
B. Comparative Stigma
Two studies based on student surveys found that stigma theorists
are incorrect in their hypothesis that affirmative action increases tigma-
tization. The first study involved students at seven law schools (four
schools with affirmative action policies and three under affirmative ac-
tion bans) and contained questions regarding stigma.112 The study found
that "among students of color at the four schools that do have affirmative
action programs and the three that do not, there is no statistically signifi-
cant difference in their responses to questions about feeling stigma-
tized."1l 3 In other words, the study found that the presence of an affirma-
tive action ban had no statistically significant effect on whether students
of color felt stigmatized.14 This at least suggests that race-conscious
colleges are not more harmful to students of color than race-neutral col-
leges.
The second study surveyed undergraduate and graduate students at
race-conscious colleges and schools subject to an affirmative action
ban."5 This study included questions regarding racism, stigma, and hos-
tility. With regards to "overt acts of racism from other students, students
attending school in the states that ban affirmative action experienced
overt racism at nearly twice the rate as students in those states that permit
affirmative action.""'6 It is regrettable that any student reported experi-
encing overt acts of racism, but it is notable that such a wide discrepancy
exists between race-conscious and race-neutral college environments. It
is also contrary to what some may believe-that students of color are
more likely to experience overt racism in race-neutral environments.
The survey results for questions about stigma were also contrary to
what stigma theorists would predict. As for internal stigma, the first two
questions regarding stigma had no statistical difference between the stu-
dents at the two types of schools.17 The third question, however, whether
11l. See Enrollment Demographics, Fall 2015, UCLA OFF. ANALYSIS & INFO. MGMT.,
http://www.aim.ucla.edu/tables/enrollment demographics-fall.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2015).
112. See Onwuachi-Willig et al., supra note 3, at 1325-26.
113. Id. at 1332 (emphasis added).
114. See id. at 1332-33.
115. See Bowen, supra note 92, at 1214-15.
116. Id. at 1221 (footnote omitted). 43.4% of students of color at race-neutral colleges reported
experiencing overt racism from other students; compared to 20.9% of students of color from race-
conscious colleges. Id. at 1222.
117. See id. at 1223.
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students of color "felt pressure to prove themselves academically be-
cause of their race," had a statistically significant result: "Almost three-
fourths of students in states that bar race-based admissions reported feel-
ing pressure to prove themselves because of their racial group member-
ship compared to less than half of students who attend schools with race-
based admissions.""8
As for external stigma, when asked whether white "students had
questioned their qualifications to be at the school, surprisingly, only
about one-quarter of students at affirmative action schools responded
affirmatively to this question, while almost one-half of students who
were admitted without race considerations answered 'yes."'119 In addi-
tion, when asked if professors "had lower expectations of them compared
to their white peers . . . . One-third of students attending schools in states
that ban raced-based admissions answered 'yes' while only one-fifth of
students in affirmative action states answered affirmatively." 20 These
results are directly opposite to what a stigma theorist would expect. More
specifically, stigma theorists assume that race-conscious schools have
more students of color experiencing stigma. Conversely, this study found
the exact opposite: Students of color were more likely to experience
stigma at race-neutral colleges. According to this study, race-neutral col-
leges are in fact harmful to students of color when compared to race-
conscious schools.
Some might attempt to discredit these studies by arguing that the re-
spondents are expressing false consciousness. That is, students of color at
race-conscious colleges are attempting to justify their decisions by deny-
ing that they experience stigma, but deep down they may feel stigma-
tized; and students at race-neutral colleges may be invested in feeling
stigmatized because it helps them excuse poor performance. Unfortu-
nately, one can always make a claim of false consciousness for every
survey because questioning motives and truthfulness is universal to the
method of surveying. Nevertheless, there is no better way of getting this
type of data, and there is no data to the contrary. Therefore, we should
not discredit these studies out of concerns for false consciousness.
Another study on the racial climates of race-neutral and race-
conscious colleges surveyed close to ten thousand black and Latino stu-
dents at eight UC campuses and three race-conscious colleges, all similar
118. Id. (emphasis added). 74.1% of students of color at race-neutral colleges reported feeling
pressure to prove themselves academically because of race; compared to 40.5% of students of color
from race-conscious colleges. Id. at 1222. This question is very much related to stereotype threat,
and will be further discussed in, infra Section IV.B.
119. Id. at 1224 (footnote omitted). 46.3% of students of color at race-neutral colleges reported
experiencing their qualifications questioned by white students; compared to 25.5% of students of
color from race-conscious colleges. Id. at 1222. These results were statistically significant.
120. Id. at 1224. 31.5% of students of color at race-neutral colleges reported faculty members
had lower expectations of them compared to their white counterparts; compared to 19.2% of students
of color from race-conscious colleges. Id. at 1222. These results were statistically significant.
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in size and ranking.121 The survey asked students whether students of
their race were respected on campus.'22 Black and Latino students in the
UC system agreed that students of their race were respected on campus at
statistically significant lower rates than at all three of the race-conscious
colleges.12 3 One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the critical
mass, or lack of critical mass, of students of color on campus.'24 All three
of the race-conscious colleges had higher percentages of black students
than seven of the UC schools.125 The only UC school, UC Riverside, to
have a higher percentage of black students (7.8% in 2010, more than any
other school in the study) agreed that they were respected on campus at a
higher rate than any other school.126 The report concludes, "[H]igher
levels of racial diversity are generally better for the campus climate faced
by African American students, whereas racial isolation in combination
with an affirmative action ban is associated with a more inhospitable
racial climate."'127 This study suggests that there is something different
about the racial climates at race-neutral and race-conscious colleges, and
racial isolation is a factor. I argue that racial isolation is just one of the
several harms students of color face at race-neutral colleges. The next
part uncovers what these potential harms are for students of color.
IV. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF RACE-NEUTRAL COLLEGES FOR STUDENTS
OF COLOR
Considering that students of color are increasingly choosing to at-
tend race-conscious colleges over race-neutral schools, an understanding
of why this is will help to evaluate the worth of each college degree.12 8
Stigma and mismatch theorists implicitly contend that a race-conscious
college degree is worth less than a race-neutral degree. In contrast, col-
lege students of color do not seem to agree. This could be because there
121. See WILLIAM C. KIDDER, THE SALIENCE OF RACIAL ISOLATION: AFRICAN AMERICANS'
AND LATINOS' PERCEPTIONS OF CLIMATE AND ENROLLMENT CHOICES WITH AND WITHOUT
PROPOSITION 209, at 2, 5 (2012).
122. See id at ll.
123. See id ("The data revealed that across eight UC campuses only 62.2% of African Ameri-
can students in 2008-10 report feeling that students of their race are respected on campus, compared
to over 92% of whites. At UT Austin in 2010-11 72.3% of African Americans reported feeling that
students of their race are respected on campus. While the UT Austin data indicate a less than ideal
racial climate for African Americans, the ten-point advantage over UC is nonetheless significant on
both a statistical and a practical level. Across the UC campuses 77.2% of Latinos feel that students
of their ethnicity are respected, compared to an impressive 89.9% at UT Austin. AAU University #1
likewise reports higher levels of African American (75.0%) and Latino (79.6%) students feeling
respected on campus. The same is true at AAU University #2, where African American (76.3%) and
Latino (90.0%) students are more likely to feel respected.").
124. See id. at 12-14.
125. See id. at 12.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 13.
128. 1 acknowledge that some may contest the validity of the Kidder's analysis and the studies
that he cites. Even considering that there are criticisms of the Kidder article, it is still worthwhile to
explore why students of color may want to choose a race-conscious college over a race-neutral
college in order to contribute to and better understand the affirmative action debate.
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are hidden costs to attending a race-neutral college. Race-neutral colleges
have fewer students of color1 29 and, thus, problems of racial isolation,130
stereotype threat,131 racial microaggressions,32 identity performance,13 3
and racial labor'34 are exacerbated. These costs are not only intrinsic but
also cause economic harms to students of color.
Some may argue that during the admissions phase, high school stu-
dents cannot possibly be aware of these hidden costs, and thus, these
costs are not a part of the decision-making process between a race-
neutral and a race-conscious college. High school students are actually
more aware of these costs than some might assume.135 High school stu-
dents have experienced the world as a person of color for eighteen years
and in various educational environments. This is plenty of time for a
student to understand that these harms exist in educational settings. Not
all high school students may fully understand these costs or be able to
articulate them, but most will have felt these costs before.
Furthermore, social media greatly contributes to the reputation of a
college's racial dynamics in the eyes of prospective students. For exam-
ple, at UCLA (a race-neutral college due to Prop 209) there have been
two widely publicized and viewed YouTube videos in recent years that
have garnered a lot of attention regarding the school's racial climate.
First, there was the infamous "Asians in the Library" video posted on
YouTube by a white female student at UCLA.' 36 In her video, she com-
plains about Asian students talking on their cell phones in the library
129. See discussion supra Section III.A.
130. Racial isolation is the lack of having a critical mass of students of color on campus and,
thus, resulting in the burdens of having to represent your entire race in class or being singled out
based on your race. This concept is discussed further in, infra Section IV.A.
131. Stereotype threat is the added pressure of having to represent your ace because there are
so few people of your race in the educational setting. Stereotype threat often results in depressed
academic performance and the student of color not performing to their true potential or understand-
ing of the material. This concept is discussed further in, infra Section IV.B.
132. Racial microaggressions are forms of unconscious or colorblind racism that contributes to
a hostile learning environment for students of color. Racial microaggressions are difficult to address
because often it is impossible to prove intentionality on the part of the perpetrator. This concept is
discussed further in, infra Section IV.C.
133. Identity performance is the energy that students of color expend on attempting to fit in or
assimilate into white institutions. This concept is discussed further in, infra Section IV.D.
134. Racial labor is the extra work in which students of color must perform because they are
students of color. This can be due to tokenism or increasing diversity efforts on campus, but this is
extra work in which white students are not asked to perform at the same rate. This concept is dis-
cussed further in, infra Section l.E.
135. Carla Rivera, African American Students Weigh Campus Attitudes in Picking Colleges,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014, 9:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-college-choice-
20140501-story.html#page=l.
136. Alexandra Wallace, the creator of the original video, removed the video from YouTube.
There are, however, various copies of the video on YouTube. For news coverage of the video, see
Larry Gordon & Rick Rojas, UCLA Won't Discipline Creator of Controversial Video, Who Later
Withdraws from University, L.A. TIMEs (Mar. 19, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/201 I/mar/I 9/local/la-me-ucla-speech-20110319; Ian Lovett, U.C.L.A.
Student's Video Rant Against Asians Fuels Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/us/16ucla.html.
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after the tsunami in Japan and mocks Asian languages by imitating Asian
students in saying, "Ching chong, ling long."l 37 The student goes on to
say, "'The problem is these hordes of Asian people that U.C.L.A. accepts
into our school every single year, which is fine.' . . . 'But if you're going
to come to U.C.L.A., then use American manners.'13 8 When the student
says "hordes of Asian people" and "our school," she implicitly means
that UCLA is for white students and Asian students do not belong, nor
are they welcomed, at UCLA.
In 2013, another video contributing to UCLA's racial climate repu-
tation surfaced on YouTube and has over two million views.1 39 The video
includes a group of black male students providing embarrassing statistics
regarding the lack of black male students at UCLA. 140 In addition, Sy
Stokes, the creator of the video, performs a spoken word poem criticizing
UCLA, while nine black male students stand silently behind him. 141 The
influential video sends a clear message that the black male students are
137. See Gordon & Rojas, supra note 136. For an interesting response to this video, see Jimmy
Wong, Ching Chong! Asians in the Library Song (Response to UCLA's Alexandra Wallace),
YOuTUBE (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-zulEMWj3sVA, which has been
viewed over five million times.
138. Lovett, supra note 136.
139. Sy Stokes, The Black Bruins [Spoken Word], YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-BEO3H5BOIFk. For news coverage of the video, see Kendal
Mitchell, Student Posts Video to Spark Discussion About Lack of Diversity at UCLA, DAILY BRUIN
(Nov. 8, 2013, 1:42 AM), http://dailybruin.com/2013/11/08/student-posts-video-to-spark-discussion-
about-lack-of-diversity-at-ucla/; Akane Otani, Black UCLA Students Decry Lack of Diversity in
Video, USA TODAY (Nov. 19, 2013, 9:43 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/14/youtube-ucla-lack-diversity/3518373/;
UCLA has More NCAA Championships than Black Male Freshmen, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8,
2013, 5:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/08/ucla-black-enrollment-
freshmenn _4242213.html.
140. See Stokes, supra note 139.
141. Part of the spoken word lyrics are:
Now you tell me that I should be proud to be at UCLA?
When only 35 of us are predicted to walk across that stage?
When most of us are dropping out from the lack of financial aid
While Judy Olian, Dean of Anderson School of Management just spent $647,000 on first
class flights and hotel stays
But waiting for an apology is asking for the impossible
Because no snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible
But you tell me I should be proud to be a Bruin
When we have more national championships than we do black male freshmen
It's evident that our only purpose here is to improve your winning percentage
So now black high school kids can care less about grades, just as long as the number on
the back of their jersey doesn't fade
And you tell me I should be proud to be a Bruin
Stop pretending that the wounds of our past have healed
We're not asking for a handout, we're asking for a level playing field
Those with less opportunity are fighting for their position trying to find their place
But those with privilege are hitting triples when they were already born on third base
So with all of my brothers' hopes and dreams that this university has tried to ruin
How the hell am I supposed to be proud... to call myself.., a Bruin
Id
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unsatisfied by the lack of diversity at UCLA. In turn, this message in-
forms and influences prospective students of color in their decision to
attend UCLA.
In addition, a high school student is usually not making this deci-
sion alone. There are often several adults (parents, older siblings, family
members, mentors, counselors, and teachers) who share their opinions of
certain schools. These adults not only bring their own life experiences
and education to the discussion but may also be more aware of current
news stories covering the racial climate of prospective colleges.14 2 For
instance, many people in Los Angeles heard about the discrimination
lawsuit filed by a black UCLA surgeon.143 The surgeon alleged that "he
was routinely publicly humiliated and once was depicted as a gorilla
being sodomized in a slide show presentation during a resident gradua-
tion event."'" The UC Board of Regents ultimately settled the case for
$4.5 million.1 4 5 Others may have heard about a prominent black judge
who "filed a complaint against two UCLA police officers, accusing them
of using excessive force when they pulled him over for not wearing a
seat belt." 46 In addition, some may have read about the several racist and
sexist slurs posted about women of color.147 One sign posted on the Viet-
namese Student Union board read, "[A]sian women R Honkie white-boy
worshipping Whores [sic]." 48 The next day, another a student found a
sign in the library bathroom that said, "Asian Women are White-Boy
142. See Rivera, supra note 135.
143. See Hailey Branson-Potts, UCLA Doctor Sues Regents, Alleging Racial Bias, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/20/local/la-me-0420-ucla-lawsuit-20120420.
144. Stephen Ceasar, Black Surgeon to Get $4.5 Million in Racial Bias Suit, L.A. TIMES (July
18, 2013) [hereinafter Ceasar, Racial Bias], http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/18/local/la-me-ucla-
settle-20130719. Interestingly, this lawsuit was followed by a study that found "UCLA's policies
and procedures are inadequate to deal with increasing complaints of racial bias among faculty-
nearly all of whom surveyed said they had experienced some level of discrimination . . . ." Stephen
Ceasar, Study Faults UCLA's Handling of Faculty's Racial Bias Complaints, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18,
2013), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-ucla-discrimination-
20131019,0,2297269.story#axzz2mGLQBE6J. Additionally, this incident has led to a petition on
Change.org urging the California Attorney General, Kamala Harris, to investigate UCLA to see if
any state laws were broken regarding claims of discrimination and retaliation by faculty members.
As of August, 30, 2015, the petition was "Closed," but had gathered 67,376 supporters. Ron Hasson,
CA Attorney General Kamala Harris: Investigate UCLA for Ignoring Discrimination and Retalia-
tion Complaints by Faculty Members, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/ca-attorney-
general-kamala-harris-investigate-ucla-for-ignoring-discrimination-and-retaliation-complaints-by-
faculty-members (last visited Nov. 23, 2015).
145. See Ceasar, Racial Bias, supra note 144.
146. Richard Winton, Black Judge Says UCLA Cops Used Excessive Force in Seat-Belt Stop,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2013, 1:44 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-black-judge-
ucla-police-20131125,0,7110117.story#axzz2mGLQBE6J.
147. See Sara Gates, UCLA Off-Campus Student Apartment Defamed with Racial Slurs,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/ucla-
graffiti-racial-slurs_n_1311463.html; Kathleen Miles, At UCLA, Racist, Sexist Signs Called Asian
Women 'White-Boy Worshipping Whores,' HUFFINGTON PosT (Nov. 29, 2012, 2:09 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/1l/2 9/ucla-racist-sexist-signs-asian-women-
video n 2212311.html.
148. Miles, supra note 147.
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Worshipping Sluts."l49 Such racist stories signal to prospective students
that UCLA is not a welcoming place for people of color, and thus, they
may decide to go to another school.150
In 2014, another highly publicized campaign recently took place at
UCLA School of Law.151 The Black Law Students Association organized
an awareness campaign called "3 3/11 00"-the fraction is the number of
black students out of the total number of students at UCLA Law.'5 2 The
goal of the campaign was to "raise awareness of the disturbing emotional
toll placed upon students of color due to their alarmingly low representa-
tion within the student body." 53 The campaign included a YouTube vid-
eo of black law students describing what it is like to be black at UCLA
Law. 154 The formidable video immediately went viral155 and garnered
significant news coverage.156 Regrettably, the campaign also resulted in
149. Id.
150. Some may argue that although UCLA may have a racial climate problem, this is not
common among most public universities banning affirmative action. I chose to focus on UCLA
because I know most about this environment. These types of racial incidents, however, happen at
various other UC campuses including UC Berkeley, UC Irvine, and UC San Diego. See Randal C.
Archibold, California Campus Sees Uneasy Race Relations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/27/education/27sandiego.html? r-0 ("Students at the University
of California, San Diego, held an off-campus 'Compton Cookout' Feb. 15 to mock Black History
Month, with guests invited to don gold teeth in the style of rappers from Los Angeles suburb of
Compton, eat watermelon, and dress in baggy athletic wear."); Jeremiah Dobruck, Second Racial
Incident at UC Irvine Roils Campus, L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/Il/ocal/la-me-In-second-racial-incident-at-uc-irvine-roils-
campus-20130511 ("Police said Friday that someone put a note in a black student's backpack that
read, 'Go back 2 Africa slave.' . . . Police say they are unaware of any connection between the note
and the fraternity YouTube video that was blasted for racial insensitivity two weeks ago. The parody
music video featured a member of the Asian fraternity Lambda Theta Delta wearing black face.");
Tony Perry, US. Ends Probe of Racial Bias at UC San Diego, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/14/local/la-me-0414-ucsd-harassment-20120414 ("The universi-
ty will take steps to prevent harassment after several incidents, including a noose left in the library
and an off-campus 'Compton Cookout' fraternity party during Black History Month."); Lee Romney
& Larry Gordon, Diversity Satire is a Little Too Biting, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/26/local/la-me-berkeley-bake-sale-20110927 ("UC Berkeley
Republican club draws nationwide protests and support with a bake sale in which items are priced
according to a buyer's race, ethnicity and gender.").
151. See Samantha Tomilowitz & Sam Hoff, UCLA Law Students Protest Lack ofDiversity,
DAILY BRUIN (Feb. 10, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://dailybruin.com/2014/02/1 0/ucla-law-students-protest-
lack-of-diversity/.
152. Id.
153. RecordtoCapture, 33, YoJTUBE (Feb. 10, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-5y3C5KBcCPI.
154. Id.
155. See id (gathering more than 400 comments and over 80,000 views).
156. See Rhonesha Byng, Video Shines Light on the 'Disturbing Emotional Toll' of Being
Black at UCLA Law School, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2014, 5:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/14/ucla-law-school-diversityn4789763.html; Melissa
Harris-Perry, Hyper- Visible, but Also Invisble,' MSNBC (Apr. 26, 2014),
http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-perry/watch/hyper-visible-but-invisible-238007363694;
Julianne Hing, How Does it Feel to Be a Black Student at UCLA Law School? [Video],
COLORLINES (Feb. 10, 2014, 4:10 PM),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2014/02/how-does-it-feel-to-be-a-black-student-at-ucla-law-scho
olvideo.htmi; Elie Mystal, Racism Abounds at UCLA School of Law, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 24,
2014, 6:18 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/02/racism-abounds-at-ucla-school-of-law/; Tamara
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racist backlash, including one black student receiving hate mail in her
student mailbox and people tearing down posters for law school events
sponsored by identity organizations.157 The backlash only sparked even
more national media coverage surrounding the events.158 Undoubtedly,
the negative publicity has influenced perspective students of color in
their decision to attend UCLA Law. As a UCLA Law student of color, I
received several emails from prospective students of color asking what
was going on and whether they should attend UCLA Law. It is evident
that the racial climate of a campus goes into the calculus for prospective
students in deciding between schools.
Moreover, colleges also feel the need to appear nonracist by dis-
playing and highlighting diversity as a means of attracting students of
color.159 In a recent study investigating the promotional materials of 371
colleges, researchers found that students of color were considerably
overrepresented in photographs.60 For example, Asians accounted for
3.3% of the student body but 5.1% of the students appearing in promo-
tional photos; black students made up 7.9% of student enrollment but
12.4% of the photographed students.'6 1 Some colleges have gone as far
as to Photoshop pictures of students of color into promotional photos
where the student was not actually present.162 Universities do this to at-
tract students to their school and avoid appearing racist.163 Clearly then,
colleges understand that diversity issues and educational climate are im-
portant factors of the decision-making process for a prospective student
of color-otherwise, why would they go through the trouble?
Tabo, On Racism at UCLA Law and False Dichotomies, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 27, 2014,4:12 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/02/on-racism-at-ucla-law-and-false-dichotomies/.
157. Rhonesha Byng, Racial Tensions Grow at UCLA Law After Black Student Receives Hate
Mail, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2014, 11:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/27/ucla-law-school-racism-diversity_n_4860406.html.
158. See Jayson Flores, UCLA Law Students Move to Improve Campus Culture After Racist
Incident, USA TODAY (Feb. 27, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2014/02/27/ucla-law-
students-move-to-improve-campus-culture-after-racist-incident/; Jonathan P. Hicks, Tense Times for
Black Students at UCLA's Law School, BET (Feb. 28, 2014, 6:41 PM),
http://www.bet.com/news/national/2014/02/28/tense-times-for-black-students-at-ucla-s-law-
school.html; Julianne Hing, Racial Harassment Picks Up After Video About Being Black at UCLA
Law School, COLORLINES (Feb. 27, 2014, 12:39 PM),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2014/02/racialharassmentpicks upaftertherelease of video abo
ut beingblackatuclalawschool.html.
159. See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REv. 2151, 2191-94 (2013).
160. Scott Jaschik, Viewbook Diversity vs. Real Diversity, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 2, 2008,
4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/07/02/viewbooks; see also Matthew Hartley
& Christopher C. Morphew, What's Being Sold and to What End? A Content Analysis of College
Viewbooks, 79 J. HIGHER EDUC. 671, 686-87 (2008).
161. Jaschik, supra note 160.
162. See William Claiborne, School's Diversity Too Good to Be True, SFGATE (Sept. 21, 2000,
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/education/article/School-s-Diversity-Too-Good-to-Be-True-
2737946.php.
163. There are many other reasons why colleges and universities highlight students of color in
their promotional material, but these reasons are outside the scope of this paper. For a more thorough
discussion of this phenomenon, see Leong, supra note 159.
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Even if one is still not convinced that a prospective student makes
these calculations before accepting an offer, it is still an important exer-
cise to uncover the costs associated with attending a race-neutral college.
These intrinsic and economic costs are significant to the comparison of
valuing a degree from a race-neutral and a race-conscious university.
This part explores each of the costs, mentioned above.
A. Racial Isolation
As discussed earlier, race-neutral colleges tend to have lower per-
centages of students of color.'6" As such, race-neutral schools have a
heightened risk of racial isolation for students of color because of the
lack of a critical mass of students of color.'6 ' Racial isolation occurs
when there are so few students of color that often a student of color may
be the only student, or one among a very few, of their racial background
that is present in class.1 66 For example, during my first year of law
school, my section had eighty students, but only one black student. This
would qualify as racial isolation. The topic of racial isolation was of
huge concern during oral arguments in Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin.16 7 Both sides appeared to agree that racial isolation is a valid con-
cern for a university to attempt to alleviate.' Part of this concern over
racial isolation is due to the negative effects that it has on students of
color. 169
There are several serious detriments to students of color that face
racial isolation on campus and in the classroom.170 Most of these psycho-
logical and academic consequences tem from feelings of distinctiveness
or unbelonging.171 More specifically, racial isolation increases the likeli-
hood that others will view students of color as a representative or
spokesperson for their entire race.172 Experts often refer to this phenome-
164. See Sander & Taylor, supra note 80.
165. See Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 18-19, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-
345).
166. See id. at 18.
167. See Oral Argument, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/201211 345.
168. Mr. Rein, Fisher's attorney, explained during oral arguments:
[T]o be within [the] Grutter framework, the first question is, absent the use of race, would
we be generating a critical mass? To answer that question, you start -- you've got to ex-
amine in context the so-called soft factors that are in Grutter. You know, are -- is there an
isolation on campus? Do members of minority [groups] feel that they cannot speak out?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). The University's
attorney affirmed, "[What we look to, and we think that courts can review this determination, one,
we look to feedback directly from students about racial isolation that they experience. Do they feel
like spokespersons for their race." Id. at 46.
169. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association in Support of Re-
spondents at 5-11, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 1-345).
170. Id
171. Id. at 8.
172. Id at 8-10
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non as "tokenism."73 The American Psychological Association (APA)
reports, "Tokenism heightens the undue attention paid to minorities, fos-
ters stereotyping, and reduces perceptions of individuality. Further, to-
kenism can foment social stigma and inhibit student achievement."'74
The effects of tokenism are not just theoretical, but rather, they are sub-
stantive and real for students of color at racially isolated campuses.
Chrystal James, one of only two black students in her class at UCLA
Law, describes:
I remember being upset almost every single day . . . I remember stu-
dents feeling free enough that when anything was mentioned about
color, to turn in their seat and stare at me . . . I had students sit there
and turn to me, and stare at me, to wait for my reaction.. . I remem-
ber Lena [the other Black student] getting up and leaving the class-
room, running out crying.1 75
Racial isolation can also preclude a sense of belonging for students
of color.176 The APA explains:
Isolated members of minority groups also "experience relatively
greater uncertainty about their belonging in school." This uncertainty
can be detrimental to "well-being and performance," and it can ulti-
mately discourage students from persisting in an academic setting.
However, when minority students experience a greater sense of be-
longing and less sensitivity to racial rejection, their interpersonal re-
lationships improve and they achieve higher grade point averages
throughout college.177
Even worse, daily experiences of discrimination can exacerbate a
sense of unbelonging.'7 8 Research shows that students in racially isolated
settings face increased overt and implicit discrimination.'79 For example,
Marky Keaton, one of only five black students in his first-year class at
UCLA Law, illustrates such discrimination in describing an incident
from law school:
One day I was approached in the law school courtyard by a couple of
UCLA campus police officers. One of the officers insisted repeatedly
that I specifically had been identified by a student as being in the vi-
173. Id at 10.
174. Id (footnote omitted).
175. Brief of Amici Curiae UCLA School of Law Students of Color in Support of Respondents
at 6, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (alterations in original) (quoting Jodie-
Marie Masley, Testimony of Chrystal Blossom James, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 433, 436 (2001)).
176. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association in Support of Re-
spondents, supra note 169, at 8-9.
177. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, A Brief
Social-Belonging Intervention Improves Academic and Health Outcomes of Minority Students, 331
SCIENCE 1447, 1448 (2011)).
178. See Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae in




cinity when some money was allegedly stolen from her two days ear-
lier. Of course, when I asked the officer if the girl had said my name,
he said no. Instead, she had merely described a Black male with
white shoes and a long sleeve shirt. Apparently, since I'm one of the
only Black males walking around this school, this was enough for the
officer to say affirmatively that I was the male she had identified. It
was around lunchtime so there were a lot of students in the courtyard
who witnessed the incident. I was absolutely humiliated. I had been
trying hard to fit in with the rest of my classmates and to get them to
see me as more than just "the Black man in the class." Because I was
the only Black man in the class, I felt that the police singled me out. I
also felt like the other students were looking at me as if I was guilty. I
was so emotionally distraught that I was not even able to go to class
that day. It will be a long time before I am ever comfortable in the
law school environment again.Iso
As one can see, racial isolation can have very damaging and lasting
effects on students of color. These consequences not only affect students
emotionally but also academically.'8 1 James describes how upsetting and
uncomfortable it was for her to attend class, while Keaton describes how
the effects of racial isolation made him unable to go to class.'82 If Stu-
dents of color are distracted in class or incapable of attending class, they
will suffer academically. Not only that, but racial isolation arguably ex-
acerbates other harms (discussed herein) at race-neutral colleges.
B. Stereotype Threat
One of the most well researched effects of racial isolation is stereo-
type threat.'8 3 "Stereotype threat is the pressure that people feel when
they fear that their performance could confirm a negative stereotype
about their [racial] group," and as a result, "[t]his pressure manifests
itself in anxiety and distraction that interferes with intellectual function-
ing."'" This causes some students of color to not perform to their true
academic potential on exams, resulting in test scores and grades that of-
180. Brief of Amici Curiae UCLA School of Law Students of Color in Support of Respond-
ents, supra note 175, at 7-8 (quoting testimonial of Marky Keaton, UCLA School of Law, Class of
2003).
181. Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association in Support of Respond-
ents, supra note 169, at 8-9 ("Social isolation also makes underrepresented minorities especially
vulnerable to psychological impediments to performance.. . . Solo status 'lead[s] racial minorities to
construe the self in terms of race and to perceive being seen as a race representative,' which can
hinder intellectual performance." (quoting Denise Sekaquaptewa et al., Solo Status and Self-
Construal: Being Distinctive Influences Racial Self-Construal and Performance Apprehension in
African American Women, 13 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 321, 326
(2007))).
182. See Brief of Amici Curiae UCLA School of Law Students of Color in Support of Re-
spondents, supra note 175, at 6-8.
183. See Brief of Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
184. Id. at 3.
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ten underestimate their knowledge or ability.'85 Increasing the number of
students of color in the classroom and on campus reduces stereotype
threat because students of color are less likely to feel as though they are
representing their racial group.186
Stereotype threat is "one of the most widely studied topics of the
past decade in social psychology," and "a large body of work now testi-
fies to the reliability and generalizability of stereotype threat effects on
performance."l87 Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson were the first to test
stereotype threat under laboratory conditions.'88 Steele and Aronson gave
the same test to groups of black and white students at Stanford Universi-
ty under two different conditions.'89 In one setting, researchers told stu-
dents that the test was an evaluation of their intellectual ability, and in
the other, researchers told students that the test was a mere problem-
solving task.190 Under the first condition, black students performed con-
siderably worse than white students with the same incoming SAT
scores.191 Under the second condition, however, in which researchers told
students it was a mere problem-solving exercise, black students per-
formed significantly better, almost closing the racial achievement gap.192
Steele and Aronson concluded that black students under the first condi-
tion "became anxious that a poor performance could seem to confirm the
negative stereotype of intellectual inferiority, and this anxiety disrupted
their test performance."'93
Subsequent research has shown that stereotype threat also applies to
other groups, including Latino students,'94 women on math tests,'95 and
even white men, when researchers gave them a math test and told them
that their performance would be compared to Asian men.'96 Interestingly,
whites also succumb to stereotype threat when given tasks where they
185. Id. at 3-5.
186. Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association in Support of Respond-
ents, supra note 169, at 8.
187. Toni Schmader et al., An Integrated Process Model of Stereotype Threat Effects on Per-
formance, 115 PSYCHOL. REv. 336, 336 (2008).
1 88. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 797, 797-99 (1995).
189. See id. at 799.
190. See id.
191. See id at 800.
192. See id.
193. Brief of Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 183, at 8.
194. See Patricia M. Gonzalez et al., The Effects of Stereotype Threat and Double-Minority
Status on the Test Performance of Latino Women, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 659,
666 (2002).
195. See Diane M. Quinn & Steven J. Spencer, The Interference of Stereotype Threat with
Women 's Generation of Mathematical Problem-Solving Strategies, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 55, 57-58
(2001); Steven J. Spencer et al., Stereotype Threat and Women's Math Performance, 35 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 4, 16-17 (1999).
196. See Joshua Aronson et al., When White Men Can't do Math: Necessary and Sufficient
Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 29, 34-40 (1999).
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are concerned with corroborating the stereotype that whites are racists.197
Another study showed that under the threat of appearing racist, white
participants distanced themselves more from black conversation part-
ners.19 8 Thus, although it seems counterintuitive, whites behave in more
stereotype-affirming ways (racist) when they are concerned with appear-
ing racist.199
Stereotype threat occurs because the task at hand and concerns of
being viewed stereotypically divide the student's attention.200 In an ami-
cus brief filed in Fisher, experimental psychologists explain the cogni-
tive effects of stereotype threat:
Research finds that anxiety about negative stereotypes can trigger
physiological changes in the body and the brain (especially an in-
creased cardiovascular profile of threat and activation of brain re-
gions used in emotional regulation), cognitive reactions (especially a
vigilant self-monitoring of performance), and affective responses
(especially the suppression of self-doubts). These effects all divert
cognitive resources that could otherwise be used to maximize task
performance.201
It is important to note that students do not need to believe that the
stereotype is true, but rather only know that the stereotype exists and care
202about their performance.
Some may argue that stereotype threat does not exist within the col-
lege setting because students are not primed in the same way that they
are in the laboratory setting.203 Studies have shown, however, that even
subtle communication of low expectations can result in stereotype threat
effects.204 This is especially concerning for students of color at race-
197. See Cynthia M. Frantz et al., A Threat in the Computer: The Race Implicit Association
Test as a Stereotype Threat Experience, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1611, 1621
(2004).
198. See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Space Between Us: Stereotype Threat and Distance in
Interracial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 104 (2008).
199. Considering that race-neutral colleges (largely white institutions made up of white lead-
ers) are concerned with not appearing racist (see conversation earlier in this part about colleges over
representing and photo-shopping in students of color in promotional material), I would hypothesize
that race-neutral colleges suffer from white stereotype threat and exacerbate racial hostilities for
students of color.
200. See Brief of Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
supra note 183, at 10.
201. Id (citing Schmader et al., supra note 187, at 342-46; Toni Schmader & Michael Johns,
Converging Evidence that Stereotype Threat Reduces Working Memory Capacity, 85 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 440, 451 (2003)).
202. Id. at 4.
203. See Joshua Aronson & Thomas Dee, Stereotype Threat in the Real World, in STEREOTYPE
THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 264, 264-65 (Michael Inzlicht & Toni Schmader
eds., 2011).
204. See e.g. Michael Inzlicht & Talia Ben-Zeev, A Threatening Intellectual Environment: Why
Females are Susceptible to Experiencing Problem-Solving Deficits in the Presences of Males, I I
PSYCHOL. SCI. 365, 369-70 (2000); Jessi L. Smith & Paul H. White, An Examination of Implicitly
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neutral schools, considering one of the studies205 discussed earlier in this
Article, supra Section III.B, regarding the expectations of professors.
When asked if professors had lower expectations of students of color
compared to their white peers, "[o]ne-third of students attending schools
in states that ban race-based admissions answered 'yes' while only one-
fifth of students in affirmative action states answered affirmatively."206
Believing that a professor has lower expectations for students of color
would certainly be a primer for stereotype threat.
Admittedly, students of color face stereotype threat at all types of
colleges, but stereotype threat is arguably more likely to occur at race-
neutral colleges because those educational settings have smaller percent-
ages of students of color. Just look to the study discussed earlier in this
207Article, supra Section III.B. When researchers asked students of color
whether they "felt pressure to prove themselves academically because of
their race," there was a statistically significant result: "Almost three-
fourths of students in states that bar race-based admissions reported feel-
ing pressure to prove themselves because of their racial group member-
ship compared to less than half of students who attend schools with race-
based admissions."208 This is an expected result when considering the
dismal percentages of students of color at race-neutral colleges. Psy-
chologists agree that "[o]ne way to mitigate stereotype threat is to pro-
vide a racially diverse environment, so that minority students do not feel
that they are seen or evaluated as representatives of their group."209 Until
race-neutral colleges are able to create racially diverse campuses, where
students of color do not feel pressure to represent their race, stereotype
threat will continue to harm students of color on race-neutral campuses.
C. Racial Microaggressions
Another cost of attending race-neutral colleges has to deal with in-
tense racial microaggressions on campus.210 Racial microaggressions are
a form of unconscious racism that is pervasive on college campuses.211
Activated, Explicitly Activated, and Nullified Stereotypes on Mathematical Performance: It's Not
Just a Woman's Issue, 47 SEx ROLES 179, 179-81 (2002).
205. Bowen, supra note 92, at 1224-25.
206. Id. at 1224. 31.5% of students of color at race-neutral colleges reported faculty members
had lower expectations of them compared to their white counterparts; compared to 19.2% of students
of color from race-conscious colleges. Id. at 1222. These results were statistically significant.
207. Id. at 1220.
208. Id. at 1223 (emphasis added). 74.1% of students of color at race-neutral colleges reported
feeling pressure to prove themselves academically because of race; compared to 40.5% of students
of color from race-conscious colleges. Id. at 1222.
209. Brief of Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 183, at 2-3; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association in Sup-
port of Respondents, supra note 169, at 8-9.
210. See Daniel Sol6rzano et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and Campus
Racial Climate: The Experiences ofAfrican American College Students, 69 J. NEGRO EDUC. 60, 60,
62-63 (2000); Tanzina Vega, Everyday Slights Tied to Race Add Up to Big Campus Topic, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2014, at Al.
211. Sol6rzano et al., supra note 210, at 60.
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They are essentially "subtle insults (verbal, nonverbal, and/or visual)
directed toward people of color, often automatically or unconscious-
ly." 2 12 Students of color face various racial microaggressions on an al-
most daily basis-"[e]xamples of typical microaggressions include being
ignored for service, assumed to be guilty of anything negative, treated as
inferior, stared at due to being of color, or singled out in a negative way
because of being different." 2 13 Racial microaggressions are difficult to
address because they often lack intentionality, but the effects of racial
microaggressions can be devastating in creating a hostile learning envi-
ronment for students of color. Although racial microaggressions happen
all the time and in various settings, race-neutral colleges have an espe-
cially difficult time in responding to these acts of unconscious racism
because they are confined to colorblind solutions and norms.
A perfect example of a notable microaggression happened at UCLA
School of Law in the fall of 2013.214 For an upcoming lL section softball
game, students in Professor Sander's property class decided to make t-
shirts that read "Team Sander" with a picture of Sander's face.215 Sand-
er's section was the only 1L section that created t-shirts and wore them
to class, so when other students saw the shirts, they had no clue that the
section had created the shirts for purposes of a softball game.216 Instead,
many students assumed that he shirts were in reference to Sander's
scholarship and opinions of mismatch and stigma theories.2 17 Justifiably,
the t-shirts greatly offended several students of color and allies.218 Stu-
dents of color interpreted the t-shirts as saying that they did not belong at
the law school.219 Reanne Swafford, a black law student, posted a picture
of a student wearing the shirt on her Facebook page with the following
caption:
So this is happening at the law school today . .. yes he & other 1 Ls
are wearing shirts that say "Team Sander" as in Richard Sander - -
UCLA faculty who believes Black students can "neither learn nor
compete effectively" at institutions such as UCLA. Thanks col-
leagues for yet ANOTHER signal of how I don't "belong" here.220
212. Id.
213. Daniel Sol6rzano et al., Keeping Race in Place: Racial Microaggressions and Campus
Racial Climate at the University of California, Berkeley, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 15, 16-17
(2002).
214. See Elie Mystal, Racists' T-Shirts on Campus? Only If You Bother to Think About It,
ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 22, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/1 I/racists-t-shirts-on-
campus-only-if-you-bother-to-think-about-it/; Are You on Team Sander?, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov.
22, 2013, 5:18 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/1 1/are-you-on-team-sander/.





220. Reanne Swafford-Harris, FACEBOOK (Nov. 20, 2013),
https://www.facebook.com/reanne.swafford.
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Online coverage of the incident shared the same sentiment. On
Above the Law, a popular website covering all things related to law
school and the legal profession, one contributor wrote in response to the
incident:
In any event, if you are a 1 L wearing a "Team Sander" t-shirt, you
are making a pretty bold statement about how you view your Afri-
can-American classmates. It's not as overt as walking around in a
pointy hood. But it's a pretty ballsy statement on a campus full of
educated black people. Black law students know that Richard Sander
doesn't think they belong.221
Although some of the students wearing the shirts knew of Sander's
scholarship and the effects that wearing the shirts might have on other
students, Sander's section was able to go unpunished and hide behind
unintentionally.222 Because they could argue that the primary intention
was to show support for the upcoming softball game, others could not
accuse them of racism. Regardless of intentionality, however, the effects
were still the same-the shirts were highly offensive to students of color
and allies, and the microaggression contributed to a hostile learning envi-
ronment.223 This example also shows the difficulty in responding to mi-
224
croaggressions. The contributor covering the "Team Sander" story on
Above the Law explained, "All you can do in response to a microaggres-
221. Mystal, supra note 214.
222. See id.; Elie Mystal, Racism at UCLA is Slightly Out of Control, ABOVE THE LAW
REDLINE (Feb. 26, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://www.atlredline.com/racism-at-ucla-is-slightly-out-of-
control-1531867754.
223. Another effect of this incident will be prospective students of color deciding not to apply
or attend UCLA Law. On Top-Law-Schools, a website focusing on law school admissions, the
"Team Sander" story hit the Underrepresented Minority 2013-2014 Cycle Thread. In response to the
story, there were numerous posts regarding not even applying to UCLA Law. Some of them include:
* "I might not need to consider UCLA if this is the norm." toshiroh (Nov. 25, 2013,
9:30 PM);
* "Yeah I'm probably gonna save my little dollars and not apply there." mandyjayl 1
(Nov. 25, 2013, 10:49 PM);
* "I really hope black ppl stop applying to this school. I wouldn't even feel comforta-
ble being there . . . . you can count the diversity on one hand." NanaP (Nov. 25, 2013,
11:44 PM);
* "I can't imagine the stress of finals compounded with racial BS. UCLA seems like a
toxic environment for African Americans." californiauser (Nov. 26, 2013, 12:23 AM);
* "UCLA is a great school ... but this is too much even for me. There's simply too
much hostility with too much formal backing out way too far in the open for me to toler-
ate. I couldn't imagine spending money to apply there, much less fly across the country
and attend." Futuregohanl4 (Nov. 26, 2013, 12:45 AM).
URM 2013-2014 Cycle Thread, TOP-LAW-SCHOOLS.COM, http://www.top-law-
schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f-14&t-211454&st-0&sk-t&sd=a&start-3125 (last visited
Nov. 24, 2015).
224. For a better response to a racial microaggression on another campus, see Peter Jacobs,
Two Kenyon Students Offered an Incredibly Sincere and Thoughtful Apology After Accusations of
Racial Insensitivity, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 25, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/two-
kenyon-students-offered-an-incredibly-sincere-and-thoughtful-apology-after-accusations-of-racial-
insensitivity-2013-l l#ixzz2mZVBQjX4 (reporting on an apology given to the entire student body
by two students who wore white sheets intending to dress up as ghosts, but mistakenly interpreted to
be KKK members).
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sion is bitch, and hope that one day people in the majority don't ignore
you just because they're not personally affected by your struggles."225
Racial microaggressions also translate into very serious costs for
students of color.226 In their study of racial microaggressions, Professors
Daniel Sol6rzano, Miguel Ceja, and Tara Yosso found, "The sense of
discouragement, frustration, and exhaustion resulting from racial mi-
croaggressions left some African American students in our study de-
spondent and made them feel that they could not perform well academi-
cally." 227 Additionally, racial microaggressions are particularly problem-
atic at race-neutral colleges because these campuses endorse colorblind
policies.228 Although white students and faculty cannot explicitly or in-
tentionally discriminate against students of color, the school may have a
more difficult time in encouraging interracial interactions or addressing
microaggressions.229 Colorblind notions attempt to avoid the recognition
of race, and thus, any school policy or program that recognizes race may
be considered suspect. Sol6rzano, Ceja, and Yosso report that black stu-
dents highly valued "counter-spaces" as a response to racial mi-
croaggressions.230 Counter-spaces are places where black students can
receive validation and emotional and academic support;231 for example, a
Black Student Union or a Black Law Students Association. Unfortunate-
ly, creating exclusive spaces for black students can prove to be problem-
atic at race-neutral schools.2 32 Under colorblindness, opponents can
equate counter-spaces for black students to preferential or special treat-
ment.233
225. Mystal, supra note 214.
226. See Sol6rzano et al., supra note 210, at 69 ("Racial microaggressions in both academic
and social spaces have real consequences, the most obvious of which are the resulting negative racial
climate and African American students' struggles with feelings of self-doubt and frustration as well
as isolation. This means that the African American students on the campuses studied must strive to
maintain good academic standing while negotiating the conflicts arising from disparaging percep-
tions of them and their group of origin. Additionally, they must navigate through a myriad of pejora-
tive racial stereotypes that fuel the creation and perpetuation of racial microaggressions.").
227. Id.
228. See discussion supra Section I.B.
229. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1285-86 (2000) ("Under a colorblind norm, whites cannot intentionally discriminate against people
of color based on race. They cannot use racial slurs or otherwise engage in over racial conduct that
creates a hostile work environment for people of color. The colorblind idea does not, however, place
an affirmative duty on whites to interact with people of color, or a negative duty to dissociate and
disidentify themselves from other whites.").
230. See Sol6rzano et al., supra note 210, at 70; see also Meera E. Deo, Separate, Unequal,
and Seeking Support, 28 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 9, 47 (2012).
231. See Sol6rzano et al., supra note 210, at 70.
232. See Christopher Metzler, Banning Affinity Groups Shows Lack of Understanding,
DIVERSE: ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 29, 2008),
https://diverseeducation.wordpress.com/2008/04/29/banning-affinity-groups-shows-lack-of-
understanding/ (discussing Arizona legislators attempts to ban affinity groups on college campuses).
233. See id. ("In the Ward Connerly tradition, [banning affinity groups] is an attempt to move
to further advance the ideological argument that American college campuses should be color-blind




Identity performance is the way in which people of color negotiate
and present their identity in order to fit in at predominately white institu-
tions.234 Most of the scholarship in this area relates to workplace antidis-
crimination law,235 however, it is a small step to transport that argument
to students of color in higher education-students of color often face the
same costs of identity performance while in college (largely white insti-
tutions).236 Students of color at race-neutral colleges, which often lack a
critical mass of one or more racial groups, are likely to feel subject to
237negative stereotypes that result in "the need to do significant amounts
of 'extra' identity work to counter those stereotypes."238 This extra work
takes away energy and focus that students of color might otherwise use
239towards studying. In competitive settings, such as law schools that use
a curved grading system,240 white students have an advantage because
the costs of identity performance do not distract them. White norms pre-
dominate the academy, and therefore, white students do not need to ad-
just their identity performance to succeed.241
The costs of identity performance are both physically expressive
and internalized. For instance, there are grooming costs in which students
of color must present themselves in a way that is socially acceptable to
whites.242 This could include a black woman straightening her hair, in-
stead of wearing it naturally.243 This could also include a Latino student
trading in his comfortable basketball shorts for slacks out of fear that his
peers and professors will not take him seriously. Other expressive costs
are language and accent.244 Often, students of color must change the way
they speak to adapt to white vernacular, or hide a certain accent as much
as possible, out of concern for being considered intellectually inferior. In
234. See, e.g., DEVON W. CARBADO & MITu GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN
"POST-RACIAL" AMERICA 1-4 (2013); KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR
CIVIL RIGHTS ix-xii (2006); Carbado & Gulati, supra note 229, at 1262; Kenji Yoshino, Covering,
Ill YALE L.J. 769, 879 (2002).
235. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 229, at 1261-63, 1276-77.
236. See Bowen, supra note 92, at 1237-40.
237. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
238. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 229, at 1262.
239. See id ("Depending on the context, that extra work may not only result in significant
opportunity costs, but may also entail a high level of risk.").
240. LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 2 (1997) ("Because law school's educational mission is so intertwined with
the goal of selecting students for entry into a competitive profession, much of its pedagogy, includ-
ing examination formats, is designed to rank students. The idea is that those who succeed in this
highly competitive and individualistic culture will do well as lawyers.").
241. See Bowen, supra note 92, at 1238 ("Minority students are asked to assimilate to white
codes of conduct. They are asked to examine their behavior for white conformity.").
242. See Yoshino, supra note 234, at 889-96.
243. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands ofAnaly-
sis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1112-15 (2010).
244. See Yoshino, supra note 234, at 896-900; see also CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 234,
at 47-67.
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this way, identity performance can be both monetarily and psychologi-
cally costly.
The internal costs of identity performance can be much harder to
quantify. Internal identity performance "might be referred to as compro-
mising moments of identity performance-moments in which a person's
performance of identity contradicts some political or social image that
person has of herself."24 5 For example, a student of color might hear a
joke or comment that she finds racist. Instead of pointing out the offense,
she might just laugh along with the rest of the group out of fear of ap-
pearing overly sensitive or a bitch.246 Nevertheless, the student of color
may continue to feel angry or uncomfortable because she must hide her
true opinions.
Race-neutral colleges particularly exacerbate the costs of identity
performance because these environments practice and promote color-
blindness.247 When colorblindness is the institutional norm, students of
color bear the burden of conforming to or maintaining colorblindness.248
Colorblind norms work one-directionally in that whites are free to per-
form their identity without consequences because the colorblind status
quo is based off of white norms;249 whereas, students of color are forced
to think about and adjust their identity performance to the white hege-
monic norms of colorblindness.250 Additionally, identity performance
primarily caters to white students in making them feel comfortable in
being around students of color.25 1 Students of color must adjust and adapt
(do the work of identity performance) so that white students will feel at
245. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 229, at 1289.
246. See id. at 1290-91.
247. See discussion supra Section I.B.
248. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 229, at 1279 ("[T]he pervasiveness of a colorblind
institutional norm might shape how an outsider attorney interacts with and performs his identity for
insider associates. To the extent that an institution expects its workplace culture to be colorblind,
people of color bear the brunt of the burden of maintaining this colorblindness. The reason is that the
question of whether the workplace is colorblind will turn primarily on the racial associations that
people of color (per)form at work, assuming few, if any, acts of intentional race discrimination will
occur.").
249. See discussion supra Section I.B.
250. Carbado & Gulati provide an example of this in phenomenon in discussing associations
among colleagues at colorblind workplaces:
The colorblind norm does not require whites to avoid other whites or to associate with
people of color. This norm does, however, require people of color to avoid other people
of color (the negative racial duty) and to associate with whites (the affirmative racial du-
ty). In fact, the colorblind norm operates as a color conscious burden. Colorblindness,
therefore, does not actually mean colorblindness. Specifically, it racially regulates the
workplace association of people of color, but not those of white people. A colorblind
workplace norm requires people of color, but not white people, to think and be careful
about their racial associations. The question of whether the workplace norm of color-
blindness is violated turns on whether people of color associate with each other or with
whites. Consequently, white-with-white and white-with-people-of-color associations are
perceived as colorblind. People of color-people-of-color associations are not.
Carbado & Gulati, supra note 229, at 1287-88 (footnotes omitted).
251. See id. at 1288.
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ease.25 2 Identity performance also reminds students of color that "they
,,253are outsiders who must be socialized into the institution.
E. Racial Labor
Another phenomenon that I witnessed during law school is the addi-
tional work performed by students of color, which I have called racial
labor. Racial labor is extra work that colleges ask students of color to
perform, but not white students. For example, in an effort to convince
prospective black students to attend the college, the admissions office
may ask a black student to perform additional recruiting activities. This
could entail meeting with the prospective student, hosting her for an
overnight stay, or conducting campus tours. Although the admissions
office may also ask white students to perform these recruiting tasks,
white students do not feel the added pressure to do the recruiting efforts
because there are plenty of other white students who can do it. Whereas,
the black student feels pressure to do the recruiting activities because she
knows that there are only a few black students on campus. In addition,
the black student may feel that it is her responsibility to increase black
student enrollment since she is just one of a few black students.
Another example of racial labor is the public relations office asking
students of color to pose for promotional materials. As discussed earlier,
college promotional materials disproportionately represent students of
color.254 Although some of these photos are candid shots taken at various
events, many others are staged photo shoots that take a student's time
away from her studies. Again, no one forces students of color to take part
in this work, but they may feel pressure to do it. For example, I have a
friend of color who received a scholarship from his law school.255 The
school was developing materials to send to donors to encourage scholar-
ship donations, and of course, the school wanted to represent a diverse
student body of scholarship recipients. My friend reported that he felt
pressured to do the photo shoot as a gesture of gratitude and out of con-
cern for renewing his scholarship for the following year.256 Although a
school may also ask white students to perform this type of work, schools
ask students of color at disproportionate rates so that schools appear
more diverse.257
Another form of racial labor is the school asking students of color to
address issues of diversity or enhance diversity efforts on campus. For
illustration, on the day of the "Team Sander" incident, discussed supra
252. See id.
253. Bowen, supra note 92, at 1238.
254. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
255. This was a classmate of mine at UCLA School of Law.
256. My friend did in fact participate in the photo shoot, and UCLA Law prominently featured
him in development materials.
257. See Jaschik, supra note 160.
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Section IV.C, I was in the library studying for my next class when one of
my professors called me. She said that she was reaching out to student
leaders who could spread the word that there would be a meeting the
next day to discuss the matter. I believed that the school community
needed to address this racial incident, so I felt that it was my duty as a
student of color to help galvanize students to attend the meeting. Thus,
instead of reading for my next class, I drafted an email to my fellow
classmates and responded to their questions. This was an act of racial
labor.
Racial labor occurs at all colleges, but the work is likely to be more
of a burden at race-neutral colleges in which there are fewer students of
color to do the work. When schools lack a critical mass, there is an en-
hanced pressure to perform racial labor because students know that there
is not an abundance of students of color to share the workload.
V. RACE-CONSCIOUS COLLEGES INCREASE THE VALUE OF A DEGREE
FOR STUDENTS OF COLOR
This part argues that, to a student of color, a degree from a race-
conscious college is actually worth more than a degree from a race-
neutral college. As discussed in the previous part, the costs of attending a
race-neutral college have very serious academic harms. These real aca-
demic consequences translate into economic harms. If a student attends a
race-neutral college with few students of color, the chances of racial iso-
lation, stereotype threat, racial microaggressions, identity performance,
and racial labor are immense. Students of color at race-neutral colleges
must feel like a representative or a spokesperson for their race, and they
likely feel uncomfortable in class and on campus.258 As a result, students
of color at race-neutral schools probably perform worse than had they
attended a race-conscious school, where the costs discussed above would
not be as prominent. Therefore, higher academic performance at a race-
conscious school would likely transfer into better job opportunities, mak-
ing the race-conscious degree worth more in both economic and intrinsic
value.
Additionally, even when students of color attend colleges that ban
affirmative action, they still face the costs of stigma and assumptions that
they do not deserve to be there.25 9 After the "Team Sander" incident,
discussed supra Section IV.C, Reanne Swafford, a black second-year law
student, posted this comment to her Facebook page:
258. See supra Section IV.A.
259. See Alexia Boyarsky, Findings by Law Professor Suggest That UCLA Admissions May Be
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To attend a public institution as a minority student in a state that
banned Affirmative Action, your merits and accomplishments are
still diminished because you are told by some professors and peers
that you do not belong here. Everyday you live and carry the added
pressure of 'proving yourself when your white colleagues simply do
not.
26
Two studies support this sentiment, discussed supra Section III.B,
which found that students of color face stigma at equal or higher levels at
race-neutral schools.261
A few years ago, Sander produced a report positing that UCLA was
violating Prop 209 by accepting less qualified students of color based on
their lower holistic admissions scores (as compared to white students).262
In an interview with the UCLA student newspaper, The Daily Bruin,
Sander contends, "'What seems to be happening is that there is discrimi-
nation [against white applicants] after the holistic scores are generated'
'(Admissions officials) seem to be making discriminatory decisions
with lots of black and Hispanic students with poor holistic scores being
admitted."'2 63 The article also cited a study published by UCLA sociolo-
gy Professor Robert Mare, who makes the same contention that "the uni-
versity admitted more than 100 black students who would not have been
admitted based on the holistic admissions process alone."2M The article
points out that this is around one-third of the total number of admitted
black students.2 65 Mare states, "There are some extra African-American
students on campus that we can't account for. ... "26
Importantly, scholars have since discredited Sander's methodology
in drawing his conclusions.2 67 Even still, this type of rhetoric only per-
petuates stigmatic harms against students of color and, in particular,
black and Latino students. In a statement in response to the news article,
a coalition of various student organizations described the article as "mak-
ing the broader statement that certain communities of color do not de-
serve to be on this campus."268 The numerous comments left on the arti-
260. Reanne Swafford-Harris, FACEBOOK (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.facebook.com/reanne.swafford.
261. See Bowen, supra note 92, at 1223-25; Onwuachi-Willig et al., supra note 3, at 1343.
262. See RICHARD SANDER, THE CONSIDERATION OF RACE IN UCLA UNDERGRADUATE
ADMISSIONS 6 (2012), http://www.seaphe.org/pdf/uclaadmissions.pdf.
263. Boyarsky, supra note 259 (second alteration in orginal).
264. Id (quoting statement by Professor Robert D. Mare, UCLA); see also ROBERT D. MARE,
HOLISTIC REVIEW IN FRESHMAN ADMISSIONS AT UCLA 74-75 (2012),
http://www.senate.ucla.edu/committees/cuars/documents/UCLAReportonHolisticReviewinFreshman
Admissions.pdf.
265. See Boyarsky, supra note 254.
266. Id. (quoting statement by Professor Robert D. Mare, UCLA).
267. Ricardo Vazquez, External Reviews Cast Doubt on UCLA Professor's Analysis of Cam-
pus Admissions Practices, UCLA NEWSROOM (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://newsroom.ucla.edulstories/two-extemal-reviews-cast-doubt-243753.
268. 'How Close to Zero Do They Want Us to Get?' Students of Color Under Attack! We Will
Not Be Silenced!, LA GENTE (Oct. 26, 2012), http://Iagente.org/?p=4 100.
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cle's Daily Bruin website only support this contention. One online user,
going by the name Elizabeth Warren, questions whether President
Obama deserved to go to Harvard Law:
We need to STOP AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. Barack Obama got in-
to Harvard Law despite being a mediocre student. He didn't even
graduate with honors from undergrad and he only applied to Harvard,
Stanford, and Yale, and Columbia Law school. Which student applies
only to those schools even with a low GPA? Answer: A minority
who is playing the system.
269
Another commenter posts, "As an American, I don't care what a
student's race is, as long as they *earned* their spot. That's the point of
[Sander's] work: UCLA is making admissions decisions off of race when
it appears to be impossible to sort by merit . . . ."270 One more writes,
"We need diversity on campus to bring those midterm/final curves
down!" 271 These types of comments go on for pages, but the point is that
even at UCLA, which is under an affirmative action ban, people still
make students of color feel as though they do not deserve to be there.
One black student, going by BlackBruin, felt the need to defend his place
at UCLA by commenting, "I have a 3.7 GPA, I study well."272
Considering students of color at race-neutral colleges till encounter
claims that they do not deserve to be there, the supposed costs of race-
conscious admissions (in particular, stigma) are not really costs of af-
firmative action. The stigmatization of students of color is prevalent in
all educational settings because of racist notions of inferiority. Thus, the
stigma problem is not affirmative action; the problem is racism.273 More-
over, if students of color have to face the cost of stigma at both race-
neutral and race-conscious colleges, then clearly the benefits of a race-
conscious college are going to outweigh the costs because the stigma
costs are present in both settings.
As for the mismatch theorists who contend that students of color at
race-conscious colleges are not prepared to adequately compete with
their more qualified colleagues (presumably admitted based on nonracial
factors), a race-conscious college experience is still worth more than
facing the harms exacerbated at race-neutral colleges. Although I disa-
gree with the underlying assertion made by mismatch theorists, for the
purposes of this Article, I will suppose that mismatch is valid. The pro-
posed harms of mismatch are that students of color at race-conscious
schools will place at the bottom of their class because they are not quali-








fled for the rigors of the university. As the APA explains, however, "The
academic mismatch hypothesis ... ignores alternative explanations for
minority underperformance in certain academic settings, such as stereo-
type threat and uncertainty about belonging."274 Mismatch theorists fail
to recognize that students of color at race-neutral schools still have to
confront threats of underachievement because of intensified harms at
race-neutral schools that affect academic performance.
In addition, race-conscious schools can provide targeted academic
support or opportunities to students of color if they are truly concerned
with mismatch. Whereas, a race-neutral college will be required to re-
main colorblind and may have a more difficult time in directly address-
ing concerns for students of color. For instance, mismatch theorists
would contend that mismatch prevents students of color from effectively
competing for law review membership at highly selective law schools. If
a law review wanted to increase members of color, a race-neutral college
cannot consider race in the application process nor can they directly re-
cruit or provide extra training to students of color. 275 If a race-conscious
college were in the same position, however, they could easily consider
race during the application and recruiting process. Some may contend
that people will stigmatize law review members of color at race-
conscious schools as not qualified for law review membership. Neverthe-
less, as discussed above, law review members of color are assumed un-
qualified even at race-neutral schools. As a former law review member
of color at a race-neutral law school, I can attest that each year there are
always rumblings that the law review favors students of color. Even
though the law review forbids the consideration of race and only a small
276handful of students of color even make the law review, others still
questioned whether the students of color "deserved" to be on law re-
*277
view.
274. Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association in Support of Respond-
ents, supra note 169, at 31.
275. See generally Adriane Kayoko Peralta, The Underrepresentation of Women of Color in
Law Review Leadership Positions, 25 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 69 (2015).
276. See N.Y. LAW SCH. LAW REVIEW, 2012-2013 LAW REVIEW DIVERSITY REPORT 3, 5, 13
(2013), http://www.nylslawreview.con/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2013/12/Law-Review-
Diversity-Report-2013.pdf; David Lat, Minorities and Women and Law Reviews, Oh My!, ABOVE
THE LAW (Aug. 17, 2010, 1:53 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/08/minorities-and-women-and-
law-reviews-oh-my/.
277. My class year at UCLA Law, 55 students made the Law Review: one Latino student, one
Native American student, one black student, fourteen Asian/Asian American students, and 38 white
students. UCLA Law Review Volume 61 2013-2014, UCLA L. REV.,
http://www.uclalawreview.org/?p=4228 (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). Some students thought that this
was a high proportion of students of color and there was no way that so many of us made the Law
Review without race-conscious selection. See also Law Review and Diversity, WHO OWNS THE Fox?
(Mar. 14, 2008, 1:43 AM), http://uclaw.blogspot.com/2008/03/law-review-and-diversity.html (spec-
ulating, in a blog post by an anonymous UCLA alum, whether the UCLA Law Review violated Prop.
209 when for the first time all five chief positions are occupied by students of color).
2015] 215
DENVER LAWREVIEW
Race-conscious schools are also better situated to address the emo-
tional needs of students of color because colorblind ideals do not influ-
ence race-conscious settings. For example, during the fall semester of
2014, the police killings of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice
affected many students of color. Students of color at Harvard Law
School, Columbia Law School, and Georgetown Law Center petitioned
school administrators to allow for those affected to postpone their final
exams.278 Columbia granted the students' request and extended deadlines
for those affected.279 Harvard and Georgetown allowed those affected to
petition on an individual basis.2 80 "Columbia and Harvard also . . . of-
fer[ed] students special sessions with trauma counselors, mental health
professionals and professors to talk about the lack of indictments in the
Brown and Garner cases."2 81 If a race-neutral school were to grant such
requests, colorblind activists would certainly accuse them of providing
an unearned advantage to students of color and potentially violating bans
on considering race.
Meanwhile, during the same time, a professor at UCLA Law drew
criticism for using an insensitive prompt during his final exam.282 Stu-
dents reported that the exam prompt asked students to write a memoran-
dum to the district attorney "on the constitutional merits of indicting Mi-
chael Brown's stepfather for advocating illegal activity when he yelled
'Burn this bitch down,' after [the district attorney] announced the grand
jury's decision."2 83 The exam question was not only an example of poor
judgment on the part of the professor but also displayed how these types
of situations unfairly burden students of color. As one reporter puts it,
"[T]his particular question places an unfair burden on African-American
students to emotionally detach from still-recent acts of essentially legal-
ized terrorism against the African-American community."284 Shyrissa
Dobbins, a law student who took the final exam, said, "Daily I think
about Michael Brown and Eric Garner, and I have a challenge.... Every
day I think about this injustice and how I'm in a law school that won't
even make a statement about it." 285 Hussain Turk, another law student
278. Philip Marcelo, Law Schools Delay Exams for Students Upset by Ferguson, Eric Garner
Decisions, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2014, 9:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/10/law-schools-exams-ferguson-n_6301282.html.
279. Jacob Gershman, Columbia Law School Lets Students Postpone Exams Due to Grand
Jury Decisions, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Dec. 8, 2014, 1:03 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.comi/law/2014/12/08/columbia-law-school-lets-students-postpone-exams-due-to-
grand-jury-decisions/.
280. Marcelo, supra note 278.
281. Id.
282. Shreya Maskara, Law School Exam Question on Ferguson Shooting Draws Criticism,
DAILY BRUIN (Dec. 11, 2014, 2:01 AM), http://dailybruin.com/2014/12/1 1/law-school-exam-
question-on-ferguson-shooting-draws-criticism/.
283. Elie Mystal, Controversial Exam Question at UCLA Law Sparks Outrage, ABOVE THE
LAw REDLINE (Dec. 9, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.atlredline.com/racist-exam-question-at-ucda-
law-sparks-outrage-1668856105.
284. Id
285. Maskara, supra note 282.
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who took the exam, said, "These kinds of questions create a hostile learn-
ing environment for students of color, especially black students who are
already disadvantaged by the institution." 286
Race-neutral schools are more susceptible to claims of hostile learn-
ing environments for students of color because they are restricted in their
ability to respond to racism. Affirmative action bans instill a value sys-
tem that schools must treat all students the same. These colorblind no-
tions prevent race-neutral schools from adopting policies with the needs
of students of color in mind. Race-conscious schools, on the other hand,
can target policies and support systems that are particular to students of
color. As a result, race-conscious schools can better support students of
color.
The costs of stigmatization and mismatch are the same in both race-
conscious and race-neutral settings. Race-conscious schools, however,
are able to better counterbalance these costs through academic opportuni-
ties, support programs, and race-conscious policies. Race-conscious col-
leges can also consider race when awarding scholarships and financial
aid. This is another financial advantage to attending a race-conscious
college. Furthermore, the hidden costs of racial isolation, stereotype
threat, racial microaggressions, identity performance, and racial labor are
greater in race-neutral settings because there are fewer students of color.
Considering all of these factors, a student of color has a better chance at
thriving at a race-conscious college.
CONCLUSION
Considering what I know now, I second-guess whether I made the
right decision by attending a race-neutral law school. I wonder if I might
have had a more enjoyable experience or better academic performance at
a race-conscious law school with a critical mass of students of color. I
certainly know that I have experienced huge costs in attending a race-
neutral university, and I know that these costs have translated into lost
opportunities (both intrinsic and economic). It is understandable that
students of color increasingly prefer race-conscious colleges. A market
analysis of the costs and benefits associated lean in favor of race-
conscious environments. A degree is simply worth more from a race-




CHOICE AT WORK: YOUNG V. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,




In deciding Young v. United Parcel Service, the Supreme Court has
intervened in ongoing struggles about when and whether the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) requires the accommodation of preg-
nant workers. Drawing on original archival research, this Article histori-
cizes Young, arguing that the PDA embodied a limited principle of what
the Article calls meaningful reproductive choice. Feminist litigators first
forged such an idea in the early 1970s, arguing that heightened judicial
scrutiny should apply whenever state actors placed special burdens on
women who chose childbirth or abortion.
A line of Supreme Court decisions completely rejected this under-
standing of reproductive liberty. However, choice arguments rejected in
the juridical arena flourished in Congress, during debate about the PDA.
For a variety of strategic and ideological reasons, legal feminists and
antiabortion activists turned to legislative constitutionalism to give mean-
ing to the idea of reproductive liberty. While not requiring employers to
provide any accommodations, the PDA prohibited employers from plac-
ing special burdens on women's procreative decisions.
The history of the meaningful-choice principle suggests that while
the Court reached the right outcome, Young still falls short of providing
women the protection intended by the framers of the PDA. By a 6-3 vote,
the Court vacated a Fourth Circuit decision vindicating United Parcel
Service's "pregnancy-blind" employment policy-that is, the policy ef-
fectively excluded pregnant workers but did not formally categorize
them on the basis of pregnancy. In its application of the McDonnell-
Douglas burden-shifting analysis, Young removed some of the obstacles
previously faced by pregnant workers relying on disparate treatment the-
ories. However, the Court still assumes that employers could have legit-
imate reasons for discriminating against pregnant workers beyond their
ability to do a job, creating precisely the kind of burdens on reproductive
decision-making that the PDA was supposed to eliminate.
t Mary Ziegler is the Steams Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State University College
of Law. She would like to thank Courtney Cahill, Kristin Collins, Deborah Dinner, Serena Mayeri,
and Tracy Thomas for agreeing to share their thoughts on this piece.
219
DENVER LAWREVIEW
The history of the meaningful-choice principle strengthens the ar-
guments against pregnancy-blind policies that are available after Young,
including disparate treatment, disparate impact, and disability accommo-
dation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Ultimately, however,
the history studied here shows that the promise of litigation after Young
may well still be limited. Legislation, rather than litigation, may be the
most promising path for expanding protections for pregnant women.
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INTRODUCTION
In recently deciding Young v. United Parcel Service,I the Supreme
Court has intervened in ongoing struggles about when and whether the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) requires the accommoda-
1. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young ll), 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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tion of pregnant workers.2 In Young, a United Parcel Service (UPS) em-
ployee asked for a light-work assignment after her doctor advised her not
to lift more than twenty pounds for the first twenty weeks of pregnancy.3
UPS refused, citing a company policy of accommodating only employees
covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), workers who
lost driving certification from the Department of Transportation (DOT),
or workers injured on the job.4 UPS's policy stands as a prominent ex-
ample of the "pregnancy-blind" policies previously approved by many
federal circuit courts-policies that exclude all pregnant workers without
formally classifying on the basis of pregnancy. The Supreme Court va-
cated the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Young, transforming the legal land-
scape surrounding pregnancy-blind policies.
Drawing on original archival research, this Article historicizes
Young, revealing the promise and limits of the Court's decision. While
the Court removed some of the practical obstacles in the way of chal-
lenges to pregnancy-blind policies, Young still fails to capture one of the
purposes underlying the PDA-preventing employers from placing spe-
cial burdens on women's procreative decisions. The PDA embodied a
limited principle of what the Article calls meaningful reproductive
choice-a guarantee that women would have neither special protections
nor special burdens placed on their reproductive decisions. By ignoring
this principle, Young may sometimes allow employers to ignore the
mandate of the PDA.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I situates Young historically,
chronicling the successful legislative constitutional project pursued by
the proponents of the PDA. The idea of meaningful choice embodied in
the PDA first took shape in the early 1970s when feminist litigators ar-
gued that heightened judicial scrutiny applied when the State placed spe-
cial burdens on women either because they chose to bring a pregnancy to
term or to terminate it. More ambitiously, some feminists suggested that
the State may have to act to affirmatively support some fundamental
rights.
2. For examples of court decisions elaborating on pregnancy-blindness theory under Title
VII, see Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young 1), 707 F.3d 437, 447-51 (4th Cir. 2013), amend-
ed and superseded by Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 784 F.3d 192, subsequent determination,
2015 WL 2058940 (2015); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir.
2011); Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enters.,
Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont'lAirlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 207-
08 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Young !, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
3. Young !, 707 F.3d at 441.
4. Id.
5. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6. Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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A line of Supreme Court decisions completely rejected this under-
standing of reproductive liberty.7 However, choice arguments rejected in
the juridical arena flourished in Congress during debate about the PDA.
For a variety of strategic and ideological reasons, legal feminists and
antiabortion activists turned to the legislative arena to give meaning to
the idea of reproductive liberty. While not requiring employers to pro-
vide any accommodations, the PDA prohibited employers from placing
special burdens on women's procreative decisions.
As Part I shows, the story of the PDA makes apparent the trans-
formative potential of choice arguments widely derided by academic
commentators. The history presented here reveals the lost potential and
complexity of choice arguments, particularly outside the abortion con-
text. These claims allowed feminists to flesh out the relationship between
poverty and reproductive healthcare. Significantly, such arguments also
helped to build an influential, if troubled, coalition between women on
opposing sides of the abortion issue.
Part II examines the reasons for the decline of meaningful-choice
arguments. Starting in the late 1970s, as abortion opponents scored victo-
ries in Congress and the states, and as Ronald Reagan successfully popu-
larized arguments centered on small government and individualism, fem-
inists sought out a more compelling justification for abortion rights. In
the process, commentators and activists highlighted the shortcomings of
framing reproductive rights as a matter of privacy or choice.
Drawing on the history of the meaningful-choice principle, Part III
evaluates contemporary judicial interpretations of the PDA, including
both the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit's opinions in Young. Prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Young, the federal circuit courts gener-
ally upheld pregnancy-blind policies-employer rules that excluded
pregnant workers but did not facially discriminate against them.' In
Young, the Supreme Court rejected both the employer and the employ-
ee's interpretations of the PDA.9 UPS argued that the PDA had nothing
to do with accommodation, simply adding pregnancy to the protected
classes covered by Title VII.'o By contrast, Peggy Young claimed that
7. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-26 (1980) (rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge to a federal ban on publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1977)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to state ban on publicly funded abortions); General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-46 (1976) (rejecting a challenge to a pregnancy exclusion under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), superseded by statute as recognized in General Electric Company
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-97 (1974) (rejecting an
equal-protection challenge to the exclusion of pregnancy in California state disability policy), super-
seded by statute as recognized in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669 (1983).
8. For examples of court decisions elaborating on pregnancy-blindness theory under Title
VII, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1352-54.
10. Brief for Respondent at 11-12, Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226).
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the PDA required employers accommodating any employee to offer
similar protections to pregnant workers so long as they were "similar in
their ability or inability to work."" Finding neither interpretation persua-
sive, the Court focused on how employees could demonstrate disparate
treatment.12 Whereas challenges to pregnancy-blind policies previously
failed at the prima facie case stage,'3 under Young, a policy treating
pregnant workers differently from other workers similar in their inability
to work may help a worker make out a prima facie case of discrimination
under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green's'4 burden-shifting frame-
work.'5 Young also changed how employees could rebut an employer's
proffered, neutral reason for discrimination. The Court laid out factors to
balance in evaluating pretext, namely, the burden a policy imposed
against pregnant workers and the employer's compelling reasons for
exclusion.16 Again, Young makes it easier for pregnant workers to prove
pretext, requiring employers to offer more convincing explanations for
policies that leave out all or most pregnant workers.17
Other scholars have explained how decisions vindicating pregnan-
cy-blind policies ignore the history of the PDA's antidiscrimination
mandate. However, this Article breaks new ground by showing that
Young only partly remedied the errors of lower court decisions on preg-
nancy-blind policies. The PDA wrote into law an intermovement consen-
sus that reproductive liberty required more than freedom from state inter-
ference. To be sure, the PDA only partly embraced the constitutional
commitments of pro-lifers and feminists. The law did not clearly require
11. Petitioner's Brief at 3-4, Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2012)).
12. Young !, 135 S. Ct. at 1353-55.
13. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcom-
ing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 36-
37 (2009) (describing court decisions of this kind).
14. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1352-55.
16. Id. at 1353-55.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25
STETSON L. REV. 1, 27-32 (1995); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 483-84 (2011) (explaining
that pregnancy blindness arguments do "not recognize two lessons that we may glean from historical
debates about the costs of reproduction"); Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise
of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 614-15 (2010) (criticizing the pregnancy-blindness line of
cases); Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 49-50; Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The
Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 978-1004, 1022 (2013). Other studies explore the best legal solutions to
the problem of pregnancy discrimination. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The
Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 21-37 (1985) (generally supporting pregnancy-
specific benefits); Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
513, 538-62 (1983) (generally supporting pregnancy-specific benefits); Christine A. Little-
ton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Prrl. L. REV. 1043, 1052-59 (1987) (generally
supporting pregnancy-specific benefits); cf Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the
Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2214-20
(1994) (proposing an insurance system for pregnancy leave).
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employers to accommodate any employees, including pregnant women.9
Just the same, as this Article argues, if an employer elected to accommo-
date any worker, the mandate of the PDA made clear that employers had
a duty to provide pregnant women with the accommodations available to
those with a similar physical capacity to work. By requiring only preg-
nancy-blind policies, the courts have allowed employers to burden wom-
en's reproductive decisions in precisely the way the PDA sought to pre-
vent.
The history considered here supports the outcome in Young, ques-
tions core premises of the decision, and strengthens the case against
pregnancy-blind policies in the courts under a variety of theories, includ-
ing disparate impact and disability accommodation under the ADA.20
Just the same, historical context exposes the limitations of litigating for
pregnant workers. In the future, as in the past, legislation, rather than
litigation, may prove to be a more promising path for women seeking
protection against pregnancy discrimination.
I. CREATING A RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL CHOICE
Young figures centrally not only in the evolving story of employ-
ment discrimination law but also in the evolution of arguments about the
meaning of reproductive liberty. In the 1970s, as the Article shows, fem-
inists and certain abortion opponents rallied around an idea of choice at
work, contending that the government could not constitutionally burden
one reproductive choice available to women more than another. By the
end of the 1970s, in cases involving pregnancy, disability, and abortion,
the Supreme Court cast doubt on the validity of this approach, particular-
ly in the context of reproductive liberty.2 1 At first, it seems that decisions
like Geduldig v. Aiello 22 and Maher v. Roe2 3 hollowed out protections of
19. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 18, at 464 ("The text and legislative history of the PDA did
not clarify whether the PDA requires, or even allows, measures beyond equal treatment to accom-
modate pregnancy and childbirth.").
20. Under Title VII, disparate treatment cases prohibit intentional discrimination against a
member of the protected class on the part of the employer and her agents. See, e.g., Michelle A.
Travis, The PDA's Causation Effect: Observations of an Unreasonable Woman, 21 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 51, 64 (2009) ("In disparate treatment claims, pregnant women allege that their employers
intentionally took an adverse action against them because of their pregnancy."). By contrast, dispar-
ate impact cases ask whether a facially neutral employment practice has an unjustifiably dispropor-
tionate impact on members of a protected class unless that practice is "'job-related' and 'consistent
with business necessity."' Id. at 70-72 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2012)). The ADA
and the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAA) mandate that "[n]o covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability" in hiring, firing, compen-
sation, training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2012). A "qualified individual" with a disability is one who "with or without reasonable accommo-
dation, can perform the essential functions" of a job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The ADA and ADAA
require that employers reasonably accommodate their disabled employees as part of its nondiscrimi-
nation scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
21. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
22. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
23. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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reproductive liberty. Geduldig held that pregnancy discrimination did not
count as sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause,24 while
Maher concluded that states could choose to fund childbirth, but not
abortion, without running afoul of the privacy right recognized in Roe.25
These decisions blocked efforts to flesh out the relationship between
reproductive liberty and equality; Geduldig ratified sex stereotypes sur-
rounding pregnancy and undermined any challenge to them, and Maher
upheld laws banning the use of public monies for abortion, reasoning that
the right to privacy did not entitle women to the means to exercise their
rights.26 These decisions stood in the way of attempts to recognize rights
to state support as well as freedoms from state intervention.27
However, as this Part argues, Geduldig and Maher did not undercut
efforts to secure meaningful reproductive choice. Instead, failures in the
courts forced legal feminists and pro-life activists to express their consti-
tutional commitments in the legislative arena.
This Part charts the evolution of meaningful-choice arguments, be-
ginning with their development in pregnancy disability litigation in the
early 1970s. After the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,28 femi-
nists developed an argument that substantive due process limited the
State's ability to burden reproductive decision-making.29 Some went
further, suggesting that in the case of certain crucial rights, the govern-
ment had to ensure that individuals could effectuate the rights they had.30
As the Part examines next, the Supreme Court ultimately found the-
se arguments unconvincing. Just the same, the Part shows that in the bat-
tle for the PDA, pro-life and abortion-rights activists rejected the Court's
understanding of reproductive privacy, insisting that meaningful choice
existed only when the government protected women from workplace
discrimination and the burdens of poverty. These arguments helped to
shape the PDA and influenced some of its most powerful supporters in
24. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495-96.
25. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75.
26. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 18, at 467 ("The majority opinion in Geduldig reflected an
emerging reluctance, in both the race and the sex contexts, to interpret the constitutional prohibition
on discrimination to reach structural inequality as well as discriminatory intent."); Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 985 (1984) ("Geduldig has made it
more difficult to claim that reproductive freedom is an aspect of sex-based equality.").
27. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contri-
butions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights
Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 725, 748-50 (1981); Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and
Compulsory Maternity, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 759 & n.39 ("[A] Constitution of nega-
tive rights does not require the government to fund the exercise of positive rights.").
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
343, 404-05 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Annexed Brief of the Ameri-
can Public Health Ass'n, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., the National Organization
for Women and Certain Medical School Deans, Professors and Individual Physicians at 11-12,
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440).
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Congress. Significantly, as embodied in the PDA, this reasoning stands
in obvious tension with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Young and the
federal courts' embrace of pregnancy blindness.
A. Feminists Bridge the Gap Between Poverty Law and Reproductive
Liberty
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, to an unprecedented extent, the
welfare rights movement challenged the constitutional distinction be-
tween a right and a privilege. 3 1 Grassroots activists organized groups like
the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) and demanded not
only fair procedures governing welfare benefits but also asserted a right
to live connected to state support.32 Similar arguments caught on i  the
legal academy. Citing the "increasing size of government as an economic
unit," Professor William Van Alstyne called for the abolition of the right-
privilege distinction in the context of certain state-created "privileges"
involving employment, housing, income replacement, and food stamps.33
Charles Reich's "new property" theory proposed that certain govern-
ment-created statuses-such as professional licenses and public bene-
fits-should count as forms of property protected by the Due Process
Clause-property that could be taken away only after a benefits-holder
took advantage of crucial procedural protections.34 Welfare rights propo-
nents like Frank Michelman interrogated the distinction between positive
and negative rights, suggesting that he Fourteenth Amendment might
actually guarantee some minimum standard of living for the poor.
As feminists began to explore the limits of reproductive liberty, they
echoed the reasoning of Supreme Court cases that fueled poverty law-
yers' demands for positive rights: Shapiro v. Thompson36 and Dandridge
v. Williams.37 In Griswold v. Connecticut8 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,39 the
31. See, e.g., Brenna Binns, Fencing Out the Poor: The Constitutionality of Residency Re-
quirements in Welfare Reform, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1255, 1259 ("As a result of the welfare rights
movement, the Court gave welfare litigation higher scrutiny and recognized welfare benefits as a
right, rather than a privilege, of the poor.").
32. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 76 (1993); FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS:
POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 143 (2007).
33. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1442, 1461-62 (1968).
34. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734, 783-84 (1964).
35. See, e.g., Frank 1. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9-13 (1969). For further discussion of the history of the welfare
rights movement, see, for example, DAVIS, supra note 32; KORNBLUH, supra note 32; PREMILLA
NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(2005). On the history of welfare rights litigation in the Supreme Court, see, for example,
ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997).
36. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
37. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Supreme Court had suggested that the Constitution offered some protec-
tion for crucial decisions involving reproduction.4) By turning to poverty
law, some feminists asked whether reproductive liberty was among the
"rights . . . so fundamental that the state must provide .. . the means to
exercise them."4'
These efforts began in the litigation of Dandridge itself, a case in-
volving a constitutional challenge to Maryland's maximum-grant law.42
The statute capped payments under the state's Aid to Dependent Families
with Children regardless of the size of a beneficiary's family.43 While the
Maryland law did nothing to stop women from having children, the max-
imum-grant policy penalized those with larger families." The Dandridge
appellees argued before the Supreme Court that such a penalty violated
the Constitution:
This Court has left no doubt that, while under certain exceptional cir-
cumstances infringement, by government, of this right of procreation
and marital privacy will be upheld, it constitutes impermissible invid-
ious discrimination to discourage one class of individuals from exer-
cising these basic rights while zealously safeguarding the exercise of
those rights by others similarly situated.45
When the Court decided Dandridge, the justices made no mention
of fundamental rights to procreate, indeed retreating from positions taken
in earlier poverty-law decisions.46 Dandridge rejected poverty lawyers'
challenge to the Maryland maximum grant law, but in spite of the deci-
sion, the premise of the appellees' brief-that some form of heightened
scrutiny ought to apply to laws that burdened procreative rights-
inspired legal feminists intent on testing the boundaries of reproductive
liberty.47
Prior to 1974, these arguments figured centrally in the litigation of
discriminatory leave policies affecting public school teachers and Air
40. On the state of the privacy right in the aftermath of Eisenstadt, see DAVID J. GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 542-97
(1994).
41. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Annexed Brief of the American
Public Health Ass'n, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., the National Organization for
Women and Certain Medical School Deans, Professors and Individual Physicians at 11-12, Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440) [hereinafter Annexed Brief].
42. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473.
43. Id. at 473-74.
44. See id. at 473-75
45. Brief for Appellees at 32, Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (No. 131) (footnote omitted).
46. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-66 (1970). Dandridge rejected challenges
to the Maryland law involving both the federal Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 482-83, 486-87.
47. On the history of these efforts, see Dinner, supra note 18, at 445-47, 449-57. For more on
LaFleur and reproductive liberty, see Tracy A. Thomas, The Struggle for Gender Equality in the
Northern District of Ohio, in JUSTICE AND LEGAL CHANGE ON THE SHORES OF LAKE ERIE: A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 165, 165-
83 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Sue Alexander eds., 2012).
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Force service personnel, including Struck v. Secretary of Defense,48 a
case famously litigated by ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg.49 In her
brief in Struck, Ginsburg contended:
The discriminatory treatment required by the challenged regulation,
barring pregnant women and mothers from continued service in the
Air Force, reflects the discredited notion that a woman who becomes
pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at home to await
childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care. Imposition of
this outmoded standard upon petitioner unconstitutionally encroaches
upon her right to privacy in the conduct of her personal life.
50
Other pregnancy discrimination cases elaborated on Ginsburg's
claim that discriminatory policies unconstitutionally burdened women's
substantive due process rights. In Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur,5 1 Jane Picker and her colleagues challenged a maternity leave
policy requiring schoolteachers to take eight months of leave without
pay.52 Picker argued that "[t]he waiting period in LaFleur thus penal-
ize[d] Respondents' fundamental right to bear children."
5 3
These arguments represented an early form of what the Article calls
meaningful-choice reasoning. Even if hirers had no constitutional duty to
assist women seeking to effectuate their procreative rights, feminists
argued that the Equal Protection Clause prevented employers from con-
ditioning a woman's economic security on her surrender of procreative
rights.54 Insofar as the Constitution protected reproductive liberty, em-
ployers could not force women to choose between bearing children and
attaining the economic security available to other workers. When the
courts identified such an unfair choice, heightened judicial scrutiny
should apply.
More ambitiously, legal feminists joined poverty lawyers in ques-
tioning the logic underlying the right-privilege distinction in constitu-
tional law. In 1892, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the dis-
tinction between a protected right and a mere privilege.5 In McAuliffe v.
48. Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.), vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). The
Supreme Court would ultimately dismiss Struck's appeal as moot. Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 409 U.S.
1071, 1071 (1972).
49. On the history and importance of the Struck litigation, see generally Neil S. Siegel &
Reva B. Siegel, Struck By Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex
Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010).
50. Brief for the Petitioner at 52, Struck, 409 U.S. 1071 (No. 72-178) (footnotes omitted).
51. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
52. Brief for Respondents at 44, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (No. 72-
777).
53. Id. at 45.
54. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 50-56, Struck, 409 U.S. 1071 (No. 72-178).
55. On Holmes' early framing of the right-privilege distinction, see Deborah Dinner, Recover-
ing the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 343, 384 (2010).
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City of New Bedford,6 Holmes rejected the claim of a policeman, who
had been fired for violating a law restricting certain political activities:
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman."5 In the late 1960s and early
1970s, the right-privilege distinction came under fire, as legal academics
and attorneys sought to carve out exceptions to it.58 Feminist litigators
hinted at the existence of a hierarchy of constitutional rights: some were
so fundamental that the State had an affirmative duty to guarantee their
effectuation."Feminists suggested that reproductive liberty might occupy
a place at the top of that hierarchy of rights.60
In the juridical arena, meaningful-choice arguments peaked during
the litigation of Geduldig, a challenge to the constitutionality of the
pregnancy exclusion in the California Disability Fund. Significantly,
Geduldig came before the Supreme Court in the aftermath of Roe v.
Wade. In that case, the Court had invalidated the abortion restrictions
then on the books, suggesting that the constitutional right to privacy "is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy."62 The Roe Court limited the abortion right in sever-
al ways: by assigning it at least equally to the woman's physician and by
creating a trimester framework that gave the states more regulatory au-
63thority in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy. Just the same,
legal feminists read their victory in LaFleur as an extension-and clarifi-
cation-of the right announced in Roe. In LaFleur, the Supreme Court
had struck down an eight-month mandatory leave policy because it "em-
ploy[ed] irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a [woman] ...
for deciding to bear a child."" While resting on procedural due process,
LaFleur fueled feminist arguments about the scope of reproductive liber-
ty.
65
Feminist attorney Wendy Webster Williams, who argued Geduldig
before the Supreme Court, read LaFleur as an expansion of the liberty
66
recognized in Roe. Citing LaFleur, Williams's brief reasoned that
"[t]he strict scrutiny test is applicable not only where the denial of a fun-
56. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892), abrogation recognized by O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
57. Id.at l7.
58. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and
the Changing Definition ofPluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1389, 1428-34 (2000) (describ-
ing the attacks that convinced "the Court [to] repudiate[] the rights/privileges distinction").
59. See, e.g., Annexed Brief, supra note 41, at 11-12.
60. See, e.g., id.
61. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 486 (1974), superseded by statute as recognized in
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
63. Id. at 152-63.
64. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 648 (1974).
65. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 55, at 404-05 (recovering the "multiple, expansive mean-
ings" of LaFleur for legal feminists).
66. See Brief for Appellees at 52-54, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640).
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damental right is absolute, but also where state regulation penalizes its
free exercise."67 In Williams's account, pregnancy discrimination count-
ed as the kind of penalty on reproductive choice forbidden by the Consti-
tution:
Unlike any other disabled worker in the State of California covered
by the state disability insurance program, the woman who suffers a
disability in connection with her pregnancy is left to bear the eco-
nomic consequences of her inability to work. As a result of her preg-
nancy, a woman faces medical bills, the possible cost of temporary
help and, if her pregnancy is successfully concluded, a new child to
support at the very time she is unable to bring home wages to pay for
these expenses. . . . The denial of benefits available to other workers
therefore constitutes a substantial burden upon her exercise of her
right to bear a child and the State must demonstrate a compelling in-
terest in its classification.68
An ACLU brief co-signed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg similarly con-
cluded that Roe and LaFleur had transformed reproductive liberty:
Under due process principles, the state is required to show that a
compelling interest justifies the substantial burden placed upon exer-
cise of the fundamental freedom to decide whether to bear a child.
Appellant has not demonstrated any such compelling interest; there-
fore the treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities violates the due
process clause.69
Roe had recognized that "the decision whether to continue or to
terminate a pregnancy . .. must be left up to the individual . . . lest the
state unconstitutionally intrude into the zone of privacy protected by the
Constitution.,,70 LaFleur further narrowed the State's power to regulate
reproductive liberty insofar as it "recognized that this zone of privacy
with respect to child bearing is unconstitutionally infringed by govern-
mental action which has the effect of burdening women who chose to
continue pregnancy rather than terminate it." 7 '
Geduldig represented an important opportunity for legal feminists
seeking a more robust jurisprudence of reproductive liberty. Feminists
highlighted the particularly harsh impact of pregnancy discrimination on
poor women-an argument carried forward in challenges to state bans on
the Medicaid funding of abortion.72 For example, in Klein v. Nassau
67. Id at 53.
68. Id at 53-54.
69. Brief Amici Curiae for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 7, Geduldig, 417 U.S.
484 (1974) (No. 73-640).
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id.




County Medical Center,73 a federal district court struck down a directive
prohibiting the use of Medicaid funding for abortion, explaining that
women choosing abortion "alone are subjected to State coercion to bear
children which they do not wish to bear."74 Constitutionally, as Klein
recognized, Medicaid bans imposed the same kind of impermissible con-
dition at work in Geduldig, denying a woman "medical assistance unless
she resigns her freedom of choice and bears the child."75 Together, abor-
tion and pregnancy disability litigation promised to entrench a much
broader understanding of reproductive liberty.
B. The Supreme Court Rejects Meaningful Choice
The Supreme Court rejected the expansive understanding of choice
advanced by feminists, adopting the position staked out by both business
organizations and some abortion opponents. In Geduldig, industry groups
and corporations had argued that, under Roe and LaFleur, pregnancy had
become a choice controlled entirely by a woman-something entirely
different from the illnesses and injuries often covered by disability poli-
cies.76 For example, in an amicus brief in Geduldig, the General Electric
Company, a company that did not cover pregnancy under its disability
policy, argued:
Thus pregnancy, unlike any sickness or accident, results from the
cumulative, four-fold exercise of free will necessary for a woman to
bear a child: (1) there must be a voluntary decision to marry, as mar-
riage still reflects by far the current standard of morality; (2) the cou-
ple must elect to have sexual intercourse-a two-person decision; (3)
the couple must elect that conception will result-i.e., must elect to
reject the various alternative methods available for avoiding pregnan-
cy; and (4) if conception takes place, the couple must elect to accept
the pregnancy and have the baby, and not to terminate the pregnancy
by abortion. It should also be noted that even for the unmarried, the
latter three choices are viable alternatives to the pregnant state.77
As General Electric understood it, women already enjoyed true re-
productive liberty. As a result, women could not fairly expect an em-
ployer to subsidize their procreative decisions, particularly since other
workers could not enjoy the same benefits.78
73. 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated by 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
74. Id at 500. For post-1973 decisions in the same vein, see Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112
(10th Cir. 1974); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 579-82 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974), vacated sub nom. Westby v. Doe, 420 U.S.
968 (1975).
75. Klein, 347 F. Supp. at 500.
76. See, e.g., Brief for General Electric Co. as Amicus Curiae at 21-22, Geduldig, 417 U.S.
484 (1974) (No. 73-640).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 6-8.
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Later in the 1970s, antiabortion attorneys borrowed from this vision
of choice in defending Medicaid funding bans. Defending such a funding
restriction in Connecticut, pro-life attorneys stressed that nothing in the
law "prevent[ed] a woman from making a choice to have an abortion."79
The State's responsibility ended with its duty not to prohibit abortion.
Beyond that, women themselves bore the costs of indigence and lack of
access to medical services. "[U]nder Roe," pro-life attorneys explained in
Maher, "an indigent woman was not given an additional fundamental
right to have an abortion paid for from public funds."80
In both Geduldig and Maher, the Supreme Court thoroughly reject-
ed the meaningful-choice reasoning on which feminists had relied. De-
cided in 1974, Geduldig found that California's disability policy did not
discriminate on the basis of sex since there was "no risk from which men
[were] protected and women [were] not."8 1 Neither the majority nor the
dissent mentioned the reproductive-liberty claims emphasized by femi-
nists.82
While Geduldig failed to mention reproductive liberty, Maher, a
case involving the constitutionality of bans on the public funding of
abortion, suggested that abortion rights guaranteed only a right to be left
alone. By conditioning the receipt of support on a woman's surrender
of her abortion right, Connecticut placed "no obstacles absolute or oth-
erwise in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion."" As Maher ex-
plained, "An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disad-
vantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth;
she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service
she desires."85
Taken together, Maher and Geduldig limited the promise of repro-
ductive-liberty doctrine in the courts. In 1980, the Court confirmed its
rejection of the doctrine in Harris v. McRae,86 upholding the Hyde
Amendment, a federal ban on the Medicaid funding of abortion.8
However, failure in the courts did not mark the end of efforts to ad-
vance meaningful-choice arguments. Indeed, after 1976, in General
79. Brief of the Appellant at 14, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440).
80. Id
81. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
82. On Geduldig's obscuring of the importance of equal sexual liberty, see Kim Shayo Bu-
chanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women's Sexuality, 56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1236-38
(2007). The Geduldig dissent failed to make any mention of women's reproductive liberty. See
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 498-505 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74.
84. Id. at 474.
85. Id.
86. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
87. Id at 326-27.
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Electric Company v. Gilbert,88 when the Court rejected arguments that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited pregnancy discrimi-
nation,89 those on opposing sides of the abortion issue revived the consti-
tutional arguments for meaningful reproductive choice rejected by the
Court, this time acting in the legislative arena.
Significantly, in the later 1970s, antiabortion activists as well as
feminists made some version of meaningful choice a centerpiece of their
legal agenda. In the aftermath of the Roe decision, antiabortion leaders
turned to a variety of constitutional strategies to outlaw most or all abor-
tions, including an Article V amendment campaign.9 In formulating
these responses to Roe, pro-lifers defined a new class deserving protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment: vulnerable and dependent per-
sons.91 For the members of groups like American Citizens Concerned for
Life (ACCL) and Feminists for Life, pregnant women fit this category
perfectly.92 These pro-life activists recognized that some women turned
to abortion because they faced sex discrimination at work.9 3 Poor women
often faced an impossible choice between exercising procreative liberty
and guaranteeing themselves economic security.94 Recognizing this di-
lemma, some pro-lifers presented protection from pregnancy discrimina-
tion as a precondition for meaningful reproductive choice.95 Conversely,
when the government refused to ensure women protection from sex dis-
crimination, as pro-lifers argued, the government put unconstitutional
burdens on women's reproductive choice. Thoroughly rejected by the
courts, this understanding of choice reappeared as a robust legislative
constitutional norm-one on which activists deeply divided by the abor-
tion issue agreed.
C. Pro-Lifers Work to Redefine Equal Protection of the Law
From the outset, the pro-life movement defined its cause as a consti-
tutional one, based on a fundamental right they identified in the Four-
teenth Amendment.96 At the state and local level, pro-life organizations
88. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
89. See id at 136-40.
90. For an overview of pro-life constitutional strategy in the period, see Mary Ziegler, Ways
to Change: A Reevaluation of Article V Campaigns and Legislative Constitutionalism, 2009 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 969, 973-84; see also ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW
SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION WORKS 85-87 (2008); Keith Cassidy, The Right to Life Move-
ment: Sources, Development, and Strategies, in THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 128, 143-50 (Donald T. Critchlow ed., 1995).
91. See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 28-29, 34, 45.
92. For a study of these groups and their influence on pro-life constitutionalism, see Mary
Ziegler, Women's Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-Life Feminism, 28
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232, 237-46 (2013).
93. See Mary Ziegler, Beyond Backlash: Legal History, Polarization, and Roe v. Wade, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 993-98 (2014).
94. See id
95. See id.
96. See Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 869, 884-86.
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mobilized in the late 1960s to preserve existing bans on abortion.9 7
Groups like the Southern California Right to Life League, New York
State Right to Life, and the Illinois Right to Life Committee chose names
that referred to the "right to life" mentioned in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.9 8 The same constitutional commitment defined the pre-1973
agendas of national organizations like the National Right to Life Com-
mittee (NRLC) and Americans United for Life (AUL). "Protecting the
right to life of the unborn child," the NRLC Statement of Purpose assert-
ed, "is a central issue to the National Right to Life Committee."99 Simi-
larly, the AUL's Declaration of Purpose similarly explained: "Believing
with those who hold that all men are created equal, we proclaim that
among our precious civil and natural liberties and rights is the responsi-
bility of society to safeguard the integral life of every human being from
conception to natural death."1
Over the course of the late 1960s and early 1970s, antiabortion ac-
tivists began to ground their normative commitments in existing constitu-
tional doctrine. Significantly, abortion opponents identified their cause
with both substantive due process and equal protection doctrine.'o'
Working in emerging national groups like the NRLC and the AUL, pro-
lifers forged an argument based on the overlap of liberty and equality
norms, training their fire on laws that denied vulnerable groups the im-
plicit right to life.1 02
Activists like Robert Byrn, a grassroots organizer and Fordham law
professor, presented dependency as a classic suspect classification, and
Byrn argued that abortion represented precisely the kind of invidious
discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to root
out. o3 In particular, Byrn compared fetuses to illegitimate children, a
group afforded some protection by the Supreme Court in the late
1960s.' For example, in 1968, in Levy v. Louisiana,tos the Court had
97. On the mobilization of pro-life activists, see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
98. On the naming of the Right to Life League of Southern California and New York State
Right to Life, see Fred C. Shapiro, 'Right to Life' Has a Message for New York State Legislators,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1972, at SMIO, SM34. On the early activity of the Right to Life League of
Southern California, see Keith Monroe, How California's Abortion Law Isn't Working, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1968, at SM10-12. On the founding of the Illinois Right to Life Committee, see SUZANNE
STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION
CONFLICT 35 (1991).
99. National Right to Life Committee Statement of Purpose (on file with The American
Citizens Concerned for Life Papers in the University of Michigan Gerald Ford Memorial Library).
100. Americans United for Life, Declaration of Purpose (1974) (on file with Concordia Semi-
nary, St. Louis, Missouri in The Executive File).
101. ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 29, 85.
102. See id. at 28-35, 85.
103. See, e.g., Robert M. Byrn, Demythologizing Abortion Reform, 14 CATH. LAW. 180, 183
(1968). For further examples of pro-lifers' reliance on the Equal Protection Clause, see David W.
Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA L. REV. 233,
234 (1968-69).
104. Byrn, supra note 103, at 183.
105. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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first struck down an illegitimacy classification, explaining, "We start
from the premise that illegitimate children are not 'nonpersons.' They are
humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly 'persons' within the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'0
Byrn saw abortion as the type of discrimination that Levy con-
demned. Levy suggested that any child qualified as a legal person if she
was human and alivel 07 -criteria which, in Byrn's view, clearly applied
to the unborn child. 08 The traits that differentiated the unborn child from
other Americans-age, vulnerability, and dependency-made no consti-
tutional difference.'" Indeed, the dependent required additional constitu-
tional and other legal protections. Highlighting President Lyndon John-
son's War on Poverty, Byrn insisted: "The more dependent and helpless
a person is, the more solicitous the law is of his welfare."'10
Like Byrn, other pro-lifers deployed a theory of equal liberty, insist-
ing that the Constitution recognized an implicit right to life that had to be
equally available to the unborn child. For example, Martin McKernan of
the NRLC emphasized: "All in all, the law has consistently established
certain procedural safeguards around fundamental rights to which the
unborn was entitled. That most fundamental of rights - not to be deprived
of life without due process of the law - cannot be ignored.""'
Activists like Byrn and McKernan did not address the ways in
which unborn children did not resemble a suspect class: there was no
obvious history of discrimination against fetuses, and neither age nor
dependency was immutable-as Byrn acknowledged, both represented
phases experienced by every citizen who reached adulthood.12 Moreo-
ver, like some gender distinctions, physical disability and dependency
could constitute real biological differences."3 From the standpoint of
conventional equal protection law, a fetus may not be similarly situated
to a child, and a person in a persistent vegetative state may not be com-
parable to a legally competent adult.
While claiming that protections for unborn children fit within a
conventional equal-protection framework, pro-lifers like Byrn actually
106. Id. at 70 (footnote omitted).
107. See id
108. See Byrn, supra note 103, at 183.
109. Robert M. Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQ. U. L. REV. 125, 127-34 (1966-67).
110. Id. at 133.
Ill. Legal Report from Martin F. McKernan, Jr., Nat'l Right to Life Comm. 4 (Jul. 1970) (on
file with The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers in the University of Michigan Gerald
Ford Memorial Library).
112. See Byrn, supra note 109, at 128.
113. Indeed, in determining whether disability discrimination warranted heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court emphasized that disabled persons had real impairments




demanded a bold reconceptualization of the doctrine. Conventional
equal-protection doctrine focused on whether vulnerable individuals had
an immutable trait, like race or gender.114 Activists like Byrn implicitly
conceded that the unborn children had no such trait. Indeed, pro-lifers
presented abortion as discriminatory precisely because it deprived un-
born children of life, notwithstanding the fact that they resembled other
rights-holders in every constitutionally salient way.'15 Strategically, this
move allowed antiabortion activists to respond to claims that fetuses did
not count as legal persons under the Fourteenth Amendment."' At the
same time, by stressing the similarities between fetuses and other per-
sons, antiabortion activists like Byrn expressed deeply held beliefs that
abortion would lead the nation down a slippery slope to euthanasia and
discrimination against the disabled.117
In 1973, the Roe Court rejected many of the premises of pro-life
constitutionalism-including the personhood of the fetus and the conclu-
sion that life began at conception-while pushing others entirely below
the surface."'8 The district court in Roe had applied conventional strict
scrutiny in analyzing an abortion regulation, asking whether such a ban
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling justification."9 This framing
set the terms of the Supreme Court's own discussion. In resolving
whether the State's interest in protecting life was compelling, the Court
highlighted disagreements between medical, philosophical, and religious
authorities, concluding that "the unborn have never been recognized in
the law as persons in the whole sense."20 The Court touched only indi-
rectly on the question of a right to life, assuming that "[i]f. . . [fetal] per-
sonhood is established," the case for abortion rights would collapse, "for
the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Four-
114. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption
and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 496 (1998) (describing the Court's
former requirement that, in order to be considered a suspect class, a group must have "obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristic[s]" (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602
(1987))).
115. See, e.g., Louisell, supra note 103, at 247 ("Medical evidence would indicate that the
various stages of development [were] merely labels which have been placed upon what is in fact the
steady, constant growth of the human being.").
116. See, e.g., Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows
of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology in Support of Appellees at 26, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) ("When one views the present state of medical science, we
find that the artificial distinction between born and unborn has vanished."); Motion for Leave to
Submit a Brief Amici Curiae Brief of Women for the Unborn et al. in Support of Appellees at 9, Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18) ("Modem genetics has confirmed scientifically what
women have long felt intuitively-the presence of another human life, a life to be reverenced and
protected.").
117. See, e.g., Press Release, Nellie J. Gray, Chairman, Nat'l March for Life Comm. (Jan. 22,
1974) [hereinafter NMLC Press Release] (on file with The American Citizens Concerned for Life
Papers in the University of Michigan Gerald Ford Memorial Library).
118. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-64.
119. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 (N.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-63.
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teenth] Amendment."l2 1 By dismissing the idea that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment defined fetuses as persons, the Court went no
further in exploring whether the Constitution recognized a right to life.122
Movement leaders responded by working harder than ever to revo-
lutionize equal-protection jurisprudence, pushing powerlessness and
helplessness as the center of constitutional analysis. Nellie Gray's March
for Life, an organization leading a major pro-life protest of the same
name, issued materials explaining: "If our Constitution, as now interpret-
ed, cannot guarantee the right to be secure in one's person in order to be
born, it cannot long protect the right to be secure in one's person during
illness, physical and mental disability, [and] senility ... 123
Partly for this reason, the fetal-protective amendment preferred by
many pro-lifers advanced a right to equal treatment not only for the un-
born but also for any similarly vulnerable individuals.1 24 A variety of
Article V amendments proposed in Congress would have changed the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, explicitly including the unborn
as persons.125 However, leaders of groups like the NRLC and AUL in-
sisted that their movement demanded protection for all vulnerable and
dependent persons. The NRLC endorsed an amendment that would re-
quire protection of life regardless of age, health, function or condition of
dependency.126 Dr. John Willke of the NRLC insisted that "civil rights
[under the Fourteenth Amendment] mean nothing if they do not protect
the weakest and most helpless of the humans among us." 27 He asked:
"[S]hould we allow the Supreme Court to define the right to life on the
basis of age and place of residence?"1 2 8
D. Pro-Life Activists Contest he Meaning ofDependency and Vulnera-
bility
While antiabortion activists shared a vision of the Equal Protection
Clause, movement members disagreed intensely about who counted as
vulnerable and dependent persons. Some movement members focused
exclusively on the abortion issue, while others also mobilized to battle
living-will and death-with-dignity laws.129 Still others viewed pregnant
women, and perhaps all women, as vulnerable, dependent, and deserving
121. Id. at 156-57.
122. See id.
123. NMLC Press Release, supra note 117.
124. ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 29.
125. See, e.g., id. at 43-45.
126. See NMLC Press Release, supra note 117.
127. Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion: Hearings on Proposed Constitutional
Amendments on Abortion Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 399 (1976) (Statement of Dr. John Wilike).
128. Id. at 405.
129. On the diversity of motives and tactics characterizing pro-life activism in the period, see,
for example, MUNSON, supra note 90, at 192; and see also CAROL J. C. MAXWELL, PRO-LIFE
ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA: MEANING, MOTIVATION, AND DIRECT ACTION 2, 8, 21 (2002).
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of protection. These activists expressed themselves in the conventional
rhetoric of the pro-life movement, demanding a reworking of equal-
protection doctrine. However, as this Part shows, these advocates moved
toward a radical reconceptualization of the movement's goals, one cen-
tered partly on women's constitutional interests in liberty and equality.
These activists turned to meaningful choice in advocating what they
viewed as both protections against sex discrimination and alternatives to
abortion. To be sure, antiabortion advocates disagreed with feminists
about the meaning of reproductive liberty.1 30 They insisted that the State
should ban all, or most, abortions-and could do so without denying
women constitutional autonomy.'31 At the same time, some influential
pro-life activists maintained that women did not have the freedom to
choose childbirth or procreation unless the State protected them against
sex discrimination.1 32
During the battle for an Article V amendment recognizing a right to
life, members of ACCL , an influential antiabortion organization, began
to develop an argument that combined antidiscrimination and reproduc-
tive-liberty reasoning. In testifying in favor of an Article V amendment
banning abortion, Dorothy Czarnecki of the ACCL argued:
It is my opinion that women are equal to but not the same as men. In
the natural order of things, this will never change. Women deserve
equal rights, equal pay, equal job opportunities, and equal[ity] under
the law. Women ought o have the right over their own bodies, inso-
far as they can determine whether or not they shall become pregnant.
They deserve to be educated. Equal opportunity means that, rich or
poor, black or white, they shall [be able] ... to receive sex education,
and contraceptive information . . . . It does not mean that we shall
supply abortion to those who cannot afford it.1 33
Czarnecki endorsed an idea of choice that seemed incoherent to
feminists who saw the connection between abortion rights, autonomy,
and equality for women. At the same time, Czarnecki agreed with femi-
nists that formal equality was not enough to guarantee women meaning-
ful reproductive choice. "Equal opportunity" involved neither abortion
nor identical treatment: women's special vulnerability meant that they
needed and deserved assistance in accessing sex education and contra-
ception.134 Czarnecki's vision of equality for women would drive pro-life
support for the PDA. Members of groups like the ACCL concluded that
pregnancy made women biologically and culturally different, vulnerable
130. See Ziegler, supra note 93, at 982.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Abortion-Part 2: Hearing on S.1. Res. 119 and S.J. Res. 130 Before the Subcomm. on





to pernicious forms of discrimination.'35 Equal treatment for pregnant
women would require some affirmative intervention on the part of the
State-to end discrimination and to ensure pregnant women a minimum
level of income, healthcare, and child care.
In 1975, while still pushing an Article V amendment, Marjory
Mecklenburg of the ACCL modified the reproductive-liberty reasoning
used in the litigation of Geduldig.136 First, Mecklenburg testified that
pregnant women represented a key example of the vulnerable persons
currently denied the protection of the Constitution. Asking Congress to
pay more attention to the women who wanted to continue a pregnancy,
Mecklenburg asserted that such women constituted "a disadvantaged
class." 37 Pregnant women were vulnerable partly because the govern-
ment denied them meaningful reproductive choice. "It is sad indeed," she
testified, "that women are making choices about whether to give their
children the right to life or to terminate based on economic conditions. If
they feel pressured because of the economic situation, we can ask what
kind of a choice do they really have?"l38
By 1975, activists like Mecklenburg had elaborated on this idea of
choice, translating it into a powerful vision for legislative change. Meck-
lenburg lobbied for a number of laws designed to help pregnant women
and new mothers: amendments to the Social Security Act allowing preg-
nant women to claim unborn children as dependents; "federal and indi-
vidual state legislation .. . providing that pregnancy, parenthood, or mar-
ital status cannot constitute grounds for denial of education"; and social
welfare programs designed to help indigent, adolescent mothers.139 In
February 1975, Mecklenburg came out in favor of the School Age Moth-
ers and Children Act of 1975, an ultimately unsuccessful social welfare
bill sponsored by abortion-rights champions Birch Bayh (D-IN) and Ted
Kennedy (D-MA).1 40 The law would have guaranteed a variety of family
planning, childcare, and healthcare services for adolescent mothers and
their children.141 Guaranteeing adolescent mothers meaningful reproduc-
tive choice would, in Mecklenburg's view, reduce abortion rates, since
the mother of a fetus was the "first line of defense against pre-birth ag-
135. See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 195-200.
136. See Abortion-Part IV: Hearings on S.i Res. 6, S.J. Res. 10, S.J. Res. 11, and S.J. Res. 91
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 644-46,
648, 650, 653, 694 (June 1975) (Statement of Marjory Mecklenburg).
137. Id. at 654.
138. Id. at 648-49.
139. See id. at 646, 655-56. This part later discusses several of these lobbying efforts at greater
length.
140. See School-Age Mother and Child Health Act, 1975: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 94th Cong. 495-96 (Nov. 1975) [hereinafter
School-Age Mother and Child Act] (Statement of Marjory Mecklenburg) (on file with author);
MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, AN "EPIDEMIC" OF ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY?: SOME HISTORICAL AND
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 50 (1988).
141. See VINOVSKIS, supra note 140, at 51.
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gression."142 But Mecklenburg went further, endorsing her own under-
standing of constitutional choice:
[M]any poor women, pressed by financial circumstances, presently
have only the "freedom" to abort ....
Alternatives to abortion must be real if freedom of conscience and re-
sponsibility are to be more than rhetoric. This means that society
must offer good health care, both pre and post-natal; daycare facili-
ties; ... [and] maternity and paternity leave ... .143
The vision of meaningful choice written into laws like the School
Age Mother and Child Act assumed that the State had to refrain from
burdening women's decisions. Mecklenburg explained: "Americans must
examine the pregnant woman's life situation, assess what is necessary to
preserve her personal dignity and her mental and physical health, and
then provide for these needs .... Women must not be forced by circum-
stances to seek an abortion .. . .144
Prior to 1976, members of the ACCL borrowed heavily from the
special-burden reasoning rejected by the courts, giving it new life as a
legislative constitutional norm. For legal feminists, special-burden rea-
soning served a different purpose: rebutting claims that women demand-
ed preferential treatment. As the battle against pregnancy discrimination
moved to Congress, business leaders and industry groups insisted that
pregnancy disability policies themselves represented discrimination
against men.145 Given the right of reproductive choice, women bore chil-
dren and then unfairly demanded that someone else foot the bill. For
legal feminists responding to these charges, it became crucial to show
that women wanted equal, rather than special, opportunities. Reworking
the reproductive-liberty reasoning used by some pro-lifers offered femi-
nists a valuable strategy for achieving this task.
E. Feminists Shiftfrom Juridical to Legislative Constitutionalism
In the aftermath of their defeat in Geduldig, feminists turned to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a source of protection against
pregnancy discrimination, this time, working with an unlikely set of al-
lies. As the New York Times reported in September 1975, "A cause that
has managed to unite women from feminists to members of the Right to
Life movement is the right to disability benefits for time lost due to
142. School-Age Mother and Child Act, supra note 140, at 511.
143. Id. at 499, 501 (quoting National Council of Churches Study Paper (Mar. 2, 1972)).
144. Id.at5ll.
145. See, e.g., Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S 995 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Human Resources, 95 Cong 1st Sess. (1977) 481-88 [here-
inafter Discrimination on the Basis ofPregnancy] (statement of Brockwell Heylin).
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pregnancy."' Progress in the courts made Title VII litigation an attrac-
tive option: the Second and Third Circuit held that pregnancy discrimina-
tion violated Title VII notwithstanding the holding of Geduldig.147 Rely-
ing on LaFleur, the Supreme Court itself had struck down a Utah law
disqualifying women from receiving unemployment insurance for an
eighteen-week period preceding and following pregnancy because they
were "unable to work."1 48 As Kathy Willert Peratis of the ACLU ex-
plained: "We're really making headway now." 49
This progress came to an abrupt halt in 1976 when the Supreme
Court decided General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. Rejecting the interpreta-
tion of Title VII adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission and many lower courts, the Gilbert Court decided that pregnancy
discrimination did not count as sex discrimination.150 Gilbert reasoned
that what women demanded was not protection against discrimination
but rather special treatment, since "pregnancy-related disabilities consti-
tute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate
them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits,
accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facially even-
handed inclusion of risks."'5 '
For legal feminists, Gilbert's reasoning was deeply disappointing.
Peratis put the point bluntly, telling the New York Times: "We bombed
out in court, so we'll have to go to Congress."52 However, feminists did
far more then switch from the juridical to the legislative arena. Instead,
organizations like the ACLU and the Women's Legal Defense Fund
(WLDF) continued litigating, seeking to carve out a space for Title VII
protections in the aftermath of Gilbert. In cases like Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty,153 feminists had to work within a Gilbert framework that denied
women's right to "special treatment" in the context of pregnancy.54 In
turn, Satty and Gilbert helped to shape the arguments used by both busi-
ness lobbyists and legal feminists in the battle for the PDA. Business
leaders popularized the idea of pregnancy disability as reverse discrimi-
nation against men.'55 Since women had the freedom to terminate preg-
146. Virginia Lee Warren, The Fight for Disability Benefits in Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 1975, at 36.
147. On the perceived promise of Title VII litigation in the period, see, for example, id
148. Turner v. Dep't of Emp. Sec. of Utah, 423 U.S. 44, 45 (1975).
149. Warren, supra note 146.
150. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
151. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
152. Keith Love, Pregnancy Sick Benefits: Call for Action on Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, at 46
(Dec. 10, 1976), http://0-
search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/122937067?accountid=14608 (quoting Statement
by Kathleen Peratis of the ACLU).
153. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
154. On the constraints faced by feminists after Geduldig, see, for example, Deborah Dinner,
Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism in the Making of Sex Discrimination Law, 91 WASH.
U. L. REv. 453, 490-500 (2014).
155. Discrimination on the Basis ofPregnancy, supra note 145.
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nancies, as business leaders asserted, women should have to bear the
costs of any children they bore.156 Forcing employers to do so would
result in discrimination against both male employees and business own-
ers. Legal feminists responded by drawing on an idea of impermissible
burdens similar to the one set forth in Satty.'5 7 The reliance on the bene-
fit-burden distinction ultimately encouraged feminists working in Con-
gress to turn back to the reproductive-liberty reasoning rejected by the
Court.
F. Satty Plays Up the Benefit-Burden Distinction
Nora Satty worked as a clerk in the accounting department of the
Nashville Gas Company when she became pregnant. The company
required Satty to take maternity leave and refused to give her sick pay
during her absence.159 Worse, while she was on leave, the company took
away the seniority Satty had already earned.160 When she reapplied for
work, the company placed her in a temporary position and, pursuant to
its policy, denied her every permanent position she applied for because
other, more senior employees had bid for them.'6 1 After Satty completed
her temporary assignment, the company terminated her "due to lack of
work and job openings.,l62
When Satty's case came before the Supreme Court, both her coun-
sel and amici curiae, including the ACLU and the Women's Legal De-
fense Fund, focused on how Satty's case differed from Gilbert. While
that case denied "special benefits," Nora Satty's defenders insisted that
they wanted nothing more than equal treatment.'63 In a brief signed by
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Susan Deller Ross, the ACLU and WLDF ar-
gued that "no 'extra compensation' issue [was] present" in Satty.' " In-
stead of directly challenging the validity of Gilbert or Geduldig, the brief
shifted the focus to the special burdens imposed on the liberty of Satty
and other pregnant women. As the brief explained:
Although Title VII does not require that greater economic benefits be
paid to one sex or the other "because of their different roles in the
scheme of existence", [sic] by the same token Title VII hardly per-
mits an employer specifically to burden female employees through-
out their working lives because of their different role.165
156. See, e.g., id. at 95-97 (statement of the National Association of Manufacturers).
157. See, e.g., id at 451-52 (statement of Letty Cottin-Pogrebin, Editor for Ms. magazine).
158. Saty, 434 U.S. at 139.
159. Id. at 138-39.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 139.
162. Id at 139.
163. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union and Women's Legal
Defense Fund at 6-8, Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (No. 75-536).




The brief insisted that Satty and other pregnant women did not re-
quest accommodation of their pregnancies.'6 Rather, Satty asked the
Court to stop the employer from burdening their ability to work because
they had chosen to have children.1 67
In a terse opinion written by Justice William Rehnquist, Satty held
that some, but not all, pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII.16 s
Holding that the Nashville Gas Company's policies violated Title VII,
Rehnquist distinguished pregnancy disability policies, which afforded
pregnant women "a benefit that men cannot and do not receive," from
the burdens imposed in Satty.' 6 9 "We held in Gilbert that [Title VII] did
not require that greater economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other
'because of their differing roles in "the scheme of human existence,""'
Rehnquist explained.170 "But that holding does not allow us to read [the
statute] to permit an employer to burden female employees in such a way
as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their differ-
ent role."l 71
Publicly, legal feminists interpreted Satty as a signal that legislative,
rather than juridical, constitutionalism represented the most promising
path for women seeking equal treatment or reproductive liberty.172 Since
Satty did not provide clear guidance about when pregnancy disability
policies would run afoul of Title VII, Susan Deller Ross of the ACLU
called the decision "confused," reasoning that it "showed the importance
of a new Federal law to make all discrimination against pregnant workers
illegal." 73
Rather than simply reinforcing the importance of amending Title
VII, Satty encouraged feminists to change the temporary-disability para-
174digm used for much of the early 1970s. Defining pregnancy as a mere
temporary disability had worked to dispel the myth that women who bore
children necessarily left work to raise them.175 At the same time,
"[c]lassifying pregnancy within the temporary disability framework
... represented an effort to extend socioeconomic protection to
childbearing workers without discouraging women's employment."7 6
After Gilbert, skeptical members of Congress and business leaders de-
nounced any effort to provide socioeconomic protection for women, pre-
166. Id at 15-17.
167. See id. at 7-9.
168. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 143-46.
169. Id. at 142.
170. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139 (1976)).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Warren Weaver Jr., Justices, 9-0, Block a Loss of Seniority in Maternity Leave,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1977, at Al, A18.
173. Id. at Al 8 (quoting Statement by Susan Deller Ross, Clinical Director, ACLU).
174. For a study of the temporary disability paradigm, see Dinner, supra note 18, at 449-56.
175. See id. at 454-55.
176. Id. at 455.
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senting it as the kind of unfair special accommodation that Gilbert re-
jected.17 7 During and after Satty, legal feminists responded by refraining
the PDA not only as "an effort to extend socioeconomic protection"'7 8
but also as a guarantee that employers could not impose unique burdens
on either women's decision to work or procreate.
G. Business Groups, Pro-Lifers, and Feminists Contest he Benefit-
Burden Distinction
The benefit-burden distinction central to Satty also shaped debate
about the PDA in 1977. Testifying on behalf of the Chamber of Com-
merce, Brockwell Heylin insisted that the issue was whether Congress
was willing to provide special benefits to pregnant women that other
workers could never enjoy. 179 Testimony highlighted statistics suggesting
that only 40%-50% of pregnant workers returned to work after maternity
leave,'80 while "almost 100% of other workers taking disability leave do
return to work."'8' Insofar as pregnancy was sui generis, the PDA would
not provide protection against discrimination; it would in fact discrimi-
nate against other employees. Heylin reasoned: "The pregnancy disabil-
ity benefits would become a severance pay which other (non-pregnant)
employees cannot receive."'82
Testimony on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM) made more explicit the connection between framing pregnancy
as a choice and denouncing the PDA as a form of special treatment.183
NAM representatives emphasized that men and women chose when they
married, chose when they had sexual intercourse, chose when they used
contraception, and chose when they turned to abortion.'84 "Within this
climate, it is appropriate to ask how much of the economic responsibility
for parenthood will be assumed by those men and women who choose to
have children" the NAM asked, "and how much responsibility will be
[placed on] society .... " The central issue was not whether Congress
should countenance discrimination but rather "how far society chooses to
go in subsidizing parenthood."86
As both pro-lifers and legal feminists recognized, the PDA would
create some socioeconomic security for pregnant women. Importing spe-
cial-burden reasoning into the PDA allowed both groups to avoid the
charge that they demanded special treatment for women. Instead, sup-
177. See, e.g., id. at 431-32.
178. Id at455.
179. Discrimination on the Basis ofPregnancy, supra note 145.
180. Id. at 101 (Statement on National Association of Manufacturers).
181. Id. at 482, 488 (statement of Brockwell Heylin).
182. Id at 482.
183. See id. at 95-97 (statement of the National Association of Manufacturers).





porters of the PDA contended that the law protected women from unfair
and potentially unconstitutional burdens on their reproductive decision-
making that men never faced.
Moreover, meaningful-choice reasoning allowed pro-life activists to
present their movement as reasonable, moderate, and willing to advance
real reproductive choice-a major goal of ACCL leaders.18 7 Lobbying
for meaningful choice showed that some pro-lifers could work in broad
legislative coalitions, advancing interests (beyond abortion bans) that
other Americans held dear.'8 8
More broadly, pro-lifers seized on pregnancy discrimination as an
issue, hoping to "promote[] motherhood."1 89 Some movement members
believed that poor women terminated their pregnancies in order to pre-
serve their livelihood.'1' Protecting women against pregnancy discrimi-
nation would ensure that more women could afford to bring their preg-
nancies to term. Pro-life activist and obstetrician-gynecologist Andre
Hellegers told Congress that the PDA would deter coercive abortions.'91
"Let's call it a pro-choice bill," Hellegers quipped, "in which . . . the
choice, if it goes in any direction, is going to go in the childbirth way."'
9 2
Other pro-life witnesses developed a more comprehensive vision of
meaningful-choice reasoning. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley of the ACCL at-
tacked Gilbert as a "dangerous precedent with respect to the exercise of
fundamental rights." 93 Nolan-Haley identified four rights at stake in
pregnancy discrimination: "The decision to procreate, the decision not to
terminate a pregnancy, the decision to prevent [pregnancy] through con-
traception, and the decision to terminate a pregnancy."94 According to
Nolan-Haley, Gilbert unjustly-and perhaps unconstitutionally-
"penalized women who chose to exercise the first two rights to the exclu-
sion of the latter."l 95
187. The ACCL, for example, stressed the need to create "a reasonable, rational, national pro-
life organization" in order to attract the support of those "unable to identify themselves with the
[current] highly polarized organizations." Memorandum from ACCL on Purposes and Objectives of
ACCL (on file with The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers in the University of Michigan
Gerald Ford Memorial Library).
188. See, e.g., Brochure, Am. Citizens Concerned for Life, No Other Vehicle Quite Like Ours
(on file with The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers in the University of Michigan Gerald
Ford Memorial Library).
189. Thea Rossi Barron, Insurance Bill Includes Pregnancy Clause, NAT. RIGHT TO LIFE
NEws, Feb. 1978, at 8.
190. See ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 193-201.
191. See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, supra note 145, at 67-68 (statement of
Andre E. Hellegers, Professor, Georgetown University).
192. Id. at 68.
193. Id. at 437 (statement of Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Special Counsel, Am. Citizens Con-
cerned for Life, Inc.).
194. Id at 432-33.
195. Id at 438.
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Legal feminists like Wendy Williams and Letty Cottin-Pogrebin, a
feminist author, relied on meaningful-choice reasoning for a quite differ-
ent reason: countering claims that the PDA required expensive and unfair
special treatment. In testifying in favor of the PDA, Williams spotlighted
what she called "[a] necessary side effect" of pregnancy discrimination:
"the burden placed upon a woman's choice to bear a child."l 96 She rea-
soned that Congress did not (and should not) intend that any citizen "for-
go a fundamental right, such as a woman's right to bear children, as a
condition precedent to the enjoyment of . . . employment free from dis-
crimination."'97
Cottin-Pogrebin articulated the connection between pregnancy dis-
crimination and reproductive choice more forcefully, explaining that
women asked for nothing more than protection against burdens society
never imposed on men:
Pregnancy discrimination forces us to choose between brain and
uterus; between making money and making babies; between being
productive or being reproductive. It is a false dilemma. Men do not
have to make this choice; they can be both parents and workers with-
out suffering a social, personal, or economic penalty.
198
In spite of deep differences about the nature of motherhood and the
need for legal abortion, the PDA campaign led pro-lifers and legal femi-
nists to adopt a strikingly similar and transformative understanding of
reproductive choice. As Deborah Dinner has shown, legal feminists be-
gan highlighting the uniqueness of motherhood in justifying protection
from the government.199 Pro-lifers like Mecklenburg had long empha-
sized the uniqueness of motherhood in asserting that abortion severed a
particularly valuable bond between mother and child, thereby traumatiz-
200
ing any woman who terminated a pregnancy.
Conversely, pro-life activists like Mecklenburg and Czarnecki grav-
itated toward a definition of meaningful reproductive choice that would
prevent discrimination against women who took leave after an abortion
as well as a pregnancy. The ACCL's change in position was striking.
After all, leaders of the group had endorsed an Article V amendment
banning abortion, asserting that the Constitution did not recognize rights
for women "to choose to destroy their unborn children."2 0 1 In the PDA
campaign, ACCL leaders argued that they would support the PDA re-
gardless of whether employers had to cover post-abortion leave, because
196. Id. at 115 (statement of Wendy W. Williams, Assistant Professor of Law, Georgetown
University).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 451-52 (statement of Letty Cottin-Pogrebin, Editor for Ms. magazine).
199. See Dinner, supra note 154, at 499-500.
200. Mecklenburg, for example, called for post-abortion counseling to address women's regret
and to prevent "recidivism." School-Age Mother and Child Act, supra note 140, at 504-06.
201. Id. at 498.
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the law "would encourage a woman to keep a pregnancy or do what she
wants. It gives women a choice."202 If anything, the ACCL favored a
version of the PDA that did not exclude post-abortion treatment, since
some within the organization believed that the law would garner more
support if no abortion exclusion applied.203 As an ACCL leader ex-
plained: "ACCL supports H.R. 6075 [the PDA] as a pro-life bill with or
without an abortion amendment and urges its prompt passage."20
This understanding of meaningful reproductive choice made an im-
pact on the larger society. A variety of religious organizations, including
the progressive National Council of Churches, endorsed a more robust
concept of a right to choose-one that required affirmative support for
205women seeking to procreate or avoid procreation.
More importantly, this understanding of meaningful choice influ-
enced many of the key supporters of the PDA. Key sponsors of the PDA
across the ideological spectrum echoed this idea of reproductive choice.
Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) argued that sex discrimination could
effectively coerce women into terminating a pregnancy:
[T]here are a number of reasons why a woman would want to have
an abortion. One of the reasons is that she cannot afford the expenses
attendant to a prolonged pregnancy and childbirth. ... We are remov-
ing that [situation] where the price tag of a baby determines whether
- 206it is born or not.
Representative Ronald Sarasin (R-CT) similarly argued that women
with real reproductive choice would be better able to participate in the
economic and social life of the nation.207 The PDA gave a woman "the
right to choose both, to be financially and legally protected before, dur-
ing, and after her pregnancy."208 According to a Democratic supporter of
the bill, the PDA would "put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system
that forces women to choose between family and career."209
Those on opposing sides of the abortion issue understood meaning-
ful reproductive choice in varying ways and described it differently over
time. In the early-to-mid-1970s, feminist litigators first used the idea to
202. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy Part 2: Hearing on
H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the H. Comm. on
Education and Labor, 95th Cong. 66 (1977) (statement of Dorothy Czarnecki).
203. See id. at 63-66; see also ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 197-99.
204. Letter from Marjory Mecklenburg, President of American Citizens Concerned for Life to
Pro-Life Leaders and News Media Representatives (on file with author).
205. School-Age Mother and Child Act, supra note 140, at 501 (quoting National Council of
Churches Study Paper (Mar. 2, 1972)).
206. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, 96th Cong. 115-16 (1980) [hereinafter Legislative History of the PDA]
(statement of Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton).
207. See id. at 208-09 (statement of Rep. Ronald Sarasin).
208. Id at 208.
209. Id. at 185 (statement of Paul E.Tsongas, Massachusetts).
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demand both abortion rights and freedom from sex discrimination. These
attorneys framed meaningful choice as a justification for heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny. Feminist litigators also used meaningful choice to expose
understudied connections between equality and liberty for women.
Forced to negotiate in the legislative arena, in the mid-1970s, femi-
nists redefined meaningful choice, playing up connections between pov-
erty, sex equality, and the costs of reproduction. In responding to busi-
ness lobbyists, feminists also emphasized the language of benefits and
burdens to counter accusations that pregnant women were seeking spe-
cial treatment.
In the mid-1970s, feminists' troubled partnership with pro-lifers al-
so transformed arguments about meaningful choice. Pro-life advocates
understood meaningful choice in different terms than did feminists, ob-
scuring any connection between abortion, equality, and liberty. Whereas
many feminists saw protective legislation as a reflection of damaging sex
stereotypes, these antiabortion activists also viewed women as vulnerable
and deserving of protection. Over time, however, some pro-lifers devel-
oped a fuller account of why women were vulnerable-one that focused
heavily on sex stereotyping and discrimination. By the later 1970s, some
pro-lifers found more common ground with feminists, favoring the PDA
even if it did not prohibit abortion coverage.
The idea of meaningful reproductive choice underlying the PDA
had radical implications. Women in favor of and opposed to abortion
brought to the surface often-ignored connections between liberty and
equality, presenting protection from sex discrimination as a necessary
precondition for any true exercise of reproductive liberty. Both feminists
and pro-lifers defined choice as much more than freedom from state in-
terference. Indeed, calling for meaningful reproductive choice allowed
activists on either side of the abortion question to navigate difficult ques-
tions about "special treatment" and "reverse discrimination" plaguing the
civil rights movement and the women's movement in the late 1970s.210
By presenting private acts of discrimination-and even poverty-as im-
permissible burdens on a woman's reproductive liberty, opposing activ-
ists found a powerful new way of demanding economic security for
working women.
Superficially, this understanding of meaningful choice seems con-
sistent with the position taken by most federal courts that employers can
satisfy the PDA by creating pregnancy-blind disability policies.211 Legal
210. On the politics of reverse discrimination in the period, see TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE
PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 135-57 (2004); NICHOLAS LAHAM,
THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICS OF RACE: IN PURSUIT OF COLORBLIND JUSTICE AND
LIMITED GOVERNMENT 20-25 (1998).




feminists, pro-life activists, and legislators sympathetic to either group
generally rejected the idea that the PDA created special benefits for
pregnant women. However, the history of arguments for meaningful re-
productive choice revealed a more complex legislative purpose underly-
ing the PDA. Meaningful-choice arguments forced Congress to evaluate
pregnant women based on their ability to work rather than the "cause" of
their disability. By penalizing pregnant women for the cause of their dis-
ability, employers would impose burdens on women's reproductive deci-
sion-making that other workers completely avoided. Pregnancy-blind
policies impose precisely the kind of harsh burden the framers of the
PDA-and activists on both sides of the abortion question-sought to
prevent.
Why did meaningful reproductive choice arguments fade from view
in the aftermath of the PDA battle? Part II argues that these contentions
lost influence not because of any inherent flaw but because of changes to
the larger political landscape.
II. THE DECLINE OF MEANINGFUL REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE
Since the 1980s, both antiabortion leaders and feminist commenta-
tors have pointed out fundamental flaws in the use of choice as a frame-
work for reproductive liberty. Before and after her nomination to the
Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg described the privacy rationale for
abortion rights as unconvincing, reasoning that the Court might have
rendered the abortion conflict less intense had it grounded abortion rights
212in the Equal Protection Clause. Commentators have pointed out that a
privacy rationale laid the foundation for later Supreme Court decisions
upholding bans on abortion funding.213 Historian Rickie Solinger has
argued that a choice framework ratified existing race and class divisions
governing access to reproductive healthcare.214
212. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1198-
99, 1208 (1992) ("[Roe] halted a political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby
... prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue").
213. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 930 (1973) (arguing that outlawing abortion is not about "governmental snooping"
into citizens' private lives); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 386 (1985) ("Overall, the Court's Roe position is
weakened, I believe, by the opinion's concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the
exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective."); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and
Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329,
331, 371, 373 (2010); Law, supra note 26, at 1020 ("The rhetoric of privacy, as opposed to equality,
blunts our ability to focus on the fact that it is women who are oppressed when abortion is denied. .
. . The rhetoric of privacy also reinforces a public/private dic[h]otomy that is at the heart of the
structures that perpetuate the powerlessness of women."); Catharine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A
Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 52-53 (Jay L. Gar-
field & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) (criticizing Roe's emphasis on choice and privacy instead of
equality).
214. See, e.g., RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE
SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 4-6 (2001).
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This Part contends that choice arguments lost influence in the abor-
tion debate not because of any of the flaws identified by feminist com-
mentators but rather because of a rapidly changing political reality. First,
pro-life arguments for meaningful choice came into growing tension with
the campaign to preserve bans on abortion funding. In the context of
funding bans, antiabortion activists, including those like Mecklenburg,
came to argue that rights to choose guaranteed only freedom from state
interference. Increasingly, the abortion funding issue divided the coali-
tion that had successfully pushed the PDA.
Moreover, as the Part shows next, coalition politics undermined
meaningful-choice reasoning. With the emergence of the New Right and
Religious Right, antiabortion activists allied with partners who rejected
both a strong antidiscrimination policy and a broadening of the social
welfare net. The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan and a slate of pro-life
Republicans reinforced antiabortion activists' dependence on allies op-
posed to the central premises of meaningful-choice reasoning.
Finally, as the Part shows, facing setbacks in the Supreme Court,
Congress, the academy, and state legislatures, feminists began searching
for a more constitutionally sound and popularly resonant justification for
abortion rights. As progressives developed what many saw as sounder
defenses of abortion rights, academics and grassroots activists lost sight
of the transformative understandings of choice used in the PDA cam-
paign.
A. The Abortion Funding Battle Divides Supporters ofMeaningful Re-
productive Choice
In the mid-1970s, as the battle for bans on publicly funded abortion
picked up pace, pro-life legislators and grassroots activists deployed two
key arguments involving a right to choose. First, some activists and poli-
ticians charged that taxpayers had a right to conscientiously object to the
funding of what they saw as the "murder [of] the unborn."2 15 To some
extent, Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), the sponsor of an ultimately
successful funding ban, described both poverty and abortion as acute
social injustices:
"Let the poor women of America make a list of those things that so-
ciety denies them and which are enjoyed by rich women" ... De-
cent housing, decent education, . . . decent income, and then say to
them, 'Now [sic] those will take second place. But we will encourage
you to kill your. . . children."
216
Hyde also insisted that poor women had no right to government as-
sistance of any kind. While admitting that he would ban all abortions if
215. Abortions: Should Taxpayers Foot the Bill?, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 29, 1976, at 3A.
216. Id. (quoting Statement by Rep. Henry J. Hyde).
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he could, Hyde emphasized that the right to choose recognized in Roe in
no way required the State to pay for abortion.2 17 In the Supreme Court,
attorneys representing Americans United for Life Legal Defense and
Education Fund similarly explained: "If the abortion decision is so pri-
vate . . . it follows that government should not itself be compelled to re-
spond to the demand of the exercise of that private right . ... Under
Roe, the state could not interfere with a woman's decision-making but
219had no obligation to fund abortion.
By 1978, the year Congress passed the PDA, the war over funding
bans had intensified. Congress passed the Hyde Amendment in 1976, and
in 1977, the Supreme Court upheld several similar state laws.220 Almost
as soon as it passed, the Hyde Amendment sparked intense conflict about
exceptions for rape, incest, and health.221 Locked in a constant struggle to
preserve funding bans, pro-lifers like Marjory Mecklenburg retreated
from their earlier positions on meaningful choice.222 In pushing the PDA,
Mecklenburg and the ACCL had defended an idea of choice that required
protection against sex discrimination, going so far as to support a bill that
required employers to give women post-abortion leave.223 By 1978,
Mecklenburg again joined Planned Parenthood in lobbying for an ulti-
mately successful bill, the Adolescent Health, Services, and Pregnancy
Care Act of 1978, requiring state support for both family planning and
for adolescents seeking to bear and raise children.2 24 This time, however,
Mecklenburg argued that women's right to meaningful choice did not
extend to abortion access. "'Freedom to choose' implies that it is equally
possible for a woman to choose to give birth as well as to abort," Meck-
lenburg argued.225 "Today frightened, confused and dependent adoles-
cents often have little freedom to continue a pregnancy unless the kind of
217. See CAROL A. EMMENS, THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 68-69 (rev. ed. 1991).
218. Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans United for Life, Inc. in Support of Peti-
tioner John H. Poelker at 13, Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (No. 75-442).
219. See id at 12-13.
220. For the Supreme Court's decisions on the public funding of abortion, see Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 470-78 (1977) (upholding a Connecticut Medicaid funding ban on abortion); Poelker
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 420-21 (1977) (sustaining a ban on the use of St. Louis public hospitals for
abortion); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445-54 (1977) (upholding a Pennsylvania law that limited
Medicaid funding for abortions).
221. Karen De Witt, Foes of Abortion Seek to Tighten Restrictions on Medicaid Funds, N.Y.
TIMES, at B20 (Mar. 1, 1979), http://0-
search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/120940075/C6EB024E86C94119PQ/l?accounti
d=14608; Martin Tolchin, Financing Bill and Abortion: Both Sides Emphasize Questions of Con-
science, N.Y. TIMES, at A19 (Oct. 2, 1980), http://O-
search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/121031543/752E5FO422104BBEPQ/1?accountid
=14608; Martin Tolchin, On Abortion, the Houses Still Remain Miles Apart, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
1977, at 176.
222. See ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 200.
223. See id. at 197-99.
224. Adolescent Health, Services, and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act of 1978: Hearings
on S. 2910 Before the Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong. 433-34 (1978) (statement of Marjo-
ry Mecklenburg).
225. Id. at 434.
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services this bill details are readily available."2 26 When addressing the
scope of reproductive freedom, however, Mecklenburg concluded that
227meaningful choice should not include abortion. Reversing an earlier
position, she maintained that the public would not support a meaningful-
choice law if it included abortion services. "If abortion is interjected in
this bill," argued Mecklenburg, "I believe it will reduce or eliminate its
chances of passage... ."228
B. Political Party Realignment Undercuts Support for Meaningful
Choice
Before the late 1970s, both the antiabortion and abortion-rights
movements appealed to politicians and activists across the ideological
spectrum. By the late 1970s, pro-life positions had become a calling card
of grassroots conservatism.229 The mobilization of organizations identify-
ing with the New Right and Religious Right, members of which opposed
abortion, represented a potent new source of allies and political influence
for pro-life leaders.230 Organizations like the Moral Majority and Chris-
tian Voice provided much-needed financial support and political connec-
tions for a struggling pro-life movement.2 31 Political operatives frustrated
with the mainstream Republican Party, including Paul Weyrich and
Richard Viguerie, united fragmented single-issue groups, forging a pow-
erful social-conservative coalition.232 By backing Ronald Reagan and
other Republican candidates who endorsed antiabortion positions, pro-
lifers bid for unprecedented political influence.23 3 Even though many
antiabortion voters had long supported the Democratic Party and contin-
226. Id.
227. See id. at 431.
228. Id
229. On the growing relationship between the Democratic Party and the women's movement in
the 1970s and 1980s, see, for example, KIRA SANBONMATSU, DEMOCRATS, REPUBLICANS, AND THE
POLITICS OF WOMEN'S PLACE 64 (2002); LISA YOUNG, FEMINISTS AND PARTY POLITICS 10, 32
(2000).
230. See generally Mary Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Antiabortion Moderates
After Roe v. Wade, 1973-1980, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (2012).
231. On the emerging alliance between the New Right and Religious Right, see, for example,
DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD'S OWN PARTY: THE MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 165-74 (2010)
("As New Right political operatives looked for controversial issues to highlight in their campaigns
against congressional liberals, they turned with increasing frequency to the subject of abortion.");
Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Back-
lash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2060-65 (2011).
232. On the formation of this coalition, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel & Linda Greenhouse,
Afterword, in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT'S RULING 259-60 (Reva B. Siegel & Linda Greenhouse eds., 2010).
233. On the importance of Reagan and Republican support to pro-lifers in the period, see, for
example, DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY: HOW THE GOP RIGHT MADE
POLITICAL HISTORY 148-97 (2007); Cassidy, supra note 90, at 146-48.
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ued to do so well into the 1980s, pro-lifers had more reason than ever to
234
forge a partnership with the Religious Right and the Republican Party.
Meaningful-choice arguments no longer fit in the new agenda craft-
ed by the antiabortion movement and its allies. Reagan's presidential
campaign had popularized neoliberalism, a theory highlighting the merits
of deregulation, welfare cuts, and free markets.235 "Reaganomics" trans-
lated these ideas into an overarching economic philosophy.2 36 When it
came to welfare, Reagan worked with the New Right to reframe depend-
ency as a vice rather than a source of vulnerability.237 New Right politics
promised to shrink the social safety net activists like Mecklenburg had
promoted as a precondition for true reproductive choice.
Whereas pro-lifers had long demanded equal treatment for all de-
pendent Americans, Reagan described dependency as dangerous. In a
1981 speech, Reagan related the story of a victim of the welfare state-a
young woman who "had become so dependent on the welfare check that
she even turned down offers of marriage."238 Reagan's story echoed
statements made by the New Right connecting the welfare state and the
decline of the traditional family. A healthy dose of economic self-
sufficiency, Reagan suggested, would save the family and revive an ail-
239ing economy. More importantly, "ideas previously seen as distinctly
conservative had become mainstream."240 Abortion opponents joined a
political coalition committed to dismantling the welfare state. American
voters appeared increasingly hostile to the idea that welfare counted as a
right for children or anyone else. In this environment, meaningful-choice
arguments lost momentum.
Reagan's Justice Department also scaled back on antidiscrimination
protections, particularly when those policies required affirmative ac-
tion.241 While continuing to enforce an existing affirmative-action execu-
tive order, Reagan Administration officials filed suit seeking to overturn
234. On the continued loyalty of some pro-life voters toward the Democratic Party into the
1980s, see, for example, DAVID KAROL, PARTY POSITION CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
COALITION MANAGEMENT 67 (2009).
235. See, e.g., DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND
THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 4-7 (2012).
236. REBECCA DOLHINow, A JUMBLE OF NEEDS: WOMEN'S ACTIVISM AND NEOLIBERALISM
IN THE COLONIAS OF THE SOUTHWEST 14 (2010).
237. MARISA CHAPPELL, THE WAR ON WELFARE: FAMILY, POVERTY, AND POLITICS IN
MODERN AMERICA 199 (2010).
238. Id (quoting Statements by President Ronald Reagan (1981)).
239. See Adam Clymer, Reagan Urges Party to Support Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, at 27 (June 25,
1978), http://0-
search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/ 23657465/76E71 B388C414A49PQ/1 ?accounti
d=14608.
240. DANIEL BtLAND & ALEX WADDAN, THE POLITICS OF POLICY CHANGE: WELFARE,
MEDICARE, AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (2012).
241. On the Reagan Administration's opposition to affirmative action, see ANDERSON, supra
note 210, at 162-85.
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242quotas in some fifty affirmative-action decrees. Ideologically, admin-
istration officials developed a stinging criticism of "special treatment."243
In 1987, in California Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra,244 the
Reagan Administration crystallized its position. Guerra asked whether
Title VII preempted any state law requiring employers to provide certain
benefits to pregnant workers.245 In arguing against the California policy,
the Reagan Administration described laws mandating accommodations
for pregnancy as the kind of "reverse discrimination" that Title VII pro-
hibited and that the administration opposed.24 6 The pro-life movement's
allies in the New Right and Religious Right strongly opposed affirmative
*247action.
Arguments for meaningful choice no longer made sense to a pro-life
movement working so closely with opponents of gender-based affirma-
tive action. When antiabortion activists like Marjory Mecklenburg de-
fended reproductive choice, they demanded protection for pregnant
women and mothers-those they saw as members of a particularly vul-
nerable and dependent class.248 New Right activists responded that since
women already enjoyed special privileges, antidiscrimination protections
represented a step down, a threat to "conventional culture, established
institutions, and customary social roles."24 9 When the antiabortion
movement partnered with the political right, prior commitments to the
expansion of antidiscrimination law seemed profoundly out of step.
C. Feminists Seek Better Justifications for Abortion Rights
As pro-lifers moved away from support for meaningful reproductive
choice, attacks on legal abortion encouraged feminists to develop new
arguments for abortion rights, including claims relying on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Starting in 1973, legal
academics from across the ideological spectrum attacked the constitu-
242. On the retention of the affirmative-action executive order, see HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM,
COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION
POLICY IN AMERICA 173 (2002). On the effort to eliminate racial quotas from consent decrees, see
ANDREW E. BUSCH, RONALD REAGAN AND THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM 27 (2001).
243. See ANDERSON, supra note 210, at 184.
244. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). Guerra ultimately held that the California law did not violate Title
VII. Id. at 280.
245. Id. at 277-80.
246. RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND
THE STRUCTURING OF RACE, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS LITIGATION 149, 240-41
(2003).
247. See, e.g., JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, TO THE RIGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM 83 (1990); LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 1974-1980, at
189, 191-92(2010).
248. See ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 197-99.
249. DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A
WOMAN'S CRUSADE 214 (2005).
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tional underpinnings of the Roe decision.250 Starting with John Hart Ely's
The Wages of Crying Wolf, legal academics presented the substantive
due process reasoning of Roe as unconvincing, intellectually under-
whelming, and even results-oriented.2 51 By the early 1980s, academic
attacks on Roe prompted a powerful response from legal feminists com-
mitted to abortion rights. Commentators from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to
Catherine MacKinnon argued that the problem with Roe lay not in its
recognition of abortion rights but rather in the rationale offered for those
rights.252 As legal feminists worked to develop a better explanation for
abortion rights, the transformative uses of choice that appeared in the
1970s faded from view.2 53
At least in the 1970s, however, the framers of the PDA (and a varie-
ty of laws guaranteeing protections for low-income mothers) advanced
an idea of reproductive choice dramatically at odds with the narrow un-
derstanding now linked to the Roe decision. The framers of the PDA
emphasized this idea of meaningful choice, presenting antidiscrimination
law as a crucial protection against reproductive coercion.
Placing the PDA in a broader historical context spotlights the short-
comings of current judicial interpretations of the law. Courts have gener-
ally interpreted the PDA to include three interrelated rights: the right to
an individualized judgment of capacity, the right to work if not incapaci-
tated, and the right to whatever accommodations an employer offers
workers who have the same physical capacity to work.254 By contrast,
women have fared poorly when seeking light-duty work or some other
modification that would allow them to work throughout pregnancy.255 As
Joanna Grossman has argued, "The failure of current law to acknowledge
a pregnant woman's right to work despite temporary, partial impairments
or risks systematically undermines the ability of women to attain work-
place equality."256 As the history of struggles for meaningful choice
250. See Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 3, 21 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
251. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 213, at 940 (arguing that Roe had revived a discredited and
dangerous substantive due process doctrine). For further exploration of criticisms of Roe in the
period, see GARROW, supra note 40, at 609-17 (surveying critical responses to the Roe decision).
252. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407, 143-44 (2001); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 821 (1983).
253. Some scholars maintained that privacy or liberty, although not in the form envisioned by
the Roe Court, represented the most promising foundation for abortion rights. See, e.g., Anita Allen,
Allen, J., Concurring in the Judgment, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 250,
at 92, 98-107; Jed Rubenfeld, Rubenfeld, J., Concurring in Roe v. Wade and Concluding that the
Writ of Certiorari Should be Dismissed as Improvidently Granted in Doe v. Bolton, in WHAT ROE V.
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 250, at 109, 118-19.
254. See Grossman, supra note 18, at 607-13.
255. See id. at 570 ("A pregnant woman who seeks to continue working through pregnancy,
but experiences a temporary diminishment or alteration of capacity due to the physical effects of
pregnancy, will encounter limited protection in the law.").
256. Id. at 621. Part 1, supra, discusses this literature at greater length.
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makes apparent, that same failure undermines the idea of reproductive
liberty written into the PDA.
Part III examines how-and how much-Young transformed preg-
nancy-discrimination jurisprudence. While the Court removed some of
the barriers in the way of individual disparate treatment claims, employ-
ers can still impose the kind of burdens on reproductive decision-making
that the PDA was designed to rule out.
III. YOUNG, ACCOMMODATION, AND MEANINGFUL REPRODUCTIVE
CHOICE
The theory of meaningful choice developed by abortion opponents
and legal feminists stands in obvious tension with decisions interpreting
the PDA to require only what the courts call "pregnancy blindness."
Where does the Supreme Court's decision in Young leave pregnancy-
blind policies and meaningful choice more broadly? After briefly laying
out the theory of meaningful reproductive choice underlying the PDA,
this Part begins by examining pre-Young analysis of light-work and other
accommodation requests. Next, the Part explores what Young did and did
not change about the judicial treatment of pregnancy-blind policies. Fi-
nally, in the aftermath of Young, the Part considers the best strategy for
advancing the norm of meaningful choice that feminists and antiabortion
activists embraced.
A. The Legislative Constitutional Norm of Meaningful Choice
The story of the PDA underlying the Young litigation spotlights the
importance of what Reva Siegel and Robert Post have called legislative
constitutionalism,257 a process that "delivered what even a more generous
American [juridical] Constitutionalism could not: affirmative rights ap-
plicable to private as well as public workplaces."25 8 Often, scholars de-
scribe the rights created by the PDA as formal-equality protections, that
is, guarantees that pregnant women enjoy protection from stereotyping
and rights to access the benefits employers provide to similarly disabled
employees.259 Understanding the role of meaningful-choice reasoning
reveals a more radical purpose advanced by the framers of the PDA and
their supporters.
It is worth explaining why an idea of choice thoroughly rejected by
the Court gained currency in Congress. While some constitutional rights
require particular remedies or entailments, others "function as values that
257. See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section
Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943
(2003).
258. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33 (2010).
259. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 18, at 570; Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 18, at
2204 (describing the PDA as adopting a "formal equality model").
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courts seek to realize, rather than as principles that mandate specific re-
medial entailments."26 Siegel and Post offer the example of judicially
ordered school desegregation orders.26 1 Although these orders may not be
specifically required by the Equal Protection Clause, they count as a cru-
cial attempt to give it meaning.262 The guarantee of meaningful choice
recognized in the PDA operates in a similar way. While the Court has
made clear that the Constitution protects a woman's freedom to make
certain reproductive decisions, the Court has found that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires no specific remedial steps to vindicate that right.263
Through the PDA, Congress attempted to work out the meaning of con-
stitutional reproductive choice from the "distinct standpoint of [the] leg-
islature.",264 The story of the PDA makes clear important differences be-
tween legislative constitutionalism and the work of the courts and be-
tween the reproductive-liberty principles each embraced.
Legislative constitutionalism differs from judicial decision-making
in ways that mattered to the recognition of meaningful reproductive
choice. Because of the case-or-controversy requirement, judicial deci-
sions address only those constitutional questions at stake in the litiga-
265tion. By contrast, Congress can take on larger issues, writing into stat-
266utes a more robust vision of what constitutional rights could mean. In
particular, Congress can test the distinction between positive and nega-
tive rights, creating redistributive remedies.267 Congress effectively ex-
periments with such capacious notions of rights and remedies partly be-
cause it can act more cautiously in articulating its constitutional com-
mitments. Legislative constitutionalism can unfold incrementally, setting
forth a principle and developing a remedial scheme over time.2 68 Crucial-
ly, Congress is also democratically accountable, and voters can respond
to any perceived misstep in the articulation of important constitutional
commitments.26 9
260. Post & Siegel, supra note 257, at 2006.
261. Id. at 2006-07.
262. See id.
263. If anything, the Court's recent jurisprudence focuses on the permissible burdens states can
place on abortion rights. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992)
("Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue.").
264. Post & Siegel, supra note 257, at 2007.
265. Id at 2006.
266. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 167 (2001)
("Congress's constitutional duties were not only to safeguard the constitutional bounds and fairness
of social and economic legislation, but also to interpret and secure these new positive social and
economic rights.").
267. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 314-15 (1994); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections
on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410, 420-22 (1993).
268. Post & Siegel, supra note 257, at 2006-07.
269. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 182-83 (1999) ("[I]ts constitutional tasks of debate, discussion,
and authorization inevitably make Congress a more deliberative [and] public ... body.").
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Key features of legislative constitutionalism made it much more ef-
fective for those arguing for meaningful reproductive choice. Courts may
have neither the competence nor the will to fashion redistributive reme-
dies of the kind demanded by some proponents of reproductive choice.270
Judicial precedents establishing a strong tradition of negative constitu-
tionalism do not bind Congress as they do the Court.271 A Congress ac-
countable to the people felt freer to experiment with different ideas of
reproductive choice.
The PDA modified the reasoning underlying meaningful-choice ar-
guments. As its legislative history makes plain, framers of the PDA set
out not only to guarantee women individualized treatment but also to
"put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to
choose between family and career."272 The framers of the PDA described
as coercive disability policies that penalized women for taking pregnan-
cy-related leave.273 As the PDA's sponsors framed it, these penalties bur-
dened an unquestionably constitutional right-a right for women "to
continu[e] their pregnancy and maintain[] their jobs at the same time."274
While the courts may not view such policies as unconstitutional, Con-
gress concluded that pregnancy discrimination created an impermissible
burden on women's reproductive choice.275
Just the same, in passing the PDA, Congress proceeded incremen-
tally, forging a compromise between feminists, pro-lifers, and business
lobbyists. Under the PDA, if the employer chooses to accommodate any
employee, that accommodation must be "administered equally for all
workers in terms of their actual ability to perform work."276 While em-
ployers had no affirmative duty to support a woman's reproductive deci-
sion-making, they could not impose special burdens. As the House Re-
port for the PDA explained, the law required that "pregnant women be
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inabil-
ity to work." 27
7
Although incomplete, the PDA's original guarantee of meaningful
choice stands in obvious tension with current judicial interpretations of
the law. The federal courts interpret the PDA to require "pregnancy-
270. Post & Siegel, supra note 257, at 2007 (highlighting "problems of redistribution that
would be quite beyond the bounds ofjudicial remedies").
271. Just the same as Gordon Silverstein has argued, judicial decisions shape Congress's en-
gagement with constitutional issues in unpredictable ways. See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW'S
ALLURE: How LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICs 35-41, 63-67 (2009).
272. Legislative History ofthe PDA, supra note 206, at 185 (statement of Paul E. Tsongas).
273. Id. at 203 (statement of Sen. J. Javits).
274. Id. at 202-03 (statement of Sen. J. Javits).
275. See id. at 208-09 (statement of Rep. Ronald A. Sarasin); id at 178 (statement of Rep.
Baltasar Corrada); id. at 125-27 (statement of Sen. Biden); id. at 208 (statement of Rep. James M.
Jeffords).
276. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (1978).
277. Id. at 4.
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blind[ness]."278 That is, a policy passes muster as long as it "does not
grant or deny light work on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions."27 9 Viewed in pure formal-equality terms, pregnan-
cy-blind policies seem valid, since such policies do not appear to single
out pregnancy, at least superficially. Understood in the context of the
liberty norms at work in the PDA, however, pregnancy-blind policies
create just the kind of special burden on women's reproductive decision-
making that the PDA attempts to rule out.
The Fifth Circuit first clearly articulated the pregnancy-blindness
defense in 1998, in Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc.280 Mirtha Ur-
bano, a Continental employee, mostly worked as a ticket agent.28' While
she performed a number of tasks, Urbano sometimes had to perform
282physical tasks, such as lifting customers' luggage. After learning she
was pregnant, Urbano began experiencing lower back pain and visited
her physician.283 Because she had not been injured on the job, Continen-
tal found Urbano ineligible for a light-work assignment, forcing her to
284exhaust her family leave and go without pay. Urbano brought suit un-
der Title VII. 285
Several years earlier, the Sixth Circuit found that a similar light-
duty policy violated the PDA, since the law expressly required "that em-
ployers provide the same treatment of such individuals as provided for
'other persons . . . similar in their ability or inability to work."' 286 The
Urbano Court disagreed.287 The formal terms of the employer's policy,
not its substantive effect, dictated the court's analysis.288 Unless Urbano
could show that Continental's policy was a "pretext for discrimination
against pregnant women or that it had a disparate impact on them," the
policy satisfied Title VII. 289 The Fifth Circuit suggested that Title VII
might mandate pregnancy blindness since a contrary "policy would treat
a male employee 'in a manner which but for that person's sex would be
different. ,290
278. See Widiss, supra note 18, at 964, 1022.
279. Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Young v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
280. 138 F.3d 204, 206-08 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).





286. Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2012)).
287. Urbano, 138 F.3d at 207-08.
288. See id.
289. See id.




The Fourth Circuit's decision in Young elaborated on the justifica-
tion for pregnancy blindness under the PDA. Peggy Young began work-
ing for UPS in 1999, and by 2002, she had secured a position driving a
delivery truck.29 1 By 2006, Young had shifted to a part-time position as
an air driver, working in the early morning and picking up packages de-
livered by air carrier the night before.2 92 In July 2006, after two rounds of
unsuccessful in vitro fertilization, Young received leave from her em-
ployer to try a third time.293 When she finally became pregnant, several
doctors told her not to lift more than twenty pounds for the first twenty
weeks of her pregnancy.294 Armed with her doctors' advice, Young re-
quested a light-work accommodation.295
As a matter of official policy, UPS's applicable Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement allowed accommodation only when workers were injured
on the job or when employees had a disability cognizable under the
ADA. 296 UPS's occupational health specialist, Cynthia Martin, concluded
that Young's pregnancy did not warrant ADA protection and had not
occurred on the job, and as a result, Martin denied Young's request.297 In
November, when refused again by UPS's Capitol Division Manager,
Young had to exhaust her leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.298
Between November 2006 and 2007, Young received no pay and eventu-
ally lost her medical coverage. 299 After April 2007, when she gave birth,
she returned to work, filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal
300
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Young alleged race
and sex discrimination under Title VII, as well as disability discrimina-
tion under the ADA. 301
In rejecting Young's claim, the Fourth Circuit zeroed in on the se-
cond clause of the PDA, which provides, "women affected by pregnancy
... shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work., 302 While acknowledging that the second clause of the PDA
seemed clear on its face, the Fourth Circuit tried to reconcile it with the
first clause.3 03 "Although the second clause can be read broadly," the
court explained, "we conclude that its placement in the definitional sec-
291. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young 1), 707 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2013), amended
and superseded by Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 784 F.3d 192, subsequent determination,




295. Id. at 440-41.
296. Id at 439-40.
297. Id at 440-41.
298. Id at 441.
299. Id
300. Id at 442.
301. Id
302. Id at 447-48 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
303. See id. at 447-49.
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tion of Title VII, and grounding within the confines of sex discrimination
under § 703, make clear that it does not create a distinct and independent
cause of action."304 To do otherwise, as the court reasoned, would make
pregnant workers a favored class, receiving special treatment other em-
ployees did not receive.30s
The same reasoning informed the court's analysis of Young's
McDonnell-Douglas claim. "Under this framework, Young must estab-
lish a prima facie case of sex discrimination on her pregnancy claim by
showing '(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job per-
formance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) that similarly-
situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable
treatment."'
306
The court focused on the fourth element-particularly, who counted
307as an appropriate comparator. Young urged the court to compare her to
other workers similarly able to perform certain on-the-job tasks.30s By
contrast, UPS primarily analyzed the source of different workers' disabil-
ity.309 As the court explained, "Young is not similar to employees injured
on the job because, quite simply, her inability to work does not arise
from an on-the-job injury." 310 Finding that Young had not presented
enough evidence of circumstances "giving rise to an inference of unlaw-
ful discrimination," the court rejected her PDA claim.31 1
B. Pregnancy Blindness After Young
In vacating the Fourth Circuit's decision in Young, the Supreme
Court tried to carve out a middle-ground position that differed from the
stands taken by both UPS and the Fourth Circuit on the one hand and
312
Peggy Young on the other. The dispute turned on the meaning of the
second clause of the PDA, which states that pregnant workers shall be
treated the same "as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work."3 13 Young argued that "[t]he PDA . . . seeks
to ensure that 'women as capable of doing their jobs as their male coun-
terparts may not be forced to choose between having a child and having a
job."'314 In Young's reading, the second clause did not require courts to
set aside a conventional disparate-treatment analysis but did mandate that
judges identifying a discriminatory intent compare pregnant workers to
304. Id at 447.
305. Id. at 448.
306. Id. at 449-50 (quoting Gerner v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 674 F.3d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2012)).
307. See id. at 450-51.
308. See id. at 450.
309. See id at 450-51.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 451 (quoting Mackey v. Shalala, 360 F.3d 463, 468 (4th Cir. 2004)).
312. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young II), 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1352-54 (2015).
313. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012); see also Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1352-54.
314. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 11, at 19-20 (quoting International Union v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991)).
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others with a similar capacity to do a job, regardless of the source of their
disability.3 15 Amici representing a variety of women's rights and civil
rights groups went further, arguing that "[t]he text of the Second Clause
leaves no room for a distinction based on the source of the condition to
masquerade as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason."316 By contrast,
UPS argued that the second clause simply reaffirmed that pregnant
workers counted among the protected classes covered by Title VII and
said nothing about whether employers could accommodate some workers
while leaving pregnant employees out.3 17 In individual disparate-
treatment analysis, courts were free to compare pregnant workers to oth-
ers on the basis of disability.3 18 If UPS excluded all employees not in-
jured on the job, the company would necessarily comply with the
PDA.
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Breyer found none of these inter-
pretations persuasive. Like the lower courts, the majority found that
Young's interpretation would "grant[] pregnant workers a 'most-favored-
nation' status."320 With little analysis of the purpose or history of the
PDA, the Court dismissed the idea that Congress would have intended to
mandate equal treatment of pregnant workers "irrespective of the nature
of their jobs, the employer's need to keep them working, their ages, or
any other criteria."321 In reaching this result, the majority relied on lan-
guage in the House and Senate Reports, which stated in pertinent part
that the PDA "reestablish[ed] the law as it was understood prior to" the
Gilbert decision in 1976.322 Since the Court applied the McDonnell-
Douglas framework prior to Gilbert, the majority concluded that em-
ployers could deny pregnant workers accommodations as long as they
had "a legitimate, non-discriminatory, nonpretextual reason for doing
so." 32 3
Nor did the majority find that the text of the PDA required a differ-
ent interpretation. The second clause compared pregnant workers to
"other persons" similarly unable to work.324 Because the clause did "not
say that the employer must treat pregnant employees the 'same' as
'any other persons' (who are similar in their ability or inability to work),
315. See id. at 20-21.
316. Brief of Law Professors and Women's and Civil Rights Organization as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 24, Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 [hereinafter Brief for Law Professors] (No. 12-
1226).
317. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 11-12.
318. See id at 14.
319. See id at I l-12.
320. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1349.
321. Id. at 1349-50.
322. Id. at 1350 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-33 1, at 8 (1978)).
323. See id.
324. Id. at 1348.
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[or] ... specify which other persons Congress had in mind," the majority
325found Young's reading unpersuasive.
However, the majority found UPS's interpretation of the second
clause equally unconvincing. As Justice Breyer explained, Congress in-
tended to overrule both the holding and reasoning of Gilbert.32 6 UPS's
reading would do nothing to a core premise of the Gilbert decision-
"that an employer can treat pregnancy less favorably than diseases or
disabilities resulting in a similar inability to work." 3 27
The Young majority further outlined what a worker could do to suc-
ceed in an individual disparate-treatment claim.32 8 At the prima facie
case stage, a worker could prove "that she belongs to the protected class,
that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate
her, and that the employer did accommodate others 'similar in their abil-
ity or inability to work."' 329 If the employer offered a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the exclusion, a worker could raise an inference of
pretext by showing that a policy created "a significant burden on preg-
nant workers, and that the employer's 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory'
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden."330 To show a
material issue of fact as to whether a burden exists, a worker could
demonstrate that "the employer accommodates a large percentage of
nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of
pregnant workers."33'
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito analyzed in greater depth
to whom pregnant workers could be compared as part of individual dis-
parate-treatment analysis.332 Alito concluded that "pregnant employees
must be compared with employees performing the same or very similar
jobs."333 Alito also offered some clues about how such a comparison
would unfold by analyzing one of UPS's accommodations.334 The com-
pany had accommodated rivers who lost their DOT certification.3 35 UPS
and the Fourth Circuit distinguished pregnant workers from those ac-
commodated on two bases. First, workers who lost DOT certification
faced a legal obstacle while pregnant workers did not.336 Second, workers
without DOT certification theoretically still had the ability to perform a
variety of physical tasks that pregnant women requiring accommodation
325. Id. at 1349-50.
326. Id. at 1353.
327. Id
328. Id. at 1353-54.
329. Id. at 1354.
330. Id
331. Id.
332. See id at 1357-59 (Alito, J., concurring).
333. Id at 1357-58.
334. See id. at 1360-61.
335. Id. at 1360.
336. See id.
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did not.3 37 For Alito, neither of these distinctions made sense.338 At least
on some occasions, workers losing DOT certification would have the
same incapacity to work as pregnant employees.3 39 UPS offered no ex-
planation as to why pregnant drivers did not receive accommodations
afforded to other workers.34 0
Where do pregnancy-blind policies stand in the aftermath of Young?
This Part next explores the impact of Young on three strategies available
to pregnant workers: those involving disparate treatment, disparate im-
pact, and disability under the ADA. By providing a partial roadmap for
workers challenging pregnancy-blind policies, Young will make it easier
to bring disparate-treatment claims. At the same time, by reinforcing the
idea that providing workers meaningful choice constitutes impermissible
"special treatment," Young exposes the persistent disadvantages of using
litigation to protect pregnant workers.
C. Individual Disparate Treatment Claims
After Young, employees will most likely challenge pregnancy-blind
policies using either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. In di-
rect-evidence cases,341 employees have conventionally (and unsuccess-
fully) turned to light-work policies themselves as proof of discriminatory
intent.342 The logic here is straightforward: employers use light-work
policies that, by their very terms, exclude all pregnant women from ac-
commodations available to employees similarly able (or unable) to work.
Prior to Young, the circuit courts refuted this logic by relying on a narrow
definition of who counts as a proper comparator for pregnant women.343
In particular, courts compare pregnant women to other workers on the
basis of the source of their injury or disability, rather than their capacity
to work. On their face, pregnancy-blind policies treat pregnant women
the same as all other workers not injured on the job or not considered
disabled under the terms of the ADA.
Young is silent on whether pregnancy-blind policies can ever quali-
fy as direct evidence of discrimination, but the logic of the majority opin-
337. See id.
338. See id at 1360-61.
339. See id.
340. Id at 1361.
341. See, e.g., Jones v. Res-Care, Inc., 613 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2010).
342. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2011),
abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338; Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir.
2006), abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338; Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309,
1312-13 (1lth Cir. 1999), abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338; Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc.,
138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338.
343. See, e.g., Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 548-49 (upholding a pregnancy-blind policy because it
treated pregnant workers the same as non-pregnant employees not injured on the job); Spivey, 196
F.3d at 1312-13 (upholding a pregnancy-blind policy because it treated pregnant workers the same
as non-pregnant employees not injured on the job); Urbana, 138 F.3d at 206 (upholding a pregnan-




ion stands in obvious tension with this argument. The Court explicitly
allowed the employer to accommodate some workers with an identical
inability to work while excluding pregnant workers so long as employers
had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for doing so. 3 Under Young,
without more, a policy denying accommodation to pregnant workers
would likely not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. The fact of
the discrimination would not change the analysis. What matters under
Young is the employer's motivation and intent.345
Young will make a greater difference to the courts' analysis under
the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. In the lower courts,
the central problem in light-work cases has involved the final element:
whether denying light work to pregnant women creates a special burden
or whether granting pregnant women light work constitutes special
treatment.346
Before Young, courts answering this question focused on who
counts as a relevant comparator-a person "similarly situated" or nearly
identical to a pregnant woman whom an employer treats more favora-
bly. 347 Workers ask the court to compare workers in terms of their ability
to do a job, while employers ask the courts to spotlight the cause of a
worker's disability. 348Again, for the most part, the courts endorsed the
latter position.349
On the rare occasions that women made it past the prima facie
stage, employees tried to show that an employer's purportedly neutral
reason for using a pregnancy-blind policy was a pretext for sex discrimi-
nation.350 Before Young, proving pretext was hard. The Sixth Circuit
rejected a PDA challenge because the employee lacked strong enough
evidence that employers had adopted a pregnancy-blind policy for dis-
criminatory reasons.351 Establishing such an evidentiary foundation was
often likely to be difficult and expensive. Employees might need to con-
duct "an examination of how the policy came to be enacted and why," to
locate "evidence about women's status generally within the employer's
ranks," and to conduct "interviews . . . [of] current and past employees
about employer attitudes concerning pregnancy or women in the work-
,,52place."3  As Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas recognize, however,
344. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
345. See id.
346. See Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 36-37.
347. See id. at 37.
348. See, e.g., id. For examples of decisions on this point, see, e.g., Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313;
Urbano, 138 F.3d at 206.
349. See, e.g., Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 36-37.
350. See, e.g., Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641-42 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated
by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338.
351. Id.
352. Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 40-41.
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even workers who can bring forth this kind of evidence must counter
arguments that they demand "special treatment."353
Young provides some reassurance for pregnant workers proceeding
under McDonnell-Douglas. To make out a prima facie case, Young made
clear that workers needed only to show that the employer accommodated
other workers similar in their inability to work. If an employer adopts a
pregnancy-blind policy that accommodates nonpregnant workers with
similar physical disabilities, most lower courts would have rejected a
disparate treatment claim out of hand. After Young, if an employer uses a
similar pregnancy-blind policy, a worker should make it to the last step
of the burden-shifting analysis.
Young also makes it easier for pregnant workers to show pretext.
Both the majority and Justice Alito's concurrence draw attention to the
impact of an exclusionary policy and the stated reasons for it. If a policy
excluded most pregnant workers while covering all others, the majority
reasoned that a jury could reasonably infer a discriminatory intent, par-
ticularly when the employer's justification did not seem strong enough to
rationalize such a significant impact.3 54 Under Justice Alito's approach,
courts applying the burden-shifting framework would compare pregnant
workers to others assigned the same job and similar in their inability to
work. Alito's skepticism about UPS's accommodation of workers who
lost their DOT certification stemmed from the kind of mismatch between
the employer's stated means and ends that troubled the majority. At least
some of the time, pregnant workers and drivers without DOT certifica-
tion could perform the same tasks. For Alito, UPS had simply not offered
a good enough reason for providing an accommodation to the latter
group of workers while denying one to the former.
Just the same, after Young, real obstacles still stand in the way of
pregnant workers relying on individual disparate treatment. The majori-
ty's reasoning presupposes that there are nondiscriminatory reasons for
treating pregnant workers differently beyond their inability to perform
certain tasks.55 The Court specifically mentioned distinctions based on
"special duties, special service, or special needs," but left the door open
for employers to identify more nondiscriminatory reasons to single out
pregnant workers.356 As a result, Young still allows employers to circum-
vent the principle of meaningful choice written into the PDA. Under the
PDA, after choosing to accommodate any employee, the employer can
exclude pregnant workers only if they differ from others in their inability
to perform certain tasks. By allowing employers more room to exclude
353. Id. at 41.
354. Young H, 135 S. Ct. at 1354-55.
355. See id. at 1354.
356. Id. at 1350.
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pregnant workers, Young still does too little to guard against the burdens
on reproductive decision-making targeted by the PDA.
To defeat a plaintiffs claim at the summary judgment stage after
Young, an employer may simply have to offer a persuasive reason for
leaving pregnant workers out. The majority countenanced the possibility
that some pregnancy-blind policies-including UPS's own rules-would
pass muster.3 57 Young makes clear that as a policy more heavily burdens
pregnant women, employers must bring forth more persuasive reasons
for discriminating.35 However, the burden on pregnant workers is rela-
tive. If employers exclude all pregnant workers and many nonpregnant
workers, the kind of significant burden that the Young Court describes
may not exist. Even a burden as onerous as the one created by UPS may
still survive as long as the employer makes a sufficiently compelling
argument for it. Theoretically, employers could have good reason to re-
ward only those injured on the job for the hazard incurred during service.
Accommodations for those injured on the job effectively exclude all
pregnant women, but under Young, such a defect may not be fatal. For
Justice Alito, a pregnancy-blind policy excluding workers who do not
have a disability under the ADA would present no problem under the
PDA.359 After Young, pregnancy-blind policies will less often absolve
employers of responsibility for pregnancy discrimination. However, giv-
en the circuit courts' receptivity to these policies, Young still allows em-
ployers to treat pregnant workers differently because of the source of
their disability-their pregnancy.
Worse, Young reinforced the "most-favored-nation" reasoning un-
derlying the lower courts' treatment of pregnancy-blind policies.360 Both
the majority and concurrence reasoned that the PDA could not require
employers to treat pregnant women the same as others based on their
inability to work without requiring the kind of special treatment Title VII
prohibits. 361
The reproductive-liberty analysis favored by feminists and pro-lifers
in the 1970s may help workers overcome the hurdles created by Young.
Presenting the law as a protection against special burdens on reproduc-
tive liberty gave both movement and countermovement activists in the
1970s a way out of the reverse-discrimination dilemma. Activists suc-
cessfully refrained the PDA as a protection against special burdens on
women's reproductive liberty rather than a guarantee of preferential
treatment.
357. See id
358. See id. at 1354.
359. Id. at 1360-61 (Alito, J., concurring).
360. See id. at 1349-50 (majority opinion); id at 1357-59 (Alito, J., concurring).
361. See id. at 1349-50 (majority opinion); id at 1357-59 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Now, reviving the liberty analysis used in the PDA debate may also
help the courts understand individual disparate treatment analysis in dif-
ferent terms. Under Young, at the pretext stage, the courts effectively
balance competing considerations, evaluating the strength of an employ-
er's justification against the impact a policy has on pregnant women.
That impact should include not only the number of women affected by a
policy but also the burden on reproductive decision-making that a policy
imposes. Giving employers an out so long as they exclude a sufficient
number of nonpregnant workers does nothing to remedy the special bur-
den prohibited by the PDA. Nor should many justifications for excluding
pregnant workers be considered sufficiently weighty to justify the repro-
ductive burden inherent in pregnancy-blind policies. To define compara-
tors too narrowly would once again ensure, contrary to the intent of the
PDA, that "women workers would face serious obstacles to continuing
their pregnancy and maintaining their jobs at the same time."362
Justice Alito suggested that UPS's policy of accommodating only
disabled employees would ikely qualify as a sufficient, nondiscriminato-
ry purpose under Young.36 3 However, the majority mentioned that the
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 might change the
courts' analysis of whether pregnancy itself may constitute a disability.
This Part turns next to the disability-discrimination challenges that may
be available to pregnant workers after Young.
D. Pregnancy as a Disability Under the ADAAA
The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of qualified disabil-
ity status and demands that employers provide "reasonable accommoda-
tions" for qualified individuals unless doing so would impose an "undue
hardship."36 The ADA treats an individual as disabled when she either
has or is regarded as having "a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual."36 5
After the Supreme Court substantially narrowed the definition of a quali-
fying disability, Congress responded by enacting the 2008 ADA
Amendments Act (ADAAA). 366 The ADAAA clarified that the statutory
definition of disability should be "construed in favor of broad coverage"
and explicitly repudiated the Court's prior interpretations.36 The
ADAAA also required a court to treat a condition as a disability regard-
less of the effect of mitigating measures, such as medication or hearing
362. 124 CONG. REC. 36,818 (1978).
363. See Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1360 (Alito, J., concurring).
364. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
365. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
366. Widiss, supra note 18, at 1006.
367. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) §§ 2, 4, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(a)-(e) (2012);
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii) (2012) ("[Tlhe threshold issue of whether an impairment 'sub-
stantially limits' a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.").
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aids, and regardless of the fact that a condition was episodic or in remis-
*368sion.16
As Jeannette Cox has shown, the ADAAA provides a strong foun-
dation for efforts to define "normal" pregnancy, and not just pregnancy
complications, as a disability.36 9 The ADAAA makes explicit that "im-
pairment[s]" that cause "substantial" limitations in "walking, standing,
... lifting, [or] bending" qualify as disabilities.370
Although the ADAAA has significantly expanded the definition of a
disability, the few courts to consider the issue have responded with am-
bivalence to claims that "normal" or even "abnormal" pregnancy counts
as a qualified disability.37 1 Consider, for example, the case of Victoria
Serednyj, an activity director at a nursing home operated by Beverly
Healthcare, LLC (Beverly).372 Serednyj's job sometimes required her to
perform physical tasks, like rearranging chairs, transporting residents to
activities, or carrying shopping bags.373 Serednyj had previously suffered
a miscarriage, and when she became pregnant again, she had complica-
tions that required her to avoid strenuous physical labor.3 74 Her employer
refused to transfer her to a light-duty position because she had not been
injured on the job.375
Serednyj argued, among other things, that Beverly's failure to grant
her request constituted both disability discrimination and a failure to ac-
commodate under the ADA, since her pregnancy prevented her from
doing daily tasks like bending and lifting. 376 While acknowledging that
pregnancy may count as a physical impairment, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that Serednyj could not show that her impairment "substantially
limited" a "major life activity." 37 7 Finding that "[p]regnancy is, by its
very nature, of limited duration" and that "any complications which arise
from a pregnancy generally dissipate once a woman gives birth," the
Seventh Circuit rejected Serednyj's claim.378 Regardless of the impact of
the ADAAA, as Serednyj shows, courts may reject any disability claim
based on the fact that pregnancy and its complications have only a tem-
porary effect.
368. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)-(E) (2009).
369. Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as "Disability" and the Amended Americans with Disabilities
Act, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 443, 444-45 (2012).
370. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i), (j)(1)(viii-ix) (2012).
371. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Heathcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 554-57 (7th Cir. 2011);
Payne v. State Student Assistance Comm., No. 1:07-cv-0981-DFH-JMS, 2009 WL 1468610, at *3
(S.D. Ind. May 22, 2009).
372. Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 545.
373. Id.
374. Id at 545-46.
375. Id. at 546-47.
376. See id at 552.




Young itself offers few clues about how the Court would view
claims that pregnancy would constitute a disability after the ADA
Amendments Act. Just the same, the history provided here bolsters Cox's
analysis. During the battle for the PDA, business lobbyists urged Con-
gress to distinguish "normal" pregnancy from other disabilities because it
was temporary and (at least often) voluntary. Reproductive-liberty analy-
sis allowed legislators to see through this argument. Assume that an em-
ployer wishes to accommodate only nonpregnant workers. She can do so
as long as she does not formally categorize workers on the basis of preg-
nancy or related conditions. Achieving the same result-excluding preg-
nant workers from generally available accommodations-would be easy.
Accommodating only workers injured on the job effectively disqualifies
any pregnancy-based request, since women rarely conceive at work. To
be sure, the PDA did not require employers who provided no accommo-
dations to do so for pregnant employees.3 79 However, as the Article
shows, the diverse constituencies supporting the PDA did demand that
pregnant women be judged on their ability to work, not their pregnan-
cy-the "source" of their disability. Ignoring this consensus allows em-
ployers to burden women's reproductive decisions in precisely the way
the PDA forbids.
E. Disparate Impact Claims
Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas point to the promise of dis-
parate impact claims for women challenging pregnancy-blind policies.3 so
Because the plaintiff did not explicitly pursue such a claim, Young did
not consider the merits of such a strategy. To make out a prima facie
case, workers must show a specific and identifiable employment practice
(here, a pregnancy-blind policy) that had a statistically significant effect
on a protected class.38 As Grossman and Thomas recognize, the courts
appear to have loosened the evidentiary burden in the light-duty context,
allowing pregnant workers to rely on general statistics about "the number
of women who can be expected to become pregnant during their working
lives . . . as well as the extensive literature concerning pregnancy's phys-
ical effects."382
However, the disparate-impact theory mostly remains untested,
since courts have not yet fully addressed the employer's business neces-
sity defense: that is, whether pregnancy-blind policies are job-related and
serve a business necessity.383 Grossman and Thomas convincingly argue
379. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,660 (1977).
380. Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 41-49.
381. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988).
382. Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 45-47.
383. Id. at 47-48.
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against several likely defenses, including claims based on cost and the
volume of available, "real" light work.
However, the biggest problem with disparate impact claims may lie
in the "special treatment" trap set by early opponents of the PDA and
reinforced by the Young majority. The Urbano Court concluded that Ti-
tle VII forbids all policies that are not pregnancy blind.385 By granting
women a benefit that men could not receive, as the courts concluded, the
employer may discriminate on the basis of sex.386 The Supreme Court's
387decision in Ricci v. DeStefano reinforces this analysis of pregnancy-
based accommodations. Although decided in the context of race discrim-
ination, Ricci expressed skepticism about the legality of affirmative ef-
forts on the part of the employer to address disparate impacts, particular-
ly when those efforts resemble "reverse discrimination."388 In that case,
the City of New Haven set aside the results of a written test for the pro-
motion of city firefighters since it had a racially disparate impact.89 Ap-
plying the strong-basis-in-the-evidence standard from equal-protection
jurisprudence, the Court held that New Haven's decision constituted im-
permissible treatment under Title VII. 390
Scholars read Ricci in a variety of ways: from suggesting that the
Court requires color- (or pregnancy-) blindness in all but the rarest cases
to arguing that Ricci creates a new defense for employers in disparate-
impact cases who were not aware that a policy would have a disparate
impact. 39 What seems clear is that Ricci narrowed the scope of dispar-
ate-impact claims, providing a powerful weapon for those who frame
pregnancy accommodation as special treatment. On its face, Young offers
little comfort to those relying on a disparate-impact heory. The majority
and concurrence give ammunition to employers framing requests for
accommodations as demands for "most-favored nation status."
The liberty analysis set forth here may help strengthen the case for
disparate impact in a post-Ricci world. In debate surrounding the PDA,
feminists and pro-lifers convinced members of Congress that demands
384. See id at 47-49.
385. Urbano v. Cont'. Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young 1), 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
386. See id.
387. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
388. See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1343-44
(2010) (discussing the constitutional implications of Ricci); Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Real-
ism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 675 (2011) (explaining that Ricci "casts doubt on the legality of
the disparate impact doctrine").
389. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 561-62.
390. See id at 584-87.
391. See, e.g., Ian Haney-L6pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1871-74
(2012) (using Ricci as evidence that "[t]he Roberts Court seems determined to fully enforce past
colorblind reasoning-indeed, to expand its reach"); Primus, supra note 388, at 1363-75 (canvass-
ing other interpretations of Ricci); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1, 58 (2013) (arguing that Ricci allowed "majority plaintiffs to challenge a civil rights law by stand-
ards not available to minority plaintiffs challenging the criminal law").
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for "special treatment" in fact constituted calls for protection against the
unique burdens imposed on women balancing childbearing and careers.
The federal courts-and the Supreme Court-should overrule deci-
sions relying on the principle of pregnancy blindness. The history of the
PDA makes clear that it requires much more. Just the same, as the Part
next explains, the courts may not be the most promising place to chal-
lenge pregnancy-blind policies.
F. The Return to Legislative Constitutionalism
The history of the battle for meaningful choice illustrates not only
the constitutional values realized by the PDA but also the shortcomings
of litigation as a tool for seeking accommodations for pregnant workers.
Because of courts' reliance on precedent, judicial decision-making re-
392mains more path-dependent. As a conservative plurality on the Su-
preme Court reads color-blindness into the Equal Protection Clause,
courts are more likely to view Title VII as a guarantee of sex and preg-
nancy blindness-one centered on formal equality and fundamentally
opposed to any accommodations. The Young Court's hostility to "special
treatment" ignores the meaning and history of the PDA, but the Court's
discomfort with the very idea of accommodation flows naturally from
recent Equal Protection and Title VII jurisprudence.
Congress's institutional advantages-an ability to work incremen-
tally, democratic accountability, and the capacity to create redistributive
remedies-make the legislative arena a more promising place for con-
temporary proponents of meaningful choice. Superficially, Congress may
not seem to be a promising place to do much of anything. Defined by
gridlock, partisan polarization, and astonishingly low poll ratings, Con-
gress seems unlikely to advance any legislative agenda, let alone one
related to either equality or liberty.393
Moreover, an accommodation-centered policy has drawbacks of its
own. Some scholars worry that an accommodation-centered policy
would reinforce gender-paternalist attitudes or encourage employers to
avoid hiring women in the first place.39 4 Michael Selmi, for example, has
392. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 605 (2001) (noting that judicial
decisions are "path dependen[t]" in the sense "that courts' early resolutions of legal issues can be-
come locked-in and resistant o change" due to a variety of factors, including stare decisis, even
when change in legal rules is needed "to respond to changing underlying conditions").
393. This Congress is the most gridlocked in history. See Jonathan Weisman, In Congress,
Gridlock and Harsh Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/us/politics/in-congress-gridlock-and-harsh-
consequences.html?pagewanted=all&r-0 ("At this time in 2011, Congress had passed 23 laws on
the way toward the lowest total since those numbers began being tracked in 1948.").
394. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of
Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 115
(1989) (expressing concern that accommodation might "simply reconstitute [women's] role in a new
and more oppressive patriarchy"); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace,
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argued that disparate-impact heory, an approach sympathetic to accom-
modation rights, has "stunted the evolution of a more robust definition of
intentional discrimination."395 Samuel Bagenstos contends that broad,
structural, accommodation-centered remedies lack the "generally accept-
ed normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination law." 9
However, as the history presented here makes clear, the PDA mat-
tered to members of Congress and grassroots supporters because it
helped to give meaning to important constitutional values surrounding
reproductive liberty. As Joanna Grossman argues, an accommodation
regime would "create a counter-narrative of a woman's proper place."397
As importantly, an accommodation law would more accurately reflect
the movement-countermovement consensus on reproductive liberty that
emerged in debate on the PDA. A new legislative constitutional cam-
paign might represent the next logical step in the expression of those
values.
At a minimum, grassroots activists could pursue an amendment to
the PDA prohibiting discrimination by pregnancy-blind policies. More
ambitiously, feminists and antiabortion activists could pursue legislation
like the proposed federal Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), a law
that would force employers to make reasonable accommodations for
pregnant workers much like those employers must make available to the
disabled.398 The PWFA would make it unlawful for employers to deny
accommodation to pregnant women unless doing so would represent an
"undue hardship."39 Seven states have already passed such accommoda-
tion legislation, as have some local governments like the New York City
Council.Y
Legislative constitutionalism may well be the most promising path
for legislators and grassroots activists who want to give further meaning
24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 327-28 (2003) (noting that a mandate to accommodate care-
giving obligations could "translate into paternalism, as the beneficiaries are viewed as uniquely in
need of extra assistance or protection. Paternalism, like resentment, could lead to further limits on
women's opportunities and roles." (footnote omitted)).
395. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 701,
781 (2006).
396. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2006).
397. Grossman, supra note 18, at 625.
398. Co-sponsored by members of Congress on either side of the abortion issue, the bill has
been introduced in both the I13th and 112th Congress but has not been moved beyond committee in
either the House or the Senate. See Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 942, 113th Cong. (2013);
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 3565, 112th Cong. (2012); Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R.
5647, 112th Cong. (2012).
399. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
400. See, e.g., Sean P. Lynch, Philadelphia Enacts Pregnancy Accommodation Law, NAT'L. L.
REV. (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/philadelphia-enacts-pregnancy-
accommodation-law (summarizing state laws passed). For discussion of the New York City law, see,
for example, Rachel L. Swains, Placed on Unpaid Leave, a Pregnant Employee Finds Hope in a




to the reproductive-liberty norm written into the PDA. Legislative consti-
tutionalism allowed feminists and antiabortion activists to make gradual
progress in the realization of their constitutional commitments. Funda-
mentally, however, legal feminists and pro-lifers in the PDA battle con-
cluded that women required accommodation, not equal treatment, to ex-
ercise true reproductive liberty. The PDA requires only that employers
treat pregnant women the same as other workers with similar physical
limitations. A hirer can circumvent the PDA by providing no accommo-
dations at all. Obviously, such a policy may force a woman to choose
between economic security and childbearing. So too may pregnancy-
blind policies. Indeed, amici on either side of the abortion issue recog-
nized the purpose of the PDA and unsuccessfully urged the Court to re-
quire employers to accommodate workers equally based on their inability
to work rather than the source of their disability.401 To give meaning to
the values embraced by the PDA, activists may have to turn once again
to the legislative arena.
CONCLUSION
Arguments for reproductive choice have few supporters, but wide-
spread criticism of choice-based arguments in the courts has obscured
their transformative potential. Dissatisfied with juridical constitutional-
ism, grassroots groups on either side of the abortion issue turned to Con-
gress in expressing their constitutional commitments. Choice served as
the touchstone of demands to analyze reproductive liberty and sex
equality as inextricably linked-demands that blurred the distinction
between negative and positive rights. The PDA emerged from debate
between antiabortion activists, feminists, and business lobbyists about
the meaning of the right to choose and the remedies appropriate for vio-
lations of that right. The law represented an incremental step on the path
to guaranteeing women meaningful, rather than formal, reproductive
choice.
Tracing the history of liberty norms and the PDA calls into question
prevailing judicial interpretations of the protections the statute requires-
including the Court's analysis in Young. But perhaps the fact that courts
have relied on so narrow an interpretation of Title VII should come as no
surprise. Now as before, for those seeking workplace fairness, the courts
may not be the best place to look.
401. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Black Woman's Health Imperative, Joined by Other
Black Women's Health Organizations in Support of Petitioner at 13-15, Young v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc. (Young 1), 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226); Brief of Amici Curiae 23 Pro-Life
Organizations and the Judicial Education Project in Support of Petitioner Peggy Young at 10-16,
Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties
Union and a Better Balance, et al., in Support of Petitioner at 6-12, Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No.
12-1226); Brief for Law Professors, supra note 316.
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